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In 1997, DVD was introduced to the American public, beginning the fastest 
diffusion of any consumer electronics product in history.  In this dissertation, I show how 
DVD, via favorable conditions in industry, technology, culture, economics, and the 
regulatory environment, replaced existing home video and computing technologies while 
transforming home entertainment.  I analyze how DVD was successfully developed and 
commercialized by member firms in the filmed entertainment, consumer electronics, and 
computing industries from 1994-2002.  I demonstrate how a new industry developed 
around DVD through unprecedented cooperation between these three industries. 
This study uses trade publications, mainstream press reports, industry data, 
advertisements, depositions to congress, and published interviews with industry members 
to analyze a process that has been understudied by scholars.  Through the use of these 
resources, I explore how demand for the technology developed within existing contexts 
and how myriad forces aligned to enable the emergence of a new disc technology.  
 viii 
Furthermore, I demonstrate how DVD reshaped these contexts while transforming the 
nature and business of filmed content distribution.  DVD initiated a new era for digital 
content distribution.  This era was marked by the convergence of three industries, new 
levels of access to filmed entertainment, mobilized viewing opportunities, the conflation 
of the computer and the television set, and heightened efforts to protect content through a 
variety of legal, regulatory, and technological strategies. 
 ix 
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Chapter One:  Introduction to DVD 
Throughout the year 2000, a series of major media events took place that signaled 
a sea change in entertainment content production, consumption, and distribution.  For the 
first time in history, the home video market surpassed $20 billion in sales and rentals, 
more than doubling the domestic theatrical gross for feature films.1  From January 
through December, consumers purchased and rented more movies for home consumption 
than ever before in the twenty-plus year history of home video technologies.  Sales 
records for individual titles, especially blockbuster-scale hits, were established and 
broken repeatedly throughout the summer and fall.  Gladiator (R. Scott, 2000) set a 
record for sales and rentals in home video, generating more than $123 million in revenues 
in the six weeks between its November release and the end of the year.2  Theatrical 
business was booming, both at home and abroad.  Big-budget, effects-driven blockbusters 
dominated the marketplace.  Hollywood was growing and prospering at a pace not seen 
since the 1940s.  Driving this success was the profitability of ancillary markets, 
particularly new revenue streams from home video. 
The primary force behind these changes was the success of a new video disc 
technology, DVD, and its impact was evident not only in the movie industry.3  While 
sales of movies on the new format jumped a staggering 269% over the previous year, 
                                                
1 Video Software Dealers Association Report: “Consumers Spent More Than Ever on Home Video in 
2000,” January 29, 2001 




totaling $4.03 billion by year’s end, DVD was also the first home video technology 
designed for use on a variety of platforms.4 On March 9th, Bill Gates announced the 
forthcoming release of the first Microsoft video game console, the Xbox, which utilized 
DVD technology.5  By October, Sony’s DVD-based gaming system, the PlayStation 2, 
was available in the United States.  Millions of personal computers were shipped to 
retailers equipped with media drives capable of playing DVD-ROM and DVD-Video 
discs.  The major movie studios responded by realigning and renaming home video 
divisions under the more general moniker “home entertainment.”6  Media analysts 
reported on these events with varying degrees of astonishment and dismay.  There was 
general consensus that something important had taken place; explaining how and why 
these events took place was another story.  Hyperbolic reports of the end of an era of 
theatrical dominance proliferated in the mainstream press.  DVD was perceived as both a 
threat to the status quo and the harbinger of a new era of digital media production, 
distribution, and exhibition. 
Taken together, the events surrounding the rapid diffusion of DVD into the 
domestic marketplace in the year 2000 were interpreted as the end result of cross-
industrial partnerships in technological development and savvy marketing campaigns by 
the major film studios and consumer electronics firms.  As milestones were passed and 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Gladiator also joined X-Men (Singer, 2000) as the first major blockbuster films to earn more in their first 
week of home video release than in their first week of theatrical distribution. 
4 VSDA Report: “Consumers Spent More Than Ever on Home Video in 2000,” January 29, 2001. 
5 http://www.activewin.com/faq/x-box.shtml#Microsoft%20%22X-Box%22%20Timeline 
6 “APAR's WORKING WEEKEND: Video Is Dead, Long Live Home Entertainment,” by Bruce Apar, 




the massive impact of DVD became ever more apparent, Hollywood studio executives 
spoke of how DVD was designed to meet consumer demand for high quality digital 
content, delivering a home viewing experience closer to the theatrical experience than 
ever before.  DVD was described as a tool of empowerment for consumers, enabling 
users new degrees of control and access to content.  DVD technology was represented by 
the press as a revolutionary technology, capable of changing the nature and quality of 
movie watching forever. 
The rapid diffusion of DVD in the year 2000 was seen as a watershed moment for 
two key reasons.  First, it was seen as an indication of a major structural transformation in 
the home video business itself.  Since 1987, revenues generated from home video rentals 
had routinely surpassed domestic theatrical grosses.  However, due to copyright law, 
movie studios could not demand returns from the rental of each tape from retailers like 
Blockbuster.  The studios sought an alternative to the home video rental model that 
would return a larger percentage of profits.  Beginning as early as 1986, the studios 
experimented with pricing tapes for sale to consumers.  By the mid-1990s, the sales 
model had been established as a viable secondary market.  This model was then applied 
to DVD as the primary mechanism for distribution, permanently altering the home video 
business.  Under this new business model, DVDs would be sold, not rented, to 
consumers. The home video market prior to the introduction of DVD was enormous but 
was experiencing little new growth.  The market had become flat, antiquated, and out-of-
step with the dynamic changes in digital media delivery via the internet.  DVD offered 
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the major studios an opportunity to resuscitate a market that had stagnated in the 1990s 
while simultaneously re-branding themselves in the digital age. 
The second reason the rapid diffusion of DVD in 2000 was so significant had to 
do with convergence.  Simply stated, DVD was a dynamic, interactive technology that 
could bridge the gaps between the personal computer and the television set.  And while it 
altered the home video business, it also liberated movies from home consumption.  
Because DVD delivered digital movies on a variety of technological platforms, movies 
were suddenly freed of their domestic constraints and made mobile and portable.  DVD 
offered more than simply a movie for playback on a television.  DVD, via its utilization 
of optical disc technology, also expanded the nature and quality of content available to 
consumers.  Supplemental features offered the consumer access to the production process 
through “behind the scenes” documentaries, deleted scenes, and director and/or cast 
audio commentary tracks.  Interactive DVD-ROM features would direct consumers to 
websites where games could be played to supplement the experience of the movie, or 
similar titles could be ordered from studio websites.  
The rise of DVD in the year 2000 was indeed a sign of a dramatic transformation 
of the media content industries, as DVD became the most successful consumer 
electronics product of all time.  However, it was a monumental event for more reasons 
than those identified by most media analysts either at the time or since.  How do we 
account for the remarkable, unprecedented growth of DVD?  Did DVD revolutionize the 
media industries, or was it the end result of an evolutionary pattern developing over a 
number of years?  DVD’s success cannot solely be attributed to an industrial strategy to 
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alter the existing home video business model while creating convergence between 
computing and televisual technologies.  The unprecedented success of DVD marked the 
synchronicity and convergence of favorable contexts in technology, industry, culture, and 
the regulatory environment.  Over a period of years, and in some cases decades, these 
distinct yet interacting spheres aligned in such a way to guarantee DVD’s successful 
diffusion.  Only by virtue of the efficient exploitation of these contexts by industry could 
the DVD become the cultural and industrial force it is today.  Therefore, DVD must be 
viewed as both evolutionary and revolutionary in nature.  DVD technology developed 
along an evolutionary continuum, drawing upon existing technologies and established 
industrial structures.  Demand for the technology, both within industry and in society, 
also occurred as a result of existing experiences, needs, and demands for new 
technologies.  DVD’s revolutionary status hinges on the synchronous convergence of 
these evolutionary moments. 
This study, which examines the unique alignment of industrial, cultural, 
economic, technological, and governmental forces contributing to the unprecedented 
success of DVD, is framed by two major events related to DVD:  the commercialization 
of DVD-Video in the United States during 1997 and the maturation of the DVD industry 
in 2002, marked by the thirty millionth player shipped and the one billionth DVD shipped 
to retailers.7  In order to explain the rapidity of DVD diffusion, this study examines how 
favorable contexts developed over several years prior to the formation and maturation of 
                                                




the DVD industry.  Furthermore, this study illustrates how shifts during these preceding 
years in the media industries relating to globalization, conglomeration, deregulation, and 
digitization influenced the process of DVD diffusion.  In covering this period, I show that 
to study the emergence of DVD as a technology is to study the transformation of the 
media industry in a time of change and uncertainty.  The rate of change is reflected in the 
myriad shifts that have occurred in the DVD industry after the end-point of this study.  
Over the course of only three years from 2002 to 2005, complete television series have 
been released on DVD, competing high-definition disc technologies have been 
commercialized, and new global markets have opened for DVD distribution. 
The form and nature of filmed content have also changed dramatically during this 
time span.  Hollywood movies and television programs are now re-mastered in digital 
form, shipped via disc and over the internet with supporting documentary materials, 
games, interactive functions, and assorted promotional materials. While only a small 
number of movies were released for sale on VHS, huge portions of studio libraries were 
re-mastered for DVD release.8  These movies are increasingly distributed in their original 
aspect ratio in high quality digital formats.  Consumers have become adept at navigating 
through graphic menus, accessing, pausing, jumping to scenes, and replaying action 
instantly.  During this period, digital video consumption has changed from being a 
specialized, niche-oriented experience to an all-access twenty-four hour a day media 
                                                                                                                                            
 
8 According to the MPAA, some 68,000 titles were available by 2006. 
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mass cultural phenomenon defined by YouTube, Google, MySpace, and movies and 
complete television series available on DVD.   
Change has also been effected upon the regulatory environment, where digital 
rights management technologies have been officially sanctioned by legislation, shifts in 
copyright law, and court rulings.  DVD proved to be the first technology to test new 
digital copyright laws designed to protect digital content.  Hollywood media companies 
have shifted as well; once focused primarily on content production for consumption in 
either theaters or on television screens, content providers now think in terms of platforms, 
mobility, global markets, and digital content production and distribution.  What was once 
an industry focused exclusively on production and distribution of content has become an 
industry virtually obsessed with protection of content in an increasing number of media 
outlets.  A brief survey of the home video industry affords perspective on the significance 
of these changes. 
  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HOME VIDEO INDUSTRY 
The development of the home video industry can be discussed in relation to 
periods of industrial practice and shifts in structure.  According to Frederic Wasser and 
Eugene Marlow, the home video industry can be defined according to four phases of 
development before DVD:  from 1975-1980 the home-video industry consisted primarily 
of blank tape and hardware sales for use in home video recording and viewing 
pornographic pre-recorded content; from 1977-1981 video distribution companies were 
established for the dissemination of pre-recorded Hollywood content; from 1981-1986 
independent video distributors and Hollywood majors dominated the marketplace; from 
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1986-1993 increased concentration of video distributors and retailers turned video into 
big business, with the major studios and the conglomerates who owned them gaining 
control over the marketplace.  Significantly, the last phase as described by Wasser ends 
where DVD technology begins.  
Increasing concentration and “tightly integrated” media conglomerates, described 
in Wasser’s final VHS period, sought to take full advantage of increasing revenue 
streams from the video market and began to realize that advancements in optical disc 
technology would allow for a viable replacement home video technology.  Battling the 
independents and retailers for control over film and television profits and increased 
concentration of ownership would lead to the development of the DVD and a boom 
period for playback-only devices.  The introduction of DVD technology, within this 
context, should therefore be viewed as a process altering the existing industrial structure 
and practice while simultaneously creating a replacement industry. 
Thus two additional stages are needed to adequately describe the history of the 
home video industry.  The first, occurring from 1994-2002, is marked by the introduction 
and rapid diffusion of DVD, and the maturation of the DVD industry.  This period was 
further defined by the simultaneous release of blockbuster titles on tape for rent and sell-
through to consumers, DVDs of classics and blockbuster films available for purchase, 
and the growth of mass retailers Wal-Mart and Best Buy selling DVDs.  This period is 
the subject of this study.  The second phase, running from 2002-2007, is defined by new 
revenue sharing deals between studios and rental retailers, making DVDs available for 
rent in virtually all international markets, the phasing-out of VHS technology, online 
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distribution of films for rent (led by NetFlix), television series distribution on DVD, and 
competing high definition DVD technologies entering the marketplace.   
 The maturation of the home entertainment industries, first with VHS and then 
with DVD, was crucially related to the support of content providers, primarily the 
Hollywood studios, and the government.  When the Betamax was introduced in 1975, it 
entered into an existing industrial and regulatory context much different from those 
present with DVD.  The Betamax machine afforded viewers control over television 
schedules and freedom from the dictates of network executives.  The reaction of the film 
and television industries was less than enthusiastic.  Almost immediately, legislative 
action was taken against Sony for violation of copyright law.  Universal and Disney filed 
suit in 1976 to stop the recording and playback of film and television content from 
network and cable television.  While the case would ultimately go to the Supreme Court, 
it would fail to stop the diffusion of Sony hardware into the American marketplace.  This 
case is illustrative of larger concerns resulting from this new ancillary market.  While the 
advertisements for Betamax heralded the empowerment of consumers, the networks and 
film studios feared loss of control.  Once a tape has been sold to consumers, how many 
copies will they make?  How many friends will they share it with?  How would the 
studios maintain their rightful share of profits in this new market?  For the purposes of 
this discussion, it is sufficient to say that the content owners would begrudgingly work 
alongside video distributors and establish business strategies to maintain control over 
content.   
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The majors wanted to sell their content at premium prices to individuals or 
establish a mechanism to recoup a percentage of each rental.  At first, the majors were 
concerned primarily with consumers taping content off of live television, potentially 
damaging the profits received from the networks through advertisers.  However, by 1980, 
a growing number of “underground” retailers had begun setting up shops designed for the 
sale and rental of pornographic videos.  Through the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
pornographic video sales accounted for over half of all video sales in the United States.  
While this content was popular and profitable, its lasting impact was the establishment of 
retail and rental stores for the sale and rental of videotapes.  These stores would soon 
establish their right to rental through the “first sale doctrine,” guaranteeing them all the 
profits from rentals after first paying for content. 
 From 1977-1981, all of the major film studios (or parent companies) entered into 
the video distribution business.  Recognizing the increased consumer demand for pre-
recorded content and the potential for profit and control, Disney, MCA/Universal, 
Paramount, and Warner Bros. formed video distribution companies.  Fox, Columbia, UA, 
MGM, and Orion either partnered with an independent distributor or contracted to have 
an independent handle their distribution.  Quickly a business structure was established.  
The content owner would sell titles to a central distributor (the independent video 
companies in most cases), the distributor would sell the titles in bulk copies to a 
wholesaler who would then sell individual copies to retailers.  Retailers would then either 
sell highly priced copies to customers or, more commonly, rent titles for a predetermined 
length of time.  These retailers, mostly “mom and pop” operations often charged a 
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membership fee to customers on top of the rental fee in the hopes of avoiding legal action 
for copyright infringement.  They need not have worried; constant badgering of congress 
and the courts by the studios failed to exempt the content owners from the first sale 
doctrine.  For several years the studios sought a means to control this industry, either 
through legislative action, exclusive leasing deals with distributors and retailers, or 
contractual prohibition of sales and rentals.  Ultimately, the development of two-tiered 
pricing would be effective (enough) in securing profit margins for the time being. 
 From 1981-1986, the home video industry found its footing.  Enormous profits 
filled the coffers of independent video distributors.  By 1986, video rental stores in 
America surpassed the number of theatrical screens.  Two-tiered pricing, defined by 
higher prices for new titles than older releases (an $80 mark was set by Paramount for 
new releases), did not restrict or stagnate the market.  In fact, video distributors were 
desperate for more titles, any titles.  Consumer demand far exceeded supply.  Anything 
on the shelves would disappear as soon as it went on display.  Video distributors, now a 
major economic and industrial force, were aggressive in acquiring titles from content 
owners.  Bidding wars were commonplace.  The distributors sought another means to 
their profitable end:  pre-buying and production.9   
                                                
9 Of note here is Vestron, an independent video distributor formerly held by Time-Life.  Vestron became 
independent after the dissolution of Time-Life Films, acquiring the rights to all titles produced by the 
parent.  Soon thereafter, Vestron would become a major player in the production of feature films.  
Producing Dirty Dancing for theatrical release, Vestron became the first video distributor to have a 
theatrical hit.  In addition to pre-buying and forays into production, Vestron and the independents cultivated 
the retailers, spent generously on advertising, explored production of marginal genres, music videos, and 
how-to tapes, and focused efforts on both adult and children’s titles. 
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 As the market matured, video turned away from independence and diversity and 
toward the big blockbuster strategy of New Hollywood through increased acceptance and 
promotion of two-tiered pricing.  Increasing revenue streams did not cut into other 
ancillary returns, and production spiked for a period.  However, the most significant 
aspect of the mature video market is its reliance on big-budget, mainstream Hollywood 
product.  Retailers, wholesalers, and distributors saw increased returns on blockbuster 
films in both sales and rentals, and recognized the importance of theatrical success to 
video business.  Additionally, many independent distributors had overreached in film 
production and pre-buying, hoping that the market would sustain initial periods of 
growth.  Many independents were consolidated into the majors’ distribution arms or 
folded outright. 10  Subsequently, consolidation of the retail business, led by the rapid 
expansion of Blockbuster Entertainment in the mid-1980s, led to closer affinities between 
video and merchandizing and advertising, franchising of stores, and the establishment of 
a royalties structure.11  Blockbuster bought up mom and pop operations and formed a 
nationwide retail chain.  Integrating all aspects of the business save distribution, 
Blockbuster was soon attractive to Viacom, who was attempting to consummate a deal 
for Paramount Studios, for the purposes of tightly integrating their entertainment industry 
interests. 
                                                
10 Establishing a payment structure for royalties and copyright, the content owners had increasing control 
over the video business.  Royalties were paid to copyright holders from video distributors (20 percent of 
adjusted gross receipts), and to unions (SAG gets 4.5-6 percent of distributors’ gross) on top of the sale 
price.  The distributor charged a distribution fee and marked up the price for the rental market (again, the 
content provider and distributor were increasingly the same company).  The wholesaler minimizes risk by 




 Blockbuster Entertainment was bought by Viacom in 1993.  Soon thereafter, the 
majors would move back into the development of video disc technology.  Because the 
video independents were now owned and operated (by and large) by the content 
providers, the only step left in securing complete control of video profits was the 
elimination (or reduction) of the rental market in favor of sell-through. Ultimately, the 
content providers came to control the home video industry and pushed the hardware 
manufacturers, both domestic and foreign, to exploit developments in laser technology to 
manufacture a viable video disc.  These consumer electronics companies had their own 
motivations for developing video disc technologies.  They desired a replacement 
technology for home video that would generate new revenues.  Because the majority of 
the market owned a VCR, new sales were stagnating.  A new console market would 
generate new profits while allowing them to exploit patents in a similar fashion to those 
held in the CD manufacturing and distribution.  The lessons of the VHS era proved 
valuable to the studios, their parent companies, and the consumer electronics 
manufacturers.  A new home video technology would allow the content providers to 
dictate the structure of an industry separate from the wants and desires of large video 
rental retailers.  A single technological standard would encourage adoption of DVD 
consoles and drives while avoiding a format battle. 
Learning from the industrial and technological shifts within the home video 
sector, content providers sought a new technology based in playback that would preclude 
duplication or trading amongst consumers.  A content scramble system (CSS) was 
                                                                                                                                            
11 Top Gun is of note here as a sell through title that included a Pepsi commercial before the film 
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developed that would ensure just that.  Furthermore, content providers knew that they 
must aggressively lobby legislature to protect digital content from piracy.  The tiered 
pricing system established during the VHS era was adapted to the DVD market, with new 
release titles priced higher than library titles.  Furthermore, content owners established a 
tiered regional releasing strategy upon the introduction of DVDs.  The world would be 
split into regions, with hardware specifically designed to only play discs coded for the 
corresponding region.  Through this system, titles would be staggered in tiers based on 
region.  Theoretically, piracy could be contained within regions without eating into global 
profits. 
Additionally, the studios sought a replacement technology that would encourage 
consumers to re-invest in movies, replicating their existing home video libraries, or 
building new ones, with newly purchased, high quality, digital titles.  As early as 1986, 
Paramount was experimenting with sell-through of blockbuster titles, selling more than 
2.5 million copies of Top Gun.  In the 1980s and 1990s, Disney capitalized on market 
demand for ownership of family-oriented titles and the desire for repeat viewing of 
animated classics like Snow White (Disney, 1937), releasing tapes for sale to the 
consumer.  In so doing, they demonstrated the viability of a home video sales model that 
was adopted by the other studios in the early 1990s.  Sell-through of titles equaled rentals 
by the mid-1990s and accounted for the majority of increases in home video revenues 
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during that decade prior to the introduction of DVD.12  The Lion King (Disney, 1995) 
sold more than 30 million copies by 1996, generating over 500 million dollars, more than 
twice its domestic theatrical box office.  During 1996 alone, the year prior to the release 
of DVD and the shift to the sell-through model, sales of films on tape grew 7% from the 
previous year to 10.4 billion dollars. Culturally, media consumers had, as of the early 
1990s, fully shifted from audio tape to the CD and seemed primed for a similar shift to 
random-access digital video content technology. 
 
HOLLYWOOD, HOME ENTERTAINMENT, AND THE DVD 
As early as 1986, under the direction of Warren Lieberfarb at Warner Bros., DVD 
technology began its gestation and development period.   After a series of starts and 
stops, failed technologies, and lukewarm support from the rest of Hollywood, 
developments in laser and manufacturing technologies led to two viable DVD 
technologies.  The turning point for DVD came in 1995, when at the behest of the major 
U.S. movie studios, a group of computer companies led by IBM brokered a deal between 
competing camps of consumer electronics manufacturers engaged in DVD 
development.13  The movie studios had what they wanted: a unified digital video disc 
technology that was “play-back only.”14   
                                                
12 Gomery, Douglas.  “The Hollywood Film Industry:  Theatrical Exhibition, Pay TV, and Home Video,” 
Who Owns the Media?  Competition and Concentration in the Mass Media Industry.  2000.  Benjamin M. 
Compaine, Douglas Gomery.  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates:  Mahwah, New Jersey.  Pp. 418. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Unlike VHS, DVD-Video and DVD-ROM could not record off of live television. 
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Concurrent with the research and development efforts relating to DVD, movie 
studios, consumer electronics companies, and computer companies were engaged in 
fundamentally different businesses.  The degree to which there was interaction between 
industries was dictated by mergers and acquisitions (e.g. Sony purchasing Columbia Tri-
Star and Matsushita purchasing MCA-Universal), by “synergizing” holdings, or by 
computing firms supplying technologies for content production.  Home video technology 
was supplied by consumer electronic companies to consumers and to content providers.  
The movie studios would then convert their products from film to analog video tape for 
distribution.  These separate industries would come together for the first time to 
commercialize DVD.  The prospect of a multi-platform optical disc technology led all 
interested parties into a tenuous partnership that resulted in the formation of an industrial 
body designed to control and develop the technology in all markets.   
The key, driving force that brought DVD to market was the cooperation and 
pooling of resources by the largest firms in the computing, filmed entertainment, and 
consumer electronics industries.  These three industries came together to form the core of 
the DVD Consortium in 1995 (renamed the DVD Forum in May, 1997).  The Consortium 
was a collective administrative organization from which to launch DVD into all global 
markets in 1997 and 1998.  From its inception in 1995 through the release of DVD in 
1997, to the maturation of the industry in 2002, the DVD Forum provided a crucial 
collaborative venue in which these traditional industrial rivals jointly shaped a new 
industry and utterly controlled the DVD marketplace.  During this brief period, the 
Forum established control over the technology through technological and legal 
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mechanisms, exploited cultural desires for home viewing and portable media 
consumption, redefined the relationship between studios and home video retailers, and 
introduced new standards for the production, distribution, and marketing of films and 
television programs.  More than simply an administrative body, the DVD Forum was a 
new strategy for collectively controlling content through technology.  Recognizing the 
increasingly digital media environment, the DVD Forum placed a heightened emphasis 
on lobbying in Washington while developing technical copyright protection measures, 
theft-deterrent packaging, and a strong legal team to combat piracy in global markets.  
Through these tactics, the DVD Forum ushered in a new era for digital technology 
marked by unprecedented integration of three once-distinct industries and by the 
increased economic value of home entertainment products to each constituent industry. 
The major film studios continued to produce big-budget “blockbusters” for 
release in theaters across the world.  However, DVD offered such enormous returns to the 
studios that theatrical exhibition became more and more a “loss leader” for the eventual 
profit returns in home video and other ancillary markets.  DVD could make films that 
disappointed at the box-office profitable eventually, and small budget or direct to video 
features could return enormous profits to distributors and production companies alike. 
DVD offered content providers an opportunity to re-orient both their long-standing 
relationships with rental retailers and the ways in which they were branded and 
conceptualized in the public imagination.  Rather than relying solely on blockbusters to 
return profits and keep the branded identity of the studio in the public consciousness, the 
studios turned to their vaults to accomplish these tasks.  DVD afforded all copyright 
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holders the potential to re-package their films (and, by 2002 television series as well) for 
audiences.  Thus, DVD vastly enhanced the value of a studio’s brand; for instance, MGM 
could re-package pristine digital versions of the James Bond series at relatively little cost 
and profit handsomely (and they did).  Additionally, DVD became the means by which 
the major studios could expand into “branded entertainment” in a variety of additional 
markets, including merchandising, video games, and cross-promotions both in the U.S. 
and around the world.  In the process, DVD returned profits to not only the studios, but 
their counterparts in consumer electronics and computing industries.   
DVD also changed how Hollywood operated by reinforcing the importance of 
digital technologies to the business of moviemaking.  DVD was not the first digital 
technology to be incorporated by the studios.  Prior to DVD, the studios utilized digital 
technologies throughout the production chain, from shooting on digital cameras and 
editing in digital suites, to the growing reliance on computer-generated digital effects.  
However, whereas digital technologies had been utilized on the production side of the 
business for a number of years, DVD was the first digital technology deployed in the 
distribution of content.  Prior to DVD, Hollywood movies and television shows were 
converted to analog tape for distribution in secondary markets.  DVD ushered in an era of 
digital content delivery via a variety of digital technologies, including high-speed 
internet, digital cable, and High Definition disc.   
Collecting movies took off like never before in the history of home video.  
Indeed, a culture of personal ownership of media developed around DVD that was 
initiated by the Hollywood studios’ desire to offer an alternative to the existing cultural 
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and industrial home video rental model. DVD offered the studios an avenue to stimulate a 
mass home viewing culture based on repeat viewing, permanence, ownership, and status.  
Barbara Klinger has identified DVD enthusiasts as “royalty” in her analysis of a number 
of home viewing cultures.15  She posits that connoisseurship and mastery over digital 
technology by “techie” film collectors led to an evaluative film culture surrounding 
DVD.  With the mass diffusion of DVD, these early adopters account for only a small 
portion of a broader DVD culture.  DVD has, since 2000, moved into the mainstream; the 
masses are purchasing DVDs in huge numbers for their family home theater libraries.  
DVDs, much more so than their video and laserdisc predecessors, were designed and 
marketed to be owned, cherished, displayed, and archived for future use by the general 
public.  Creating this cultural phenomenon was at least partly based on technological and 
industrial conditions; the ease of use and quality of the image, coupled with the 
affordability of hardware and software, made the casual home-film viewer comfortable 
with the switch to digital disc technology. 
DVD influenced the media landscape by virtue of its widespread adoption and 
compatibility across platforms.  As I demonstrate over the next several chapters, DVD 
and members of the DVD Forum from the three constituent industries were at the 
forefront of myriad changes across a variety of contexts.  For example, by developing a 
series of digital rights management technologies designed to limit piracy of digitally 
encoded discs, the members of DVD Forum initiated debate about digital copyright law 
                                                
15 Klinger’s book illustrates the centrality of home viewing to the histories, discourses, technologies, 
cultures and business of cinema in her book:  Beyond the Multiplex:  Cinema, New Technologies, and the 
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and fair use in the digital age.  By developing an administrative body for controlling the 
technology that included members from three different industries, the DVD industry first 
circumvented and then adapted to antitrust concerns through direct interaction with the 
Department of Justice.  Throughout this study, I show how these three industries 
developed, commercialized, and controlled DVD technology while simultaneously 
altering the content businesses and the larger regulatory, cultural, and industrial 
landscapes.  A key consequence of these partnerships was that DVD provided a model 
for digital industrial formation and technological introduction.  In this new era, both 
“old” media industries (i.e. the film studios) and “new” media industries (i.e. computer 
companies) partnered to establish a universal technological standard.  In so doing, these 
industries combined resources to assure the successful introduction of DVD as a 
technology meeting the demands of both the public and the constituent industrial players. 
As I demonstrate in the next section, scholars are only beginning to discuss the impacts 
DVD has had on the media industries, media culture, and the regulatory environment. 
SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
As influential as DVD has been to the bottom-line profitability of the 
entertainment, computing, and consumer electronics industries, remarkably little has been 
written about the technology, the processes through which it was commercialized, and its 
various impacts on the contemporary media world.  Jim Taylor’s DVD Demystified marks 
the first and only substantive effort, at this point, to chronicle the various mechanical 
workings of the technology, including the processes of technological and industrial 
                                                                                                                                            
Home (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2006). 
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development.16  However, Taylor limits his focus to the technology itself, offering 
descriptive accounts of the various “pros” and “cons” of DVD over the alternatives in the 
marketplace, rather than investigating its dynamic influence on a variety of contexts.  
What little academic inquiries there have been into DVD have focused on the cultural 
impacts of the technology on social groups and the negotiation of their identities relative 
to changing home viewing cultures.17  If the process of DVD development, diffusion, and 
commercialization are mentioned in these analyses, it is usually an afterthought, or 
simply a “given condition.” 
DVD is often overlooked in contemporary media industry analyses.  Most studies 
covering 1990s Hollywood focus on the home video industry as an important 
development to the economic well-being of the studios and their parent conglomerates 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s while suggesting that uncertainty lays ahead with 
DVD.18  Since DVD entered into an existing home video marketplace and home viewing 
culture relatively recently, scholars seem hesitant to assess its various impacts and 
significances in any great detail.  Studying a technological-cultural phenomenon without 
the benefit of historical perspective is a daunting task.  Additionally, the process of DVD 
development, diffusion, control, commercialization, and popularization are exceptional in 
                                                
16 For example, Jim Taylor’s work has been most noteworthy in this regard, see DVD Demystified (New 
York:  McGraw-Hill,1998), DVD Demystified Second Edition (New York:  McGraw-Hill, 2001), and 
Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About DVD (New York:  McGraw-Hill, 2004). 
17 The first book to discuss the cultural impacts of DVD by Aaron Barlow, The DVD Revolution:  Movies, 
Culture, and Technology (Westport, Connecticut:  Praeger, 2005) suggests that DVD is at the heart of a 
global participatory culture. 
18 For example, see Douglas Gomery, “The Hollywood Film Industry:  Theatrical Exhibition, Pay TV, and 
Home Video,” Who Owns the Media?, eds. Benjamin M. Compaine and Douglas Gomery (New Jersey:  
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.), 411-426. 
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the degree of involvement across industry lines, and can not be easily assessed by 
studying one particular component, company, or individual.  Because DVD is not a 
media-specific technology (i.e. bound to a single media industry) scholars undertaking 
analysis of any aspect of DVD must first decide if they are studying the technology as a 
new media technology, a home video technology, a gaming technology, as a delivery 
mechanism for a cultural experience, or some combination thereof. 
Scholars studying cinematic technologies seem equally perplexed with regard to 
DVD.  While there have been no significant scholarly studies to date on the DVD 
phenomenon, how media technologies have been studied in the past suggests directions 
for this study.  Media scholars have routinely relied on classification systems to make 
sense of cinematic technologies in keeping with traditional ideas of what technologies 
consist of:  mechanical devices produced and consumed by and for human experiential 
pleasure.  By classifying moving image technologies according to their mechanical 
underpinnings, historians could connect the processes of representation (camera), 
reproduction (printing), and exhibition (projection).  In so doing, cinema and later 
television and related technologies, including home video, became quantifiable objects of 
study, their unique social and cultural import explained through a process of 
extrapolation from the precise nature of core technologies.  Studying the processes 
involved in the “birth” of DVD reveal that this approach fails to account for the 
complicated and fluid nature of technological innovation.  Because a variety of 
technological, cultural, industrial, and economic forces influenced the development of 
DVD, it is necessary to account for these factors through a nuanced, synthetic approach. 
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Traditional accounts of technological history tend to isolate machines within one 
sphere of influence, whether social, political, cultural, industrial, legal, or economic 
contexts.  Attempting to redress and deconstruct this tendency, media scholars have 
sought to identify the interplay of forces that might have influence on the form and 
function of home video devices.  Shifting from technological determinism to a range of 
determinants in attempting to ascertain what shapes technological change, scholars have 
engaged with multifarious methodologies.  To wit:  economic imperatives contextualize 
the development of cinematic and home video technologies within a broader discussion 
of mature (or maturing) capitalist industry (Gomery and Allen 1985; Marlow and 
Secunda 1991; Albarran 1996; Picard 1989).  Political and ideological determinants 
privilege the role of power and agency in locating the development of home video 
machines (Wasser 2001).  Cultural studies inquiries focus on the uses and interfaces of 
home video machines impacting our sense of self in relation to gender, class, and race 
(Gray 1992; Levy 1989).  Sociological and cultural analyses further explore how 
spectators use home video technologies in forming or maintaining social groups and 
norms as well as the cultural position of home video technology relative to ways and 
processes of viewing (Barlow 2005; Carrol 2005; Cubbison 2005; Johnson 2005; 
Kendrick 2005; Wasko 1994).  Industrial determinants posit the significant role of 
changes in business strategies intrinsic to the mode of production, arguing that home 
video technology fulfills an industrial role, carefully managed to augment the existing 
paradigm (Wyatt 1994; Gomery 1989; Prince 2000).  By employing these approaches 
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scholars seek to shift the definition of home video technology, eliciting a broader, more 
nuanced view of this technology as systems of social demands and uses (Moran 2002). 
Home video scholarship, within the larger field of media studies, has deployed 
one or more of these methodological approaches to discuss the technology’s significance 
to perceived changes in industry, culture, economics, and global distribution of 
Hollywood content.  Technocratic studies, commonly associated with these “before and 
after” type polemics, take several forms.  Occupying spaces along a continuum between 
“hard” and “soft” extremes, Post-Enlightenment technology studies convey a vivid sense 
of the efficacy of technology as a driving force of history.  Focusing largely on the 
impact of the home video and DVD technology before investigating its genesis point, 
these narratives make for entertaining historical storytelling:  the material artifact (the 
VCR, the VHS/Betamax, or the DVD) is invented and has immediate causal efficacy in 
imparting change in society, culture, economics, etc (Barlow 2005).  As is the case with 
traditional histories of home video technology, the very materiality of the artifact and its 
widespread popularity gives weight to this assertion, one in which the machine becomes 
an active role player in the process of historical revolution.  However, technological 
determinism is nuanced between those polarized extremes of hard and soft.  In the 
former, technology is assigned agency and leads us towards inescapable necessity 
(Marlow and Secunda 1991).  The latter perspective locates video technology in the 
various and complex social, economic, political, and cultural matrices of existence, 
highlighting the role of human actions in shaping historical moments (Moran 2002).   
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However, the development and diffusion of digital cinematic technologies has 
significantly altered this pattern.  Faced with new non-linear technologies, and more 
specifically digital media technology, media scholars were challenged to develop new 
ways of addressing technology-user interaction.  Because these technologies privilege 
graphic interfaces and complex navigation through branched menus, scholars engaged 
new media theory, systems analysis, interface theory, hybridity, and media specificity to 
understand a new dynamic between audience and text.  Once the technology itself moves 
outside a linear continuum, in the case of cinematic technology (analog or celluloid) 
towards a more fluid, random access digital technology such as DVD, scholars are faced 
with a daunting task:  contextualize a hybridized media format in terms other than 
traditional aesthetic, industrial, “bounded,” approaches of the past.  Scholars have 
responded by integrating new media theory into existing paradigms, contextualizing 
digital media in traditional categories of production, distribution, and exhibition.  
Additionally, new and digital cinematic technologies are most often situated in industrial, 
political, or reception contexts (versus aesthetic or social contexts).  Digital media 
scholarship is forging new ground in theoretical domains, reshaping our understanding of 
media texts and media specificity.  However, the dominant trend within film and media 
studies is to move away from the “mechanical underpinnings” of digital technologies in 
favor of a definitive industrial bias.  In this approach, digital technology is viewed in 
predominantly economic or industrial terms; either digital technology exists within a 
larger move towards late capitalism categorized by profit margins and multinational 
conglomeration, or as a symptom of industrial imperatives to create “filmed 
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entertainment” franchises capable of crossing traditional media boundaries (Wasko 1994; 
Prince 2000). 
From evolutionary histories, “Great Man” histories of conquest and invention, 
etymological histories detailing linear chains of events leading directly to causal 
inevitabilities, to industrial, economic, social, cultural, aesthetic, discursive investigations 
of technology in context, scholars attempt to fill the record with perspectives on the 
relevance of technology in a particular historical moment or moments.  It is my task, 
undertaking a similar consideration of technology, to create a synthesized methodological 
approach that can begin to account for the relevance of DVD technology to contexts 
including industry, culture, regulatory and political environments, economics, and the 
like.  However, it is important to recognize that there exists no history of this technology 
to revise, no problematic text to revisit, only one to write through the lens of a 
contemporary scholar seeking the best and most ways to contextualize and theorize 
digital media technology. 
 Given the limited amount of information analyzing the development of DVD 
technology, and the dearth of scholastic inquiry into the topic, I have relied heavily on 
trade publications, popular press articles, depositions to Congress, Security and Exchange 
Commission filings, and published interviews for information. There are multiple main 
sources of data:  secondary sources including trade publications Variety, Video Business 
News, and The Hollywood Reporter, economic data supplied by the Video Software 
Dealers Association (VSDA), mass media publications including USA Today, The New 
York Times and major newspapers from around the United States, and websites, 
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interviews with DVD producers and designers, corporate documents including 
memoranda, corporate correspondence and other general data, and published interviews 
with industry personnel who played a role in establishing technological specifications and 
industrial structures in the mid-1990s.  I also rely on a variety of DVD news websites.  
Secondary sources are culled from a variety of online and print sources dating back to 
1994, including “DVD Exclusive” (Variety Supplement), “DVD Report,” “Electronic 
News,” “Screen Digest,” “PR Newswire,” “DVD Angle,” and “The Digital Bits” website.  
Much of the information garnered from these secondary sources has provided insight into 
the official position espoused by industry member companies through their PR firms, and 
will be compared to interview responses on the same subjects.  I have relied on a variety 
of technical publications to familiarize myself with jargon related to the technology; I 
have made every effort to avoid lapsing into this jargon.  Primary corporate documents 
are analyzed in conjunction with interviews of corporate executives in order to compare 
and contrast official documentation to interview responses.  Because these secondary 
sources often lack perspective, depth, or objectivity, the information and analysis from 
these sources are cross-checked with multiple sources for validity whenever possible.  
Additionally, as mentioned above, this study is not attempting to be an exhaustive study 
of the DVD in all contexts.  This analysis is limited in scope, focusing primarily on DVD 
in the United States.   
In this study I employ a synthesis of technology studies’ focus on the artifact 
combined with analysis of a variety of “determinants” shaping the technology and its 
process of diffusion into society.  In so doing, this study examines technological, socio-
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cultural, political, and industrial enabling conditions in order to begin to explain the 
successful introduction and commercialization of DVD technology.   The study begins 
with a history of home video and optical disc technology and then employs multiple 
approaches:  discourse analysis, diffusion of innovations theory, cultural studies, 
economic industrial analysis, and political economic approaches.  In so doing I detail the 
complex forces at play in DVDs development and introduction.  I have tried to create a 
synthetic approach that is fluid and exploratory.  Wherever possible, suggestions have 
been made for directions for further research.   
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As a means of further framing my analysis, I have turned to four bodies of 
scholarly literature:  media industry studies, political economy of the media industries, 
diffusion of innovations, and social-shaping of technology.  In referring to these four 
areas of research, this study can be contextualized within larger scholarly traditions. 
Media Industry Studies 
Critical studies of cinematic technologies have examined technology in a variety 
of contexts, including its relationship to industrial modes of production.  Media industry 
studies, though rarely focusing exclusively on cinematic technology, have grappled with 
the relationships between production operations, marketing strategies, media economics, 
management systems, and labor.  On the whole, however, the role of technology within 
industrial analysis remains focused on the industrial context within which technology is 
exploited.  By detailing the division of labor within industrial sectors, scholars and 
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industry insiders utilize evidence pertaining to the industrial structure in particular 
historical periods, relating shifts in the structure to changes in the production process and 
the products themselves. 
Studies of industrial modes of production and the dynamics of managerial 
decision making processes are complemented by a growing body of literature focusing 
explicitly on media economics.  Douglas Gomery provides a basic model for examining 
media economics, suggesting that, “a set of firms creating a similar product or service 
constitutes an industry (Gomery 1989).”  These industrial organizations act in 
systematized and highly regular ways to ensure efficient allocation of resources and the 
distribution of goods and services into the economy.  The systemic and differentiated 
labor structure, which often includes technology producers and designers, 
documentarians, editors, graphic designers, etc., serve these aims for the DVD industry.  
Analysts employing this approach attempt to define the basic structure, conduct, and 
performance of the industry under study.  Questions addressed include:  Who are the 
firms constituting an industry?  How big are they?  How do firms set prices?  How do 
they distribute their products?  Are goods distributed “fairly”?  What is the role of 
government in the performance of the industry?  These questions provide a starting point 
for examining a given industry but fail to address the developmental conditions or the 
activities of key firms in establishing an industrial structure.  Contemporary media 
scholars recognize this shortcoming and thus are beginning to account for the formation 
of industries and the incorporation of new technologies into existing industrial structures.  
Additionally, scholars are employing a synthetic approach to technology and economic 
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analysis, analyzing the economic impetus behind particular contemporary production 
styles (Wyatt 1994).   
 Neo-classical economics, focusing on the structures through which production 
executives meet the wants and needs of audiences through the allocation of resources, 
analyzes the role of producers and consumers and attempts to predict the success or 
failure of films or genres in particular markets (Picard 1989; Albarron 1996; Alexander et 
al. 1993).  Through micro-analysis these researchers illustrate how industries prosper 
within particular economies.  These studies are largely descriptive, detailing the complex 
financial and legal arrangements surrounding production, distribution, and exhibition. 
 The question of how to conceptualize the role of technology within media 
industry studies has been of little concern to scholars within the field.  Studies of 
entertainment industries routinely focus on mergers and acquisitions, economic 
imperatives, and the role of management in the production of cultural texts.  Beginning in 
the 1980s, scholars undertook several studies of the studio era.  These studies detailed 
through archival evidence the division of labor and the need for standardization on the 
supply side of the economic chain (Staiger 1985).  Through analysis of the inner 
workings of studio decision-making processes, scholars were able to account for the 
development of group styles while detailing the production histories of individual films 
(Schatz 1988). 
 Schatz, Staiger, and others redressed theoretical gaps within the field of cinematic 
research.  By contextualizing the relationships between labor and management, these 
scholars can be aligned with revisionist technological historians.  However, the roles 
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played by technology and the shifting stakes of contemporary media economics in an era 
of ancillary markets and digitization suggests new questions about the primacy of 
technology and technological industries.  Analyses of division of labor within new media 
industries should consider not only owners and executives, primary creative personnel, 
and creative managers, but also technical craft workers, including designers who execute 
and conceptualize the possible applications of digital technologies (Hesmondhalgh 2002).  
In the DVD industry, these workers design interfaces, menus, branching designs, and 
compression algorithms.  Creative craft workers produce, direct, shoot, and edit 
documentary features that detail the making of the primary product (film or television 
series); they produce commentary tracks by actors, directors, or historians to accompany 
the film; and they work in close concert with the creative personnel on the film or 
television series to acquire deleted scenes, alternate endings and the like.  
The relationships between technology and economics in the digital age are not 
limited to production, content acquisition, and design.  In order to fully account for the 
technology’s role in the economic equation, we must begin to conceptualize 
technological manufacturing, design, replication, duplication, etc., not only according to 
its position vis a vis institutional structures and support mechanisms, but as wholly 
defined, differentiated and integrated industries.  Understanding the activities of member 
firms explains, to some degree, the successful integration of DVD into the existing media 
marketplace.  Examination of the collective activities of member firms begins to explain 
the dynamic processes of industrial formation.  Gomery claims, “For a particular 
industry, conditions of supply and demand give rise to a certain number of corporations 
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which, in turn, define its basic economic structure.”  As we will see, consumer demand 
for DVD and the rush to supply it were central to the rapid evolution of industrial 
structures.  DVD offered superior quality compared to its home video and computer drive 
antecedents, combining quality, reliability and speed of data transmission.  Firms acted to 
ensure that the new technology would meet or exceed consumer and technical 
expectations in the early stages of product launch.  Laserdisc-style ancillary materials 
with multiple format options (aspect ratios ranging from pan and scan to anamorphic 
widescreen, subtitles, and language options), commentary tracks from scholars as well as 
producers and directors, and “making of” documentaries defined DVD-Video as a 
markedly different technology than VHS. Therefore, firms acted to ensure that consumers 
recognized this product as different from and superior to existing home video and 
computer technologies.  
 While media industry studies apply economic analyses in order to explain the 
relationships between production, distribution, and exhibition systems and market 
performance, these systems are often over-determined relative to other frameworks.  
Little attention is given to mutually-influencing conditions in law and the political 
environment, focusing instead on economic behavior as the principal framework for 
analysis.  Conversely, political economy studies approach economic doctrines as beliefs 
and actions to be explained relative to existing conditions in government.19  Political 
                                                
19 See for instance, David Baker, “The political economy of fascism:  Myth or reality, or myth and 
reality?”  New Political Economy, Volume 11, Issue 2 June 2006, pp. 227-250. 
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economic studies challenge orthodox economics by drawing on a variety of disciplines to 
explain the interplay between industry, political institutions, and capitalism. 
 
Political Economy 
 A political economy approach to the film and media industries is concerned with 
economics, ownership, power and relations of power within industry and society.  This 
approach details the structures of power and the strategies of control employed by 
conglomerates forming a media oligopoly.  Specifically, political economy approaches 
investigate social change and history, social totality, moral grounding, and praxis.  Its 
concern with social change and history is centered on understanding and contextualizing 
the impacts of capitalism, including its dynamic relationship to the state apparatus.  In 
this way, political economy approaches continue theoretical and critical traditions of 
Marxist economics, highlighting the processes through which control and power are 
operationalized in the maintenance and organization of society (Mosco 1996).  Social 
totality, according to Mosco from Murdock and Golding (1991), explores the interplay 
between commodities, institutions, social relations, and hegemony, focusing on a 
totalizing approach that broadly defines relationships between elements.  Moral 
philosophy, in this theoretical paradigm, is a primary area of research.  Detailing the 
potential discord between public desire and corporate economic imperatives, along with 
moral issues arising from the structures of power, political economy details the failings 
and successes of capitalistic industry in serving the goals of contemporary society.  
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Finally, praxis is roughly defined as activism; the political economy approach suggests 
solutions for the inequalities uncovered during research. 
 The political economy of media industries, including film and DVD, defines and 
analyzes cultural artifacts as commodities within a capitalist economic system in a 
manner similar to media industry studies (Mosco and Wasko 1988).  However, political 
economy approaches broaden the field of influence, suggesting that these artifacts 
perform within economic systems according to influences in the regulatory environment.  
Like industrial organization analysis, political economy of DVD will address questions of 
industrial structure and performance, albeit within wider social, legal, and regulatory 
contexts.  The economic structure of the DVD industry will therefore be understood in 
terms of political and socio-cultural structures of power.  Taking an evaluative position 
relative to inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power within these realms, 
political economy of DVD suggests how access and fair use are constricted.  
Understanding the processes by which DVDs are produced and distributed, as well as the 
processes involved in industrial formation will afford perspective on the relationship 
between multi-media conglomerates and the state.  Furthermore, approaching the DVD 
industry through political economy will highlight the significance of institutional 
structures and the collective behaviors of industry members to restrict access to content 
on the discs.  This control was augmented by strategies deployed by the DVD Forum 




The DVD industry successfully manipulated and adapted existent industrial and 
manufacturing infrastructures, market forces of supply and demand, and a favorable 
regulatory environment.  Because the infrastructure already existed in terms of hardware 
and software manufacturing, retail/rental outlets, and home video marketing and 
distribution, DVD posed relatively little risk to firms wishing to develop and distribute 
the new technology.  However, firms employed three key strategies that were imperative 
to the exploitation of resources, the creation of consumer demand, and the successful 
diffusion of DVD technology:  (1) hardware and software companies agreed to work 
cooperatively in product development; (2) firms agreed to form collective organizations 
to ensure the mutual interest of all members in the marketplace; (3) development firms 
did not release technology until quality standards were agreed upon industry-wide.  
 DVD industrial organization developed firms operating as a cooperative 
collective to produce similar goods and services.  These firms were divided into 
categories:  disc manufacturers, hardware manufacturers, content providers/producers, 
retailers, and distributors, all under the umbrella of the DVD Forum whose guidance 
impacted industry wide standards in each category while presenting a unified front to an 
agreeable legislature.   Businesses desired to take full advantage of the power collective 
cooperation offered to reduce initial capital outlay in manufacturing and product 
development.  The collective would “share” innovations while guaranteeing market 
positions based on a leveled playing field.  In this regard, developers could avoid costly 
research and development budgets.  Secondly, cooperative collectives ensured market 
control.  A member of a production, research, or leadership consortium need not worry 
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about being left behind in the event of new technological advances.  As a forum or 
consortium member, the corporation could virtually guarantee their standing in relation to 
firms seeking entry into the marketplace.  This institutional structure implies not only 
collusion, but deliberate attempts to gain protection and assistance from the state in the 
early period of industrial development. 
 
Diffusion of Innovations 
Innovations that are perceived by individuals as having greater relative advantage, 
compatibility, trialability, observability, and less complexity will be adopted more rapidly 
than other innovations.      Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations 1995 
  
 The DVD console became the fastest-selling consumer electronics product ever, 
having reached sales of more than 56 million players within five years.  Between product 
launch in the third quarter of 1997 and the end of 1999, 128.6 million DVDs were 
shipped to retailers.  By 2003, DVD players were in more than half of all U.S. homes.20  
In the first year on the market, DVDs shipped to retailers increased five-fold.  How did 
the DVD diffuse so quickly into the market?  Was the DVD perceived as having those 
qualities mentioned above by Rogers on a scale heretofore unimagined in the history of 
technology?  How did the DVD target adopters and guarantee massive diffusion into the 
mainstream marketplace faster than any other electronics device?  What were the 
enabling conditions surrounding DVD product launch and diffusion?  Diffusion of 
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innovations theory is useful in explaining why DVD became such a phenomenal success 
so quickly, its status as a disruptive innovation, and the strategies employed by the 
“change agents” in introducing the DVD. 21 
Diffusion research analyzes the adaptation of innovation.  Explaining the 
processes of social change stimulated by new ideas, practices, or objects, scholars in 
myriad fields examine how members of social systems integrate newly introduced 
products, services, and concepts over time through communication systems.  Beginning 
as early as the early 1900s with Gabriel Tarde in France, continuing through the 1920s, 
and exploding in the 1960s with the work of Neal Gross and Bryce Ryan, diffusion 
research developed in fields ranging from education, sociology, anthropology, 
geography, economics and communications.  Through diffusion theory, scholars are able 
to examine the degree to which the person or agent introducing innovation into a social 
system considers the target population, the relative advantage of the innovation, the 
compatibility of the innovation to existing values, the innovation’s complexity, the 
trialability (or degree of experimentation with the innovation on a limited basis), 
observability (or the visibility of the results of use to others), and the stages of adoption. 
Communication, uncertainty, and social change are important components of 
diffusion theory.  Studying the adoption rate of a new innovation, scholars look to the 
processes through which adopters create and share information in understanding the 
                                                                                                                                            
20 http://www.dvdinformation.com/News/press/010903.htm 
21 In the case of the DVD, the “change agents” include content providers, consumer electronics 
manufacturers, disc manufacturing houses, computer firms, and content distributors.  These agents would 
band together to form “The DVD Forum,” discussed herein. 
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innovation.  Furthermore, diffusion scholars conceptualize uncertainty as the perception 
of alternatives by the audience and the possibility of a lack of predictability in explaining 
diffusion adoption rates.  Perhaps the most important of the diffusion constructs is social 
change; researchers seek to explain how innovations alter the structure and/or function of 
social systems.  Additionally, diffusion research defines adopter categories based on 
speed of engagement with the innovation and social standing and/or personality traits. 
(Rogers 1995) 
Innovations can be thought of as occurring on a continuum between two 
extremes.  Innovations are thought to reside on a scale from evolutionary to revolutionary 
(Christensen 1997; Hill and Jones 1998; Tidd et al 1997; Trott 1998; Veryzer 1998) and 
are categorized as either improving the performance of existing products, services, or 
business models, or as revolutionary breakthroughs that serve as the basis for the 
establishment of new industries and the generation of enormous wealth.  Disruptive 
innovations are conceptualized as the opposite of evolutionary innovations; the highly 
discontinuous nature of the product or service relative to the existing paradigm 
transforms the demands and needs of a mainstream market and disrupts the former 
industrial members.  In the case of the DVD, transforming the demands and needs of the 
home video and computer markets meant changing expectations for quality, accessibility, 
storage, and the practices of viewing audio/visual content in the home and elsewhere 
while stimulating social and cultural change. 
The fact that the film industry has periodically engaged in the process of 
revolutionary innovation speaks to the long-term viability and profitability of the 
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industry.  After an initial period of hesitancy and even active resistance to technological 
innovation, the studios adopted new technologies into the production, distribution, and 
exhibition chains.  The degree to which any new technology disrupted the established 
business model corresponded to the level of resistance from Hollywood.  The coming of 
sound, color, widescreen, the drive-in, television, and home video, to name but a few, 
initiated some disruption to the existent industries and audiences and were met with a 
reluctant response.  DVD is an exception to this rule because of the primary role played 
by Hollywood in establishing the form and function of the technology.   
Some of these innovations, such as the coming of sound and the DVD, can be 
defined as “competence-destroying” discontinuities, because they entailed significant 
product substitutes and new business models (Christensen 1997).  Furthermore, the 
introduction of sound and the DVD required new skills, abilities, and knowledge both in 
production, distribution, and reception and initiated new industrial companies into the 
marketplace. Conversely, the introduction of color and widescreen can be described as 
“competence-enhancing” discontinuities, since these innovations represented 
improvements over prior products and built on existing know-how both in technology 
and reception (Hamel 2000).  Furthermore, disruptive innovations can be divided into 
“product discontinuities” and “process discontinuities,” suggesting that the artifact and/or 
the mode of production can be altered by the innovation. 
In order for disruptive innovations to create change in industrial, economic, social 
and cultural spheres, the innovation must not only meet the unfulfilled needs of a niche 
market, it must also change the perception of the mainstream market.  The DVD did not 
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simply meet the needs of video and home electronics enthusiasts, but it changed what 
mainstream audiences thought about home viewing in terms of aesthetics, interfacing, 
archiving, and the boundaries of the text.  As with many innovations, the disruptive 
innovation is initially appreciated only by niche market consumers; however, the rate at 
which the DVD moved from niche to mainstream consumption is unparalleled and is the 
subject of the forthcoming chapter on DVD industrial performance. 
Social Shaping of Technology 
Social Shaping of Technology (SST) approaches attempt to comprehend the 
complexity of the socio-economic processes involved in technological innovation. The 
social shaping perspective develops in the social and natural sciences in the UK and 
Europe as an interdisciplinary critique of technological determinist approaches, reflecting 
a shift in recent (1980s and 1990s) social and economic research on technology.  This 
field of research broadens inquiry beyond the technological artifact, incorporating the 
detailed processes of innovation (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1985, Bijker & Law 1992). 
Social Shaping theory both agrees and conflicts with elements of other theories that tie 
sociology and technology together such as Social Construction of Technology, which 
argues that human action shapes technology, from designers to choices made by 
consumers, but technology does not shape human action.  Social shaping theory explores 
a range of factors - organizational, political, economic and cultural - which pattern the 
design and implementation of technology.  SST explores the material consequences of 
different technical choices, suggesting that alternatives exist to technological determinist 
perspectives.  SST strives to redress problematic post-Enlightenment traditions that 
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examined technology out of context, thereby bringing technology into the realms of 
social explanation and analysis while expanding critical inquiry beyond detailing its 
social impacts.  Furthermore, SST challenges presumptions and assertions that 
technological change is both inevitable (demonstrating economic and/or technical 
“rationality”) as well as being the sole agent of social change. Conversely, SST studies 
show that technology is perhaps best understood as being structured by conditions of both 
its creation and its reception/consumption, and is therefore a social product. As will be 
shown with DVD, at every stage in both the innovation and development of new 
technologies a variety of technical options were available. The process through which the 
artifact became “finalized” for distribution to the market cannot be reduced to simple 
technical considerations, but is assessed in terms of a wide range of social, economic, 
cultural and political factors.   
Thus SST challenges linear models of innovation that suggest technologies are 
developed to satisfy particular industrial and/or social needs and then are easily, 
rationally marketed.  The concept that there are alternative possible choices in the design 
of artifacts and technological systems will be demonstrated through the example of the 
DVD. Different technological routes were available, choices that potentially would have 
led to different outcomes in terms of the form of technology.   The DVD’s form and 
function along with the practices of social groups interacting with the technology may 
have been radically different had standards for product specifications been different. 
Significantly, the choices made by members of the DVD Forum could have resulted in 
differing implications for society and for particular social groups. SST thus attempts to 
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integrate traditional approaches, concerned with assessing the “social impacts” of 
technology, to examine what shapes the technology which is having these impacts, and 
the way in which these impacts are achieved (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985). In this 
way SST broadens the policy agenda to suggest that there are dynamic processes at work 
in the development and innovation of technologies generally and media technologies 
specifically.  In contrast to the certainties held out by images of social and technological 
progress, technological change was revealed by a growing body of SST research as a 
highly uncertain and unpredictable process. 
STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 The four theoretical frameworks discussed above are important because they 
provide a basis for understanding the variety of approaches available to scholars, as well 
as the difficulty in discussing technological innovation, commercialization, and diffusion 
in simple terms.  In addition, these approaches offer a means by which this study can 
frame description of the development of DVD technology and demonstrate why this 
particular technology was impacting and was impacted by contexts ranging from culture 
to industry and the regulatory environment.  These theoretical approaches provide a 
starting point from which this study begins to unpack DVD development and diffusion 
into these contexts. 
This study begins by examining the technological and industrial conditions into 
which DVD was developed and introduced.  Chapter two describes the technological 
basis for DVD, based in CD, laserdisc, and optical media storage.  Additionally, this 
chapter examines the technological development of home video technologies in an effort 
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to compare and contrast the development of DVD by the consumer electronics, filmed 
entertainment, and computer industries.  Chapter two concludes by suggesting that the 
cooperation of these three industries was a crucial step in developing an industry-wide 
standard for DVD.  Chapter three then details the processes through which these three 
industries came together over several decades.  Each industry is examined independently 
to identify the forces that led to their involvement in the DVD Forum.  This chapter 
discusses how and why the three vested industries cooperated to create an “ancillary 
industry” around DVD, and traces the consequences of these efforts in terms of the 
conduct and performance of industry members as the technology rapidly diffused into the 
domestic marketplace.  In addition, this chapter provides a much-needed analysis of 
1990s Hollywood that accounts for the influence of digital technologies, the cooperation 
between firms in technological development, and cross-industrial alliances with computer 
industry firms.  The chapter also discusses a variety of strategies to legitimize control and 
access to power within the industry and potential impacts on the form, function, and 
utility of DVD technology as it is developed within this context. 
The conclusion of chapter three shifts focus away from the individual industrial 
structures and practices and toward an investigation of the DVD Forum, which is the 
subject of chapter four. After examining the collective influence, structure, and practices 
of the DVD Forum in chapter four, I examine the cultural contexts into which the Forum 
introduced DVD in chapter five.  This chapter focuses on the creation of meaning and the 
cultural context(s) of home video and digital media consumption, examining how DVD 
was introduced to the public through trade, popular, and advertising texts.  These sources 
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provide a framework for understanding how a variety of discourses combined with 
consumer behaviors and experiences with the technology, defining the early relationships 
between industry and the public related to the technology.  I argue that DVD was made 
meaningful through successive stages of discourse that began with trade descriptions of 
the technology and the format war that existed in the early stages of product 
development.  These discourses played an important role in “priming” the early adopter 
community for the technology and set the agenda for meaning-making prior to product 
launch.  This chapter also examines how early advertising for the technology structured 
meaning in particular ways by associating DVD with home video and theatrical viewing 
cultures.   
Chapter six returns to issues of control and power by focusing on the regulatory 
context surrounding DVD.  Strategies employed by the DVD industry to regulate use of 
the technology are identified.  I show how DVD entered into a changing landscape of 
intellectual property law, digital copyright law, fair use, deregulation, conglomeration 
and international protocols for managing the distribution of digital content.  This chapter 
then illustrates how the members of the DVD Forum established legal precedent for 
digital copyright law by prosecuting a number of “hackers” in state, federal, and 
international courts.  In addition, this chapter demonstrates the various strategies 
employed by the members of the DVD Forum to restrict access to the technology and 
prescribe the kinds of uses available to consumers.  DVD was a key component in 
initiating debate around the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, fair use in the digital age, 
and the legality of digital rights management technologies.  This chapter then turns its 
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focus to analyze the strategies employed by the entertainment industries in establishing a 
global distribution system that staggered the release of DVDs to specific markets in order 
to maintain theatrical profits and to minimize piracy around the world. 
The chapters take a thematic approach, organized around specific contexts rather 
than following a strict chronological history.  Over the course of each chapter, I describe 
how demand for DVD developed within each context and how the technology influenced 
existing conditions in distinct ways.  Every chapter includes analysis of the particular 
context prior to the introduction of DVD and concludes by suggesting the how the 
technology was impacted by those conditions and how the technology affected contexts 
in far reaching ways.  By organizing my study in this fashion, each chapter contributes to 
a larger argument concerning the synchronous alignment of favorable conditions that 
facilitated the successful diffusion of the technology.   
As this overview indicates, in many ways DVD was at the center of dynamic 
changes in a variety of contexts during the 1990s.  DVD successfully diffused into the 
marketplace because of the unique combination of these changes and the various desires 
of industry and the public to commercialize and adopt a new home video/computer 
storage device.  DVD was made possible by technological developments in optical media 
storage stemming from the CD and laserdisc.  However, its technological basis is only 
part of the dynamic interplay of forces contributing to its success in the domestic 
marketplace.  What made DVD possible included favorable contexts in culture, industry, 
and the regulatory environment, along with the technological context.  These influences, 
taken individually, would not fully explain how DVD became the most successful 
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technology in history.  By addressing each context in turn, this study builds a nuanced 
picture of the processes involved in technological diffusion.  My attempt to trace the 
integration and interplay of these various forces distinguishes this work from previous 
examinations of the rapid ascent of DVD as a technology, a distribution/delivery system, 
and ultimately as an industry. 
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Chapter Two:  The Development of Home Video Technologies 
The development of home video technologies has occurred as a result of the 
confluence of advances in technology, corporate vision, and marketplace demand. 
Technological advancements in the 1950s in magnetic tape recording led to the 
commercialization of machines capable of recording and playing-back filmed content on 
tape.  Japanese consumer electronics leaders Sony and Matsushita developed competing 
consumer technologies that were mass-marketed in the 1970s as devices for recording 
live television for later viewing.  After challenging the legality of Sony’s Betamax in 
federal court, Hollywood adapted to the perceived threat by tapping into the cultural 
desire for feature films on television, shifting the principal purpose of the device from 
recording television to playing back pre-recorded feature films.  Thousands of films, from 
new releases to classics, were transferred to tape and made available for rent throughout 
the world.  American and foreign audiences, accustomed to viewing Hollywood and 
foreign films on broadcast television, eventually embraced home video technology.  By 
1987, twelve years after the introduction of Sony’s Betamax, revenues returned to the 
studios from tape rentals surpassed box-office grosses for the first time.  Home video 
devices were in nearly every American home; home viewing of films on tape was 
ubiquitous.   
Despite this phenomenal growth however, video tape technologies and the home 
video industry actually developed at a much slower rate than the DVD.  Because 
competing videotape technologies confused potential consumers, and given Hollywood’s 
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initial reluctance to support either Betamax or VHS formats, successful mass diffusion 
was scarcely a foregone conclusion.  Without a standardized format recognized as such 
by the content providers and potential consumers, the path to widespread adoption was 
tumultuous.  Matsushita and Sony struggled for market share throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s, promoting the benefits of their respective products while Hollywood looked 
on.  In the end, shifts in consumer demand, industrial behavior, and technological 
advancements in Matsushita’s VHS technology eventually ended the format battle by 
1985.  Matsushita’s VHS became the industry standard by virtue of these shifts combined 
with its lower retail price and the widespread perception that it could record more live 
television than the Betamax.  However profitable home video tape technologies proved to 
be for Hollywood, the studios still sought a technology for home video that would 
preclude illegal copying and sharing of content.  They repeatedly urged domestic 
technology companies to develop a device for play-back of content only.  Laserdisc, 
Selectavision, and other disc-based technologies emerged throughout the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, but remained niche products for cinema enthusiasts and collectors due to 
cost, lack of titles, and functional problems with the discs.  These disc technologies, and 
their more successful tape-based counterparts, are important precedents for DVD.  Their 
development and diffusion, and the home video industry they spawned, were crucial 
antecedents to DVD.  Examining the processes of their invention, innovation, and 
diffusion well indicates how indebted DVD technology was to earlier advances in home 
video tape, laserdisc, and compact disc technologies.  This analysis also reveals how 
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DVD develops according to industrial desires for a play-back only home video device for 
the masses. 
HOME VIDEO TECHNOLOGIES BEFORE DVD 
Home video technology did not simply appear in some rudimentary technological 
form in 1956, the year that magnetic tape was innovated, and go through a linear series of 
improvements before becoming a consumer-sector phenomenon in the late 1970s.  The 
development of home video technology is a long and complex one, with players on either 
side of the Atlantic and Pacific (with vastly different aims) struggling to invent, innovate, 
and distribute home video technology to worldwide consumers.  Asian consumer 
electronics manufacturers developed and commercialized home video technology to 
empower consumers to record and share media taped from television.  American content 
providers desired a product without such capability; home video technology would 
ideally serve as a play-back only technology for delivering pre-recorded content.  The 
divide between corporate goals for video technology and consumer uses and 
gratifications would eventually lead to the development of playback-only home video 
technology. 
 Prior to the mid-1950s, the magnetic recording industry was under the direct 
purview of the American radio industry.  Magnetic recording experiments and devices, of 
both audio and visual data, can be traced back as far as the industrial modernization era 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  However, struggling inventors and 
prototypes does not an industry make.  Magnetic recording did not become a viable 
technology until after the Second World War.  Early developments in magnetic recording 
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by Valdemar Poulsen in Denmark towards the end of the nineteenth century and 
subsequent inventions by Dr. Fritz Pfleumer in 1920s Germany differ from the 
innovations by Leonard F. Fuller in the United States.  The early inventors envisioned 
differing applications for the technology and established a continuing theme in 
technological and industrial development in regards to home video that would persist 
through the development of DVD technology:  American content providers desired a 
machine that would protect their valuable assets on the open market; European and 
Japanese manufacturers developed a technology based on recording and sharing of 
content.   
Soon after the war, the flailing American magnetic recording industry received a 
boost from the fall of Germany, as engineers and their technological innovations were 
discovered by allied troops.  By 1946, the differing technologies had merged into a 
unified prototype.  In June of 1947, the Magnetophon was demonstrated for Bing Crosby, 
who was seeking a means to prerecord his radio programs.  Crosby would soon join 
forces with the Ampex Corporation, leaving NBC radio for ABC.  By 1948, ABC began 
large-scale use of 3M Magnetic tape and Ampex model 200s to record radio shows.  
Ampex and RCA had begun experimenting with video technology shortly after the end of 
the War.  Ampex won the race to a prototype and in 1951 the electronic division of Bing 
Crosby Enterprises (in affiliation with Ampex) demonstrated the first video recorder in 
black and white.  However, it was not until 1956, when Ampex introduced the Ampex 
VR-1000 that video technology became commercially viable.  This marks, according to 
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Wasser and Eugene Marlow, the beginning of the modern video era.  For the next 
fourteen years, almost all videotape recorder design was based on Ampex’s system. 
 Videotape and video recording technology would soon spread to the Asian 
continent.  By 1959, Toshiba improved on Ampex’s design, introducing helical scanning 
that improved signal strength and resolution.  Soon after, the three major Japanese 
technology companies, Sony, Matsushita, and JVC, entered into the fray and cooperated 
by setting standard specifications for the development of their own machines.  Initiating a 
cooperative business plan for the development of video technology that was defined by 
collective research and sharing of technological advancements, the partnership proved 
beneficial to all members for a brief period.  Each member company worked towards 
technology based on the Ampex design in the hopes of cornering the growing Asian 
markets.  However, the introduction of the proprietary Sony U-Matic in 1966 and its 
popularity in business and educational markets would position Sony as the market leader 
in this new business.  Spurned by the successes of Sony in these burgeoning markets 
(Sony’s U-Matic brought color to the video image), Matsushita and JVC would openly 
compete with Sony in the next decade.22  Sony, unfettered by the challenges of 
Matsushita and JVC, shrunk the ¾ inch U-Matic tape to ½ inch and introduced the 
Betamax in 1975.  Marketed as a tool of empowerment for the consumer, enabling 
recording and playback of live television (“time-shifting”), Sony advertised videotape 
and the Betamax recorder as an extension of the television industry.  Matsushita and JVC 
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subsequently introduced the VHS player in 1976.  While both technologies offered 
recording and playback capabilities, VHS tapes could record longer (four hours to 
Betamax’s two).  However, the format war, according to Wasser, was not decided on the 
basis of internal technological differences.  Rather, the battle between Sony and 
Matsushita was won on the basis of “network externalities” or forces unrelated to the 
technology proper.  These included the consumer perception that VHS tapes could record 
longer than Sony’s (even after Sony caught up with the Matsushita standard), significant 
price differences between the competing machines, effective marketing campaigns, a 
shift in viewing patterns relating to watching Hollywood movies on tape, and pre-
recorded content availability.  By 1978, VHS had overtaken Betamax in marketplace 
saturation.  By 1979, viewing pre-recorded tapes through the VCR became the dominant 
practice by consumers across the world (more on this below). 
 In America, consumer electronics companies and content providers--namely the 
Hollywood studios and the television networks-- forged a different path to the consumer 
market during the 1970s.  Convinced that home video viewing should be an extension of 
the film industry, where pre-recorded content could be controlled in distribution by the 
studios, steps were taken to develop video disc technology for playback only.   American 
firms were concerned over control of content, copyright protection, and piracy and 
attempted to integrate videotape technology into existing industrial practices.  The goal of 
American companies remained in developing a technology for the home market centered 
                                                                                                                                            
22 According to former IBM executive Dan Sullivan, this jealousy would split the Asian industry along 
national boundaries.  Japanese firms, led by Sony, would wage war in the press and through competing 
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around playback-only devices.  As a suitable industrial product, videotape was capable of 
increasing profits through syndication and reruns of film and television series.  
Videotapes could be shipped to local affiliates, shown, and returned at relatively little 
cost.  For home use, consumers taping live television potentially would cut into theatrical 
and traditional television ancillary markets.  Forging ahead with the development of 
numerous disc technologies, including the Discovision, Selectavision, and eventually the 
Laserdisc, manufacturers were slow to market and plagued by production costs, a lack of 
titles for playback, few retail stores willing to participate, a refusal to supply 
pornographic content, and competition from the now entrenched videotape market.  
However, as late as 1976, Hollywood executives were still optimistic that the videodisc 
would triumph over the videotape.   
 According to Frederic Wasser, the development of VCR technology can be 
roughly sketched into four historical phases.  The first is initiated by the introduction of 
the Ampex video playback machine in 1956.  Ampex was introduced as an industrial 
machine, too expensive for practical consumer applications.  The second phase begins in 
1969 with the introduction of the ¾ inch U-Matic from Sony, sold as a business and 
educational tool for the recording and playback of video and audio recorded on Sony 
cameras.  The third begins with the introduction of Sony’s Betamax, characterized by the 
format war between Sony and Matsushita (who introduces the VHS player/recorder in 
1976), and the first consumer technologies.  The fourth phase begins in 1979 with 
technological improvements to existing technology and marked by the shift in audience 
                                                                                                                                            
product development against Taiwanese firms for the next three decades. (personal interview) 
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behavior from recording live television to playing back pre-recorded tapes.  These phases 
overlap, of course, as technological advancements initiate competitor response and 
demarcate the shift from industrial to consumer technology.  This technological approach 
is part of Wasser’s synthetic, political economic approach to the subject, and reveals the 
tensions that shape video and magnetic recording technology and the structure of the 
home video industry.  Wasser’s periodization demonstrates the process of industrial 
maturation as well as shifting uses and gratifications by consumers.  The fact that 
consumers eventually preferred to play-back pre-recorded content rather than record and 
share content off of television aligns with the desires of Hollywood for a playback-only 
home video technology. 
 Wasser’s fourth and definitive phase, beginning in 1979 and marking the 
emergence of home video as a motion picture market, accounts for the eventual rise of 
rental retailers Blockbuster, Movie Gallery, and Hollywood Video and the significance of 
the home video industry to production, distribution, and exhibition.  A viable home video 
market also increased the value of the content providers, continuing to turn around the 
financial fortunes of major studios, who had struggled to turn profits under diversified 
corporate umbrellas during the 1960s.  Increasing revenues for both studios and retailers 
helped propel the frequency of mergers and acquisitions within the media industries.  
New revenue streams made the studios attractive to media conglomerates seeking to 
diversify their holdings.  Valuable studios libraries could be mined for titles to release, 
while new releases were virtually guaranteed to turn a profit once in the home video 
market.  Once this market was established, very little technological improvements were 
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made to the video tape standard established by Matsushita’s VHS technology.  
Incremental improvements throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, including high 
fidelity tape and machines capable of delivering stereo and surround sound, were 
integrated into the existing technology. 
Several studios, principally Disney, circumvented the rental retailers in the mid-
1980s by marketing and selling tapes directly to consumers.  It is in no small part due to 
the profits generated from sell-through of blockbuster hits and family titles that content 
providers revived their collective desire for a new playback-only device.  Selling directly 
to the consumer at prices ranging from $15.99-$29.99 (per title) returned enormous 
profits to the studios.  Disney’s success with animated classics and family titles, 
including The Fox and the Hound (Disney 1981), The Little Mermaid (Disney 1989), 
Aladdin (Disney 1992), and The Lion King (Disney 1994), throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, along with the small but profitable market for laserdisc sales, suggested that 
consumers were willing to purchase, collect, archive, and repeat-view films in the home.  
Despite the profitability of the sale of tapes directly to consumers, the studios did not 
immediately embrace this model en masse; titles released directly for sale to consumers 
were mostly limited to blockbuster hits and family titles.  The vast majority of Americans 
still preferred to rent tapes and the studios dared not risk their golden video goose by 
abruptly shifting the distribution model. 
Disney employed videotape technology to build a lucrative sales model for home 
video.  Their efforts to establish this market align with the collective desires of their 
competitors in filmed entertainment.  All of the major studios conceptualized video 
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technology as a delivery mechanism for pre-recorded content.  The development of 
videotape technology can also be understood in light of continental technological and 
cultural divides, first between Europe and the United States, then between Japan and 
Europe, and then the United States and Asia, a gradual progression from industrial 
technology to consumer technology, differing intended uses of the machines (playback 
vs. recording), and a struggle for control over the marketplace and content.  Along these 
dividing lines, American content providers and consumer electronics firms sought 
playback-only devices while Asian and European firms based their technology in 
recording and “time shifting.”  In the process, the home videotape industry would move 
from an extension of the television industry to an extension of the film industry.     
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DVD TECHNOLOGY 
Unpacking the circumstances surrounding the production and development of 
DVD is not a simple matter. Because DVD is a multiple-media technology (i.e. both a 
technology for the computer and a “stand alone” hardware console device connecting to 
the television set), different industrial motivations and technological developments were 
at play in the shift from existing technologies to digital video technology platforms.  
Computer manufacturers sought a replacement technology for the unsuitable and 
unpopular CD-ROM.  Consumer electronics manufacturers recognized the potential of a 
new disc technology to do for movies what CD had done for music:  create a new market 
that would boost sales of consoles.  Additionally, these firms sought to exploit the 
established patent pooling structure employed with the CD in an effort to retain the 
majority of royalties from hardware sales.  Content providers understood that a new home 
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video technology, with copyright protections in place, might offer a new market to 
exploit existing film libraries in a more profitable way than had been established with the 
home video rental business model.  
According to Aaron Barlow, media commentator and historian, a prime motivator 
for the development of DVD technology and investment in the potential replacement for 
VHS was recognition by media conglomerates that developments in television 
technology (High Definition, video on-demand, digital cable) would make obvious the 
inferior picture quality delivered by VHS technology.23 Barlow’s argument privileges the 
influence of media conglomerates over consumer electronics manufacturers and 
computer firms because his story focuses on film and home video culture and the role of 
the media conglomerates in shaping that culture. While high definition television 
technology was available in the late 1990s, and was indeed ill fitted to video tape 
technology, the move to develop DVD was also crucially linked to the existing home 
video business model, patent pooling and licensing, a long history of videodisc 
technology and developments in digital audio and digital video compression, and a 
perceived shift in consumer consumption patterns, viewership, and film culture generally. 
VIDEO DISC TECHNOLOGIES 
 The technological basis for the DVD was established as early as 1928 by John 
Logie Baird.  Baird developed a wax disc capable of storing images for playback via a 
stylus similar to a record player.  Utilizing data storage technology developed in 1801 by 
                                                
23 Barlow, Aaron. 2005. The DVD Revolution:  Movies, Culture, and Technology. London:  Praeger 
Publishing, pp. 16. 
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Joseph- Marie Jacquard, and furthered by Charles Babbage and Herman Hollerith, 
Baird’s disc employed the concept of punched holes and punched tape for data 
transmission.  The difference between surface and hole, or pits and lands, served as the 
foundation for high-speed optical data storage and would be utilized by the first 
electronic computers, census machines, and eventually the CD and DVD.  The 
foundation for modern optical storage technology was set.  However, Baird’s technology 
failed due to technical glitches and its inability to galvanize industry players.  Fifty years 
later, Philips and Pioneer introduced videodisc technology that improved upon Baird’s 
concept, replacing wax discs with polymer discs while employing a laser to read analog 
data off the grooved surfaces in the disc.  The “laserdisc” offered key functional 
differences to its VHS/Beta competitors.  Capable of high quality data storage and 
playback, the laserdisc produced vastly superior picture quality, random access 
functionality, and printed material storage.  However, because the disc could not hold 
more than one hour of analog video per side, it was incapable of uninterrupted feature 
length film playback.  As early as 1976, MCA began developing its own videodisc 
technology.  They joined the laserdisc market by releasing the DiscoVision brand in 
1979, offering the new technology to consumers for the first time.24  Like all home video 
technologies, competing formats came to market before a winner was declared.  RCA 
introduced its own videodisc technology in 1981, called capacitance electronic disc 
(CED), utilizing a diamond stylus that came in direct contact with the disc to read 
information.  Due to technical flaws and a lack of industrial support, the technology was 
                                                
24 Taylor, Jim.  DVD Demystified.  Second ed.  2001.  New York:  McGraw Hill.  Pp. 33. 
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abandoned in 1984.  JVC and Matsushita developed their own technology, the video high 
density or video home disc (VHD), using a floating stylus that read information from a 
smooth disc.  Again, due to a lack of industry-wide support of titles and a tepid response 
from consumers, the technology ultimately failed.  The Philips/Pioneer technology would 
attain market dominance, largely due to its widespread application in Asian markets as a 
karaoke technology, but remained a niche success in the West, catering largely to 
videophiles and the educational marketplace. 
 One of several reasons for laserdisc’s lukewarm reception and diffusion was its 
size and functionality.  The laserdisc was roughly the same size as a record album, and 
behaved in much the same way, with an “A” side and a “B” side.  Consumers would have 
to eject the disc, turn it over, and begin playing the second half of content embedded on 
the disc.  The affiliation of the laserdisc with an “old” media technology meant that 
consumers would potentially associate the technology with low quality analog media.  
Another principal problem facing the laserdisc was the compression of video and audio 
data.  The laserdisc was not able to store video and audio digitally and convert it 
efficiently to a standard analog television signal for display.25  Instead, the disc relied on 
analog data storage and transmission for video and limited digital audio specifications. 
However, the laserdisc proves to be significant to the story of the DVD for multiple 
reasons.  First, the laserdisc established the technological viability of the video disc.  Its 
ability to playback (only) high quality video through optical data storage encouraged the 
                                                
25 Jim Taylor’s chapter “The World Before DVD” in DVD Demystified details the data storage 
requirements for such a conversion. 
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eventual hybridization of its technology with digital formats like the CD.  Both laserdiscs 
and DVDs are made from two bonded substrates; DVD technology would improve on 
bonding techniques utilized by laserdisc manufacturers, avoiding technical problems 
common to the laserdisc.  Second, the laserdisc established that there existed a market 
segment who would invest in high quality videos on disc, even if they were unable to 
record on the format.  Third, the relative success of the laserdisc in ancillary and tertiary 
markets like karaoke bars and educational sectors suggested that video disc technology 
could be profitable in a variety of arenas.  Fourth, the laserdisc spurred the creation of a 
number of production companies specializing in supplemental content to package with 
Hollywood movies.26  These companies would be crucial early supporters of DVD, 
adapting their production models, styles, and resources for use with the new technology.  
Finally, the technology employed with the laserdisc, as well as analog video and digital 
audio, existed without region codes or advanced copy protection schemes.  Even without 
these safeguards in place, Hollywood supported the laserdisc format for home video 
distribution, releasing in excess of 35,000 titles worldwide.  Before the internet and 
global connectivity, sophisticated protection and encryption technologies were not 
viewed as mandatory for home video technologies; simple Macrovision technologies that 
discouraged the average consumer from copying would suffice.  The support of 
Hollywood also demonstrates the desire of the content providers (the film studios and 
their parent companies) to exploit new playback-only technologies AND the need to 
                                                
26 Companies such as Criterion Co. would be successful boutique houses during the days of laserdisc 
before successfully exploiting the potentials of DVD. 
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eventually replace the laserdisc with a more safeguarded technology in the computing 
age. The shift to digital audio, the promise of digital television, along with the 
development and introduction of compact disc (CD) and DVD technology, would prove 
that the laserdisc was not able to compete in a new, all digital marketplace. 
CD TECHNOLOGY 
When the CD was introduced by Sony and Philips in 1982, the laserdisc was still 
in its infancy.  The compact disc, as a delivery mechanism for digital music, would 
generate enormous revenues for the music and recording industries.  In the process, it 
would prove a crucial antecedent to DVD, both technologically and culturally.  
Recognizing the potential of pulse-code modulation (PCM) technology for applications in 
the consumer market that were demonstrated in 1974 by Denon Records for digital 
recording, Sony and Philips developed the digital-based CD as a replacement to the then 
dominant audio cassette.27  The CD was developed to exploit digital sampling through 
PCM technology, converting electronic signals into numbers represented as binary digits.  
CDs and DVDs, like all optical storage technologies, store data in the form of 
microscopic pits that represent these binary digits.  On a CD, the minimum pit length and 
track pitch (the distance between pits) restrict the amount of data that can be encoded on 
the disc.  Infrared lasers then read the data from the pits and convert the digital 
sequences.  The CD has a layer of reflective aluminum behind the pitted layer of 
polycarbonate substrate that reflects the laser back to a photo detector.  Data is stored on 
                                                
27 PCM technology is the basis of all digital audio recording, storage, and playback and is the foundation of 
the DVD’s audio capabilities.   
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a single layer of substrate on a single side of the disc and spirals outward from the center.  
As an evolutionary technology, the DVD would build upon these technical specifications 
through advancements in laser technology, encoding technology, and substrate materials.   
The technical specifications for the CD were based on its functionality as a digital 
platform for music.  The shift to digital music was, in part, spurred by the technological 
benefits afforded through the application of PCM technology:  digital sound promised 
high quality frequency response, exceptional dynamic range, and no generational loss in 
copying.28  A number of advantages over existing audio tape and LP technologies, 
including longer playing time, smaller size, instant access to data, and increased 
durability propelled CD past LP in worldwide sales by 1988.  With the early success of 
the CD, manufacturers and product developers began pushing the limits of the technology 
in the hopes of including high quality digital video with digital audio on the CD.29  Given 
its limited storage capacity, (see figure 2.1 below) engineers faced an uphill battle to 
achieve multi-media functionality with the CD; the disc simply could not hold enough 
information to adequately store and playback feature-length video content.  Compression 
technology proved crucial to overcoming the size demands of high quality digital video 
and would be a first step in the eventual development of the DVD.  Compression 
technologies employ complicated algorithms that convert media from original formats 
into smaller versions encoded on the disc to be decoded by the player.  By 1988, after 
several proprietary compression systems had been developed and proved unsuitable as 
                                                
28 See Taylor, pp. 23. 
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industry standards, the Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) committee was created to 
address the problem.  Founded by Leonardo Chairiglione and Hiroshi Yasuda, the MPEG 
group’s expressed mission was to standardize video and audio for CDs.30  By 1992, the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) recognized the labors of the MPEG group and 
adopted the standard that came to be known as MPEG-1.  The standard offered a formula 
for compressing and decompressing (on the hardware end) audio and video to fit the data 
rate of the CD format.  The viability and acceptance of MPEG-1 proved to be the 
foundation for a variety of CD-video technologies.  However, these technologies were 
unreliable and would eventually encourage the development of a new technological 
standard for video on disc.  Additionally, the MPEG-1 standard made possible video and 
audio for personal computers, the internet, digital video camcorders, Direct Broadcast 
Satellite television, and the MP3 audio format.  Simply put, the MPEG-1 standard made 
the technological, cultural, economic, and industrial shifts of the “dot-com” era possible. 
Even before the MPEG-1 standard achieved widespread acceptance in the 
manufacturing sector, attempts were underway to hybridize the two existing disc 
technologies (CD and laserdisc).  CD-Video (CDV) was developed in 1986 to 
incorporate the video performance of the laserdisc with the digital audio specifications of 
                                                                                                                                            
29 See Taylor (2001) pp. 39-45 for a thorough discussion of the different CD applications developed by 
consumer electronics companies. 
30 Halfhill, Tom R. "CDs for the gigabyte era. (Digital Video Discs will offer 25 times the capacities of 
CD-ROMs)." Byte 21.n10 (Oct 1996): 139(4). InfoTrac OneFile. Thomson Gale. University of Texas at 




the CD.  The CDV contained 5 to 6 minutes of audio tracks and 20 minutes of analog 
video.  Due to its inability to play back larger segments of video, the technology 
ultimately failed to catch on.  However, the experiment proved to be a bellwether for 
things to come.  Sony and Philips, after successfully introducing the CD-ROM drive to 
the computer industry (a hardware device that would read data and interact with 
operating systems on hard drives), expanded the CD universe with the Compact Disc 
Interactive (CD-i) in 1986.  The new format was designed to interact with the OS-9 
operating system and was envisioned as “the standard for interactive home 
entertainment.”31 The technology languished for the first few years and was thought to be 
obsolete even before it debuted.  Its significance to DVD, however, is noteworthy.  The 
CD-i was the first CD technology to successfully demonstrate MPEG-1 video and 
achieved limited support from Hollywood, with 50 movies released on the CD-i Digital 
Video format between 1991 and 1993.32  However, the technology proved to be 
unreliable, supporting companies dropped out of product development, and Philips was 
left with a billion dollar tab for development costs.  By 1993, JVC, Sony, and Philips 
jointly developed a new standard called Video CD (VCD) that would employ MPEG-1 
compression to store 74 minutes of video and audio.  The new standard was designed to 
play through a CD-ROM on a home computer or through a console developed and 
distributed by Philips.  By 1996, the VCD was selling millions of units in countries like 
                                                                                                                                            
Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T003&prodId=ITOF&docId=A18786569&source=gale&srcprod=ITOF
&userGroupName=txshracd2598&version=1.0>. 
31 Taylor, Jim (2001). Pp. 41. 
32 Ibid. pp. 43. 
 
 65 
China where the VHS had not achieved dominance, but failed to achieve significant 
market shares in Western nations. 
In 1993, ten years after the introduction of CDs and CD- ROMs, the first 
prototypes for high density CDs were demonstrated.  After a period of twenty-odd years 
of targeted marketing and niche consumption of video disc technology, technological 
developments in laser technology enabled the production of a video disc the size of the 
existing CD.  Early attempts at creating the video disc simply pushed the capabilities of 
the existing CD technology, reducing the size of the pits on the disc to double amount of 
potential embedded information.  Nimbus developed a CD with double the storage 
capacity of existing discs, capable of connecting to an MPEG video decoder.33   Nimbus, 
in partnership with Sony and Philips, had joined forces during the development and 
diffusion of CD technology in an effort to stave off anti-trust legislation by sharing the 
patent pool. However, Nimbus and Philips quickly realized that CD technology tended to 
falter when pushed too far, and decided to develop a separate disc technology.34  The 
potential viability of this technology was tied to developments in the MPEG compression 
and decoding technology.  The MPEG committee had been working to improve the 
standards it had set with MPEG-1, and by 1994 had introduced MPEG-2, a variation on 
its existing system that could handle high quality data at much higher speeds than its 
predecessor. 
                                                
33 DVD Demystified, second edition, by Jim Taylor. 
34 Philips refused to release its CD patents for video CD technologies, further instigating the shift to a new 
digital disc separate from the existing technology. 
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Meanwhile, Toshiba and Time Warner began developing their own next 
generation video disc.  As development was underway in early 1994, Hollywood weighed 
in, calling for a single worldwide standard for the new generation of digital video on 
optical media.  Seven entertainment and content providers formed the “Hollywood 
Digital Video Disc Advisory Group,” asking developers to meet their collective demands.  
Members of the group included Sony, Disney, MCA/Universal, MGM/UA, Paramount, 
Viacom, and Warner Bros.  Their inventory of desirable features included room for a full-
length feature film, about 135 minutes, on one side of a single disc; picture quality 
superior to laserdisc; compatibility with high quality audio systems; ability to 
accommodate three to five languages per disc; copy protection; multiple aspect ratios for 
widescreen support; and multiple versions of a program on one disc, with parental 
lockout.  All interested parties recognized the technological need for a higher capacity 
disc.  CD-ROMs average a total capacity of 553 Megabytes per disc.  In order to meet the 
demands of the studios, whose support of the technology was crucial to its successful 
commercialization, the disc capacity needed to be expanded by a factor of seven.  
Improved manufacturing techniques for bonding multiple layers of substrate combined 
with refinements made in disc-mastering technologies and shorter-wavelength lasers 
provided the technological material to squeeze the pits on the disc, resulting in more data 
capacity.   These smaller pits combined with tighter rings, or tracks of information, 
requiring a more refined red laser to read the material.  Employing the same red-laser 
diodes used in retail for reading bar codes produced the desired effect (see figure 2.1 
below for a comparison of CD and DVD laser specifications).  The combination of 
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technical advancements in disc encoding and laser technology resulted in a disc with the 
capacity to hold 4.7 GigaBytes (GB) of data, more than enough to satisfy the demands of 
the Hollywood Advisory Group.  
Figure 2.1:  Comparing CD-ROM and DVD-ROM  
  
                                 CD-ROM           DVD-ROM 
  
Disc diameter                    120mm            same 
                                 (4.7 inches) 
Disc thickness                   1.2 mm           same 
                                 (0.6 mm X 2) 
Track pitch                      1.6 microns      about one half of CD 
      (0.74 micron) 
Minimum pit length               0.834 micron     about one half of CD 
      (0.4 micron) 
Laser wavelength                 infrared         red-laser diode 
Data layers                      One              One or two 
Data sides                       One              One or two 
Data capacity (per layer)(2)     682 MB           about 6.9 times the 
CD 
      (4.7 GB) 
Data capacity (per side)(2)      682 MB           4.7 to 8.5 GB 
Total data capacity(2)           682 MB           about 25 times the CD 
      (17 GB) 
 
Source:  Halfhill, Tom R. "CDs for the gigabyte era. (Digital Video 
Discs will offer 25 times the capacities of CD-ROMs)” Byte 21.n10 (Oct 
1996): 139(4). InfoTrac OneFile. 
 
As mentioned, the physical size of the CD-ROM and DVD-ROM were identical.  
This was a crucial design element allowed CDs to play and perform in DVD drives.  The 
major differences between the two standards were in the track pitch, pit length, and laser 
type and wavelength.  Track pitch refers to the distance between data marks and the 
orientation of the data on the disc; smaller distances between data markers allowed the 
DVD-ROM to store more data.  Pit length differences also improve the storage capacity 
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of DVD-ROM; pits are the indentations on the surface of the disc.  Smaller pits allowed 
more of them to be embedded onto the disc, resulting in larger storage capacity.  
Additionally, multiple layers of pits/data could be laid on top of each other, doubling the 
potential storage capacity of the technology. 
STANDARDIZING DVD 
On December 16, 1994, the structure of the fledgling DVD industry was divided 
into two camps as Sony and Philips announced their own standard, Multimedia CD 
(MMCD).  By January 1995, hardware and software manufacturers were working 
together to challenge Sony/Philips.  Sony, Philips, and 3M MultiMedia CD were working 
on single and dual layer optical discs and hardware capable of converting MPEG-2 
compressed video with eight channels of surround sound, capacity for multiple languages 
and subtitles, and compatibility with CD, CD-ROM and photo-CD formats.  The dual 
layer model was said to be capable of carrying 270 minutes of video, in addition to 
sound, language, and subtitle options.35 The second camp was comprised of MCA, Time 
Warner, Toshiba, MGM/UA, Matsushita, JVC, Thomson, and Mitsubishi.  The group, 
known as the SD (super density) Alliance, offered four products:  single-sided five and 
nine-gigabyte discs and double-sided ten and eighteen-gigabyte models.36  While the two 
formats differed in architectural structure, they both offered relatively inexpensive 
manufacturing options.  The estimated cost of mass production was estimated to be 113% 
                                                




of the cost of manufacturing CDs.37 Compared to the existing home video technology, 
VHS, DVD manufacturing costs were significantly less, adding to the potential profit 
margins in the sell-through market (DVDs cost disc manufacturers roughly 80 cents to 
produce each disc compared to $2.20 per VHS).  Additionally, the optical discs could be 
produced with minimal modifications to existing CD manufacturing technology. 
The installed manufacturing infrastructure and the potential ease of efficient and 
inexpensive manufacturing would be undercut if competing, incompatible formats went 
to market.  The two camps seemed poised to engage in a format war similar to the 
aforementioned Beta/VHS battle of the early 1980s.  However, at the end of April 1995, 
five computer companies, Apple, Compaq, HP, IBM, and Microsoft, weighed in to urge 
the technology developers to come to an agreement on a single format for both computers 
and home video entertainment.38  Based on the techno-industrial history of the CD and 
the CD-ROM, technology developers knew that without the support of the computer 
industry any technology they developed for digital discs would fail in the marketplace.  
Still, the two camps, SD and MMCD, refused to cooperate, citing “liberalism and 
democracy” and the desire to offer options to interested consumers.39   On August 14, 
1995, the technical working group from the computer industry recommended adoption of 
                                                                                                                                            
36 The single sided, single layer, five-gigabyte disc is capable of storing a 135-minute film with Dolby AC-
3 audio, three languages, four subtitled languages, multiple aspect ratios, parental lockout, and backward 
capability with CDs. 
37 “DVD camps remain split at REPLItech” by Paul Verna, Billboard, 7/1/1995. 
38 Additional recommendations included a common file system for computers and video entertainment, 
backward compatibility with existing CDs and CD-ROMs, forward compatibility with future writable and 
readable discs, costs similar to the CD media, no mandatory caddy or cartridge, and data reliability equal to 
or better than CD-ROM. 
39Taylor, Jim. (2001) DVD Demystified, p. 49. 
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the Universal Disc Format (UDF), supported by the SD alliance.  The UDF format would 
ensure a universal interface and file structure that guaranteed the DVD-ROM would be 
able to interact with all computer operating systems.  This is a crucial point; without a 
standard infrastructure in place, DVD technology could not expect widespread support 
from the computer industry or default installment of DVD-ROM drives on home 
computers.  Sony and Philips quickly demurred, saving face through a compromised 
format agreed upon by all members.   
After eight months of haggling between interested parties, the collectives agreed 
on December 12, 1995, on a unified standard for hardware and software that would cover 
the DVD-ROM format and video standards, taking into account the recommendations 
made by the computer and movie industries.40  In an unprecedented cooperative 
agreement, ten companies-- Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Philips, Pioneer, Sony, 
Thomson, Time Warner, Toshiba and Victor Company of Japan, Ltd. -- joined into a 
consortium whose principal aim was “exchanging and disseminating ideas and 
information about the DVD format and its technical capabilities, improvements and 
innovations.”41  These ten firms forged ahead with the hopes of delivering hardware and 
software into retail outlets as fast as possible.42 Because compromise was needed to 
establish the standard, the resulting technical specifications reflect elements from each 
camp.  The MMCD group favored a single-sided/dual-layer disc, while the SD group 
preferred a double sided disc.  Toshiba and Time Warner insisted on a double-sided 
                                                




option, so the standard was established that all discs would have two 0.6 mm substrates.  
The final specification would have two layers bonded together, even though only one 
layer contains data.   
Sony and Philips, heading the now defunct MMCD group, complained that 
manufacturing costs for bonding would be prohibitive; Toshiba and Time Warner, 
drawing on lessons learned from laserdisc technology, countered that the technology had 
developed to a point of mass production feasibility.  The final format settled on for DVD-
Video was a two-sided five-inch optical disc capable of holding a total of 18.8 gigabytes, 
or the equivalent of two two-hour features per side.  Ultimately, the standards were met 
and agreed upon by all parties in 1994, only to have multiple formats developed within 
the guidelines of the standard (see figure 2.2 below).  By employing a standard for DVD-
Video, the consortium guaranteed that Hollywood would not have reservations about 
competing formats and thus would support the technology by releasing large quantities of 
titles.  Furthermore, the involvement of content providers Time Warner, MGM/UA, and 
MCA in the technological development and standardization process virtually guaranteed 
that Hollywood’s support would be forthcoming. 
Support from content providers proved more difficult to garner than expected due 
to concerns over copyright protection. Clouding matters further was the competing 
interests of the varying industries.  DVD-Video was designed for the playback of pre-
recorded content on stand-alone consoles and on home computers; it was imperative that 
the technology be protected from potential pirates wishing to profit from copied versions 
                                                                                                                                            
42 Everything You Ever Wanted to Know about DVD, Jim Taylor, p. 179. 
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of Hollywood content.  The computer industry, however, desired a format based in 
interactivity that would allow consumers to burn and re-burn content onto discs for data 
storage.  In a joint conference held in October of 1995, the Interactive Multimedia 
Association (IMA) and the Laser Disc Association (LDA), drawing on years of 
experience in manufacturing and marketing CD and laserdisc technologies, concluded 
that the new technology needed “functional interactivity” in order to galvanize interest in 
the international marketplace.43  Superior audio and video quality was thought to be 
insufficient for the new standard.  The group’s recommendations were based on a 
minimum level of interactivity that would include internet connectivity, random access 
functionality, and the capability for functional menu buttons that would lead to different 
content areas for both DVD-Video and DVD-ROM.  The level of interactivity supported 
by the formats would ultimately be tied to the flexibility of the technological standard.  
Because the agreed upon format could be developed and tweaked to suit the needs of 
potential consumers, the companies involved in the process could work together to 
develop compatible secondary technologies if they so desired.  While the DVD-Video 
standard would be “read-only,” or “playback only,” and would temporarily quell 
copyright concerns from content providers, the computer industry desired flexible 
“writable” and “rewritable” discs for data storage.  The solution would be DVD-R and 
DVD-RAM, two writable disc formats that would interface with DVD-ROM drives but 
that would not function as recordable technologies on consoles connected to televisions.  
                                                
43 Taylor, Jim.  (2001).  Pp. 50. 
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However, the prospect of computer drives capable of copying movies onto computers 
was cause for concern for Hollywood. 
Figure 2.2:  DVD Physical Formats  
DVD format                       Capacity        Capacity 
                                 (120-mm disc)   (80-mm disc) 
  
DVD-ROM: one side, one layer     4.7 GB          1.4 GB 
DVD-ROM: one side, two layers    8.5 GB          2.6 GB 
DVD-ROM: two sides, one layer    9.4 GB          2.9 GB 
DVD-ROM: two sides, two layers   17 GB           5.3 GB 
DVD-R: one side, one layer       3.9 GB          1.2 GB 
DVD-R: two sides, one layer      7.8 GB          2.4 GB 
DVD-RAM: one side, one layer     2.6 GB          0.7 GB 
DVD-RAM: two sides, one layer    5.2 GB          1.5 GB 
   
 
Within a month of the December 1995 announcement of a unified technology 
standard, companies began announcing plans for hardware release.  Philips claimed that 
their player would be available by late 1996; Thomson targeted summer 1996; most other 
companies aimed for a fall release date.  Hollywood was still not satisfied.  Without a 
copyright plan in place, through legislation or technology, or both, support from the 
studios would not be forthcoming.  For three months, the major Hollywood production 
companies and distributors, through the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), 
cajoled the consortium to develop and implement copyright technology.  Recognizing 
that the Macrovision protection technology employed by VHS was insufficient for digital 
content protection, the MPAA sought a new technological answer.  On March 29, 1996, 
the MPAA and the Consumer Electronics Manufacturers Association (CEMA) 
announced their intention to seek legislation that would protect their intellectual property.  
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Hoping to include their proposal in the Digital Recording Act of 1996 (discussed in detail 
in chapter five), the two industries recommended that Congress enact legislation that 
would dictate hardware and software systems to prevent copying of movies onto 
computers.  However, the recommendation came without the support of the computer 
industry, whose Information Technology Industry Council (ITI) balked at the mandatory 
standards.  The Council announced it would have a counterproposal for an April 29 
meeting.  That meeting came and went without an agreement or a copyright technology 
in place.  A June 3 meeting between the newly formed Copyright Protection Technical 
Working Group (an inclusive collection of members from all three branches of the 
Consortium) and the rest of the Consortium resulted in a moratorium on Copyright 
legislation proposals.  By June 25, the ten founding members of the Consortium agreed to 
integrate copy protection circuits into their players, including a regional management 
system that would divide the world into segments, allowing for tiered global distribution 
of content.  It wasn’t until October 29, 1996, however, that the final copy protection 
mechanism was in place, clearing the way for product launch.   
Developed by Matsushita and Toshiba, the Copy Scramble System (CSS) 
promised to protect digital content by matching encryption codes on discs to decoding 
systems in players.  One of the first instances of Digital Rights Management technologies 
(DRM; covered in chapter five), the CSS system allayed the fears of Hollywood by 
matching digital protection technologies between discs and players. Thought to be 
unbreakable, CSS combined with analog protection systems like Macrovision to protect 
content from “casual copying.”  The system basically works like cable channel 
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scrambling technology.  Through the encryption process, data is moved around, jumbled 
without degrading the signal.  The decryption technology shifts the data back into place, 
restructuring the fragments into a unified whole.  If an encoded disc is duplicated, the 
copy would not contain the encryptions; if the copied disc or data were then played on a 
console, the reader would not recognize the data and the disc would be unplayable.  
Because the system was developed with 400 keys available, it was thought to be 
sufficiently flexible to guarantee its long-term viability as an anti-piracy technology. 
 With the final technical standard in place, discs and players could be produced 
for the mass market.  The technological foundation was set.  By drawing upon 
developments in CD manufacturing, including laser technologies, data compression 
technology, and laserdisc manufacturing, including bonding techniques for 
manufacturing layered discs, the development of DVD technology went from concept to 
market.  By pooling resources, consumer electronics firms divided the costs incurred for 
product development.  Initially divided into competing factions that reflected long-
standing animosities between Japanese, American, and Taiwanese companies, an 
agreement was brokered by the increasingly powerful computer industry.  In an 
unprecedented cooperative gesture, ten of the leading global technology firms joined 
together to share resources and develop a unified standard.  Once the technology was in 
place, these firms conceded that the support of content providers was necessary for a 
successful product launch.  Again, working together to develop a totally new digital 
encryption technology, Matsushita and Toshiba delivered the solution that cleared the 
final technical obstacle to mass marketability.  The process was protracted and 
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complicated; because the new technology involved both the development of discs, 
copyright technology, and players, and was inclusive of interests in the computer 
industry, the consumer electronics industry, and the motion picture industry, cooperation 
and competition defined product development.  The desire to control patents for the new 
technology encouraged the involvement of every major technology provider in the world.  
However, the potential for windfall profits from patents were not the only motivating 
factor in the development of DVD technology. 
The foregoing discussion has focused, by and large, on the processes of 
technological innovation in establishing business and economic structures in the home 
video market.  While this technological approach sheds light on the historical changes 
and continuities leading to the development of a new technology, it remains only one of 
many possible methodologies available to explore the subject.  The full story of the home 
video market and the unprecedented successful diffusion of DVD needs to account for 
additional forces impacting technological development and diffusion.  Before returning to 
the activities and structure of the DVD Forum that led to an industry-wide DVD standard, 
examination of each core industry reveals the unique processes encouraging their 
convergence.  With this in mind, I now turn to the broader industrial contexts surrounding 
the development and commercialization of home video technologies.  The next chapter 
accounts for the economic and structural organization of the consumer electronics, 
computing, and film industries in an effort to further explicate the motivations behind the 
cooperative practices that led DVD to the marketplace. 
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 Chapter Three:  Producing DVD:  Industrial Contexts 
 So far we have examined how DVD was developed and introduced, propelled by 
existing home video and digital disc technologies.  DVD was conceptualized as both a 
technology and a commodity by corporations in the consumer electronics, computer, and 
film/home video industries.  DVD’s industrial significance, however, extends well 
beyond its antecedents in home video and computing technologies.  DVD grew out of 
existing industrial conditions in the filmed entertainment, consumer electronics, and 
computing industries.  Each of these industries, over the course of the home video era 
prior to DVD, integrated new business strategies to expand into global markets.  New 
technologies were innovated through research and design collectives.  The promise of 
DVD as a new revenue stream brought together these three once-distinct industries who 
agreed to structure and conduct themselves in particular ways, resulting in a new kind of 
industry defined by unprecedented convergence and cooperation. 
Rather than developing within an individual corporation and being subject to the 
distinctive practices and ways of operating within that corporate culture of production, 
DVD development and commercialization contributed to the formation of an industrial 
culture of production.  Each of these industries altered existing practices to participate in 
the process of DVD standardization.  Individual members adapted to the newly formed 
industry, integrating cooperative processes of production with their individual corporate 
cultures.  The conditions under which this “industry-think” and “industry-practice” 
became widespread reflect the collective values, beliefs, and patterns of working of 
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member organizations and the industry at large.44  Each of the constituent industries drew 
upon their disparate experiences in technology development and integration during the 
home video era prior to DVD to adapt to the newly formed industrial culture.  
 The unprecedented cooperation between traditional rivals in the consumer 
electronics industry, as well as the involvement of computer and film industry 
corporations in creating an industrial culture did not develop in a vacuum.  In fact, the 
processes of production that would eventually be categorized as “cooperative” and 
“efficient” by participating corporations and industrial associations developed within the 
existing industrial contexts for the three industries.  The formation of an industrial culture 
of production was directly tied to the respective motivating factors that led to the 
involvement of these corporations.  Conditions in each industry contributed to the 
decision to become involved in DVD development.  Beyond the key motivation for new 
revenue streams, each industry had its own rationale for changing and/or supplementing 
the existing industrial conditions in the mid to late 1990s.  Moreover, each industry drew 
upon long histories of technological innovation and adoption to rationalize DVD’s 
potential.   
In a continuing effort to elucidate the various contexts into which DVD was 
introduced, this chapter argues that favorable conditions within industrial sectors 
contributed to the successful diffusion of DVD technology.  It is the combination of 
favorable conditions in a variety of contexts, including technological, cultural, industrial, 
                                                
44 Du Gay, Paul, and Stuart Hall, et al. 1997. Doing Cultural Studies:  The Story of the Sony Walkman.  
London:  The Open University, Sage Publications, Pp. 43. 
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regulatory, and economic that result in DVD becoming the most successful consumer 
electronics product in history.  DVD technology stimulated cross industrial cooperation 
and led to the development of an industrial culture that set clear standards for conduct by 
member firms.  A new industry formed around DVD, existing alongside the pre-existing 
core businesses of industry constituents.  Member firms continued to be actively engaged 
in their “home” industries while participating in the newly formed DVD ancillary 
industry.  The participatory nature of this new industry developed from existing, intra-
industrial cooperative traditions within each segment during the home video era.  The 
nature and degree of cross-industrial participation and cooperation pertaining to DVD 
distinguishes DVD industrial culture from the hermetic cooperative culture of each 
industry. 
 Before analyzing the formation of a DVD industrial culture of production and the 
structuring of a newly formed ancillary industry, it is necessary to explore and examine 
these conditions in each related industry prior to DVD to explain the processes leading to 
participation in the DVD industry.  This chapter is therefore divided into four sections.  
The first section focuses on the consumer electronics (CE) industry during the home 
video era prior to DVD development and diffusion.  The consumer electronics industry in 
the period leading to the commercialization of DVD was marked by geographic and 
political industrial divides, globalization, and home video technologies.  Deeply rooted 
conflict, suspicion, and animosity between Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, American, and 
European corporations defined the industry throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  
Economic downturns and poor industrial performance offset the successes of new 
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technologies, resulting in periods of market stagnation and heightened competition.  Price 
slashing and tightened profit margins encouraged shared development of research and 
development costs.  Analysis of the structure, conduct, and performance of the industry 
will demonstrate that a favorable environment and enthusiasm for new hardware markets 
existed prior to product development and launch.  The second section explores industrial 
conditions in Hollywood in the 1980s and 1990s, identifying the industrial structure, 
conduct, and performance prior to DVD.  This analysis will examine trends in the 
industry, including the prevailing attitudes towards new technologies generally and 
digital technologies specifically.  The increasing prominence (if not dominance) of home 
video to the profitability of media conglomerates will demonstrate the potential 
significance of DVD to the existing industry.  The third section shifts to explore the 
computing industries prior to DVD development and diffusion.  Like section one, 
analysis focuses on the structure, conduct, and performance and key trends, including 
prevailing industrial attitudes towards new digital technologies.  We will see how 
economic downturns and industrial shifts in the late 1980s and early 1990s combined 
with unstable conditions in U.S. computer manufacturing sectors, resulting in a favorable 
environment for a new optical storage technology. 
 The final section of this chapter charts the formation of the DVD ancillary 
industry, which brought together members from three historically divided industries into 
an integrated operation involving audio-visual digital content delivery in hardware and 
software manufacturing and distribution.  Drawing upon both their unique corporate 
cultures and the burgeoning industrial culture of production, these firms behaved 
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according to both corporate/individual and industrial/collective desires.  Throughout this 
chapter analysis will demonstrate how a variety of conditions, attitudes, and behaviors 
related to new technology development and commercialization paved the way for DVD 
development and diffusion. 
THE CONSUMER ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY IN THE HOME VIDEO ERA 
 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese corporations acquired smaller 
American manufacturers and invested large sums of capital in U.S. manufacturing plants.  
Revenues generated from home video technologies were reinvested into infrastructure 
and global expansion.  The enormous success of the VCR and the continuing profitability 
of televisions and radios assured continuing profitability throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s. Radio and television sets dominated the global market for consumer 
electronics through the late 1970s, when home video technologies stimulated a wave of 
globalization that would be the undoing of the American manufacturing sector.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese consumer electronics manufacturers expanded 
their product lines, adding to their diversification in manufacturing and 
commercialization.  These firms grew exponentially through research and development 
initiatives supported by government.   
The 1980s consumer electronics industry was defined by explosive growth in new 
products, improvements of existing products, and a shift in the leading market sectors.  
Digitization, mobilization, and miniaturization were key aspects of new product 
development and introduction in the decade.  New leisure time technologies like the 
VCR, the Sony Walkman, and video game consoles expanded the functionality and 
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interactivity of the technological base of the industry, television and radio, through new 
ancillary technologies based in “plug and play” compatible hardware.  Video games, 
digital music technologies, and home video re-oriented the industry by creating new 
revenue streams and shifting the locus of power away from American firms to Japanese 
electronics giants.  Globalization became a key industrial strategy throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, as Japanese and American corporations exploited labor pools in the Pacific 
region and continued to develop subsidiaries in global markets.   
New consumer electronics products in the early 1990s set the stage for DVD by 
successfully incorporating digital technologies into ever-increasingly convergent forms.  
In fact, the consumer electronics industry was increasingly tied to the computer industry 
through audio and visual digital technologies designed to interface with the personal 
computer.  Explosive growth in the telecommunications and audio/visual markets 
expanded the industry; cellular phones, digital televisions, and digital satellite 
technologies expanded the global influence of Japanese and Asia-Pacific manufacturers.  
Following a market lull in the early part of the 1990s related to the aforementioned U.S. 
economic recession, new consumer electronics technologies were successfully 
commercialized by Japanese firms.  These changes were due in large part to a structural 
shift in the industry related to failed managerial strategies at the Radio Corporation of 
America (RCA) and the global market position obtained by Sony, Matsushita, and Philips 
stemming from the commercialization of the compact disc and home video.  By the 
1990s, only one American corporation, Zenith, had a significant market share.  Japanese 
firms came to dominate the 1990s global market through a combination of managerial 
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strategies to exploit growing markets, the growth of domestic markets guaranteed by 
protectionist policies, and through tightly integrating their holdings in manufacturing 
technologies.  Conversely, the remaining American and European consumer electronics 
corporations remained focused on a singular product, rather than diversified products, 
and were unable to compete in global markets. 
 
Figure 3.1:  U. S. Exports and Imports of Major Consumer Electronics Products, 1965-
1990 ($1,000) 
 
             Home Radios         Color Television  Videotape Recorders 
 
           Exports        Imports       Exports Imports Exports Imports 
1965  5,274        125,103 
1970 4,007        305,227      17,755 141,858 16,651  8,779 
1975 4,877        374,561      50,012 220,751 44,735  34,931 
1980 20,718        486,304      276,983 311,785 76,087  498,333 
1985 13,986        609,763      85,806 1,113,770 68,798  4,165,103 
1990 35,217        506,777      423,108 1,659,132 N/A  4,223,254 
 
Source:  Inventing the Electronic Century, appendix 3.1 (from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
and Electronic Industry Association) 
 
 The American consumer electronics industry, once a global leader in television 
and radio manufacturing and distribution, was unable to commercialize new products in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Japanese firms cooperated to innovate new technologies for the 
consumer market, pooling resources to develop manufacturing and distribution 
infrastructures.  Because the American industry had long been dominated by a single 
firm, RCA, it lacked the ability to partner with domestic firms in research and 
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development.  Without the creative and logistical resources of the Japanese, RCA failed 
to compete in the rapidly expanding global consumer electronics market. 
The American Consumer Electronics Industry:  The Rise and Fall of RCA 
Prior to the home video age, RCA (Radio Corporation of America) dominated the 
global markets for consumer electronics.  RCA had partnered with the German company 
Telefunken to commercialize radio in the United States in the 1920s.  RCA went it alone 
in commercializing black and white television in the 1930s and color television in the 
1950s.  Unlike CBS, which was formed as an independent programming enterprise, NBC 
came into existence as the subsidiary of an electronics manufacturer, RCA, which saw 
programming as a form of marketing, an enticement to purchase radio and television 
receivers for the home.  The power and influence of a national network aided RCA as it 
lobbied to see its technology adopted as the industry standard.  RCA controlled patents 
for radio and television technologies, licensing their technologies to manufacturers 
around the world.  Essentially, RCA functioned as a patent monopoly throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, restricting entry into the manufacturing sector of potential competitors 
in the domestic radio market.  As a result, RCA dominated the U.S. market for consumer 
electronics; by licensing patents for radio production to General Electric and 
Westinghouse, RCA could not develop integrated development plans to take new 
products from concept to market (Chandler 2001, p. 48).  RCA did expand its production 
and research bases with television technology in the 1940s, but because they separated 
their research facilities from their operating division, they were unable to fully integrate 
divisions for commercializing new technologies.  After the war, two Japanese companies, 
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Matsushita and Sony, along with the Dutch company Philips had moved into global 
markets with their own electronics products based on RCA patents.  Philips had obtained 
a 40% stake in Matsushita in exchange for sharing technical knowledge in design and 
manufacturing.  RCA attempted to keep up with their foreign competitors by developing 
a new strategy for growth.  
RCA’s decline and eventual demise was a direct result of two key managerial 
decisions related to this search:  conglomeration and investment in computing 
technologies (Sobel 1986).  During the war, RCA had expanded production of electrical 
components for governmental contracts, teaming with GE and Bendix to build radar and 
communications facilities.  The resulting profits provided the stimulus for expansion into 
unrelated (to the core business) manufacturing.  After the war, with governmental 
contracts ebbing, David Sarnoff and his son Robert shifted research and development 
funding away from consumer electronics towards electronic data processing in the hopes 
of entering the burgeoning computer market. Their hope was to sink large sums into 
research and development to compete with the aforementioned IBM 360 System.  In so 
doing, RCA unwittingly ceded control of the consumer electronics industry to their 
Japanese and, to a lesser extent, European competitors.  Additionally, turning RCA into a 
diversified conglomerate became an effort to find funding sources for the development of 
computer technologies.  Two waves of acquisitions were intended to diversify holdings in 
order to withstand market fluctuations and offset research funding.  The first began in 
1966 with the acquisition of Random House, followed shortly thereafter by Arnold 
Palmer Enterprises, Hertz rental car company, and the Alaska Communications Systems.  
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The second took hold in 1970 with the acquisition of F.M. Stamper Co. (Banquet Foods), 
Cushman & Wakefield (New York real estate), Coronet Industries (carpets) and finally 
Oriel Foods and Morris James Jones, Ltd. in 1974.  These acquisitions had increased the 
company debt from $266.4 million in 1966 to over $973 million by 1970 (Chandler 2001, 
p. 42).  Less than a decade later, RCA had consolidated debt of over 2.6 billion dollars.  
The computer venture had proved to be a costly failure.  Unable to compete with IBM on 
the international market, RCA lost more than $200 million in the $1.4 billion venture 
before selling off the computer division to Sperry Rand’s UNIVAC division for $250 
million in 1971.  More importantly, RCA had neglected its consumer electronics division, 
the core of its profit generators, at a time when its international competitors were 
investing in their research and development and core technologies. 
The rest of the domestic consumer electronics industry was forced to reconcile the 
effects of conglomeration in a different manner.  Because of RCA’s historical dominance 
and control over patents, their domestic counterparts, led by Sylvania and Philco, were 
specialists, developing and commercializing a particular product.  With the corporate 
zeitgeist firmly engaged with conglomeration strategies, these smaller companies were 
quickly bought and integrated into conglomerate business structures throughout the 
1970s.  Philco and Sylvania were victims of neglect through acquisitions by diversifiers.  
Philco was the nation’s second largest producer of radios and television sets, and had a 
profitable business in producing supercomputers and peripherals for the scientific and 
governmental markets prior to its acquisition by the Ford Motor Company in 1961.  After 
the acquisition, Ford limited funding for consumer electronics development and split the 
 
 87 
company’s activities by selling off manufacturing plants, the brand name, and the sales 
and distribution organization.  Sylvania, the nation’s second largest producer of 
electronics components was acquired by General Telephone (eventually GTE), in 1958.  
GTE reduced research and development funding and shifted focus away from consumer 
electronics, before selling Sylvania to Philips in 1981.  In the process of becoming a 
conglomeration or becoming a subsidiary of a conglomeration, American consumer 
electronics firms lost institutional focus and funding.  Broad scale institutional support 
dried up, with the parent company only interested in the profitability of existing products 
rather than the development of new ones.  In 1987 RCA, which had been a subsidiary of 
General Electric since its founding in 1919, sold its consumer electronics division to the 
French conglomerate Thomson Multimedia and effectively destroyed the remaining 
American consumer electronics industry. 
The Japanese Consumer Electronics Industry 
During the 1960s and 1970s, as RCA struggled in the computing business, the 
three largest international consumer electronics corporations, Sony, Matsushita, and 
Philips, along with Sanyo and Sharp, were concentrating on core consumer electronics 
development and commercialization.  Matsushita, since its beginnings in the 1920s, had 
focused closely on electronics.  Sony developed its internal technical capabilities, 
commercializing new products and enhancing old ones through miniaturization and 
digitalization.  Philips, the only major European competitor in the international 
marketplace had relied, like Sony, on RCA licenses to develop television technologies 
and sustained its focus on the core businesses of electronics products for consumers.  
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However, because Philips was the sole power in that region, it was limited in its 
opportunities to pursue collaborative research and product development.  Eventually, it 
partnered with Matsushita and, beginning in the mid-1970s, with Sony to develop and 
commercialize new products.  The Japanese firms created what Chandler (2001) calls a 
“supporting nexus” of suppliers of materials and services—that is, a group of secondary 
companies that had become major industry players themselves by the 1980s.  These 
included Pioneer Electronic, TDK Electronics, Kyocera, and computer manufacturers like 
Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, and Nippon Electric Company (NEC), all of which had 
research and/or manufacturing plants in Japan.  This group, as was mentioned in the 
previous section, engaged in cooperative endeavors to share technologies and research 
findings.  The supporting network could also assist in the supply of constituent parts for 
entirely new technologies, or components for the improvement of existing technologies.  
Again, the strength of the Japanese domestic market in the 1980s for consumer 
electronics contributed to the success of the nexus.  Because tariffs were in place and the 
computer industry had developed a strong supportive base of domestic consumers, there 
was little competition and a virtually guaranteed market for new electronics.  For 
instance, the video game industry, which emerged in the 1970s in America with Atari, 
was soon dominated by Nintendo, Sega, and Sony during the 1980s.  These Japanese 
firms exploited the pool of resources and strong domestic marketplace to dominate an 
industry sector. 
 The 1990s consumer electronics industry was dominated by Japanese 
manufacturing corporations.  Their market share throughout the decade was determined, 
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to a large degree, by their organizational structure and managerial philosophies.  
Generally, these firms operated according to one of two strategies:  either they developed 
internal technical operations to innovate, design, and commercialize new technologies, or 
they partnered with specialized corporations to divide the production, distribution, and 
marketing of new technologies between firms. These two strategies were most clearly 
demonstrated through the introduction of home video technology in the 1970s and 1980s.  
That involved competition between Sony, whose managerial strategy was to create and 
innovate new technologies internally, and Matsushita/JVC which employed an Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) strategy that relied on a network, or “nexus,” of 
participating firms to increase economies of scale in marketing and production.  The 
difference between developing proprietary technologies and “open” technologies that 
incorporated the collective resources of multiple firms would significantly impact the 
structure and performance of the industry in the 1990s, leading to the development and 
diffusion of DVD.  The former strategy, employed by not only Sony but also RCA and 
Philips, represented an effort to maintain control over new technology and the lion’s 
share of profits.  The latter strategy, as demonstrated by IBM’s success in the computer 
market with “plug compatible” platforms, and by Microsoft’s and Intel’s licensing of 
technologies to manufacturers, was based on maintaining dominance in the marketplace 
through volume, and exploiting economies of scale to reduce prices.   
An excellent example of these different strategies was the VCR market in the 
1970s, when four competing formats were developed and introduced:  Sony’s Betamax, 
Matsushita/JVC’s VHS, Philips’s V-2000 tape system, and RCA’s VideoDisc.  Of the 
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four, only Matsushita’s VHS technology developed through a collective organization of 
manufacturing and distribution partners.  RCA’s proprietary strategy was based on the 
hope of re-establishing market share through new technologies.  RCA was competing 
with Philips, which was in the process of developing their own video disc format, and 
hoped to introduce the system to the public before the tape-based systems could establish 
dominant market share.  However, RCA’s technology was not ready for market in 1976, 
after Betamax and VHS had introduced their competing tape-based technologies.  
Edward Griffiths, then CEO of RCA, devised a compromise that entailed negotiation 
with Matsushita for licensing tape-based technology to distribute under RCA’s brand 
(Chandler 2001, p. 60).  Because RCA had not developed their own tape technology, 
instead sinking millions into the disc technology, they were forced into a distributor role 
if they hoped to profit from the initial market surge in the VCR business.  By supporting 
Matsushita’s VHS, RCA played a large role in deciding the format battle between the two 
Japanese giants.  By competing with Philips, who was employing a similar proprietary 
strategy for development of disc technology, RCA was attempting to re-establish its 
corporate identity while creating a barrier to entry in its domestic market for Japanese 
firms.  Philips’s strategy for the video disc was similar; by cornering the European video 
market, they hoped to re-establish their corporate identity as a technological innovator 
while restricting the growth of their Japanese counterparts.  Philips, however, still held 35 
percent equity in Matsushita and was profiting from the booming international success of 
the VHS.  Due to delays in the development process with Philips’s disc and without a 
global distribution network for their V-2000 technology, they abandoned the 
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development of the disc and the V-2000 in 1983, licensing Matsushita technology for 
distribution under their corporate brands.  A year later, RCA shut down its videodisc 
project, losing more than $500 million after selling only 550,000 units (Graham 1986).   
The consumer electronics industry’s reliance on collective organization and 
strategic alliances to exploit new technologies in competitive market situations was well 
evidenced in the successful diffusion of VHS.  Six Japanese companies and one 
Japanese-owned American company produced, distributed, and marketed the VHS:  
Matsushita, JVC, Sharp, Tokyo Sanyo, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, and Quasar.  Sony’s 
foray into home video through its Betamax technology demonstrated that without 
supportive networks between manufacturers, distributors, and marketers, successful 
commercialization of new technologies in a highly competitive market was difficult.  
Sony did eventually employ this strategy in the early 1980s, enlisting Sanyo (a sister 
company to Tokyo Sanyo), Toshiba, and NEC to volume produce the Betamax, with 
Zenith, Sears, Pioneer, Aiwa, Fisher, Rank, General, and Knekerman licensed to sell the 
technology.  By this time, however, Matsushita had established a supportive 
infrastructure that resulted in nearly twice the number of models licensed by Sony at far 
reduced prices (Cusumano, Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom 1992).  The early success of its 
VHS technology enabled Matsushita to invest in manufacturing infrastructure, increasing 
automation and reducing the number of parts required.  As a result, Matsushita reduced 
the cost of manufacturing and the cost of the technology for consumers, winning large 
contracts to supply distributors with VHS through the OEM arrangements.   
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The implications and full effects of Matsushita’s VHS strategy were enormous.  
First, Matsushita set the standard for videocassettes in all global markets through their 
transnational partnerships.  Second, Matsushita’s dominance produced barriers to entry in 
the market, reducing the possibility of a new competing product.  Third, the strategy 
encouraged Japanese computer makers (like Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, and Toshiba) to 
expand their burgeoning investments in manufacturing and distributing consumer 
electronics.  Fourth, the OEM strategy solidified the Japanese domination of American 
and European consumer electronics markets.  Fifth, the cooperative strategy set the stage 
for further industrial growth strategies in the 1980s and 1990s, while demonstrating the 
need for collective development and unification in commercializing the next-generation 
home video technology. 
Lessons Learned:  Innovating DVD 
These lessons learned during the VHS/Betamax product commercialization 
influenced the industrial conduct and performance throughout the 1980s and into the 
1990s prior to the introduction of DVD.  Matsushita expanded its production of 
communications and consumer electronics products throughout this period, while steadily 
expanding their global development, distribution, and marketing efforts.  Rather than 
developing new technologies internally, they exploited existing technologies, improving 
them for a variety of markets.  Just as Matsushita had relied on Sony’s technical 
innovation of the U-Matic (as discussed in chapter one) to develop its VHS system, the 
company later exploited existing technologies to move into the production and 
distribution of pagers, cordless telephones, fax machines, copiers, and computer products.  
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Meanwhile, Sony continued to innovate and develop its core technical capabilities.  Their 
relative failure in the home video market was offset by the success of the Betamax in 
industrial markets and the overwhelming successes of 1979’s Sony Walkman and 1982’s 
CD player.  As a number of commentators have pointed out, Sony’s unique ability to 
innovate and commercialize new electronics products stems from a corporate culture that 
combines American and Japanese industrial cultures while integrating changes into 
flexible business models (Nathan 2001; Luh 2003; Asakura 2000; Kunkel 1999; Hays 
1999; and Morita, Reingold, and Shimomura 1988).  Sony learned from its early mistakes 
with Betamax, incorporating international partners for the commercialization of new 
products from the late 1980s through the 1990s. 
The CD’s technological development, as discussed in chapter two, combined with 
laserdisc technology and developments in lasers and substrate manufacturing to make 
DVD technology possible.  Additionally, Sony’s competition with Matsushita in the 
home video market produced industrial knowledge that was then integrated into the 
commercialization strategy employed with the CD.  Sony established licensing and 
manufacturing agreements with a number of Japanese partners, and built CD 
manufacturing plants in the United States and Austria to ensure dominance in those 
crucial markets.  Rather than employing the OEM strategy, Sony established a patent 
pooling structure that allowed tighter technical control over their product (Chandler 2001, 
p. 65).  Additionally, Sony partnered with Philips, with whom it had partnered in its 
Betamax campaign, to develop and market its CD technology.  In the wake of 
Matsushita’s success in the home video market, Sony and Philips were both seeking 
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alternative investments in the consumer electronics industry.  As a result, the tandem 
worked cooperatively to develop CD technology, quickly expanding the core business to 
include manufacturing CD-ROM hardware for the computer industry.  The success of the 
CD provided enormous profits for Sony and Philips.  Philips invested these revenues into 
the development of the aforementioned CD-i as a counterpart to CD-ROM technology, 
designed to deliver video through consoles attached to television sets.  The failure of this 
technology in the early 1990s, which cost Phillips more than $1 billion, was a direct 
result of a lack of broad-scale support from corporations in developing supplemental 
technologies.  The effect of this misstep was Philips’s complete dependence on 
partnerships with Japanese corporations for future commercialization of new 
technologies.  Sony’s strategy was to expand their innovation and development 
operations by moving into the computer industry.  In 1985, Sony purchased Apple’s hard 
disk drive operations and began an unsuccessful initial venture into personal computing.45  
Additionally, Sony invested revenues from the CD into the entertainment business.  After 
successfully partnering with CBS records in 1988, Sony channeled their CD profits into 
the aforementioned acquisition of Columbia Pictures in 1989. 
Matsushita followed suit in 1990 by also acquiring a feature film production 
company to synergize their hardware manufacturing with software.  While this strategy 
resulted in varying degrees of success for the two Japanese companies, it served an 
important function in the development of future corporate growth strategies.  Matsushita, 
                                                
45 Sony would pull out of the computer business in 1991 after failing to successfully challenge the 
dominant PC makers, only to return with more success in 1997 through a line of laptop computers. 
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through its attempts to profit from the purchase of MCA, learned that their strategy for 
growth should remain centered around exploiting the supporting network of regional 
consumer electronics and other closely related electronics technologies.  By focusing 
resources on the improvement, distribution, and marketing of technologies, Matsushita 
could be assured of continuing growth.  Sony doggedly maintained its entertainment 
interests after Matsushita had left the sector, enjoying consistent profits from its music 
business but not becoming consistently profitable in the filmed entertainment sector until 
after they acquired MGM in 2004.  Sony continued to innovate and commercialize new 
consumer electronics products, including the highly successful PlayStation videogame 
console in 1993.  By 1998, the PlayStation led this industry sector, with more than 50 
million units sold.  Thus despite Sony’s failure in the home video battle, the company’s 
subsequent pursuit of new consumer electronics technologies and software/content 
production, as well as the ability to channel revenues from hardware successes into new 
ventures, allowed it to maintain a dynamic and fluid corporate business philosophy. 
The industrial context in the consumer electronics sectors during the 1990s set the 
stage for the introduction and diffusion of DVD.  American consumer electronics 
companies had all but disappeared by the dawn of the decade, with Japanese 
conglomerates dominating the global market.  Through supportive networks and 
collective organizations, these firms collaborated on product development, distribution, 
and marketing.  Globalization and digitalization were key industrial themes throughout 
the decade.  The format battle over home video solidified the dominance of the two 
leading consumer electronics firms, Sony and Matsushita.  Sony, because of its failure in 
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the home video market invested in developing and commercializing the CD with their 
European partner, Philips.  This investment proved to be the first step in the product 
development process for DVD; Sony sought a new technology to replace the VHS that 
would challenge the hegemony of their rival Matsushita.  Throughout the 1990s, the 
consumer electronics industry became more closely aligned with the computer industry, 
as consumer electronics companies like Sony moved into the computer industry while 
computer companies, like Toshiba, moved into consumer electronics manufacturing, 
distribution, and marketing.  This conflation proved to be a key enabling condition for the 
development of DVD.  The consumer electronics and computer manufacturers 
cooperated to develop an interactive technology that would serve dual purposes in 
delivering content via the television and the computer.  Only through partnerships and 
pooling of resources (and patents) could the development and commercialization of DVD 
be realized. 
THE FILMED ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY IN THE HOME VIDEO ERA 
 The filmed entertainment industry in the home video era was defined by 
increasing globalization, conglomeration, diversification, and digitization.  The studios 
responsible for feature film production were, by the end of the 1990s, centerpieces of 
global media conglomerates.  Increased synergy between divisions within the 
conglomerate structure maximized profits and expenditures while minimizing risk.  
Changes in regulatory law, technology, business models, distribution strategies, and 
increased pressures to produce blockbuster hits were met with remarkable adaptability.  
Faced with dynamic changes in the marketplace, in politics, and in culture, the film 
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industry at large continued its production of feature films, including those for television 
and direct-to-video, at a rate close to that of Hollywood’s Golden Age.46  The feature film 
remained the centerpiece of a global profit chain.  While production budgets continued to 
increase, profitability was also up due to increased revenues from markets other than 
theatrical.  Global markets expanded, as both theatrical and home video revenues grew in 
international markets throughout the 1980s.  Big budget blockbusters dominated the 
industry during the home video era, beginning with Jaws (Spielberg 1975) and 
continuing throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  Deregulation in media ownership laws 
initiated under the Reagan administration paved the way for mergers and acquisitions and 
newly integrated media conglomerates.   
Figure 3.2:  1990s Domestic Box Office 
 
Year   Total Gross*  Change    Tickets Sold*   Change  # of Pics   Total Screens  Ticket Price Ave Cost** 
2000 $7.661     +2.9%      1.4208     -3.0%     478         37,396    $5.39          $54.8 
1999 $7.448     +7.2%      1.4652     -1.0%    461             36,185            $5.08            $51.5 
1998 $6.949     +9.2%      1.4807               +6.7%    509             34,186            $4.69            $52.7 
1997 $6.365     +7.7%      1.3877               +3.7%    510             31,640    $4.59          $53.4 
1996 $5.911       +7.6%      1.3386               +6.0%     471         29,690            $4.42            $39.8 
1995 $5.493     +1.8%      1.2626               -2.3%     411         27,805            $4.35            $36.4 
1994 $5.396     +4.7%      1.2917    +3.8%     453         26,586    $4.18           $34.3 
1993 $5.154     +5.8%      1.244    +6.0%     462         25,737    $4.14           $29.9 
1992 $4.871     +1.4%      1.173    +2.8%     480         25,105    $4.15           $28.9 
1991 $4.803     -4.4%       1.140    -4.0%     458         24,570    $4.21           $26.1 
1990 $5.021     -0.2%       1.188    -5.9%     410         23,689    $4.23           $26.8 
* in billions 
** in millions 
 
Source:  www.boxofficemojo.com 
 
                                                
46 Including features produced for distribution directly to the home video and cable markets; between 450-
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Domestic theatrical attendance also continued its ascent following a brief 
downturn at the dawn of the 1990s.  The total number of screens grew dramatically due 
to expansion in global markets and overbuilding multiple screen “mega-plexes” in the 
United States.  Domestically, screens rose from just over twenty three and a half thousand 
in 1990 to more than thirty seven thousand by the end of the decade.47  The total number 
of admissions rose from 1.188 billion to 1.42 billion by 2000.  As a result, domestic box 
office revenues jumped from $4.8 billion in 1991 to a record $9.52 billion by 2002.  
Increasing production costs, including rising above the line salaries, expenditures on 
digital and computer generated imaging (CGI), and marketing campaigns were offset by 
rising ticket prices and the long-term profitability guaranteed by distribution on television 
and home video.  Home video revenues assured profitability for theatrically-released 
feature films; increasingly, theatrical releases served as a “loss leader,” for eventual 
profits in the the home video and television markets.  Throughout the decade, the film 
industry was remarkably healthy and profitable (see figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
Industry Structure:  Conglomerate Hollywood 
 In the course of the 1990s, the film industry came to be structured as a tightly 
controlled and operated oligopoly, as several horizontally and vertically integrated 
conglomerates controlled the bulk of profits from feature film distribution in all markets.  
A wave of mergers and acquisitions began in 1984 with the acquisition of Fox Studios by 
Rupert Murdoch’s Newscorp.  The trend continued throughout the home video era, with 
                                                                                                                                            
500 films were produced a year throughout the decade. 
47 Nielson EDI 
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Time Inc.’s acquisition of Warner Communications in 1989 (including Warner Bros. 
studio), Sony Corp.’s purchase of Columbia Tri-Star in 1989, Matsushita’s buyout of 
MCA/Universal in 1990, Pathe’s acquisition of MGM/UA also in 1990, Disney’s 1993 
purchase of independent film producer/distributor Miramax, and Viacom’s acquisition of 
Paramount and Blockbuster (in separate deals) in 1994.  The mid-1990s was marked by 
more shifts in the industry, with three significant mergers and acquisitions in 1995: 
Seagram bought MCA/Universal from Matsushita; Disney purchased Cap Cities/ABC; 
and Time Warner acquired Turner Broadcasting.  The millennium featured more mergers 
involving major studios:  in 1999 Viacom bought CBS; 2000 saw two major moves, with 
AOL merging with Time Warner and Vivendi buying Seagram; in 2003 GE acquired 
Universal, creating NBC Universal; 2004 marked the purchase of MGM by Sony; and in 
2005 Viacom bought DreamWorks. 
 Each of these major acquisitions or mergers underscores the fact that the film 
studios in the home video era had become core businesses for multimedia conglomerates.  
The ability to produce and distribute feature films enabled synergistic exploitation of 
media holdings in television, music, theme parks, hardware manufacturing, home video, 
magazines, and other media.  Each of the media conglomerates utilized the film studios to 
brand their corporation through big budget blockbuster films while maximizing profits 
and controlling the distribution, representation, and exhibition of feature films in all 
ancillary markets.  The acquisition of television networks, both cable and broadcast, 
demonstrates this consolidation of power and the struggle for control over all profit 
chains related to “filmed entertainment.”  Throughout the 1990s, control over visual 
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media production and distribution shifted from the studios to their conglomerate parent 
companies.  These global media empires developed a ravenous appetite for profitable 
media companies, with each of the eventual “Big Six” acquiring or creating television 
and home video divisions at some point in the 90s.   
By the beginning of the millennial decade, the wave of mergers and acquisitions 
had repositioned the major studios as centerpieces of global media companies, with 
feature films driving profits throughout the corporate chain.  This acquisition and creation 
strategy also demonstrates an effective response to competition.  When companies other 
than the studios and their conglomerates were profiting in independent film production, 
distribution, and home video, the conglomerates acquired them or started their own 
companies to eliminate competition and control all potential profits from their products. 
Each acquisition, then, offered a means to capitalize on “downstream” profits from the 
core business of filmed entertainment production and distribution.  The consolidation of 
media interests meant that a single conglomerate could control profits from audio/visual 
media in all distribution windows, from theatrical, home video, pay-per-view, cable 
television, and network television.  Exploiting changes in U.S. regulatory law, media 








Figure 3.3:  Hollywood Revenues 
  
  Source:  Goldman Sachs Movie Industry Update—1996 
Blockbuster Mentalities 
While the wave of mergers may suggest instability and volatility in the film 
business, the reality is that the industry remained remarkably stable and productive 
throughout the shifts in ownership.  The number of films produced continued to grow 
throughout the decade, as did profits stemming from ancillary distribution outlets such as 
network, cable, and video-on-demand television, and home video.  Theatrical film 
production was separated in three tiers from three different kinds of producers (Schatz 
2006).  Blockbusters dominated the industry and accounted for the overwhelming 
majority of profits.48  These films featured budgets exceeding $100 million, big stars, 
digital effects (more on this below) and elaborate advertising and marketing campaigns 
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and merchandising tie-ins.  The second tier included specialty fare produced and 
distributed by the conglomerates’ newly formed or purchased independent subsidiary 
companies (e.g. Fox Searchlight, Warner Independent Pictures, Sony Pictures Classics, or 
Disney’s Miramax).  Budgets were roughly 40% of the average blockbuster with 
advertising campaigns averaging one third of the cost to market.  Independent 
subsidiaries accounted for the occasional breakout hit in the 90s, and with the marketing 
support of their parent companies, were able to reach large audiences if they performed 
well in initial limited release.  The third tier was comprised of low-budget specialty, art, 
and genre films produced by wholly independent production-distribution companies for 
carefully targeted markets.  These films accounted for a large portion of the overall 
production output during the 1980s and 1990s, surpassing the number of studio releases 
routinely throughout this period.49  However, these films account for only a small fraction 
of the revenues generated by the conglomerates’ filmed entertainment divisions. While 
production of feature films was up throughout the 1990s, and the industry split between 
the conglomerate producers and the independents, it was clear that the feature film had 
become the eye of a storm of profits that stimulated concentration of ownership and 
conglomeration. 
This is not to suggest that conglomeration was solely linked to the lure of the 
blockbuster.  Each of the mergers identified above represented a strategic effort to expand 
the existing structure of the conglomerate to include holdings in a media division other 
                                                                                                                                            




than those already under the corporate umbrella.  As we’ve seen, the impetus behind the 
acquisitions of Columbia Tri-Star and MCA-Universal by Sony and Matsushita, 
respectively, marked an effort to synergize hardware with software content.  However, 
these deals also represent institutional strategies outside of the film industry’s purview 
including economic stagnation within the hardware industry.  Furthermore, the 
acquisition of MCA-Universal by Matsushita, Sony’s longstanding rival, should be 
viewed in light of the animosity-laden relationship between the two corporations.  Surely 
Matsushita was not only attempting to follow Sony’s lead in developing 
hardware/software synergies, but was actively and openly competing to keep up with 
Sony’s aggressive global expansion.  Similarly, when News Corp. bought 20th Century 
Fox in 1984 and purchased a number of television outlets nationwide to start the Fox 
television network, thus establishing a model for 90s conglomeration in the media 
industries, others were soon to follow.  Hence 1994’s acquisition of Paramount and 
Blockbuster by Viacom, a conglomerate with considerable holdings in amusement parks, 
publishing, cable and international television, represents not only the desire to maximize 
profits from a division capable of creating blockbusters but a “gap filling” in the 
conglomerate portfolio.  With holdings in virtually every other media available, the film 
studio was most desirable as a means to an end.  That end would seem to be effective 
control over price discrimination in the distribution of content in all channels, synergy, 
and economies of scale between divisions.  Another example of this “gap filling” 
tendency would be Disney’s buyout of Cap Cities/ABC in 1995.  Disney’s acquisition of 
Cap Cities/ABC completed their cross-ownership efforts that already included 
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Hollywood Pictures, Walt Disney Pictures, Touchstone Pictures, Buena Vista Pictures 
Distribution, Buena Vista Home Video, The Disney Channel, the Disney theme parks 
around the world, sports franchises in baseball and hockey, retail stores, Broadway plays, 
a publishing group, and two music companies.  The purchase of a major network was not 
the only incentive; ESPN Networks was also a part of the deal.  ESPN was (and remains) 
by far the most profitable cable channel in the industry and has affiliated businesses in 
restaurants, radio, and retail. 
Digital Technologies 
Digitization has yet to be fully examined as a transformative mechanism for 
1990s Hollywood.  Digital technology played an important role in the successive waves 
of mergers and acquisitions that reshaped the industry throughout the 1990s.  As seen in 
chapter two, for instance, Sony experimented with digital disc technologies, pushing the 
limits of the CD in the hopes of cornering the digital home video market.  A new digital 
platform for delivery of content, which Sony now owned via its acquisition of Columbia-
TriStar, would be most profitable if hardware and software could be cross-promoted.  
Speaking shortly after another major content acquisition (Sony’s buyout of MGM in 
2004), Howard Stringer, CEO of Sony of America, states:  "History will continue to 
prove that technology innovations, large-capacity data-storage mediums, and higher-
speed distribution networks will only boost the value of Sony's digital-content libraries. 
Whether we distribute our content via CD, DVD, cable, and satellite today, or repurpose 
it for high-definition displays or wireless distribution tomorrow, our networks, 
distribution, and devices enable us to financially mine our high-quality libraries for many 
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years to come."50  Between 1990 and 1995, the New Hollywood of the 1970s and 80s 
transformed into “Conglomerate Hollywood,” as tightly integrated media giants bought 
up the content providers/studios in an effort to synergize their various media holdings 
(Schatz 2006).  By the end of the decade “The Big Six” had effectively consolidated their 
power through strategic acquisitions and perhaps more importantly, by integrating new 
technologies into their existing business models.  Participation in the development and 
commercialization of DVD through active partnerships with consumer electronics and 
computing companies redefined Hollywood once again.  “Conglomerate Hollywood” 
became “Convergent Hollywood,” as filmed content moved onto computers and became 
increasingly mobile through digital delivery technologies. 
 Digitization became a prominent buzz word in Hollywood in the 1990s.  Over the 
course of the decade, digital filmmaking entered the mainstream, digital effects were 
commonplace within big-budget blockbusters, non-linear digital post-production for 
audio and visual became the norm, the number of digital projectors was rising 
dramatically, and at decade’s end, home video began its digital transformation with the 
shift to DVD.  As much as any other phenomenon in the 1990s, including the wave of 
mergers and acquisitions that restructured the industry into tightly integrated media 
conglomerates, digitization was the lynchpin to profitability and global dominance.  
Throughout the 1990s, digital effects figured prominently in the string of blockbusters 
that dominated domestic and international theatrical box office revenues.  Beginning in 
                                                




1991 with Terminator 2 (James Cameron, TriStar 1991) and concluding with the release 
of Star Wars Episode I: The Phantom Menace (George Lucas, Fox 1999) in May of 
1999, every year’s top grossing domestic film featured digital effects.51  This fact is 
further amplified if we examine the role of digital technologies in these films.  CGI was 
not simply a background effect that punctuated a dramatic moment; it became the source 
of spectacle and the foundation of blockbuster narrative construction.  Would audiences 
have flocked to theaters in the 1990s without the digital effects that made possible the 
dinosaurs of Jurassic Park (Spielberg, Universal 1993), the photo realism accomplished 
through the all-digital Toy Story (Lasseter, Buena Vista 1995), the alien destruction of 
Independence Day (Emmerich, Fox 1996), the spectacular recreation of the sinking of the 
Titanic (Cameron, Paramount 1997) or the invasion of Normandy in Saving Private Ryan 
(Spielberg, DreamWorks 1998)?  Without CGI, these films would be hard to imagine. 
 Digital technology became pervasive in 1990s Hollywood.  Digital audio, 
beginning with Warren Beatty’s Dick Tracy (Buena Vista 1990), was adopted and 
employed by hundreds of films throughout the decade.  Dolby Stereo Digital (now simply 
called Dolby Digital) was first featured on the 1992 film Batman Returns (Warner Bros. 
1992).  Introduced to the home theater market as Dolby AC-3 with the 1995 laserdisc 
release of Clear and Present Danger (Paramount Pictures 1994), the format did not 
become widespread in the consumer market, partly because of extra hardware that was 
necessary to make use of it, until it was adopted as part of the DVD specification.  A 
series of improvements led to widespread adoption of DTS (Digital Theater Sound) 




technology, including Jurassic Park, Independence Day, Apollo 13 (1995), and Twister 
(1996).  As early as 1992, the first demonstrations of digital cinema proved the viability 
of the format for image capture as an alternative to celluloid.52  The Hollywood 
establishment was slow to recognize that digital sound, image capture, and post-
production technologies could enhance the production process while delivering high 
quality, high fidelity outputs.  In keeping with their attitude towards new technologies, 
the studios slowly integrated digital technology into the production chain in the 1990s.  
Because digitization in production and post-production offered efficiency and potential 
and did not present any threat to the existing mode of production, there was less hesitancy 
from studios to adapt than in the past.  Unlike the cases of sound and television 
technologies, where uncertainties surrounded adaptation and adoption, digitization was 
not an imminent threat to the profitability of Hollywood.  Like widescreen and color 
technology, digitization in production and post-production should be viewed as an effort 
to alter filmed entertainment to differentiate product in the marketplace and to compete 
with other media.  
However, digitization in home video technology and distribution meant 
something altogether different.  Because digitization in distribution technologies 
presented consumers (and potential pirates) with pristine digital versions of content, there 
was considerable concern for copyright protection.  Content owners were understandably 
reluctant to adopt technologies that might threaten their hegemony and oligopoly.  Digital 




distribution technologies, including DVD, required technology that encrypted the 
material, protecting it from illegal copying and distribution. 
 Studio executives were not the only proponents for digital technologies in effects, 
editing, and sound.  The Academy quickly lauded the application of the latest digital 
tools.  Apollo 13, for instance, was the first picture featuring DTS sound to win the “Best 
Sound” Academy Award; The English Patient (1996) became the first feature with a 
digitally edited soundtrack to win an Academy Award.  More important than awards was 
the increasingly powerful position of special effects producers and directors throughout 
the 1990s.  George Lucas pushed digital technology further than most of his 
contemporaries, creating all digital characters in his Star Wars prequel, founding 
Skywalker Sound (a digital sound company), developing digital effects through his 
Industrial Light & Magic and LucasFilm shingles, and shooting and exhibiting Star 
Wars:  Episode I with all-digital technology.  By the turn of the century, Lucas’ estimated 
net worth topped $3 billion.53  Digitalization was not limited to big budget spectaculars, 
with Lars Von Trier employing digital video cameras for use in his anti-Hollywood 
“Dogme 95” projects.  Furthermore, established directors began employing high quality 
digital video for image capture, experimenting with the technology to alter traditional 
narrative construction, including the likes of Spike Lee (Bamboozled 2000), Mike Figgis 
(Timecode 2000), and Barbet Schroeder (Our Lady of the Assassins 2000).  The digital 
“evolution” spilled over into the advertising and marketing sectors.  With the rapid 
diffusion of computers into homes across the country with access to the digital internet, 
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online advertising and marketing campaigns became increasingly prevalent.  The Blair 
Witch Project (Sanchez and Myrick, Artisan 1999) proved that “viral” internet marketing 
campaigns could translate into huge box office success.  Shot on 16mm and digital video, 
the film became the most profitable film of all time, grossing $248 million on a budget of 
$35,000 (plus nearly $20 million in marketing expenses).54   
The introduction of digital technology into the production, post-production, 
distribution, and exhibition businesses fundamentally altered the ways in which feature 
films were made and experienced.  Digital technology allowed filmmakers to create, via 
the computer, more fantastical worlds than was ever possible before.  Sound recording 
and editing became much more precise and nuanced.  Editors were able to access scenes 
and create effects in seconds and minutes, rather than the weeks and months it took in the 
past.  Audiences embraced big budget spectaculars that employed CGI to best effect.  
With digital technology, the line(s) between fantasy and reality became increasingly 
blurred, as audiences struggled to identify digital effects as such.  However, digital 
technology did not stimulate significant alternatives to the proven story formulas 
produced by Hollywood for nearly a hundred years.  These genres remained intact; digital 
technology was integrated into pre-existing narrative structures to heighten affect and 
produce spectacle.  Rather than initiating a whole-scale narrative revolution, 
digitalization resulted in an incremental and evolutionary shift in narrative, enhancing the 
firmly established “blockbuster mentality” that had been driving the industry since Jaws 





broke box office records in the mid-1970s.  Blockbusters within action and fantasy genres 
utilized CGI to increase the amount of spectacle and action already prevalent in those 
forms prior to digital technology.  Digital technologies did shift the profitability, scale, 
and volume of these genres.  With the aforementioned popularity of T2, studios rapidly 
adopted CGI into their potential blockbusters and produced more successful action and 
fantasy films during the 1990s than ever before.  Even colossal big budget effects failures 
could not stem the move to digital technology and digital effects; films with enormous 
effects budgets and disappointing domestic theatrical returns, like Speed 2:  Cruise 
Control (DeBont, Fox 1997) and Waterworld (Costner, Universal 1995), were profitable 
even before going to ancillary markets due to profitability in foreign theatrical (Gomery 
2000).55  
Consider 1997 by way of example:  of the top twenty grossing films during the 
calendar year, fourteen can be categorized into the action or fantasy genres.  Each of the 
fourteen employ digital effects, with eleven grossing more than $100 million in domestic 
theatrical returns alone (see figure 3.4).  
                                                




Figure 3.4:  Top Grossing Films, Domestic Markets, released in 1997 
 
Rank Movie Title  Studio  Total Gross Genre 
1 Titanic   Paramount $600,788,188 Historical Romance/Action 
2 Men in Black  Sony  $250,690,539 Science Fiction/Action 
3 The Lost World:  Universal $229,086,679 Action/Adventure 
 Jurassic Park 
4 Liar Liar  Universal $181,410,615 Comedy 
5 Air Force One  Sony  $172,956,409 Action/Adventure 
6 As Good as It Gets Sony  $148,478,011 Comedy 
7 Good Will Hunting Miramax $138,433,435 Drama 
8 Star Wars (Special Ed.)  Fox  $138,257,865 Fantasy/Action Adventure 
9 My Best Friend’s Wedding Sony  $127,120,029 Romantic Comedy 
10 Tomorrow Never Dies   MGM  $125,304,276 Action/Adventure 
11 Face/Off  Paramount $112,276,146 Action/Adventure 
12 Batman and Robin WB  $107,325,195 Comic Book/Action/Adventure 
13 George of the Jungle Buena Vista $105,263,257 Children’s Fantasy 
14 Scream 2  Dimension $101,363,301 Comedy/Horror 
15 Con Air   Buena Vista $101,117,573 Action/Adventure 
16 Contact   WB  $100,920,329 Fantasy 
17 Hercules  Buena Vista $99,112,101 Children’s Action 
18 Flubber   Buena Vista $92,977,226 Children’s Comedy/Fantasy 
19 Conspiracy Theory WB  $75,982,834 Action/Adventure 
20 I Know What You Sony  $72,586,134 Horror 
 Did Last Summer 
 
Source:  www.boxofficemojo.com 
 
What effect digitalization did have on the narrative output of the major studios 
should be seen as incremental and evolutionary rather than revolutionary.  Digital effects 
meant more spectacle, less dialogue, and oversimplified plot construction.  The structure 
remained the same; narratives were constructed around empathetic protagonists fighting 
against clearly defined enemies with clear conflicts and well defined goals driving the 
story forward, as they had been for decades.  Around simple universal conflicts digital 
effects heightened the obstacles, made possible impossible enemies, and made 
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spectacularly explosive climaxes (and sometimes resolutions) the norm.  The result was 
more internationally marketable fare.  Universal themes and universal conflicts convey 
well, as is evidenced from Hollywood’s long standing international domination.  Digital 
effects increased spectacle and propelled international theatrical and home video 
revenues, as theatergoers and home video patrons eagerly paid for the latest digital 
creation.  Over the course of the 1990s, international box office, driven in large part by 
the digital effects-driven action/fantasy blockbuster, would routinely surpass domestic 
theatrical grosses (Balio 1998).  Higher returns were offset somewhat by higher 
production and advertising costs, as teams of digital artists labored to concoct the 
spectacle required for marketability.  Between 1990 and 2000, the average per film 
negative cost jumped by over 50%, in no small part due to the excessive budgets of 
blockbusters and their digital effects budgets.  The rise in digital effects thusly resulted in 
higher per film production budgets and more action and fantasy film output, not new 
genres or new storytelling techniques (see figures 3.3 and 3.4). 
Hollywood and Home Video 
 Digitalization would have its most obvious impact in the home video market.  As 
a replacement technology for the VHS, DVD would alter the existing business model and 
return greater profits to the conglomerates than ever before.  The film industry during the 
home video era, as we’ve seen, was being re-structured by conglomeration, globalization, 
and digitalization.  Throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, the rising profitability of 
ancillary markets also contributed to shifts in the industrial structure.  The home video 
market, prior to the introduction of DVD, was booming.  As we saw in chapter two, VHS 
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sell-through became much more prevalent during the latter half of the 1980s and into the 
1990s, as content providers developed more efficient home video technologies and began 
buying out home video retailers.  In the early 1990s, having grown over the course of the 
1980s into a multibillion dollar enterprise dominated by national chains like Blockbuster 
Video, as well as regional chains like Hollywood Entertainment, Movie Gallery, and 
Video Update, the home video industry was a rental business, relying on content from the 
film industry.  Industry leader Blockbuster had expanded from 17 stores in 1986 to more 
than 1,000 stores by 1990, buying out its rivals and “franchising” its brand much like fast 
food retailers (Gomery 2000).  Relying on economies of scale and blockbuster theatrical 
hits, Blockbuster took in more than $400 million in annual revenues at the start of the 
decade.  While these large retailers obtained a national profile through expensive 
advertising campaigns, the industry remained fragmented throughout the 1990s.  The top 
50 rental chains accounted for only 49% of the overall revenues in the 1990s; small 
chains and individual stores accounted for the rest. 
The 1990s VHS industry saw explosive growth in the sell-through market, as 
studios attempted to bypass the First Sale Doctrine by pricing blockbusters and children’s 
films for direct sell-through to consumers.  Revenues from VHS purchases rose from 
$3.6 billion in 1990 to more than $10 billion by 1996 before falling off due to the 
introduction of DVDs priced for direct sale.  By the late 1990s, more new VHS releases 
were being priced for sell-through, jumping from 44 such titles in 1997 to 63 in 1998.56  
However, this sales strategy did not seem to inhibit the rental market, which remained 
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relatively flat, and profitable, throughout the decade.  Revenues from rental jumped from 
around $10 billion at the start of the decade to $11 billion by 1992 and remained there 
throughout the decade (see figure 3.4).  Combined with the sell-through market, the VHS 
home video market accounted for an average of $15 to $18 billion dollars in revenue in 
the 1990s.  Theatrical revenues, also rising throughout this period, crested at around $9 
billion dollars at the end of the decade.  However, because a revenue sharing model was 
not in place with rental retailers, the studios were unable to fully capitalize on the $11 
billion dollar rental market.  This revenue stream easily exceeds domestic theatrical 
grosses, and positions the video market prior to DVD as the largest single potential 
revenue source for the media conglomerates.  By shifting from a rental to a sell-through 
model for the new home video technology, not only could the majority of profits be 
returned to the studio-distributors, but their profit margins would also increase as the 
price per unit reduced with disc technology.  Recognizing the imminent shift in 
distribution strategy in home video, rental retailers quickly agreed to share rental 
revenues, returning around 40% after 1998 (versus 0% in the prior era) (Gomery 2000).   
With rising production and advertising costs, theatrical exhibition increasingly 
became a loss leader in the home video era.  Theatrical runs established subsequent 
markets for films, including home video, and television broadcasts.  Due to the rental 
orientation of the home video industry, broadcast, cable, and satellite television 
represented a lucrative after market.  In fact, the overwhelming majority of profits in the 
1990s filmed entertainment business came from presentation of Hollywood content on 
                                                                                                                                            
56 VSDA, “An Annual Report on the Home Video Market 1999,” pg. 5. 
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television.  Including non-theatrical filmed content and theatrical films on home video, 
pay-per-view, cable television, and network television in domestic and foreign markets, 
profits from films on television dominated worldwide theatrical by a staggering margin.  
Estimates have the difference somewhere in the neighborhood of 85% of total profits 
coming from films presented on television.  Exploiting the feature film in all windows 
became the defining business strategy of the 1990s media industries; the potential 
revenues offered from filmed entertainment along a chain of integrated media holdings 
was a central motivating factor in conglomeration throughout the decade. 
Figure 3.5:  The 1990s VHS/Home Video Industry  
 
Year  Total VHS Rentals*   Total VHS Rental        Avg. Tapes           Total VHS        Total VHS  
        Spending*             Rented Per HH        Purchases*    Purchase Spending** 
 
1990 4,132.50      $10, 331  3.02     231  $3,629 
1991 4,090.90      $10,227  2.84     290.7  $4,317 
1992 4,481.20      $11,203  2.88     386.8  $5,543 
1993 4,473.60      $11,184  2.92     462.5  $6,591 
1994 4,593.90      $11,485  2.92     580.1  $8,423 
1995 4,194.80      $10,948  2.84     682.9  $9,738 
1996 4,226.10      $11,453  2.84     735.1  $10,409 
1997 4,086.50      $11,238  2.8     657.1  $9,278 
1998 3,979.50      $11,023  2.72     676.3  $9,658 
1999 3,741.20      $11,111  2.61     592.8  $8,145 
2000 3,720.20      $11,621  2.65     576.4  $7,620 
 
*millions of units 
**millions of dollars 
 
Source:  www.alexassoc.com 
 
 The film industry in the home video era is best understood within the contexts of 
digitalization, globalization, and conglomeration.  These three trends suggest large-scale 
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shifts in the business of making movies.  However, what they more accurately 
demonstrate is the concentration of ownership, control, and power, the dynamism and 
flexibility of media business models and the willingness to incorporate new means and 
methods of creating content for sale to audiences.  Throughout the decade of the 1990s, 
the major studios maintained between 85 and 94 percent of the domestic box office 
market share.57  What this statistic suggests is that even when facing changes in 
ownership, threats from new technology, increasing pressures to produce hits, and the 
increasing economic significance of ancillary markets, the top six studios continued to 
dominate the industry through feature filmmaking.  The fact that these shifts and 
pressures occurred during a period of sustained economic growth reflects the efficiency 
in the mode of production, the strength of leadership within the film production business, 
and ongoing stability with labor relations.  Maintaining the centrality of the film studio 
and its product in the corporate pecking order represented an effort to exploit the 
potential synergies between the blockbuster and other media interests (including cross 
promotion, merchandizing, licensing, and home video sales).  The increased 
concentration and cooperation between members of the oligopoly also contributed to an 
atmosphere conducive for industry wide acceptance and participation in new 
technologies.  With complete control over the filmed entertainment landscape, including 
content for any new technology, the conglomerates were well positioned to deal with any 
new home video technology. 
                                                




THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY IN THE HOME VIDEO ERA 
 As in the film and consumer electronics industries, a favorable environment 
existed in the computer industry that spurred the eventual diffusion of DVD.  In fact, the 
computer industries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia were in an industrial position of 
need relative to a new optical storage technology.  Existing technologies failed to meet 
the changing needs and developments of content manufacturers and the public.  Due to a 
series of strategic missteps by industry leader IBM, opportunities for industrial and 
technological development were opened to Japanese firms throughout the 1970s and 
1980s.  IBM’s outsourcing of technological component development and rush to market 
personal computers decreased its market share and ability to innovate new products.  
When IBM weighed in during 1995 to solve the format battle over DVD, it did so to 
compensate for its failure to internally develop drive technologies.  Thus the story of the 
computing industry during the home video era is marked by IBM’s rise and fall as the 
market leader and also by the Japanese response to IBM’s travails.  Cooperation that 
would prove to be a crucial strategy in DVD commercialization began as a strategy 
employed by Japanese computing firms in response to IBM’s global dominance.  These 
computing firms emerged from the consumer electronics industry and were able to 
innovate and commercialize new technologies by virtue of their cooperation with other 
Japanese firms.  As they did so, they set the stage for cross-industrial cooperation that 
made possible the universal standard specification for DVD. 
The computing industry at the time of DVD commercialization was structured 
around seven specific sub-industries related to hardware equipment and software sectors 
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that had developed over the course of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.58  Four computer 
equipment sub-industries included electronic computers, computer storage devices, 
computer terminals, and computer peripheral equipment (Miles 1993).  The computer 
software sub-industry consisted of computer programming services, prepackaged 
software, and computer integrated systems design.  Electronic computers included PCs, 
laptops, and any digital computer of any size.  The computer storage industry was based 
around equipment like magnetic and optical storage drives (like the eventual DVD-
ROM), and tape storage devices.  Split between the United States and Japan, the industry 
was defined by trade barriers, cooperation between national governments, academics, and 
domestic corporations in research initiatives, and economies on the rebound following 
periods of stagnation.  The computer industry during the home video era was structured 
in this particular manner due to a series of innovations, market developments, regulatory 
decisions, and industrial shifts occurring from the foundation of the industry in the 1950s 
through the end of the 1980s.  Over the course of that relatively short historical period, 
one corporation influenced the international computer industry more than any other:  
IBM. 
Creating Computers:  IBM   
IBM established the industry in the 1950s by demonstrating the viability of 
electronics technology integrated with existing punch-card tabulators (Chandler 2001).  
After successfully introducing the 650 mainframe computer and attaining an 80 percent 
                                                
58 Appendix 3.1 lists the leading firms and their market share in the 1990s in these seven core industrial 
sectors.   
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share of the world computer market in the 1960s, IBM channeled profits into 
development and research of the System 360 line of compatible mainframe computers for 
industrial use.  This led to a threefold impact on the industry.  First, the introduction of 
the System 360 and its successor the System 370 spurred the creation of a supporting 
network of “plug-compatible” components and software produced by both existing 
businesses and entrepreneurial start-ups.  Second, the migration of the System 360 to 
Japan with designer Gene Amdahl in September 1970 resulted in the growth of the 
Japanese domestic computer market and, due to failures by European firms to develop 
their own plug-compatible products and Japan’s ability to supply the European market 
with mainframe computers, the international competitiveness of Japan’s computer sector.  
And finally, the success of the 360 led to a dominant market position for IBM in 
mainstream commercial computing, opening market opportunities in supercomputing and 
minicomputing (Chandler 2001). 
The growth of the Japanese computer industry, led by Fujitsu, Toshiba, Hitachi, 
NEC, and Mitsubishi Electric, was a national cooperative effort to challenge the global 
dominance of IBM.  After World War II, the Japanese computer industry, at the behest of 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), formed the Japan Electronic 
Computer Company (JECC) to fund the development and manufacturing of computer 
products.  The JECC was designed to fund research and development within the industry, 
guaranteeing a market by purchasing the end products and leasing the computers to 
clients within Japan.  Five of the seven members of the group developed partnerships 
with U.S. based IBM competitors in the hopes of developing the technical knowledge 
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required to compete on the global stage (Chandler 2001).  The JECC was followed by the 
unsuccessful FONTAC initiative, the Ogata Project, the influential “New Series Project,” 
and the VLSI circuit project, each efforts to develop competitive technology after IBM 
had introduced a new computer mainframe or peripheral technology to the international 
market.59  Each initiative divided development responsibilities between member 
organizations, with one corporation developing large scale mainframes, another firm 
handling medium sized and peripheral products, and another handling small computers 
for machine control and operation.  However, it was not until Gene Amdahl defected 
from IBM to Fujitsu, bringing along his design skills and technical know-how, that the 
Japanese computer industry became a viable international market force.  Arriving in 
1971, Amdahl’s firm quickly produced competitive mainframes that enabled Japanese 
firms, working cooperatively, to dominate the European market for large computer 
systems, to compete successfully in the international mainframe marketplace, and to 
virtually destroy the U.S. memory chip industry.60   
The Rise of the Pacific:  the Japanese Computer Industry 
Through the 1970s, the Japanese computer industry dominated the European and 
Asian markets.  Based largely on patents obtained from U.S. technology developers, the 
big five Japanese computer makers were the leaders in mainframe production and posed 
serious threats to American semiconductor developers.  By 1984 the Japanese market 
                                                
59 The FONTAC Project was an attempt to compete with the IBM 1700 series; the Ogata with the 360 
series; and the New Series Project for the 370 series. 
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share in the semiconductor (memory chip) international market had risen to 92% 
(Chandler 2001, p. 131).  This dominance forced the closing of plants in Silicon Valley 
for semiconductor manufacturers Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), Intel, and National 
Semiconductor.  The challenge from the Japanese firms in the semiconductor business 
coincided with the invention and development of microprocessors at the research and 
development centers for Intel and Texas Instruments.  Because American firms 
reinvested revenues from memory technologies into microprocessor technologies, they 
were able to reduce the manufacturing costs for, and the power of, the “computers on a 
chip” that would make the personal computer possible in the 1980s.  The research and 
development initiatives of the Silicon Valley firms and the subsequent shift in business 
practices by IBM ensured that the market dominance of the Japanese firms would not 
last.  The microprocessor shifted the industrial focus from mainframe computing and the 
peripheral software, devices, and services for managing large industrial computers to a 
world of small computers used by individuals in the office on small networks and by the 
general public in the home.  Because IBM had so dominated the domestic market in 
computing prior to the microprocessor, the number of software and peripheral equipment 
producers was high.  The costs of the equipment needed to produce a computer, given the 
commercial success of the microprocessor, made it possible for amateur enthusiasts to 
develop home-made personal computers.  Famously, it was the amateur enthusiast-
developed and marketed Altair 8800, employing an Intel 8080 chip, which inspired Bill 
                                                                                                                                            
60 For a thorough account of the development of the five core Japanese computer companies from their 
formation through the 1990s, see Alfred D. Chandler Jr.’s (2001) Inventing the Electronic Century, chapter 
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Gates and Paul Allen to develop the BASIC programming language that would lead to 
the founding of Microsoft in 1978. 
The decision by the managers of IBM to mass produce the PC for sale to the 
general public in the late 1970s and early 1980s ensured their continuing dominance in 
the domestic computing market.  Rushing into production after the early successes of 
Apple, Commodore, and Tandy, IBM shifted from proprietary hardware and software 
packages to open source, scalable, interactive systems based on Intel chips and Microsoft 
operating systems.  Because IBM benefited from economies of scale and applied the 
resources of mass production and mass marketing, it set the standard for personal 
computing in the 1980s.  Intel and Microsoft became dominant market forces, and shifted 
the innovation focus from hardware and semiconductors to microprocessors and 
software.  Barriers to entry dropped.  The software industry virtually exploded with gross 
infusions of capital.  By the end of the 1980s, software was the industry’s fastest growing 
sector.  The decision to go non-proprietary with PC technology led to innumerable IBM 
clones employing the same hardware and software combinations under the nomenclature 
of a variety of international companies.  Thousands of software start-ups struggled for 
market position and profitability.  By the end of the 1980s, the industry had matured.  
IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Compaq dominated the PC market, with Apple maintaining a 
smaller market share with its proprietary system.  After the decline of the U.S. economy 
in the early 1990s, the market boomed once more in the mid to late 1990s. 
                                                                                                                                            
6, “National Competitors.” 
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Entering the 1990s, the computer sector was in the midst of its longest sustained 
economic downturn in its history.  The domestic industry endured four consecutive years 
of employment loss from 1988 through 1992.  Prior to the “dot com” boom of the late 
1990s, computer companies around the world restructured their operations in continuing 
efforts to cut costs and improve efficiency.  Hit hard by the economic recession, U.S. 
computer equipment firms laid off 191,729 workers worldwide between 1988 and early 
1992.61  Globalization began to affect the industry, as cheap off shore labor replaced 
domestic factories, and plant closing became the norm nationwide.  Automation in the 
manufacturing sector was up, leading to increased efficiency and a reduction of jobs.  By 
the early 1990s, employee reductions had spread from the factories to include 
researchers, engineers, managers, and marketing executives.  Research and development 
expenditures were down and eating up a significant percentage of total revenues, though 
still at a staggering $14 billion.  However bleak a picture this may present, the global 
market for computer/information equipment and services had more than doubled between 
1984 and 1991.  During the same period, the Japanese market share tripled, to 27%.  The 
European market share stood consistent at right around 10%, and relied mostly on 
Japanese technology and services that were then branded under European corporate 
nomenclatures.  The $290 billion industry was still dominated by American computer 
companies, whose 62% market share at the dawn of the 90s was growing increasingly 
tenuous.  The Japanese consumer market grew from a relative non-factor in the global 
market to the second largest in the world over the course of the 1980s.  Japanese firms, 
                                                
61 1993 U.S. Department of Commerce annual report, Copyright 2004 Gale Group. 
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due to governmental trade restrictions on foreign firms, cornered their domestic market 
and formed strategic alliances at the behest of government and academia.  The result was 
a consistent trade deficit for the U.S. industry throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
U.S. exports averaged around $26 billion compared to an average $31 billion in imports. 
Internet products and services contributed to a significant boom period during the 
middle 1990s, following “bust” periods for the entire industry in the 1970s and 1980s.  
The instability of the market belies its overall performance and profitability.  Split 
between U.S., Asia, and Europe, the IT/computer industries are amongst the largest and 
most profitable in the world.  For example, Information Technology (IT) products and 
services, the core of the computer industry, accounted for nearly 30% of the growth in the 
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) between 1994 and 2000.62  Over the same period of 
time, IT became the nation’s largest exporting industry, accounting for 29% of all U.S. 
exports.  According to the World Information Technology Services Alliance (WITSA), 
domestic spending on IT products and services jumped by almost 70% from 1992 to 
2001.  By the turn of the century, the computer industry was generating domestic 
revenues of over $800 billion, and had the largest per capita spending of any nation in the 
world.63   
The Dot Com Boom 
At the dawn of the 1990s, while the market for PCs and supporting equipment 
sagged, the promise of the next new market loomed on the horizon.  After workstations 
                                                
62 “The North America IT and High Technology Sectors:  A Company and Industry Analysis,” Charlotte 
NC:  Mergent, Inc., 2003. 
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and PCs had infiltrated the business and home markets, network systems developed to 
connect employees in an organization or researchers in different parts of the country.  
The Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) demonstrated 
that computers could communicate through the telephone system using minicomputers 
and mainframes in the early 1970s.  By the end of the decade over a hundred institutions 
across the country were connected to the system.  Throughout the 80s, thousands more 
connected and corporate and public networks appeared in the United States and around 
the world.  Based on the success of LAN (land area network) technology, as 
demonstrated through both governmental and closed intra-organizational 
communications systems, entrepreneurs started developing ways to connect these groups 
into a unified network.  The development of the router by Cisco Systems in 1980 solved 
that problem; the disparate networks would be connected together through hardware 
supplied by the company.  The foundation was set for the development of a publicly 
accessible internet.  However, the problem of organizing, accessing, and interfacing with 
information and data on these networks proved to be a major obstacle to widespread 
adoption.  Tim Berners-Lee developed the solution by originating a system that labeled, 
addressed, and formatted information on the system.  The development of the World 
Wide Web was furthered by the invention of the Mosaic browser that exploited the 
hypertext on the internet with a graphic user interface.  The browser developed through a 
research initiative undertaken by researchers at the University of Illinois-Urbana and 
spun off the commercial technologies that would become Netscape and Internet Explorer.  




By 1994, the internet was privatized and companies began offering services for 
connection and electronic mail service.  At the dawn of the decade some 300 thousand 
users were on the internet, by the end of the decade more than 93 million had connected.  
This “dot com” boom impacted the culture, economy, industry, and politics in countless 
ways.  Perhaps most significantly for the purposes of this discussion, the rapid ascent of 
home computing and the rise of the internet and its supporting software and hardware 
packages led to the demand for technologies associated with content delivery.  These 
technologies included CD-ROM peripherals, compression technologies (including 
MPEG), and software systems able to convert online content through an audio/visual 
interface. 
The rise of the internet in the 1990s was facilitated by the supply of hardware and 
software from the computer industry.  The computer industry, although historically 
dominated by IBM, has a long history of technological innovations and demonstrated 
success in commercializing new products and services.64  While the rapid ascent of the 
internet vastly improved market conditions after the downturn in the early 1990s, it also 
shifted power dramatically from hardware manufacturing to service providers and the 
aforementioned microprocessor and software manufacturers.  The resulting growth in the 
personal computer hardware and software markets did not dramatically increase the 
number of platforms just the number of firms involved in all stages of their production, 
distribution, and service.  Because IBM rushed to market with an open architecture 
                                                
64 Bresnahan, Timothy F. and Shane Greenstein. “Technological Competition and the Structure of the 
Computer Industry,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XLVII, March 1999.  
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personal computer that relied on suppliers to deliver constituent parts, the industry 
became de-centralized.  Instead of one firm controlling the technological hardware, any 
number of firms could market interchangeable components designed to operate through 
the “wintel” platform.65  These providers implemented as strategy of cross and backward 
compatibility between platforms.  This led to increased competition from a “divided 
technical leadership.”66  Because there was increased competition between firms in the 
technology development and commercialization efforts, the speed and frequency of 
technological innovations increased.  Furthermore, the inter-operability and backwards 
compatibility for new personal computing technologies contributed to the persistence of 
the “open architecture” platform initially sponsored by IBM.67  Consumers could be 
assured that the firms supplying content or hardware could rise and fall without their 
products becoming useless. 
                                                
65 “wintel” refers to the combination of a Microsoft Windows operating system with an Intel 
microprocessor chip. 
66 Bresnahan and Greenstein, p. 3. 




Figure 3.6: Global IT/Computer Spending, 2002 
 
Region  Telecom Software   IT Services IT Hardware Corporate/Internal 
  




W. Europe   38.1% 9.4%    18.6%  15.4%  18.5% 
 
N. America  33.2% 11.8%    24.5%  16.8%  13.7% 
 
Asia-Pacific  60.7% 3.9%    7.5%  20.4%  7.5% 
 
Japan      55.2% 3.4%    12.8%  12.1%  16.6% 
 
Source:  WITSA, 2002 
 
The lessons learned by the computer industry during this period of industrial 
shifts and new market formations would eventually influence the formation and 
structuring of the DVD ancillary market.  IBM would play a central role in the 
development of unified technological standards and the cessation of hostilities between 
rival companies.  IBM’s willingness to incorporate lessons learned from its 1980s and 
1990s experiences in the personal computing market into their activities related to DVD 
and DVD-ROM are noteworthy.  Knowing that the success of the majority of new 
computing technologies was based on compatibility across systems and backward 
compatibility, IBM stressed these features in the final specifications for DVD-ROM and 
DVD-Video.  Because IBM was not structured as a diversified electronics manufacturer, 
like some its Japanese competitors, it was unable to develop DVD technology on its own.  
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Desiring a replacement technology for the CD-ROM, IBM relied on its longstanding 
relationships with peripherals and hardware vendors to negotiate a settlement between 
Hollywood and the consumer electronics companies. Calling for an “open source” 
product that would work between hardware devices from competing companies would 
guarantee widespread adoption and revivify the desktop and laptop markets.  DVD 
technology would replace the existing CD-ROM technology while functioning as an 
incentive for consumers to replace existing technologies. 
The computer industry in the home video era was undergoing dynamic changes 
and explosive growth.  Over the course of the 1990s, the dominant market sector became 
the personal computer and its supporting technologies and software.  The once dominant 
markets of supercomputing, mainframes, and superconductors remained profitably 
controlled by single firms.  The rise of the PC shifted the industrial structure and 
increased competition in technology development.  Research alliances continued on a 
broad scale in Japan and began to become more commonplace in the United States.  GE, 
AT&T, Honeywell, and IBM formed the Optoelectronic Technology Consortium in 1992 
in a cross-industrial effort to study high speed data transmission devices, and to keep up 
with the research initiatives and products coming from the Japanese firms.   
Governmental funding supplemented corporate expenditures and long-term strategies for 
the industry were established.  New technologies and the demand for interfaces capable 
of translating online data for consumers were driving the industry. 
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INDUSTRIAL CULTURES AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has identified the industrial contexts into which DVD was 
introduced.  We have seen how globalization, digitalization, and conglomeration has 
impacted the industrial structures, conduct, and performance of three distinct industries.  
The filmed entertainment industry during the home video era was analyzed relative to 
these forces for change; the widespread adoption of digital technologies in production 
and post production combined with increasingly profitable global markets in theatrical 
and home video distribution and tightly integrated conglomeration to lead to a favorable 
environment for a new digital home video technology.  Additionally, the film industry’s 
exploitation of home video markets and their attempts to control the profits within that 
sector were identified as contributing factors that led to the support for new digital 
content delivery technology.  The film entertainment industry became structured as a 
tightly controlled media oligopoly over the course of the 1990s.  The core business of 
these conglomerates continued to be the production and distribution of filmed 
entertainment, including feature films and television series for all markets; it is clear that 
maintaining control over this content meant having a direct say in any new technology 
that would deliver the content to consumers.  The members of the oligopoly consistently 
employed similar production and distribution strategies for their feature films throughout 
the decade, with each member producing larger budget films with digital effects and 
initiating or acquiring independent subsidiaries and home video divisions.  This collective 
behavior can be defined as an industrial culture; each of the member firms behaved in 
similar ways and engaged similar strategies for growth.  While developments in the 
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industry were often initiated by a single member, as with the case with Disney’s sell-
through of video titles, the remaining firms quickly caught on and behaved in similar 
fashion.  Competition between firms ensured production of similar products and 
engagement with similar growth strategies.  Additionally, cooperation between firms 
continued to be the de-facto industrial strategy in promoting products and establishing 
strict barriers to entry by presenting competitors with a unified industrial front.  Acting 
collectively, the major studios maintained business models that had been established 
years before; their parent conglomerates continued to produce feature films through a 
division of labor that privileged the director and producer, continued to release films 
through a tiered distribution strategy, and continued their support of trade organizations 
such as the MPAA.  Additionally, cooperative behavior continued to demonstrate the 
existence of an industrial culture through co-production and co-distribution agreements 
(as was the case with Titanic).  The filmed entertainment industry in the home video era 
was healthy, with profits rising throughout the decade.  The significance of this industrial 
context for DVD is clear; because the industry recognized the profitability of ancillary 
markets and desired greater control over the core profit center for their products, they 
were eager to modify the home video business model through introduction of a new 
digital platform. 
 Cooperation and collective industrial behaviors were also prevalent in the 
computer industry.  In an industry historically dominated by IBM, collective measures 
were necessary for Japanese firms seeking entry into the global marketplace.  Through 
governmental support, including tariffs on computer industry imports in the Japanese 
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market, firms were able to establish technical and organizational capabilities that would 
benefit them in global conflicts with IBM.  Because new market segments were created 
with the introduction of personal computers and the internet, and IBM’s control over the 
industry was greatly reduced by their rush to market the PC, Japanese firms obtained a 
larger share of the global market in the 1990s.  IBM struggled to maintain its global 
dominance because it lacked the diversified portfolio of their Japanese competitors.  This 
fact would force IBM to cooperate with competitors and would relegate them to a 
negotiator position in the struggle for a unified DVD format.  While the filmed 
entertainment business remained a tightly controlled oligopoly of six firms, the computer 
industry became increasingly decentralized throughout the period leading up to the 
development and diffusion of DVD.  In fact, IBM’s hegemony over the computer 
industry was in jeopardy because of their own domestic dominance.  Because there were 
few domestic competitors to IBM and no supporting network of manufacturers, IBM 
could not benefit from cooperative behaviors and governmental support.  By the time 
IBM had partnered with AT&T in a research consortium, their Japanese counterparts had 
wrested control of hardware manufacturing from them and Microsoft and Intel were 
global giants. 
 Domination by Japanese electronics conglomerates in the home video era over the 
CE industry came via innovation and commercialization of new technologies, 
cooperation with each other to share research, development, and marketing costs, and 
consistent focus on a core set of electronics manufacturing businesses.  The industrial 
atmosphere in the 1990s consumer electronics business thus can be described through the 
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combined effects of globalization, conglomeration, digitalization, cooperation, and 
innovation.  The fact that the computer, filmed entertainment, and consumer electronics 
industries evolved independently belies their growing interdependence and convergence 
in the 1990s.  Even before the development and diffusion of DVD, these three industries 
had increasing propensities for cooperation and cross-fertilization.  In the 1990s, more 
computer companies invested in developing, manufacturing, distributing, and marketing 
consumer electronics devices such as televisions and CD players.  Meanwhile, more 
consumer electronics companies were moving into the computer industry, with Sony 
leading the charge with the development of PCs for domestic use.  Additionally, 
consumer electronics companies were moving into the filmed entertainment business, 
investing millions to own and operate content production businesses to supply their 
growing stable of hardware devices.   
Since the introduction of the television in the 1940s, the film industry was forced 
to reconcile the effect of consumer electronics devices as delivery mechanisms for their 
content.  Through a series of industrial and regulatory shifts, media conglomerates 
acquired both the content providers and television networks in an effort to maintain profit 
streams from all distribution windows.  With the coming of the VHS player, and the 
growing revenues generated from pre-recorded content, the studios sought another 
strategy to control the dissemination of content and the resulting profit windfalls.  Only 
through acquisition of home video retailers (such as Viacom’s purchase of Blockbuster 
entertainment in 1994) or through the introduction of a new business model related to a 
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new video technology, DVD, could the content providers wrest control away from video 
rental retailers and hardware manufacturers. 
 The DVD ancillary industry was formed through cooperative involvement 
between members of the three industries described herein.  While the members of the 
ancillary industry are the same corporations that came to dominate their respective 
industries prior to DVD, their behavior is noteworthy for the degree of cooperation 
demonstrated in the first several years of product development and launch.  The 
individual corporate cultures that defined the ways in which these corporations interacted 
and developed business strategies in their respective industries combined into a collective 
industrial culture.  In each of the cases presented in this chapter, member organizations 
acted together to establish operating procedures, to create unified collectives to interact 
with regulators, and to maintain barriers to entry.  These cooperative cultures then 
combined into an entirely new industrial culture of production around the DVD.  The 
degree of cooperation expanded exponentially.  Cooperative agreements based on OEMs 
or licensing dovetailed into membership in the collective organization of The DVD 
Forum, where each member would share technology and policy decisions were made 
through collective decision making.  We will examine the structure and behavior of this 
organization in chapter four, identifying how barriers to entry were created, how power 
was established and maintained, and how a political economic institution was formed 
through the combined influence of these giant conglomerates.  The DVD Forum 
established an industrial culture of production that guaranteed an efficient exploitation of 
the market economy while granting access to power only to those member organizations 
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willing to devote resources to the collective good.  In a paradigmatic way, the DVD 
Forum will represent the combination of cooperative industrial cultures for the fullest 
exploitation of the market.  We’ve seen in this chapter that the industries involved in the 
production, distribution, marketing, and commercialization of DVD had developed the 
cooperative foundations and collective practices that would come to be fully realized and 
exploited through The DVD Forum.  The increasing convergence of these industries, in 
retrospect, makes their participation in the formation of an ancillary industrial culture 
seem all but inevitable.  However, as has been demonstrated, these conditions developed 
through complex shifts in national and international markets stemming from managerial 
decisions and organizational capabilities. 
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Chapter Four:  The Political Economy of DVD 
Thus far, we’ve seen how favorable technological and industrial conditions in the 
home video era made possible the introduction of a new digital audio/visual technology.  
Chapter two examined the technological precursors to DVD, identifying the evolution of 
existing technologies that impacted the eventual design and functionality of DVD.  
Drawing on lessons learned from the commercialization and design of CD and Laserdisc 
technologies, DVD designers exploited advancements in technology to meet the 
collective demands of hardware and software providers and the public.  The third chapter 
explored the industrial contexts surrounding DVD development and commercialization, 
identifying the respective structures, conducts, and performances of the filmed 
entertainment, computer, and consumer electronics industries during the home video era 
prior to the introduction of DVD.  Each of these industries developed new industrial 
practices to cope with changes stemming from increasing globalization, digitization, and 
conglomeration.   
In the 1980s and 1990s, revenues generated from the distribution of feature films 
on video and sales of video machines shifted the core profit centers of both the filmed 
entertainment and consumer electronics industries.  New revenue streams encouraged 
reinvestment in manufacturing and technological development in the consumer 
electronics industry.  Similarly, Hollywood invested in the continued production of 
filmed entertainment, as production, advertising, and special effects budgets for potential 
blockbuster hits increased exponentially during the video era. Conglomeration and 
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diversification occurred simultaneously, as the major film studios were purchased by 
multinational media conglomerates who then integrated their media holdings while 
diversifying into home video businesses.68  Globalization impacted both industries, as 
Japanese hardware manufacturers, along with other international corporations, became 
members of the Hollywood oligopoly through acquisitions of major studios.69  Two 
consumer electronics firms with studio holdings in the early 1990s, Sony and Matsushita, 
employed differing strategies to dominate technological markets.  Throughout the period 
leading to the commercialization of DVD, home video revenues stimulated more direct 
interaction between content providers and hardware manufacturers, as each sought 
greater control over all revenues and related businesses along the production, distribution, 
and exhibition chains.   
Globalization and new technologies also impacted the relations of power while 
increasing revenues in the computer industry.  Through protectionist strategies supported 
by government, Japanese firms partnered in technology development initiatives to 
challenge the hegemony of IBM in international markets prior to the introduction of the 
personal computer in the 1980s.  Diversification and cooperation in the Japanese industry 
led to greater hybridization between the consumer electronics and computer industry and 
consortia of supporting companies that assisted in commercializing new technologies.  
The diffusion and adoption of the personal computer and the eventual rise of the internet 
                                                
68 Each of the studios had, by the time of DVD’s introduction, started their own home video subsidiary 
and/or purchased a video rental retailer. 




stimulated growth in the computer markets and increased demand for peripheral 
technologies capable of storing and playing back large audio/visual media files.  Growth 
in these markets combined with Japanese corporations’ diversification to create the 
demand and development infrastructures to make the commercialization and rapid 
diffusion of DVD possible.   
While each industry adapted in different ways to shifts in industrial structure 
stimulated by changes in ownership, new technologies, and newly globalized markets, all 
recognized the value of cooperative partnerships, consortia development, and shared 
research and development initiatives by the dawn of the 1990s.  The recent successes of 
the personal computer, the CD, and home video demonstrated the potential promise of a 
new versatile disc technology that could deliver movies, games, and other visual media 
via television, gaming consoles, and computers.  Working together, member firms could 
develop a unified technological specification that would guarantee broad-scale support 
from all three industries. 
The successful development of DVD was contingent upon the behaviors and 
industrial strategies of these three core industries in a newly formed cooperative 
collective.  Historically, the filmed entertainment, consumer electronics, and computer 
industries developed competitive and cooperative relationships between firms in 
continuing struggles for market dominance.  Cross-industry partnerships related to DVD 
commercialization resulted in unprecedented cooperative and communal behavior from 
member firms related to DVD-Video. What this unprecedented collaboration of 
American, European, and Japanese firms accomplished was a governing body that could 
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control all elements of product development, distribution, and marketing.  They could 
work together to thwart challenges from potential competitors or governmental anti-trust 
litigation.  In so doing, these firms also created a new industrial culture based on 
collective decision making, cooperative product development, and a hierarchical division 
of power that guaranteed their respective place within the newly formed pecking order. 
This chapter examines the development of organizational control and the relations 
of power within the emergent DVD industry.  While the macro-level technological, 
cultural, and industrial contexts helped create a favorable atmosphere for the introduction 
of DVD, the micro-industrial developments involving individual firms determined 
DVD’s technological development and adoption.  In the process, member firms of the 
new industry employed strategies designed to establish barriers to entry, maintain control 
over licensing and patent revenues, and thwart threats from competitive technologies.  
The formation and structuring of the DVD Forum guaranteed control through 
cooperation, standardization, and delegation of duties and responsibilities to individual 
companies.  Additionally, the organizational structure of the DVD Forum assured that a 
hierarchy of power could be maintained for key firms from each constituent industry.  
The ten founding members of the Forum, including members from the consumer 
electronics, filmed entertainment, and computer industries, worked together to restrict the 
form and function of the technology while assuring quality and technical standards.  
Drawing upon lessons learned from each industry in technological innovation and 
commercialization, member corporations in the DVD industry employed strategies that 
would establish hierarchies of control and mechanisms to maintain that control 
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indefinitely.  These strategies included creating a rigid power structure within the DVD 
Forum, limiting competition, establishing patent pooling and licensing bodies, and 
partnering with manufacturing consortia to assure quality standards. 
The structure of this chapter is threefold:  section one offers analysis of the 
formation of the DVD Consortium and DVD Forum; section two explores the behaviors 
of members to demonstrate collective practice and the development of an industrial 
culture of production; section three examines the performance of industry members to 
highlight the success of the industrial strategies outlined in section one and the behaviors 
detailed in section two.  The third section demonstrates the rate of diffusion for DVD into 
the marketplace, suggesting the relative influence of the strategies and behaviors of 
industry members.  The first section draws upon data obtained from the DVD Forum, 
including its founding charter and mission statements, the structure of the organization as 
defined by its official releases to the press, its responsibilities and activities, as well as 
identifying its member organizations and their roles within the Forum.  The second 
section delves into the activities of the Forum, drawing official press releases from 
industry members and the DVD Forum website to explicate how cooperation over DVD-
Video turned to conflict over recordable DVD formats.70  Drawing on data from the 
MPAA, the Video Software Dealers Association (VSDA), and boxofficemojo.com, the 
third section illustrates how quickly DVD became a viable commodity in the 
marketplace.  Additionally, these data will demonstrate how the strategies for control, 




including licensing and control over patents, relates to market share and market 
performance. 
STRUCTURING CONTROL:  THE DVD FORUM 
DVD was conceptualized by technology developers and content providers as an 
extension of existing digital audio (CD) and home video (VHS and laserdisc) 
technologies.  As such, the technology was developed within a framework of associative 
technological functions and manufacturing capabilities.  The DVD industry successfully 
manipulated and adapted existent industrial and manufacturing infrastructures, market 
forces of supply and demand, and a favorable regulatory environment to commercialize 
the new technology.  Because the infrastructure already existed, in terms of hardware and 
software manufacturing, retail/rental outlets, and home video marketing and distribution, 
DVD posed relatively little risk to firms wishing to develop and distribute the new 
technology.  However, firms employed three key strategies that were imperative to the 
efficient exploitation of resources, the creation of consumer demand, and the successful 
diffusion of DVD technology:  (1) hardware and software companies agreed to work 
cooperatively in product development; (2) firms agreed to form collective organizations 
to ensure the mutual interest of all members in the marketplace; (3) development firms 
did not release technology until quality standards were agreed upon industry wide.  All 
three of these strategies were predicated on the willingness of consumer electronics 
manufacturers to work together in a heretofore unprecedented manner.   
The formation of a DVD ancillary industry required the participation of 
corporations engaged in a primary business that is different from, but related to, the 
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production, distribution, and commercialization of a new product or service relating to 
optical disc technology.  In the case of DVD, the 1990s filmed entertainment, computer, 
and consumer electronics industries organized their corporate and industrial models 
around the feature film, the personal computer, and the television/radio/VCR 
respectively.  The fact that the leading corporations in these three industries recognized 
the suitability of DVD as a new product was directly related to the perceived 
enhancement afforded by the technology as it related to their existing products and 
services.  For the filmed entertainment industry, the content providers sought a new 
delivery mechanism for feature films that could alter the existing business model in home 
entertainment.  For the computer industry, DVD offered an opportunity to enhance the 
functionality of the personal computer, improving the audio/visual and data storage 
capabilities necessary for the increasingly online environment.  For the consumer 
electronics industry, DVD consoles promised a new revenue stream that could enhance or 
replace the core business of television and VCR manufacturing and distribution.  The 
successful development and commercialization of a new optical disc technology for 
home entertainment meant that existing products (movies, games, and later television 
series) and services (home viewing, computing, gaming) could be packaged, delivered, 
purchased, and experienced in ways different from existing home video and computer 
products.   
Participation in the DVD industry by these major firms gave rise to corporate 
divisions whose primary businesses were distinct from their traditional business practices 
and existing technologies.  With DVD, these firms would focus on compression services, 
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packaging, supplemental content production, graphic and menu design, and the like.  
These new DVD divisions performed functions within the newly formed industry that 
served the needs of the founding parent corporations.  DVD ancillary industries were 
established, then, through the behaviors of corporations entrenched in existing, mature, 
video and computer industries along with newly formed businesses serving the needs of 
the core companies.  For the filmed entertainment companies, the continued production 
of feature film content, particularly blockbusters, meant that there would be ample supply 
of software for the new technology.   
DVD was designed to deliver feature film content for playback on both television 
sets and computer monitors.  A new home video technology that could also deliver 
content (and storage) for computers could potentially combine the revenues of existing 
home video and CD-ROM software markets while replacing VHS and computer drive 
hardware markets.  For each of the three industries involved in DVD commercialization, 
the potential revenues generated from filmed content distributed on DVD encouraged 
members to alter existing relationships between technology providers and content 
suppliers as well as business models relating to home entertainment.  The potential profits 
generated in sales of discs, consoles, and computers, led major corporations in each 
constituent industry to behave amicably and to alter existing practices relating to new 
technologies.  These new behaviors differ in degree, if not substance, from the activities 
established during the home video era prior to DVD; content providers would continue 
relationships with home video retailers, but would circumvent major video rental chains 
in favor of sell-through retailers like Best Buy and Wal-Mart.  Consumer electronics 
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manufacturers would continue to cooperate in product development, but would agree to 
technological standards for the entire industry to ensure Hollywood’s participation. 
Prior to the founding of the DVD Forum, DVD technological development was 
undertaken by competing consumer electronics firms in the early 1990s.  In 1993, ten 
years after the introduction of CDs and CD- ROMs, the first prototypes for a compact 
disc capable of delivering video were demonstrated.71  However, the developers of this 
technology, Nimbus and Philips, quickly realized that CD technology was unreliable as a 
video disc technology, and decided to develop a separate disc in 1993.  As development 
was underway, Hollywood weighed in during 1994, calling for a single worldwide 
standard for the new generation of digital video on optical media.  Seven entertainment 
and content providers formed the “Hollywood Digital Video Disc Advisory Group,” 
asking developers to meet their collective demands.72  As early as 1994, it was apparent 
to consumer electronics developers that in order for any new disc technology to succeed 
in the marketplace, the support of Hollywood through supply of content would be 
necessary. DVD technology was designed to do many things on many different 
platforms, but for it to reach the public en mass, it would first and foremost be a delivery 
mechanism for Hollywood films. 
                                                
71 Nimbus developed a CD with double the storage capacity of existing discs, capable of connecting to an 
MPEG video decoder.  
72 Members of the group included Sony, Disney, MCA/Universal, MGM/UA, Paramount, Viacom, and 
Warner Bros.  Their request included room for a full-length feature film, about 135 minutes, on one side of 
a single disc, picture quality superior to laserdisc, compatibility with high quality audio systems, ability to 
accommodate three to five languages per disc, copy protection, multiple aspect ratios for widescreen 
support, and multiple versions of a program on one disc, with parental lockout. 
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On December 16, 1994, the structure of the industry was divided into two camps 
as Sony and Philips announced their new standard, Multimedia CD (MMCD).  By 1995, 
hardware and software manufacturers were working together to challenge Sony/Philips.73  
These challengers formed a second camp, comprised of MCA, Time Warner, MGM/UA, 
Matsushita, JVC, Thomson, and Mitsubishi.  Known as the SD (super density) Alliance, 
the collective offered four different disc products of varying storage capacity.74  While 
the two formats differed in architectural structure, they both offered relatively 
inexpensive manufacturing options.75 Additionally, the optical discs could be produced 
with minimal modifications to existing CD manufacturing technology.  Crucially, each 
camp’s technology met Hollywood’s demands for functionality and quality.  The two 
camps seemed poised to engage in a format war similar to the aforementioned Beta/VHS 
debacle of the late 1970s and early 1980s.  However, at the end of April 1995, five 
computer companies, Apple, Compaq, HP, IBM, and Microsoft, formed a technical 
working group and met with each faction, urging them to compromise.  The two camps 
refused to cooperate citing “liberalism and democracy” and the desire to offer options to 
interested consumers.76   On August 14, 1995, the work group recommended adoption of 
the Universal Disc Format (UDF), supported by the computer industry and the SD 
                                                
73 Sony, Philips, and 3M MultiMedia CD were working on single and dual layer optical discs and hardware 
capable of converting MPEG-2 compressed video with eight channels of surround sound, capacity for 
multiple languages and subtitles, and compatibility with CD, CD-ROM and photo-CD formats.   
74 These included single-sided five and nine-gigabyte discs and double-sided ten and eighteen-gigabyte 
models. The single sided, single layer, five-gigabyte disc is capable of storing a 135-minute film with 
Dolby AC-3 audio, three languages, four subtitled languages, multiple aspect ratios, parental lockout, and 
backward capability with CDs. 
75 The estimated cost of mass production was estimated to be 113% of the cost of manufacturing CDs, 
“DVD camps remain split at REPLItech” by Paul Verna, Billboard, 7/1/1995. 
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alliance.  Sony and Philips quickly demurred, saving face through a compromised format 
agreed upon by all members.   
The formation of the DVD Consortium, later renamed the DVD Forum (more on 
this below), drew upon Japanese and American research consortia examples but differed 
in its structure, function, and behavior.  The founding members of the DVD Consortium 
were Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Pioneer, Philips, Sony, Thomson, Time Warner, 
Toshiba, and Victor Company of Japan (JVC).  These corporations did not join forces to 
challenge the market dominance of a single firm, as was the case with Japanese computer 
manufacturers challenging IBM.  Instead, these companies agreed, as their mission 
statement asserted, to “exchange and disseminate ideas and information about the DVD 
Format and its technical capabilities, improvements and innovations…and to promote 
broad acceptance of DVD products on a worldwide basis, across entertainment, consumer 
electronics, and IT industries.” 77  In the process, these firms established control over the 
technology and the industry through pooling of resources and establishing barriers to 
entry.   
After a group of computer companies, led by IBM, insisted that the competing SD 
and MMCD factions agree on a single standard, a combined format was announced in 
September 1995.  IBM and the rest of the American computing industry recognized the 
potential of DVD technology as a replacement for CD-ROM.  However, these firms 
lacked the infrastructure to participate in technological development.  Only the Japanese 
                                                                                                                                            
76 Taylor, DVD Demystified (2001), p. 49. 
77 “DVD Forum’s Mission,” from the official DVD Forum website, www.dvdforum.org. 
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computer makers who had diversified into consumer electronics manufacturing and 
development (and vice versa) could innovate new technologies.  The American firms, 
including IBM, were relegated to an advisory role, albeit one that carried significant 
weight given their respective market shares in the booming personal computing industry.  
The overwhelming influence of the Japanese firms within the newly formed consortium 
can not be understated.  Besides drawing on Japanese research consortia as a model for 
the DVD group, and notwithstanding the fact that seven of the founding ten members of 
the organization were Japanese-based consumer electronics manufacturers, the 
relationships between firms developed over the previous twenty-plus years assured that 
technological resources would be shared and progress would be forthcoming. 
Strategy of Control:  Establishing a Power Structure 
The DVD Consortium was initially structured as a closed association of hardware 
manufacturers, software firms, and content providers from the three core industries based 
in Japan, Europe and the United States.  After threats of litigation from the United States 
Justice Department on antitrust grounds, the Consortium changed its name to the DVD 
Forum and created a voluntary, open membership standard in May 1997.  However, a 
strict hierarchy was established to maintain control.  Any corporation attempting to 
establish itself in the newly forming industry was confronted with a veritable cartel that 
dominated and controlled all aspects of the technology and the industry.  Any new market 
entry was required to deal with the Forum for licenses, including format and logos, 
technical specifications, and access to distribution networks.  Because the Consortium 
(hereafter “the Forum,” or “the DVD Forum”) stratified membership and tightly 
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controlled all aspects of decision making for the entire industry, it quickly became 
obvious that membership in the organization was imperative to establishing a market 
presence and/or a voice in the collective process of decision making.  Membership, while 
open to any firm engaged in the DVD business, was organized around two classes:  
principal and associate.  Principal membership was restricted to firms “deemed to be 
making a significant contribution to the development, promotion, or improvement of the 
DVD formats and who pay the required membership fees.”78  Of course, the ten founding 
companies were responsible for evaluating any potential members, and could deny 
membership as it pleased.  Given the vague wording of the charter, it is clear that 
decisions could be based on any number of factors, including the relative significance of 
any contribution a prospective member was offering.  Principal members were eligible to 
participate in the “format-making” activities and were provided access to the research and 
technical developments made by other principal members.79  Principal members signed a 
non-disclosure agreement that protected both the confidentiality of technical information 
disclosed during meetings and the member companies from any potentially illegal trust-
making claims.  Associate membership was open to any firm interested in joining the 
group and willing to pay the yearly membership fees.80 Associate members were afforded 
access to working group activity reports, but could not participate in decision-making 
processes. 
                                                





The structure of the DVD Forum can be described as a cooperative oligopoly of 
hardware manufacturers, software designers and manufacturers, content providers, 
distribution companies, wholesalers, and retailers (with the latter two categories often 
overlapping).  Perhaps more so than any other industry in history, the companies 
involved in the commercialization and development of DVD worked together and shared 
resources.  In so doing, they established a structure for control over the technology that 
was virtually impenetrable.  The Forum’s structure illustrates this explicitly; the forum 
was composed of a Steering Committee, a Technical Coordination Group, Working 
Groups, the DVD Format Promotion Conferences, and a variety of “non-profit trade 
associations” that licensed technology for members of the Forum.81  The Forum was 
directed by a “Chair Company” and three “Vice-Chair” companies that were elected from 
the Steering Committee members by a majority vote every two years.82  The three Vice-
Chair positions were required to include one member from the consumer electronics 
industry, one from the computer/IT industry, and one from the “content industry.”83  In 
this manner, control over the industry was guaranteed to remain under the auspices of the 
leading firms in each of the three industries; because ascension to Chair was restricted to 
members of the Steering Committee and membership on that committee was controlled 
by its members, only the original members or their designees could hope to attain the seat 
                                                                                                                                            
80 The annual fee for principal members is 1 million Yen (about $9500 U.S dollars); the annual fee for 
associate members is 300,000 Yen ($2,850) www.dvdforum.org/about-faq.htm  
81 Quoted from Article 6 section 1 of the DVD Forum Charter. 




of penultimate power.84  The Steering Committee served as the executive body of the 
Forum and for the first two crucial years of the Forum’s existence (from 1997-1999), 
with the ten founding companies completely controlling access to the decision-making 
group.85  Curtailing access to power was guaranteed through the structure and 
organization of the Forum, and only the founding companies could grant access to the 
decision making body.  By establishing a strict hierarchy of power, the leading firms 
were assured that their contributions to the technology, or their demands for the 
technology relative to software functionality, would be included in the final technological 
specifications.  Crucially, this division of power guaranteed that the unified specification 
for DVD-Video and DVD-ROM would reach the marketplace, assuring the continued 
participation of Hollywood and the computing industry. 
The Steering Committee maintained control over the industry through control of 
the Forum.  Members required that all decisions relating to the structure, policy, or 
operation of the Forum be approved by the Steering Committee.  Additionally, the 
Steering Committee controlled all of the groups within the Forum, including the relative 
efficacy and implementation of recommendations of the various Working Groups.86  
                                                
84 General Meetings were held yearly upon the call of the Steering Committee and included all members of 
the Forum.  Only Principal Members could vote during the meetings.  The content of the meetings was 
dictated by the Steering Committee, who reviewed the previous year’s activities and set the plan for the 
forthcoming year. 
85 After that initial period, any company seeking election to the Steering Committee was required, per the 
Forum charter, to participate in three or more Working Groups or “otherwise have made significant 
contributions, as determined by the Steering Committee, to the development, improvement, verification, or 
promotion of the DVD Formats.”  Article 8, section 2, paragraph three of the DVD Forum Charter. 
86 The Steering Committee controlled the adoption and publication of new DVD formats and revisions to 
existing formats proposed by the Working Groups, the licensing of DVD Formats and the DVD logo 
(including terms and conditions of the licensing and appointment of the licensing entity), access to chair 
positions on the Working Groups, termination of Forum Membership, establishment of any new 
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Steering Committee members participated in these groups, creating an oversight 
mechanism that assured that the power elite was well-informed as to the activities of 
other members.87  For example, Toshiba, a Steering Committee member, was appointed 
as the first chair of the Technical Coordination Group.88  Through this chair position, 
Toshiba could both control the direction of research and design initiatives within each 
Working Group and could monitor the activities of members.  Through this institutional 
structure, Steering Committee members assured complete control not only of the 
technology and its licensing, but over all other industry members as well.  By establishing 
through the Charter their ordained right to dictate the power structure of the industry, and 
by virtue of their control over the Technical Coordination Group, the original ten 
companies assured their continuing dominance over all things DVD. 
The establishment and control over Working Groups derived from the structure 
established by the original DVD Consortium.  When the industry’s trade organization 
was still closed to the founding ten members, the consortium had divided into eight 
“working groups.”89  After a technical standard had been established through these 
                                                                                                                                            
organization within the Forum (including its operating rules), approval of plans for conferences, 
amendment of the Charter, approval of any matters submitted by the Technical Coordination Group, 
establishment of the Promotion and Communication Committee, and any decision to extend, dissolve, or 
change the structure or organization of the Forum Article 8, section 5, paragraphs (a) through (i) of the 
DVD Forum Charter. 
87 Additionally, all members of the Steering Committee participated in the Technical Coordination Group, 
along with the chair-companies (approved by the SC) of the Working Groups.   
88 Technical Coordination Group powers included coordinating the activities of the Working Groups, 
approval of new DVD formats or revisions proposed by Working Groups, and the formulation and adoption 
of operating rules for all the Working Groups.   
89 Each working group was open to any of the ten original members and was divided into topic headings:  
(1) DVD-Video and video recording applications, (2) Physical specifications for DVD-ROM, (3) Film 
system specifications for discs, (4) DVD Audio applications, (5) Physical specifications for DVD-RAM, 
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Working Groups, and the Consortium changed to the DVD Forum, the original ten 
members delegated work to Principal Members through newly opened groups.  These 
Working Groups were responsible for the actual technical development of new DVD 
formats and recommended policies and opinions to the Steering committee related to 
copyright protection and regional coding.90  What this organization of labor illustrates is 
the desire by the ten founding members to control all current applications of the 
technology through the Forum in order to establish and maintain a unified standard for 
DVD-Video and DVD-ROM.   Founding members also had the foresight to control all 
future applications of the technology through these groups, with the ultimate goal being a 
unified standard that would receive the support of the Hollywood content providers.91  
Through this strategy, the Steering Committee established and maintained control over 
technological development, dictating which future standards would be realized.  The 
Steering Committee also recognized that DVD would eventually be replaced by High 
Definition discs employing a next-generation laser technology.  By setting up a working 
                                                                                                                                            
(6) Physical specifications for DVD-R and DVD-RW, (7) Copyright protection, and (8) Professional 
applications.  www.dvdforum.org/about-faq.htm 
90 The initial division of labor (as of 1997) was structured around nine working groups:  WG-1 (DVD-
Video Applications); WG-2 (Physical Specifications for DVD-ROM); WG-3 (File System Specifications 
for discs); WG-4 (DVD-Audio Applications); WG-5 (Physical Specifications for DVD-RAM); WG-6 
(Physical Specifications for DVD-R); WG-9 (Copyright Protection); WG-10 (Professional Applications); 
and WG-11 (Blue Laser DVD). 
91 The first three working groups demonstrate the desire to develop industrial control over the DVD 
console used for playback of pre-recorded content (DVD-Video) and its computer counterparts (DVD-
ROM hardware and File System interfaces with computer operating systems), the two principle markets for 
DVD.  Working groups four, five, and six, illustrate the desire to establish technological standards and 
control over secondary applications, including DVD Audio and recordable DVD technology.  Finally 
working groups nine and eleven represent the efforts of the founding ten companies to establish technical 
copyright standards (see chapter five) and the next generation of DVD, the Blu-Ray/HD DVD.   
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group to develop this technology, the Forum hoped to establish control in the same 
manner used for DVD. 
Figure 4.1:  DVD Forum Organizational Structure 
 
Source:  The DVD Forum (www.dvdforum.org) 
Strategy of Control:  Limiting Competition 
While the Forum was nominally “open” to any company working on 
commercializing DVD technology, the powers granted to the Steering Committee 
through the DVD Forum Charter limited the potential power of new members and 
virtually eliminated the possibility of a successful competing proprietary technology 
related to DVD.  Competing technologies developed outside of the Forum (like Circuit 
City’s Divx) would lack the support of the hundreds of participating companies that had 
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entered the forum by the late 1990s.  Companies attempting to commercialize competing 
technologies would be forced to expend enormous amounts of capital and resources to 
compete with the collective.  Outside competitors not only had to compete with the 
technologies introduced by the collective development teams within the Forum, they 
were also forced to compete with the publicity and public relations resources of member 
firms.  The Forum Charter formally established a mechanism to pool the public relations 
and communications resources to thwart such challenges.92  In effect, a committee was 
designed to guarantee public acceptance of DVD to the exclusion of other formats.  By 
pooling resources and presenting a unified message to the public and press through public 
Forum events, this committee controlled the “official” meanings and connotations 
surrounding DVD and was the principal source of industry originated discourse. 
The Forum’s hierarchal structure guaranteed that any developments in technology 
coming from the Working Groups required ratification by Steering Committee members 
before they were implemented by all members.  Through this structure, the founding 
members established oversight that assured they would capitalize on any and all iterations 
developed by the Working Groups.  The Steering Committee also oversaw the work of 
three subcommittees that would prove crucial to the long-term viability of both the 
Forum and the industry.  Members of the Steering Committee established and controlled 
the China Subcommittee, the Regional Playback Subcommittee and the HD-DVD-Video 
                                                
92 The “Promotion and Communication Committee” was comprised of all the Steering Committee 
members and those Principal Members approved by the Steering Committee and was responsible for 
“promoting communication with consumers and organizations outside of the DVD Forum…in order to 
facilitate common understandings and wide acceptance of the DVD Format in each region.” Article 11, 
sections (1) and (2) of the DVD Forum Charter. 
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Signed Application Subcommittee.  These three subcommittees, whose membership was 
limited to the ten Steering Committee members, represented the future of industrial 
profits and control over the technology for the foreseeable future.  As their names 
suggest, the subcommittees were responsible for strategizing ways to penetrate the 
enormous Chinese market, including negotiating with the Chinese government, 
establishing mechanisms to deal with piracy in China, establishing regional controls for 
DVD that would establish a tiered global distribution network, and taking steps toward a 
next-generation High Definition disc.  Besides illustrating the foresight of Steering 
Committee members, the formation of these subcommittees demonstrates the closed 
power structure within the forum and the desire of those ten leading companies to limit 
competition.  By limiting competition and maintaining oversight over all the activities of 
the Forum, Steering Committee members created a trust that opened them to 
investigations from the U.S. Justice Department.  To avoid potentially devastating action 
from the government, the Forum created carefully worded guidelines for members.  The 
official documentation from the office of the secretary of the DVD Forum reads: 
The purpose of the forum is the dissemination of technical information 
concerning the DVD format and the use of input from participants to 
improve and establish the technology for the benefit of consumers and 
users and encourage broad acceptance of the DVD format.  
Communication among participants in the forum should be aimed at 
advancing the goal of enhancing competition.  Participants in the forum 
should not have discussions that call for or result in anticompetitive 
collective action of any kind.  This applies both to formal meetings and 
informal conversations before, during, and after the event.  Your strict 
adherence to these guidelines is essential.93 
 
                                                
93 “Antitrust Guidelines for the Forum Participants,” The Secretary Office of the DVD Forum. 
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While guidelines seem to have kept the Justice Department at bay (see chapter five), it is 
clear that the structure of the Forum and the powers granted the Steering Committee by 
the charter result in an industrial structure that limits competition while creating a 
collective oligopoly. 
Strategy of Control:  Licensing and Patent Pooling 
 The Steering Committee also established and controlled the Format/Logo 
Advisory Group (FLAG) which created an outside corporation called the DVD 
Format/Logo Licensing Corporation (DVD FLLC) in April 2000.  Time Warner 
originally trademarked the DVD logo, but assigned it to FLAG after repeated challenges 
to their trademark (see figure 4.2).94  The company controls the licensing of the DVD 
format and logo, the production, maintenance, and issuance of the DVD format book, 
trademark registration and maintenance of DVD logos, verification related activities, and 
the policing of pirate manufacturers and incorrect usage of DVD logos.95  The DVD 
FLLC, and before its formation, the FLAG committee within the forum, established 
relationships with other trade associations like the ECMA, a European based trade 
association of companies seeking standardization in the IT and computer industries (and 
counting among its members the seven Japanese CE firms on the Steering Committee), 
OSTA (Optical Storage Technology Association), who publishes the UDF file system, 
                                                
94 Toshiba administered the logo and licensing prior to the founding of DVD FLLC. The DVD FLLC, not 
surprisingly, is owned by Hitachi, Philips, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Pioneer, Sony, Thomson, Time Warner, 
Toshiba, and JVC, the original ten members of the Consortium and the principal members of the DVD 
Forum’s Steering Committee.     
95 DVD specification books, required for manufacturers of players or discs, are sold through the DVD 
FLLC for a $5000 fee.  http://www.dvdfllc.co.jp/about/about.html 
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and DVDA, a non-profit volunteer association supporting the work of the Forum and 
promoting the broad acceptance of DVD worldwide.  Through this network of supporting 
associations, the DVD Forum delegated responsibilities in an effort to avoid anti-trust 
investigations.  Through this strategy, power and control were maintained by the Steering 
Committee members, whose interests and involvement reached outside of the activities of 
the Forum into the trade associations. 
Figure 4.2:  Original Warner Bros. DVD Logo 
 
Yet another strategy for control employed by the cartel was implementation and 
maintenance of a patent pooling structure.  This strategy, which is similar to the one 
employed with the CD by Sony, Philips, et al., guaranteed collective control and reduced 
risk through collaborative enforcement of licensing standards.  By November of 1997, 
Pioneer had joined a patent licensing group initiated by Sony and Philips.  In December 
of 1998, the Department of Justice approved the joint licensing agreement, allowing 
makers of discs and players to use the technology developed by the three firms in 
compliance with standard specifications.  Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Antitrust Division said through a business review letter that the patent pool 
would “reduce costs associated with obtaining licenses on the three firms’ essential 
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patents, while raising little possibility of competitive harm.”96  Standard specifications 
were established by the DVD Forum work group, including rules, conditions, and 
mechanisms for players to read the discs and convert compressed data into images for 
screen display.  The industry sought to avoid the mistakes of prior technological 
introductions.  By combining strategies utilized in CD and video licensing, the DVD 
industry established specific pools of patents required for manufacturing technologies 
related to DVD.  For instance, Toshiba, Time Warner, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, 
and JVC agreed in October of 1997 to license their patents jointly.97  The majority of 
these patents were related to previously existing optical media technologies; percentages 
for the technology were determined based on these existing patents combined with newly 
secured patents specifically related to DVD (see figure 4.2).  By June of 1999, the 
Department of Justice approved a global licensing program for the second collective.98  
The two collectives were joined by claims from Thomson and Discovision Associates, 
the latter holding about 1300 optical disc patents.99  Besides hardware and software 
patents, the principal firms holding ownership rights over DVD related technology 
included the Motion Picture Experts Group Licensing Administrator, which created the 
compression standards used in DVD-Video (MPEG-2), and Time Warner, which 
originally trademarked the DVD logo.100  Therefore, any firms attempting to manufacture 
                                                
96 “Justice Department approves joint licensing of patents essential for making DVD-Video and DVD-
ROM discs and players.”  Regulatory Intelligence Data:  12/17/1998. 
97 “Second DVD patent licensing group formed,” Screen Digest:  11/1/1997. 
98 The program mandated hardware and software royalties amounting to 4% of the net selling price for 
DVD Video players, 4% of the net selling price for DVD-ROM drives, and 7.5 cents per blank disc.   
99 Taylor, 180. 
100 Taylor, 179. 
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DVD products were forced to license essential technologies from the “3C” pool (held by 
LG, Philips, Sony, and Pioneer), the “6C” pool (Hitachi, IBM, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, 
Time Warner, Toshiba, JVC) and from Thomson and Discovision. 
Figure 4.3:  DVD Patents 









Mitsubishi, JVC, Time Warner, Less than 1%
   
 Source:  DVD Demystified, Jim Taylor (2001) 
Copyright protection was also mandated by the Forum and by Hollywood, 
requiring manufacturers to license that technology from the DVD CCA (Copy Control 
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Association) and from Macrovision, whose analog anti-recording technologies were 
required for hardware manufacturers.  Player manufacturers would also deal directly with 
Dolby for access to their Dolby Digital Decoders (or MLP decoders for DVD-audio 
players) and with the MPEG LA group to acquire patent licenses for compression 
technologies.101  All told, the new market entry would pay a total of $81,000 in licensing 
fees alone, with an additional six-or seven-figure investment required for manufacturing 
technologies and physical location establishment.102  After the new company began 
producing players or discs, $20 in royalties would come off the top of a player retailing 
for $200.103  With an installed base of players topping 122 million in the United States 
alone by 2007, the returns to patent holders and licensing organizations total more than 
$2.4 billion. 
Strategy of Control:  Dictating Manufacturing Standards 
Control over the technology, its licensing and patents, and the industrial 
organization overseeing its commercialization guaranteed market dominance for the 
founding ten companies.  IBM, Discovision, Dolby, and the MPEG group obtained 
                                                
101 Any new entries into the hardware manufacturing market would need to acquire the license yearly from 
DVD CCA for $15000, pay a one time $30000 fee to Macrovision (renewed yearly at $15000) for their 
license, purchase a specification book for the $5000 fee, pay the $10000 fee for the format and logo 
licensing, and pay an additional $5000 if they planned to manufacture both DVD-ROM and DVD-Video. 
http://www.allformp3.com/dvd-faqs/61.htm 
102 The company would return 3.5% per player or drive (minimum of $3.50) and 5 cents per disc to the 3C 
pool, 4% per player or drive (minimum $4), 4% per DVD Video decoder (minimum $1) and 7.5 cents per 
disc to the 6C pool and about a dollar per player or drive to Thomson.  Manufacturers would also return a 
maximum of $0.60 per player to Dolby for their digital decoder patents and $2.50 per player and 4 cents 
per disc to the MPEG group for decoder cards.  Many hardware manufacturers seeking cross-compatibility 
would choose to include Philips licensed Video CD technologies for $25000 and 2.5% per player ($2.50 
minimum).  An additional 25 cents per player went to Nissim, an organization managing DVD related 




market position through their unique patents or licensed peripheral technologies that were 
incorporated into the infrastructure established by the Forum.  The structuring of power 
and control within the industry was not limited to its administrative body and the 
organization deciding the technology’s form, function, and fate.  While the DVD Forum 
guaranteed control to the largest ten consumer electronics and computer companies, there 
still existed an open market competition in the manufacturing sector.  Disc 
manufacturers, led by Nimbus CD International, Warner Advanced Media Operations 
(WAMO), Pioneer, and Panasonic quickly produced bonding machinery to meet the 
quality specifications of the DVD standard established by the Forum.104  Working as 
independent manufacturers, these companies invested heavily in improvements to 
existing infrastructure and conversion in the hopes of obtaining competitive advantage.  
By July 1996, Nimbus became the first company in the world capable of manufacturing 
DVD and DVD-ROM discs, with an initial yearly output of 3.5 million discs.  “Being 
‘DVD ready’ this early in the game puts us in an excellent position to serve the market’s 
earliest adopters and ensures our competitive lead in terms of experience in producing the 
service,” said executive vice president of operations for Nimbus, David Trudel in a press 
release.105  Nimbus’ outlay ($25 million) is illustrative of the manufacturing sector’s 
willingness and ability to invest in DVD.  While improving their existing infrastructure, 
Nimbus also entered into early discussions with MPEG-2 vendors in the hopes of 
                                                
104 “Bonding still a sticky issue for DVD,” by Debbie Galante Block, Tape-Disc Business:  9/1/1996. 
105 “Nimbus Begins DVD Production,” PR Newswire: 9/13/1996. 
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integrating authoring, manufacturing, packaging, and distribution of the final product.106  
WAMO and Nimbus are examples of companies laying the foundations for market 
dominance through integration of the production chain. 
Alliances proliferated between production companies who converted CD 
authoring and manufacturing infrastructures to suit the new format.    The “DVD 
Production Alliance,” a Sonic Solutions-sponsored initiative, was formed in March 1996 
to provide “the technology and tools required by production facilities and content 
developers to create DVD titles.”107  In an attempt to go to market as soon as possible, 
Sonic offered content providers an integrated system, streamlining the production process 
and pushing titles into the retail channel.  Sonic unveiled the industry’s first workgroup-
based, integrated DVD production environment, called DVD Creator.108  This technology 
allowed for all manufacturing elements necessary for the production of a title, including 
compression, authoring, and bonding to be done on a single work-station.  By September, 
the system had been enhanced to conform to the Forum specifications, enabling users to 
create DVD 1.0 discs by fall.109  The Production Alliance, like patent holders and 
hardware manufacturers, pooled their resources and completely controlled the 
manufacturing side of the early developmental market.110  Several companies were quick 
to join the alliance:  California Video Center, Crest National, Laser Pacific Media Corp., 
                                                
106 “Nimbus will invest $25 Million in DVD manufacturing capability,” PR Newswire:  5/17/1996. 
107 “Sonic Solutions Creates Industry’s First DVD Pre-Mastering System; Industry’s Top Content 
Providers Join ‘DVD Production Alliance’ to Create DVD titles,” Business Wire:  3/20/1996. 
108The system was unveiled at the National Association of Broadcasters’ convention in Las Vegas in April 
with the support of Toshiba Corp., Warner Advanced Media Operations, and Daikin Industries.   
109 “Sonic Debuts Premastering System for DVD 1.0,” Business Wire:  9/19/1996. 
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Patapsco Design, Thomson Electronics, and Warner Bros were all on board by year’s 
end.   With the additions of Apple, IBM, Foto-Kern, General TV Network, Intel Corp, 
and Sunset Post, the alliance worked to produce convergent software and hardware 
editing packages, electronics hardware, and authoring tools for creators of digital 
entertainment.111 
The DVD Forum established formal strategies for controlling DVD technology 
and the fledgling DVD industry.  Through the Forum’s mission statement, the ten 
founding members were granted institutional control over all aspects of technological 
development.  This hierarchical division of power delegated responsibilities while 
assuring that new industry members were not able to innovate outside of the desires of 
the central power structure.  Through licensing and patent pooling strategies, these 
corporations solidified their position of dominance while maintaining direct control over 
the technology’s applications and assuring their portion of revenues.  Through 
partnerships with manufacturing collectives, these companies were assured that the 
product entering the marketplace would meet their collective demands under conditions 
they controlled. 
INDUSTRIAL BEHAVIOR AND INDUSTRIAL CULTURES OF PRODUCTION 
 The DVD Forum was designed by its founding members to guarantee power and 
control through the structure of the organization, and the distinctive practices engaged by 
the Forum members in the production and distribution of the DVD solidified that control.  
                                                                                                                                            




These practices further ensured that control and power would be limited to a particular set 
of firms.  The behaviors of industry members create and reflect specific values, beliefs, 
and patterns of working within the industry (Du Gay, Hall, et al 1997, p. 43).  These 
values, in turn, become an integral part of the industrial way of life, informing inter-
organizational decisions and activities.  For instance, members of the Forum devised 
unified strategies to litigate against content pirates, develop industry-wide format 
standards, and enact protectionist barriers to thwart threats from rival formats like Divx.  
These behaviors inform the perceptions of member corporations within the industry about 
how “things are done.”  Outside observers also understand the Forum through these 
activities, according the industry with particular identities that are distinct from the 
identities associated with individual firms.  Throughout this section practices will be 
identified that make it hard to categorize the DVD industry as a typical industry based on 
the commercialization of a singular technological product; the DVD industry became, 
through the collective behaviors of its constituent members, a cooperative cartel that 
worked to most efficiently exploit the assets and resources of the various companies 
engaged in the processes of commercializing the various formats, software, and hardware 
associated with DVD technology.  These behaviors were, in turn, represented by the 
industry in particular ways and became an integral part of the Forum’s attempt to create 
and maintain a distinctive industrial culture.   
This industrial culture was established via actions taken by the Forum over the 
first five years of its existence (from 1997-2002), most notably their efforts to establish 
                                                                                                                                            
111 “Apple, IBM join Sonic Solutions,” by Paul Verna, Billboard:  9/28/1996. 
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technological standards, discourage rival formats, enforce licensing conditions, 
discourage conflicts, incorporate new members, maintain current members, and establish 
barriers to entry for rival firms with competing technologies.  That culture developed in 
order to assure the success of DVD-Video and DVD-ROM, and the crucial software 
support supplied by Hollywood and the computing industry.  This section accounts for 
the relative successes of the varying DVD formats.  Without the influence of these two 
industries, formats other than DVD-Video and DVD-ROM failed to obtain widespread 
market dominance.  The cooperative culture that was established surrounding DVD-
Video and DVD-ROM was increasingly tenuous and unstable with recordable and audio 
DVD formats.  The DVD Forum struggled to exercise its power and maintain unified 
technological standards as new iterations of the technology appeared in 1997 and 1998. 
Contrary to the case of DVD-Video, supplemental formats did not quickly supplant their 
technological predecessors, precisely because the hegemony established through the 
DVD Forum was challenged by firms splitting from the collective to release proprietary 
technologies.  A number of key firms, including Sony and Philips, were engaged in an 
effort to challenge the Forum’s authority and control.  The Forum ultimately maintained 
its authority in the most crucial of industrial sectors:  DVD-Video intended for playback 
of pre-recorded content.  The cooperative culture established in the early days of the 
Forum pertaining to DVD-Video and DVD-ROM quickly shifted without the influence of 
Hollywood to a contentious industrial culture defined by a growing divide between Sony 
and Philips on one side and Matsushita and Pioneer on the other.   
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Dissention in the Ranks:  Threats to the Forum’s Collective Culture 
 The DVD Forum ensured continuing control over the DVD industry through their 
collective practices pertaining to format specifications and licensing.  As early as 1997, 
the ten founding members of the Forum established their collective authority by 
announcing standards and practices for licensing logos, the standard DVD-Video format, 
as well as supplemental formats for recording onto DVD.112  These announcements mark 
the first steps in the Forum’s continuing effort to encourage industry members to agree to 
standards, thus avoiding consumer confusion and technological incompatibility between 
formats.  On April 13, 1997, the Forum announced uniform standards for re-writable 
(DVD-RAM) and write-once (DVD-R) digital discs.113  Not more than a week after the 
press release appeared, the trade press implied that the announcement was causing some 
derision within the ranks of the Forum.114  Sony, after nearly a year of negotiating within 
the group to ensure adoption of its own rewritable and write-once format, was not happy 
the group decided to go forward with a standard not compatible with Sony’s offer.  
Hitachi and Matsushita led the charge to standardize the format, reigniting passionate 
competition and distaste between Sony and Matsushita.  Hitachi and Matsushita 
announced in late April that they would be first to market with PC drives based on DVD-
RAM technology.115  This struggle to establish a standard for re-writable discs marks the 
                                                
112 The ten founding companies included:  Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Philips, Sony, Thomson, Time 
Warner, and JVC. 
113 “DVD Forum Announces DVD-RAM and DVD-R Formats,” Business Wire, April 13, 1997. 
114 “Tensions Seen in DVD Market, But Impact Small on Product,” by Kenneth McCallum and Makiko 
Fukui, Dow Jones International News, April 17, 1997. 
115 “Matsushita Develops PD-Compatible DVD-RAM,” Jiji Press English News Service, April 23, 1997; 
Hitachi Announces Worlds First DVD-RAM Drive; Samples of Recordable DVD Drive to Ship in June” 
Business Wire, April 23, 1997. 
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first internal conflict within the Forum represented to the public since the DVD-Video 
format specification had been announced.  What was at stake in this conflict is clear:  
whether the equanimity between Matsushita and Sony that had resulted in the first ever 
global inter-industrial technological standard would survive.    
Control over DVD-RAM and DVD-R technology was thought to be the next 
generation of huge windfall profits; the technology was designed to replace recordable 
media (VHS and CD-R) and would be sold as blank media ready for copying data or 
video content off of computers or television sets.  Being first to market with these 
technologies, particularly the drive technologies, meant an enormous advantage in the 
marketplace; if a standard was agreed upon, new consoles, PCs and laptops could be 
marketed as “time-shifters” or as a more versatile version of the increasingly popular 
playback-only DVD-Video.  Sony, Philips, and Hewlett-Packard split from the Forum 
and announced on August 12, 1997 that they would commercialize a competing standard 
for recordable disc technology.116  The result of this announcement was to effectively 
open the floodgates to competing formats and consumer confusion.  Sony’s 
announcement led, in turn, to NEC’s announcement the very next day that they would be 
developing their own standard.117  The trade and popular press couched Sony’s 
announcement as a sign of a forthcoming apocalyptic struggle for control.  By playing up 
the divide between Forum members and the struggle for industrial control, the press 
                                                
116 “Sony Pushes Alternative DVD Format,” by Todd Zaun, The Associated Press, August 13, 1997. 
117 Known as Multimedia Video Format, the standard was designed to be compatible on PCs and consoles 
and would hold 5.25 GB of storage per side.  “NEC To Push Its Own Format For Next-Generation 
Computer Storage,” Dow Jones Online News, August 14, 1997. 
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encouraged the public to conceptualize the activities of industrial members as some sort 
of melodramatic format battle.  Sony was cast as the villain, struggling to regain control 
of an empire it had lost.  Most American publications referred to Sony’s refusal to 
abandon Betamax, even after Matsushita’s VHS technology had gained control of 
consumer market, as an analogy for the ensuing battle.  A small sampling of the press, 
however, sought to understand the announcement in light of Sony’s struggle to enter the 
PC market in 1996, explaining the effort as a way to correct that unsuccessful effort.118   
Meanwhile, the Forum went ahead with their standards, proposing their standard 
to the European Computer Manufacturers’ Association in an effort to establish global 
uniformity.119  Sony’s collective also submitted their standard and announced they would 
not support the Forum’s proposal.120  The Forum responded by attempting to court NEC 
back into the fold to strengthen their standard; NEC demurred.  The Forum then 
demonstrated the “multibrand compatibility” of DVD-RAM during an event in Tokyo on 
August 25, 1997, ensuring its viability in the marketplace.121  In September, Sony’s 
consortia unveiled their DVD-RAM format just as the Forum was preparing concessions 
on the audio specifications for DVDs employing PAL standards for playback in Europe.  
The format battle for recordable and re-writable discs was well underway; Hollywood 
was nowhere to be found.  For the content providers, support for DVD and participation 
within the Forum depended on the technology being read-only.  Weighing in on the 
                                                
118 “Sony, 2 others go own way on DVD-RAM format,” NIKKEI English News, August 15, 1997. 
119 “Consortium Proposes DVD-RAM Format to European Body,” Jiji Press English News Service, August 
18, 1997. 
120 “Sony, Philips Electronics, HP Propose New Format for Storage Discs,” EDP Weekly, August 18, 1997. 
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conflict over recordable home video technologies would have implied support for that 
technology.  By January, the Forum had established a verification services system that 
allowed manufacturers to have their drives and discs confirmed as compliant with the 
standard, a major step towards mass commercialization of the product.122 
 What the lead-up to the conflicts over DVD-RAM illustrates is the fragile nature 
of the cooperative culture forged through the DVD Forum.  Companies with long-
standing animosities agreed to work together, sharing research and eventual profits to 
guarantee software support from Hollywood and the computer industry.  While 
cooperative partnerships continued to proliferate as companies sought to develop 
economies of scale in research, development, production and marketing, and industry-
wide practices aiming to guarantee the successful commercialization of DVD-Video and 
DVD-ROM continued with the support of Hollywood, conflicts between groups became 
more prominent.  Each new format developed by the industry held the potential for 
enormous profit and increased industrial power.  To cede that power to the collective 
meant supporting the established power structure at enormous cost to any company 
capable of producing proprietary technologies.  Sony and Philips were not willing to 
continue their amicable behaviors established early in the commercialization of DVD. 
Arriving at a standard for DVD-Video and DVD-ROM was done only begrudgingly.  The 
peace would not last; Sony’s enlistment of Philips, meant that they were guaranteed a 
                                                                                                                                            
121 “DVD-RAM Compatibility Shown” Consumer Multimedia Report, September 1, 1997. 




market for their competing technologies in Europe.  Hewlett-Packard’s involvement 
ensured entrée into the U.S. computer market.   
Perhaps more significantly, however, the growing conflicts within the Forum 
created a palpable tension within the steering committee meetings that threatened to undo 
the collective efforts designed to be mutually beneficial to all industry members.  For 
example, at the December 1997 DVD Forum meeting at the Trianon Palace Hotel (the 
site of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, significantly enough, which marked the end 
of World War I), the steering committee voted to adjust the language of the DVD-Video 
specification to allow for Dolby AC-3 audio formats on PAL DVDs.  The adjustment 
would greatly improve the manufacturing capabilities and compatibility of platforms in 
Europe and was thought to be necessary for a successful launch of DVD-Video and 
DVD-ROM on that continent.  Sony and Philips were the only two companies on the 
Forum’s steering committee not to approve the measure.123  Whether this decision 
illustrates a strategic move by Sony and Philips to attempt to restrict the launch of DVD-
Video in Europe for some nefarious reason or simply was a demonstration of their ill will 
towards the other Forum members stemming from the DVD-RAM format conflicts, the 
significance of the vote lies elsewhere.  Sony and Philips, along with their partners 
Hewlett-Packard and Ricoh, were engaging in a struggle for control that became 
symptomatic of the newly contentious industrial culture percolating within the industry. 
                                                




Warring Factions:  Computer Companies Join the Forum 
 Meanwhile, the Forum’s working groups continued their efforts to develop 
industry-wide standards for a variety of supplemental DVD formats.  WG-4 DVD Audio, 
released a draft of technical specifications on January 7, 1998 in an effort to standardize 
the next-generation audio disc.124  Sony and Philips did not participate, instead choosing 
to work towards their own proprietary format.  Intel, the first computer company to join 
the Working Group, openly derided the separatist behaviors of Sony and Philips, 
contributing to the bifurcation of companies and the growing cultural divide within the 
Forum.125  Pioneer and Matsushita unveiled plans for DVD-R/W on February 1, 
proposing a rewritable disc that would be cross compatible with read-only drives, a 
function DVD-RAM was unable to perform (see figure 4.4).126  DVD+RW, developed by 
Sony, Hewlett Packard, and Philips outside of the auspices of the DVD Forum, was 
demonstrated in March as an erasable format to compete with DVD-R/W.127 
                                                
124 “WG-4 Delivers Draft DVD Audio Specifications to Audio Companies and Associations,” Business 
Wire, January 7, 1998. 
125 “Intel Joins DVD Working Group, Snubs Sony and Philips,” Computergram International, February 
26, 1998. 
126 “Pioneer proposes DVD-R/W,” by Dana J. Parker, EMedia Professional, February 1, 1998. 




   
Figure 4.4:  Writable DVD Overview 
DVD-RAM 1.0 DVD-RAM 2.0 DVD-R 1.0 DVD-R 2.0 DVD-RW 1.0 DVD+RW 2.0 
First available (US) 
   1998         2000  1997  1999  2000  2001 
Capacity   
2.6 GB/side      4.7 GB/side 3.95 GB/side 4.7 GB/side 4.7 GB/side 4.7 GB/side 
Backers 
Hitachi, Matsushita,    Pioneer Pioneer, Ricoh, Hewlett Packard, 
Samsung, Toshiba   Sharp, Sony, Philips, Sony, 
      Yamaha  Thomson,   
        Mitsubishi, Ricoh, 
        Yamaha 
 Source:  Jim Tayler (2001), DVD Demystified, Second Edition 
The Forum’s officially supported formats, which did not include DVD+RW, were 
championed by the collective marketing resources of Forum members, an effort to 
convey to consumers the superiority of the Forum’s formats over Sony’s.128  Sony, taking 
a cue from their Forum counterparts, formed the DVD+RW Compatibility Alliance with 
Philips, Hewlett Packard, Ricoh, Mitsubishi, and Yamaha Corp. to pool resources, 
develop standards, and challenge the hegemony of the Forum.  In an effort to resolve the 
format disputes within the organization, the Forum invited seven new companies to join 
the steering committee (the seven new members included IBM, Industry Technology 
Research Institute of Taiwan, Intel, LG Electronics, NEC, Samsung, and Sharp); by 
opening membership the committee divested the seat of power, bringing disgruntled 
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technology developers into the power structure to effectively unify the disparate attempts 
to control writable DVD.129  In a separate effort to unify the disparate technologies, 29 
manufacturers joined together through the Optical Storage Trade Association (OSTA) to 
“forge a common format for digital video disks [sic] they hope will cut a swath through 
the labyrinth of competing approaches to rewritable DVD.”130   
The expansion of the steering committee also marked a shift in the Forum’s 
distribution of power across its three constituent industries.  The inclusion of IBM and 
Intel on the steering committee changed the dynamics of the Forum irrevocably; the two 
leading global computer companies now had direct influence over the form and function 
of the technology for use on computers.  These two companies also played a significant 
role in the development of the DVD-Audio specifications, working with Matsushita and 
Toshiba to develop content protection technology, thus finally clearing the path to market 
for the format by March 1999.131  Additionally, the inclusion of the Industry Technology 
Research Institute of Taiwan demonstrates that the long-standing animosity between 
Japanese and Taiwanese electronics manufacturers could be reconciled.  Matsushita, the 
chief antagonist to the Taiwanese industry, dramatically changed its practices to 
challenge Sony, vowing to champion DVD in partnership with the ITRIT in the 
Taiwanese market. The Forum also went so far as to challenge Sony and Philips publicly, 
                                                                                                                                            
128 “Forum:  Family of discs to offer added value, simplicity,” TWICE, March 30, 1998. 
129 “DVD Committee expands to combat disputes,” Screen Digest, June 1, 1998. 
130 “Group Hopes to Unify Recordable DVD Factions,” by Junko Yoshida, Terry Costlow, and George 
Leopold, CMP TechWeb, January 11, 1999. 
131 “IBM:  Technology companies and music industry agree on framework for DVD-audio content 
protection,” M2 PRESSWIRE, March 5, 1999. 
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asking them in a press release to “stop referring to their rewritable products as DVD.”132  
Finally, to resolve the standards issues  over writable DVD formats, the DVD Forum 
announced in December 2001 hardware specifications designed to ensure compatibility 
between all Forum-supported formats.  “DVD Multi” was intended to alleviate consumer 
confusion and spur adoption of DVD recordable drives and consoles.  However, because 
the format did not support the DVD+RW and DVD+R formats from the Sony collective, 
DVD Multi failed to galvanize the public.133   
Regardless of the success or failure of supplemental formats, the Forum’s 
continuing control and power was assured.  If the Forum could not control the technology 
and its profits through unified standards, they could guarantee that competing 
technologies would not have free reign over the marketplace.  If the Forum could not 
guarantee that member firms would remain in the collective, working towards the greater 
good of all members, they could ensure that those members would achieve limited 
success challenging the hegemony of the collective.  The seat of power within the Forum 
could be manipulated to thwart challenges from expatriate members; new members with 
enormous resources could be encouraged to support Forum technologies over those of 
competitors.  The activities of the Forum established a way of dealing with threats to 
power and control that proved to be efficient and profitable.  When faced with challenges, 
the Forum enlisted its member companies in collective practices that supported the 
Forum.  When faced with new technologies that could disturb the order established by the 
                                                
132 “Forum Tells Renegade Members:  Customers Will Be Confused by DVD+RW Name,” by Doug 
Olenick, Computer Retail Week, April 13, 1998. 
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collective, the Forum turned up the pressure to enlist new members or to attain additional 
support from existing ones.  If a new technology based in playback of pre-recorded 
content emerged, the Forum turned up the pressure on its software constituency to 
include more of its counterparts (ie the other members of the Big Six) and to provide 
more titles.  Acting as a collective organization, with the blessing of the U.S. Department 
of Justice (as discussed in chapter six), the Forum could restrict competition and set 
prices for hardware and software through unofficial guidelines.  In so doing, the 
organization developed specific strategies for control; these strategies percolated and 
manifested into a culture of production that ensured that the technology and the content 
embedded within its layers would perform in particular ways through a limited set of 
design elements and user interfaces, agreed upon by all members of the Forum and their 
employee designers.  The struggle for control over supplemental formats, however, did 
solidify practices and strategies for maintaining power established by the unified 
collective in the early stages of industrial development. 
 While the conflicts over writable DVD formats led to expansion of the power elite 
and challenges to the hegemony of the Forum, power and control were maintained 
through the practices of the collective relative to DVD-Video and DVD-ROM.  The DVD 
Forum and its constituent members behaved in particular ways to establish and maintain 
control through licensing strategies, establishing and supporting technological standards, 
patent enforcement, verification practices, and lobbying and litigation efforts to protect 
the technology from piracy.  By acting as a collective organization to combat threats from 
                                                                                                                                            
133 “What is DVD Multi?” by Ralph LaBarge, Digital Video Magazine, November 1, 2002. 
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rival technologies, including writable formats from Sony’s collective, the Forum ensured 
that the successful introduction of any new DVD platform required the support of the 
collective. 
Outside Challengers:  The Case of Divx   
This collective power held by the Forum constituents and the viability of their 
control of the DVD marketplace was most evident in the case of Divx.  While Divx was 
developed and commercialized by Circuit City and Thomson as a supplemental rental 
platform not intended to directly compete with DVD, the Forum refused to include the 
specification amongst its supported formats.  Through this action, the Forum discouraged 
the manufacturing of Divx technologies by member firms. This decision was then 
supported by the activities of key software leaders within the Forum.  Warner Home 
Video, for instance, sent a memo to retailers in December 1998 stating that they would 
not receive advertising support from Warner if they promoted any Warner products in 
conjunction with “any alternative or variant optical disc technology, including both video 
software and hardware (excepting only laserdisc technology).”134  Threatening the retailer 
was a strategy supported implicitly by the Forum, as Time Warner was a founding 
member of the steering committee and the most vocal proponent of DVD over Divx.  By 
enacting protectionist strategies to support the early diffusion of DVD, the Forum 
restricted competition and guaranteed that any competing technologies would have 




Figure 4.5:  Dates the Studios Committed to DVD & DIVX Formats 
 
Major Studio   DVD Date  DIVX Date 
 
Warner (HBO, New Line)  Before players were Did not release in format 
    available 
Columbia   Before players were Did not release in format  
    available 
MGM/UA   Before players were March 1998 
    Available 
Universal   July 1997  September 1997 
Disney (Buena Vista)  August 1997  September 1997 
Paramount   April 1998  September 1997 
20th Century Fox   August 1998  February 1998 
 
(source:  Dranove, David and Neil Gandal.  “The DVD vs. DIVX Standard War:  Empirical Evidence of 
Network Effects and Preannouncement Effects” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2003) 
 
Plans for Divx’s launch, meanwhile, employed a similar strategy to that utilized 
by the Forum with DVD; Divx was set to launch in the San Francisco and Richmond, Va. 
test markets prior to its nationwide release.135  With support from Disney, Fox, 
Dreamworks, Paramount, Universal, and MGM, the technology seemed to have the 
necessary software support to be a viable entrée into the nascent DVD marketplace.  
However, these firms only released 25 titles to Divx and players and discs were only 
made available through Circuit City, Ultimate Electronics and Good Guys stores.136  
Divx’s strategy to enlist the support of the studios was to guarantee minimum 
compensation of $112 million, distributed between the studios between 1999 and 2004. 
137  This cash payment was intended to guarantee software support from some of the 
leading content providers.  Several crucial mistakes in this agreement virtually 
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guaranteed the unsuccessful launch of the technology:  1) cash payments were guaranteed 
to the studios regardless of the performance of the technology in the marketplace; 2) the 
pay-outs did not guarantee exclusive support of Divx over DVD; 3) the fact that the 
technology was proprietary and owned by a major electronics retailer eliminated support 
from other major retailers; 4) Divx could not enlist the support of Time Warner, whose 
investment in DVD ensured their exclusive support of that technology; 5) Circuit City 
could not compete with the collective resources of the DVD Forum in marketing, 
technical support, and interaction with regulators. Without the support of the Forum or a 
consortium of major companies supporting the technology, which could have encouraged 
widespread manufacturing of Divx players that would have been made available through 
all major retailers, the technology was doomed to fail.  Divx did just that.  The Divx 
rental system was created in 1998 in time for the holiday season and was discontinued on 
June 16, 1999 after consumers failed to embrace the technology. 
Software Distribution:  Establishing a DVD Model 
While Divx failed in its efforts to commercialize a competitive or supplemental 
DVD technology, DVD-Video and DVD-ROM were primed to enter the marketplace 
with the full support of all three constituent industries in 1997 and 1998.  Within each 
Working Group, tasks were divided amongst members according to the relative resources 
and expertise of the company.  This division of labor and communal atmosphere 
permeated the industry, spreading from the Forum into all sub-activities of the industry.  
In the manufacturing sector, firms pooled resources and established packaging standards 
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at the behest of the Forum.  In the software section, the major studios, drawing on their 
experience in the VHS home video market, partnered to distribute each other’s films in 
international markets.  These relationships had been established in the mid-1980s as a 
way to share costs while capitalizing on strengths of particular studio’s distribution 
networks around the world.  In some cases, these partnerships would not last once the 
DVD revenues started pouring in.  For instance, MGM/UA entered into a long-term 
agreement with Warner Home Video in 1990, granting the rights to distribute both new 
releases and library titles for a percentage of worldwide home video revenues.138  This 
agreement was scheduled to expire in May 2003; in 1999, MGM negotiated an early out 
that returned their home video rights for $225 million.139  MGM/UA handled the 
distribution of their own product in the domestic market from February 2000 onwards, 
but negotiated a new deal with Fox to distribute titles internationally, maintaining “broad 
powers to direct and control the handling of [our] home video product.”140  While these 
deals were increasingly commonplace in the home video market after DVD, collectively 
the studios maintained control and market share through branded product lines, cohesive 
large-scale advertising campaigns, and targeted, strategic releasing strategies.   
The major studios also devised a collective strategy to increase revenues in 
shifting to DVD:  revenue sharing with the home video retailer.  While each studio was 
responsible for cutting their own deals with rental retailers and dealt directly with major 
                                                






retailers for sell-through, they cooperated to establish guidelines for revenue sharing 
contracts and technologies.141  Revenue sharing was sold en masse to the rental retail 
industry as the new business model for home video.  Under this new arrangement, 
retailers lowered the initial cost of acquiring product while sharing the revenue of each 
new release with the studios, typically for at least the first six months a title was in 
circulation.  The studios could then recoup a percentage of the profits from the retailers, 
instead of selling titles outright at high prices and not receiving profits as the title was 
rented repeatedly.  Lower priced (read low-performing box-office films or direct-to-video 
titles) were purchased outright and were not subject to revenue sharing terms.  Most early 
revenue sharing programs employed by the studios guaranteed an increased stake in the 
exploding home video market through “output programs.”142  Similar to “block booking” 
employed by the studios prior to the 1948 Paramount Decree, output programs required 
that rental retailers carry every new release distributed by the studio.  Additionally, these 
programs mandated that a guaranteed amount of revenue be returned to the studio for 
each release, regardless of its performance in the store.  Blockbuster hits would easily 
return the minimum to the studio, with profits left over for the retailer; lower performing 
new releases often failed to return the minimum guarantee and resulted in losses for the 
retailers.  When the retailers balked, threatening anti-trust litigation, the studios devised 
“non-output” agreements that permitted the retailer the option of either taking in large 
quantities or purchasing a title outright through a distributor for rental. 
                                                




Early in the development of industrial strategies related to DVD, the studios were 
willing to license titles to niche independent distributors who would package the film 
with supplemental content as “special edition” discs.  Companies like Criterion Co., 
which had made a name for itself through high-quality transfers and supplements on 
laserdisc, could exploit this specialty market, packaging titles with high quality, 
widescreen transfers and a glut of originally-produced supplemental content at premium 
prices.143  However, as the studios recognized the profitability of the DVD market, they 
trended towards maintaining control of their own product and producing supplemental 
features in-house.  This shift away from the independent distributor led to increased 
control and profits for the majors, while limiting the variety and type of content available 
on the disc.   
The “mainstreaming” of the DVD market has also resulted in multiple iterations 
and releases from the studios, increasing the profit margins as consumers willingly 
purchase multiple versions of their favorite movies on disc.  Furthermore, the fact that the 
studios moved away from licensing titles to independent distributors greatly reduced the 
number of distributors in the marketplace.  The studios, by simply maintaining their 
distribution rights to titles produced under their corporate parents, have effectively taken 
control of the industry’s most lucrative division.  The fact that these six studios have 
gained control over the distribution of DVDs is not surprising; as the DVD industry 
developed and partnerships between major studios became the norm, they established a 
                                                                                                                                            
142 “Video Update Inc. Annual Report (10-K) Item 1:  Business” SEC Filing, 9/11/00. 
143 See appendix 4.4 for a list of DVD Distributors by production company. 
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collective strategy in all areas pertaining to DVD.  One important side effect of the 
increasingly cooperative studio relationships in the home video market, particularly in its 
developmental period, was the establishment and control over pricing.  Software titles 
from partnered studios were priced similarly for sell-through based on the developing 
market, duration in release, and box office performance.  Titles that were unqualified hits 
were priced higher than their underperforming counterparts, regardless of the studio that 
produced them.  By virtue of these cooperative distribution deals, all titles were priced 
along a continuum from about $19.99 to $29.99. 
DVD DIFFUSION 
Strategies for control and power in the DVD marketplace were not restricted to 
hardware and manufacturing sectors, the behaviors of the Forum or its individual 
members.  The market segment that offered the most promise for windfall profits, and the 
power derived from them, was software and pre-packaged content.  Controlling the 
software market meant performing in the marketplace under the conditions stipulated by 
the Forum’s structure and behavior.  As the 1990s computer industry demonstrates, 
software and content providers like Microsoft displaced hardware manufacturers like 
IBM as the leading profit earners, resulting in a dramatic shift in the industrial power 
structure.  Software providers influenced the culture developing within the Forum, while 
establishing a new software sales and rental model.  The involvement of the content 
providers in the DVD marketplace would play an imperative role in the success of DVD.  
Without supporting content from the Hollywood studios, the format could not achieve 
widespread market penetration or replace existing home video technologies.  While it 
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was a foregone conclusion that Time Warner/Warner Bros. and Sony/Columbia would 
release titles on DVD, given their involvement in the development of DVD technology, 
the other members of Hollywood’s oligopoly were initially hesitant to support the digital 
format.   
Regardless of the fact that the DVD Forum worked cooperatively with the studios 
in establishing a technical standard for playback of pre-recorded content, the content 
providers recognized that the new technology would need to be copy-protected before 
widespread support was offered. While five hundred features from Warner and 
MGM/UA were committed in 1996 and MCA/Universal and Columbia TriStar were 
vocal supporters of the new format, Disney, 20th Century Fox, and Paramount initially 
remained quiet.  On March 24, 1997, Time Warner released 32 titles to New York, 
Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington D.C.  Columbia 
Tri-Star Home Video withheld product until April 29, citing the difficult production 
process and the desire to “show off the quality of the new digital medium, not offer a 
‘marginal’ alternative to VHS.”144 
Limiting release to stores in seven initial cities enabled the software/content 
providers time to produce more titles before the technology hit the mass market.  All of 
the content providers were concerned about copyright, pricing issues, revenue sharing, 
the threat or promise of Divx, and packaging standards.  Three key developments 
between March and December of 1996 quelled concerns and encouraged some of the 
studios to move forward:  (1) A multi-industry Copyright Protection Working Group 
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agreed in October of 1996 on copyright technology designed as a picture-based 
encryption scheme to prevent unauthorized copying of motion pictures and other content 
from pre-recorded DVD video;145 (2) Thomson/RCA set hardware pricing guidelines for 
DVD players at $499 suggested retail list;146 and (3) Clear-Vu products introduced an 
alternative DVD jewel-box design meeting VSDA standards while challenging Time-
Warner subsidiary Ivy Hill, then sole manufacturer of DVD packaging.147  By 
establishing a copyright standard content providers were assured that there would be a 
technological protection scheme embedded both on the disc and within the player and 
that their content would be protected from piracy, at least initially.  The existence of Divx 
as an alternative technology with “better” copyright protection restricted full support 
from the studios.  After large cash payments were offered by Divx’s progenitor Circuit 
City to Fox, Paramount, and Dreamworks, those studios agreed to support Divx over 
“open-source” DVD through 1997 and the first half of 1998.148 By late 1998, all of the 
major studios had announced their support of the DVD format, either exclusively, or in 
combination with their support for Divx.  Meanwhile, hardware pricing guidelines 
assured the studios that the manufacturing sector would supply the market with 
accessibly-priced consoles that would not restrict early adoption of the format.  
                                                                                                                                            
144 Ibid. 
145 “Groups reach DVD accord; Pioneer, Samsung ready,” by Kristen Kenedy, Computer Retail Week:  
11/4/1996. 
146 “How the disc was spun; vision and compromise lead to one of the most successful consumer 
products of all time,” by Scott Kirsner, Daily Variety, April 24, 2007. 
147 VSDA (Video Software Dealers’ Association) is an industrial organization that works with the DVD 
Forum to recommend standards for retailers; “Contention clouds pending DVD intro,” by Seth Goldstein, 
Billboard:  3/9/1996. 
148 “Revenge of the ‘Early Adopters,’” by Andrew Leonard, Salon, April 29, 1998. 
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Packaging standards allowed DVD products to be seamlessly integrated into existing 
retail shelves alongside VHS tapes, securing its place in the retail distributorship as a 
designed-for-sell through product. 
DVD-Video Performance 
Control and market share in the home video content/software market for DVD 
was dictated by the studios’ release strategy, existing library of titles, market position 
relative to VHS, and timing entering the market.  The first studios to release on DVD had 
the advantage over their laggard counterparts.  On March 24, 1997, Warner Home Video 
released thirty two titles on DVD in the aforementioned seven test markets.  Time 
Warner devised a release strategy to exploit their library of titles, at that time the largest 
in the industry, by partnering with MGM/UA, HBO, New Line, and Warner Bros. to 
release a variety of titles for sell-through at prices ranging from $19.95 to $24.99.149  On 
August 26, 1997, Warner Home Video went nationwide, releasing 61 titles.150  Time 
Warner had the early competitive advantage by virtue of their wholesale support for the 
technology, library of titles, and early entry into the market.  Warner Home Video, under 
the leadership of Warren Lieberfarb, had established and maintained the leading market 
position through exploitation of titles for sell-through and rental on VHS.  With DVD, 
they would employ a similar strategy, releasing both blockbusters, led by their Batman 
franchise, and popular library titles like the Bond series (through MGM/UA) and classics 
                                                
149 “DVD Historical Timeline,” by Stephen Czar, DVDFILE.com 




like Bonnie and Clyde and Cool Hand Luke.  The success of DVD software sales was 
predicated on the technology serving as a home video feature film delivery platform.  
"DVD's performance has been strong, and our numbers prove it. Driven by sales of both 
new releases and catalog titles, we had total revenues of over $50 million, and we expect 
1998 to be even better," said Warren Lieberfarb, president of Warner Home Video.151  Of 
the $50 million generated by DVD sales in 1997 catalog revenues totaled $40.6 million, 
81% of total DVD revenues, while new releases accounted for only 19%.152  Warner 
Home Video sold more than three million DVDs in 1997 to retailers from the stock of 61 
titles released.  The top five 1997 DVD titles from the Warner family sold as follows: 
Figure 4.6:  Top selling DVD Titles, Warner Home Video, September-December 1997 
Titles Units Wholesale Revenues 
Batman & Robin 91,521 units $1,486,301  
Twister  86,840 units  $1,410,282  
Eraser  79,806 units  $1,296,049  
Blade Runner  64,791 units  $1,052,206  
The Fugitive  61,093 units  $ 992,150 
 Source:  www.timewarner.com 
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While the other studios debated entering the DVD market or the Divx market, 
Warner Home Video established dominant market position.  Independent content 
providers, led by Simitar Entertainment, rushed to fill the gap.153  Disney, a leading 
player in the VHS market through their wholly-owned subsidiary Buena Vista Home 
Entertainment, refused to release any of its animated classics on DVD until Divx folded 
in 1999.  Instead, Disney released its live-action catalog and new releases on DVD, 
including Ransom, Phenomenon, George of the Jungle, Tombstone, Homeward Bound: 
An Incredible Journey, and Nightmare Before Christmas.154  Disney, along with 
Paramount, Universal, and Dreamworks agreed to release 100 titles to support the launch 
of Divx.  Figure 4.5 illustrates the rush to market and the desire by the Big Six to 
dominate the fledgling DVD business.  Compare these staggering numbers to the number 
of theatrical releases and new releases priced for direct-sales on VHS prior to DVD:  
from 1995-2002, the number of new MPAA films released theatrically remained between 
400 and 500 titles; in 1995, there were only 22 theatrically released titles introduced on 
VHS at sell-through prices; even with this market expanding prior to DVD, only 63 
theatrical titles were released for sell-through on VHS in 1998.155  By 1999, DVD was 
established as a delivery mechanism for feature films.  The major studios divided the 
                                                
153 “DVD vs. Divx” by Seth Goldstein, Billboard, 1/10/98, vol. 110, issue 2. 
154 Ibid. 
155 VSDA Reports, 1997, 1998, 1999. 
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market amongst themselves, based on the depth of their existing libraries and the 
theatrical successes of their new releases and blockbusters.156 
Figure 4.7:  Feature Films Released on DVD-Video in the United States 







































Source:  Jim Taylor, www.dvddemystified.com 
 
                                                
156 By 1999, the leading software suppliers on DVD for feature films (in descending order) had been 
established:  Warner Bros./Warner Home Video was first with around 20% of the rental and sell-through 
markets; Buena Vista controlled around 16% of those markets; Columbia/Sony claimed around 14% of the 
rental market and 11% of the sell-through market; Universal had around 10% of the sell through and 
around 13% of the rental market; Fox reported around 10% of sell-through and around 11% of rental; 
Paramount claimed around 7% sell-through and about 10% of rental; MGM carried about 6% of each 
market, with the remaining 8% of the rental market and 17% of the sell-through market controlled by 
independent specialty companies marketing sports and children’s programming.  White Paper, “The US 
Home Entertainment Market” by Marshall Forster, EVP Home Entertainment, Columbia Tristar. 
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The DVD-Video retail market was controlled by the largest mass market retailers 
working with the studios and their conglomerate parent companies.  Because the studios 
changed the existing rental model in favor of sell-through with DVD, they alone could 
dictate which stores were granted access to titles and depth of inventory.  New strategies 
for control and market share emerged, as retailers jockeyed for position, cutting deals 
with the studios to sell and market DVDs in their stores nationwide.  Setting the price of 
DVD titles according to the studios’ guidelines, these retailers were offered a percentage 
of each disc sale.  With titles competitively priced between retailers, marketing efforts for 
the retailers stressed depth of inventory and supporting technologies.157  Many sought to 
offer “one-stop shopping” for DVD players, titles, and televisions, thus increasing sales 
of peripheral technologies.  Because the DVD Forum had established a single 
technological standard for DVD-Video, both retailers and consumers could be assured 
that the discs being sold in stores would work on DVD players available one aisle over. 
Instead of dealing with rental distributors and wholesalers, the studios formed 
direct sales relationships with the largest existing online and “four-wall” retailers.  Rather 
than limiting these relationships to specialty retailers selling only VHS or music content, 
the studios capitalized on the explosive growth of mass-merchant companies selling 
everything from electronics to clothing and foodstuffs (see figure 4.6).  DVD-Video titles 
offered these retailers an opportunity to branch out into a new and lucrative business with 
little to no investment to change the existing retail infrastructure.  DVD packages were 
                                                
157 The average price point for DVDs in 1997 was $24.60; 1998 $25.32; 1999 $25.86;  2000 $22.91; 2001 
$20.74 (source:  DVD Release Report, 1.16.02) 
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specifically designed to fit into the existing shelves devoted to VHS display.  While 
DVDs were fitting into the retail infrastructure (pun intended), they were also impacting 
the layout and design of floor space in large retail outlets.  By positioning DVD titles 
strategically at the back of their stores, retailers hoped to lure consumers into purchasing 
additional goods on their way to or from the DVD section.  Best Buy, the leading retailer 
of DVDs by 2000, positioned DVD titles at the rear of their enormous stores, strategically 
positioned next to televisions and DVD consoles.  Additionally, Best Buy adapted 
quickly to DVD’s popularity, expanding its DVD section more than half a dozen times 
between 1997 and 2000 at the expense of VHS shelf space.  Best Buy’s subsidiary 
Musicland rapidly converted to DVD and saw more than 40% of their total sales 
attributed to DVD by 2000.158 
 
Figure 4.8:  Top 10 DVD Sellers (2001) 
 
Rank Company  U.S. Outlets  DVD Rev. (M) 
1 Wal-Mart  2713    $905.5 
2 Best Buy  478    $746.6 
3 Musicland  1336    $393.7 
4 Costco   280    $388.1 
5 Target   1055    $359.0 
6 Circuit City  632    $308.0 
7 Suncoast  400    $193.7 
8 Amazon.com  N/A    $180.6 
9 Blockbuster  5374    $160.0 
10 Kmart   2114    $137.6 
 
Source:  Video Store Magazine, 2001 
 
                                                
158 VSDA (2001), “Annual Report on the Home Entertainment Industry.” 
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Meanwhile, the video rental market remained under the control of the largest 
rental retailers (see figure 4.8).  The ten largest rental chains accounted for $3.9 billion in 
revenues in 1999 alone, some 47% of total rental spending.159  By the end of the 1990s, 
there were between 24,000 and 25,000 video rental specialty stores in the United States, 
with an increasing number controlled by the two largest rental chains, Blockbuster Video 
and Hollywood Video.160  These retailers were in the process of consolidating and 
altering their business models to cope with DVD and the direct-sales model.  Beginning 
in 1997, Blockbuster Video and Hollywood Video entered into revenue sharing deals 
directly with the Hollywood studios in an effort to adapt to DVD.  The studios, under this 
arrangement, lease cassettes or discs to the retailer, who pays around $5.00 to cover 
shipping and then shares a percentage of the revenue from each rental with the studio.  
The percentage shared varies from title to title, with an average range of 45-60%.161  The 
largest retailers negotiated directly with the studios, eliminating the wholesaler entirely; 
smaller stores could deal with wholesalers who arrange revenue sharing agreements with 
the studios, keeping 5% of each rental.162  Under this arrangement the studios reaped 
more revenue per store from a given title while rental retailers had more copies on hand.   
The impact of DVD on the rental business was enormous; the shift to a revenue 
sharing model completely altered the existing business model and reduced the revenues 
and power of the top two chains.  In so doing, the rental market was opened to new 
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competitors for the first time since the success of Blockbuster in the 1980s.  DVD pushed 
rental of content online, where retailers like Netflix created a subscription based rental 
service that mirrored direct-mailing strategies while employing the new revenue sharing 
model.  Customers could browse for titles online and have them sent directly to their 
stores from a regional distribution hub, returning titles via mail after they were viewed.  
Through online distribution Netflix restructured the rental industry dramatically; 
Blockbuster was forced to close thousands of stores and eventually (in 2006) moved into 
online rentals themselves. 
Figure 4.9:  Top Ten Video Rental Chains, 2001 
 
Rank Company  Total Number U.S. Outlets        Total VHS/DVD Rev. (M) 
1 Blockbuster Inc.   5,374    $3,550.0 
2 Hollywood Entertainment  1,801    $1,201.7 
3 Movie Gallery   1,315    $306.2 
4 Kroger    2,401    $245.0 
5 Albertsons .  2,600    $151.0 
6 Family Video   237    $144.0 
7 IGA    1,715    $95.1 
8 Safeway    1,559    $72.1 
9 Giant Eagle   204    $51.9 
10 Meijer    152    $39.6 
 
Source:  Video Store Magazine (2001) and SEC Reports 
  
DVD-ROM Performance 
Control over the DVD-ROM software market largely was dictated by existing 
market share in the IT software industry and the filmed entertainment industry.  
Microsoft established a dominant position in the market by virtue of their global 
dominance in the IT software industry and by being the first major industry member to 
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release DVD-ROM titles, as early as 1997.  The Big Six included DVD-ROM features on 
their DVD titles to encourage consumers to visit studio websites where other media 
products could be advertised.  Still, enthusiasm for DVD-ROM was palpable.  "DVD is 
already changing the way we think about the personal computer. As the natural successor 
to CD-ROM, DVD will be in tens of millions of PCs by the turn of the century," said 
Bryant Frazer, an editor of DVD Report, in a leading DVD newsletter in late 1998. "That 
means tens of millions of PCs with high-quality full-motion video, digital surround-
sound capabilities, and a universe of possibilities on every disc - from educational 
products like Encarta to electronic commerce to DVD-based Internet environments."163 
However, the DVD-ROM market failed to meet lofty expectations.  Software publishers 
were slow to convert existing CD-ROM titles to DVD-ROM or publish wholly new titles 
for DVD-ROM.  Even with an installed base of 75 million DVD-ROM drives in the 
United States by 2002 and 140 million worldwide (almost twice the number of DVD-
Video players), ROM titles did not materialize.164  ROM titles were expected to include 
games, computer software titles, and educational materials incorporating video and 
interactive functionality.  Several reasons for this dearth of titles explain the discrepancy 
between DVD-Video’s success and DVD-ROM’s failure:  price of drives/computers; the 
rising popularity of recordable CD-ROM drives; the rising popularity of online 
distribution for content traditionally distributed via disc; a shortage of components 
available to computer manufacturers needed to equip machines with the DVD-ROM 
                                                
163 Microsoft Press Release, “DVD Delivers Enhanced Content and Relief From Disc-Swapping In Encarta 
Reference Suite 99 and Encarta Encyclopedia Deluxe 99,”REDMOND, Wash., Nov. 23, 1998. 
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drive prior to 2001; and complicated and unreliable upgrading technologies to outfit 
existing computers with DVD-ROM drives.165   
With the personal computer market thriving in the late 1990s, stimulated by 
increased competition between Japanese and American manufacturers, prices in the 
United States were falling to below the $1000 threshold.  DVD-ROM drives, more 
expensive to produce than their CD-ROM counterparts, increased the price of personal 
computers by at least fifty dollars.  In a competitive market where the CD-RW drive 
offered recording functionality, the DVD-ROM was more expensive and less practical for 
consumers.  According to IDC, CD-RW drives enjoyed global sales of 1.2 million units 
in 1997 and 4.8m units in 1998.166  CD-RW served as a bridge between CD-ROM and 
recordable DVD-ROM drives for many consumers who did not initially embrace the 
promise of DVD on computers.  Even consumers who wanted to purchase computers 
with DVD-ROM drives were sometimes left wanting; Hitachi converted all of its 
manufacturing infrastructure to DVD-ROM, but was still unable to quickly produce 
enough machines to penetrate the marketplace.  The software industry hedged its bets, 
failing to embrace the conversion of the existing base of 46,000 CD-ROM titles.  Instead, 
they continued to produce CD-ROM titles and began distributing content online.  “It 
makes sense to buy a product for the computer on the computer, but it won't happen 
overnight," Ted Pine, president of InfoTech, Inc., the market research and consulting firm 
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based in Woodstock, VT concluded.167  “Software publishers are on the whole more 
rational and trying to plan better.  In the early days of CD-ROM, and again in 1995 with 
the Internet, there was a lot of 'me too' rushing to get out there. As the industry 
consolidates, publishers are being increasingly sensible," he continued.168 Consolidation 
in the software industry not only contributed to the lack of support pertaining to DVD-
ROM, it was symptomatic of the industrial desire to challenge the supremacy of 
Microsoft.  Through a series of mergers and acquisitions, a handful of computer-based 
DVD-ROM content providers emerged.  Led by Multimedia 2000, Digital Leisure, 
Interplay and The Learning Company, the early leaders in the DVD-ROM market 
produced prepackaged content designed for educational and specialized consumer 
gaming markets.  However these titles were limited to less than one hundred, and did not 
represent a significant threat to the entrenched CD-ROM industry.  To make matters 
worse, converting existing personal computers required complicated and often expensive 
technology, including retrofitting existing chips to operate with MPEG-2 decoders.  Even 
with an upgrade, many early DVD-ROM drives would not reliably play DVD-Video 
movies on computers, thought to be the basis of early adopter enthusiasm. 
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Figure 4.10:  Early DVD-ROM Game Titles for PCs 
 
Performance of Selected DVD Game Titles For Ytd 98 (Jan-Oct)  
 
Title           Publisher      Format          YTD98 $        YTD98 Units 
Tex Murphy Overseer  Access         DVD Win 95/NT   $1,187,027      27,628 
Riven           Learning Co.   DVD Win 95/NT   $140,196        3,167 
Journeyman Project 3 Learning Co.   DVD Win 95/NT   $68,015         1,522 
Dragon's Lair  Digital Leisure DVD Win 95/NT $37,532         1,022 
Virtual Pool II        Interplay      DVD Win 95/NT   $11,267         212 
Star Trek: Starfleet 
Academy        Interplay      DVD Win 95/NT   $7,111          139 
Totals:                                        $1,451,148      33,690 
 
Source:  PC Data 
 
The DVD-ROM software market did not materialize as a competitive alternative 
industry to DVD-Video until the turn of the early 2000s.  In fact, the number of DVD-
ROM titles remained below one hundred throughout the 1990s (compare to the 10,000+ 
DVD-Video titles available in the U.S. by 2000).  As late as 1999, DVD-ROM-only titles 
represented only 1.2% of the CD-ROM market.169 The vast majority of the software 
market for computers equipped with DVD-ROM was controlled by Hollywood content 
providers equipping their movie discs with DVD-ROM features or IT software 
companies “bundling” software with hardware.  It was not until Sony and Microsoft 
released their next generation gaming consoles that DVD-ROM software became a viable 
market.  While Nintendo offered its “Gamecube” in October 2001 and Sega introduced 
its “Dreamcast” in September 1999, neither integrated the DVD-ROM into their gaming 
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hardware and both failed to attain widespread market success as a result.  Sony 
introduced its “PlayStation 2,” bundling a DVD-ROM drive with a 300-MHz Toshiba 
processor and an Ethernet peripheral and quickly sold more than 10 million devices.170  
By 2002, Sony achieved an installed base of more than 41 million consoles worldwide.171  
Sony developed partnerships with Japanese content providers who produced cross 
compatible software designed to function on both the console and on suitably equipped 
PCs.  Microsoft’s “Xbox,” released in the fall of 2001, also paired the DVD-ROM drive 
with a high-speed processor, not surprisingly Intel’s 733-MHz Pentium III.  Microsoft 
countered Sony’s software strategy by developing an in-house development program that 
quickly released the best selling Halo game and dominated the market.  The two gaming 
platforms opened a market for DVD-ROM games that would dictate overall segment 
control and power.  These two companies, which by the time of their new product 
launches were significant players in the DVD Forum, were entering into a videogame 
industry whose market totaled more than $6.4 billion in revenues in the year 2000.172  
The existing software market for gaming alone was $4.9 billion in 2000, with PC 
software (mostly CD-ROM-based) accounting for a paltry $1.6 billion.173  By expanding 
the market for DVD-ROM through the gaming consoles, Sony and Microsoft opened a 
significant market for PC gaming on DVD-ROM.  While PC gaming thrived through 
                                                                                                                                            
169 “ROM Title Sales Increase; Library Still Small,” November 1, 1999.  DVD Report, Vol. 4, Issue 42; 
Phillips Business Information, Inc. 
170 “Death Match:  Your Guide to the Box Wars,” by Mark Frauenfelder, Wired, Issue 9.05, May 2001. 
171 http://ep2010.salzburgresearch.at/knowledge_base/gibson_2003a.pdf 
172 Ibid. 
173 VSDA Annual Report on the Home Entertainment Industry, 2001. 
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“open-source” technologies allowing the playback of any content, it expanded 
significantly through DVD-ROM only after the proprietary technologies introduced by 
Microsoft and Sony opened their software accompaniments for use on PCs. 
Power and control over DVD was dictated by the structure of the DVD Forum 
and the existing structures of control in the various content markets. In the software 
markets, control and power was dictated by title support, release timing, and existing 
market share.  Time Warner/Warner Bros. dominated the early DVD-Video market, in no 
small part due to their control over libraries of content and their early participation in the 
Forum.  Buena Vista, the distribution arm for Disney, capitalized on its existing VHS 
market share, targeting children through release of their animated classics in limited 
release, once they had fully entered the DVD market.  Significantly, control over the 
DVD content market resided, and remains, firmly under the thumb of the Big Six content 
providers (all of which would eventually join the Forum).  These conglomerates dictated 
which titles would be released and under what conditions; through their increasingly tight 
affiliation with the hardware manufacturers in the DVD Forum, they could stimulate how 
the technology would be distributed to the public.  Seizing the opportunity to wrest 
control away from the rental retailers, led by Blockbuster and Hollywood Video, the Big 
Six established a sell-through priority that established direct relationships with major 
retailers, effectively circumventing the wholesaler and the rental house.  The Big Six, at 
the peak of their industrial power, controlled access to the flow of content in a heretofore 
unprecedented manner.  Without support from these studios, led by Time Warner/Warner 
Bros., DVD-Video would have floundered like its DVD-ROM counterpart. 
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The promise of DVD-ROM offered yet another avenue for increasing the control 
of the IT software industry’s major participants.  However, due to the innumerable 
factors listed above, DVD-ROMs failed to materialize as a major market segment until 
they were incorporated into video game consoles.  The disparity between the IT and 
filmed entertainment content providers’ conversion to the new format is illustrative of the 
fundamental difference between VHS and CD technology.  Hollywood’s content 
providers, after their copyright fears had been temporarily allayed in 1997 (see chapter 
five), recognized the superiority of the format for delivering high quality versions of their 
content to enthusiastic audiences.  They realized that consumer enthusiasm for the new 
format could stimulate a new market for content.  This content was recognized by 
consumers as markedly different from VHS content in myriad ways, from its image 
quality to the interactivity granted by the user interface, and the availability of hundreds 
and thousands of titles available for purchase.  Furthermore, the DVD consumers were 
quick to realize that the new technology was more reliable than the existing one and 
would grant them repeated and random access to content without quality loss.  
Conversely, DVD-ROM technology was only incrementally different from the existing 
CD-ROM technology.   
Consumers and content providers alike were hesitant to replace their existing 
computer software libraries with the new technology.  The vast majority of existing CD-
ROM content designed for use on personal computers was not fundamentally based in 
high quality video playback, due to the technology’s technical limitations.  To convert 
existing software to DVD-ROM would be counter-intuitive; in order for DVD-ROM to 
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attain a significant market share, new content would need to be developed and designed 
to exploit the functionality of the disc.  Enter the video game industry; prior to the release 
of the PlayStation 2 and the Xbox from Sony and Microsoft respectively, the DVD-ROM 
market was limited to a few original titles and bundled software packages from 
Microsoft.  The release of these two gaming consoles, essentially personal computers 
without the keyboard or mouse, created an enormous market for DVD-ROM games 
virtually overnight.  After their release, the personal computer gaming industry took off, 
with new DVD-ROM games like The Sims franchise breaking sales records.  By virtue of 
their early entry and their in-house development team for DVD-ROM software, 
Microsoft established and maintained control over the industry. 
Conclusions 
While the DVD-ROM software market failed to achieve the success predicted by 
industry insiders, the DVD-Video and DVD hardware markets blossomed.  Because the 
DVD-Video market included titles from all of the members of the major studios by the 
end of 1998, and the hardware market included products from every major international 
manufacturer, DVD could be found in every major retail outlet in the North American 
market very early in the process.  The activities of the DVD Forum ensured that 
technological quality standards were maintained and that each product representing the 
DVD Logo functioned according to industry standards.  The Forum also established and 
maintained profit margins for manufacturers and distributors of discs, players, and 
content.  While players were initially released at prices near $500 (see figure 4.10), 
rapidly increasing competition and a growing network of suppliers of consoles dropped 
 
 201 
the price to a standard four times that of manufacturing costs (each player costing around 
$25 to manufacture).  Disc manufacturers were selling blank discs at small profit 
margins, literally pennies per disc to content suppliers.  The majority of profits were split 
between player manufacturers and content distributors.  According to MGM, profit 
margins on DVD sales are 50-60%, while the standard VHS profit margin remained 
between 20-30%.  With an average sales price of $20 per DVD, and costs per disc at 
around $9 to produce, advertise, distribute, etc., about $11 per sale returned to the content 
distributor.174   
With early vitriol from online communities combined with limited distribution of 
hardware and software for Divx, competing technologies were non-existent by the end of 
1999.  Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the rapid ascension of DVD; between 1997 and 
2002, over 1.3 billion DVD discs were shipped in the North American market alone.  
What these charts cannot illustrate however, is the processes explained herein that 
guaranteed such widespread success.  Only through the collective control and 
maintenance of the technology and the clear delineation of an industrial culture of 
production could such staggering results have been possible. 
                                                





Figure 4.11:  North American DVD-Video Software Shipments (in millions) 
Quarter 1997  1998  1999  2000   2001    2002   2003   2004    2005 
1st N/A   3.3      11.1 29.0    69.2    120.1   231.7  332.2    403.0 
2nd N/A   4.1       13.9 33.2    81.7    152.2   195.5  316.8    369.1 
3rd 2.3     5.9      29.0 42.7    75.9    153.3   214.6  340.9    347.9 
4th 3.2    11.8     44.0 77.5   137.6   259.4   381.5  528.4    536.7 
Yearly 
Total 5.5   25.1     98.0  182.4  364.4  685.0   1,023.3 1,518.3 1,656.9 
  
Total Since Launch 
              30.6   128.6 311.0  675.4 1,360.4  2,383.7 3,902.0   5,558.9 
 
Figure 4.12:  DVD Hardware Sales to Consumers 
CE 
Historical:   
DVD Player  
Description: 
Factory sales of DVD players. Includes sales of DVD audio 
players.  
Units: Thousands of units  
Dollars: Millions of dollars  
 










 1998  1,079  $421  $390.18   1.00% 
 1999  4,072  $1,099  $270.00  5.00% 
 2000  8,499  $1,713  $201.55  13.00% 
 2001  12,707  $2,102  $165.00  21.00% 
 2002  17,090  $2,427  $142.00  35.00% 
 2003  21,994  $2,698  $123.00  50.00% 
 2004  19,990  $2,171   $108.60  70.00%  
What this chapter has illustrated, therefore, is the structure, conduct, and 
performance of the DVD industry.  The collective efforts of three industries working in 
concert exploited favorable conditions in technology, culture, and industry to guarantee 
the support of Hollywood content providers to drive the technology into the marketplace.  
The major consumer electronics and computer industry firms involved in development of 
DVD technology recognized that the home video industry was a potential new source of 
massive revenues.  Tapping into that market with a new disc technology meant assuring 
that all of the major Hollywood content providers would supply feature films.  While 
these corporations created an industrial hierarchy that would guarantee control over the 
technology to a few major companies, we have also seen how these efforts have resulted 
in an industrial culture that aligns or conflicts with the individual corporate cultures of the 
industry’s constituent members.  This industrial culture is defined by its unprecedented 
level of cross-industrial membership and cooperation, its efficiency in dividing labor, its 
structuring of patents and licenses to guarantee its continuing power position, and its 
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ability to combat threats from competing technologies.  This culture is further defined by 
its international composition; the fact that the largest consumer electronics, computer 
companies, and software/content providers from three continents joined together to 
develop standards and to mutually benefit from each others’ resources is unprecedented 
in the history of industry.  The fact that each member company was willing to suppress 
their corporate desire to openly compete for new DVD-Video and DVD-ROM markets 
through proprietary technologies illustrates the centrality of Hollywood’s role in 
establishing this industrial culture.   
The DVD Forum’s industrial culture was predicated on pooling resources and 
establishing a hierarchy of power.  Members worked to assure industry-wide 
technological standards, patent pooling strategies, and licensing organizations.  DVD was 
introduced into a uniquely favorable regulatory environment that assured the practices 
and structures of the DVD Forum would not be disturbed by antitrust litigation.  The 
cooperative practices and protectionist industrial culture surrounding DVD-Video 
guaranteed a collective response to threats to the newly established hegemonic order.  
The next chapter examines how the Forum exploited the favorable legislative 
environment while establishing mechanisms for controlling access to the technology.  
Additionally, the following chapter will illustrate the context into which DVD is most 
prescient in the current technological environment; as the first technology to employ 
Digital Rights Management Technology, DVD stands as a symbol for heated debate in a 




Chapter Five:  DVD Culture 
  Thus far, technological, macro-industrial, and micro-industrial enabling 
conditions have been examined in order to explain how DVD was innovated, controlled, 
and distributed to the public.  In order to more fully understand the processes of 
technological diffusion and adaptation, this chapter examines the social construction of 
DVD.  In so doing, this chapter investigates how DVD was thought about and 
represented in the trade press, popular press, and through advertising representations, and 
how those representations changed between 1994 and 2002.  While the interactions 
between member firms in the computer, consumer electronics, and filmed entertainment 
industries influenced technological design and industrial formation, discourses focusing 
on the promise and transformative power of DVD combined with existing cultural 
contexts and the activities of industry members to influence the rate of adoption.  
Additionally, the ways in which consumers integrated these discourses into their 
understandings and experiences with home video and digital technologies begins to 
explain the rapid acceptance and adoption of DVD. 
The shiny little disc containing our favorite movies, music, and data, is the subject 
of a plethora of discourses, ranging from technical descriptions of the technology in the 
trade press, to advertisements hailing the revolutionary nature of the technology, to 
romantic descriptions of the inventor-heroes thought to be responsible for the birth of 
DVD in the popular press.  Examining the uniquely contingent circumstances 
surrounding the creation of these discourses reveals a great deal about the ways in which 
the various stakeholders in DVD, including the trade industry press itself, saw the new 
 
 206 
technology and their own investment in its representation. The firms involved in creating 
and marketing the new technology established a preferred set of meanings to be 
associated with DVD through advertisements for hardware and software.  Reporters 
contributed to the creation of meaning by writing stories about technological 
development, industry conflicts, technological performance, and consumer satisfaction.  
Consumers integrated these discourses into their experiences with DVD to make sense of 
it and its place within their lives.  The degree to which DVD fit into existing behaviors 
related to media consumption, from viewing feature films on television, to computer 
storage and gaming, combined with trade and advertising discourses to create a range of 
possible meanings for the technology. 
DVD is a typical technological artifact in that it was born unto a complex and 
dynamic cultural environment with pre-existing discourses and practices. Culturally, 
DVD became meaningful as a home entertainment technology through a range of 
denotative and connotative associations.  For example, DVD has come to stand for things 
that are high-tech, user-friendly, interactive, reliable, mobile, and versatile; it has been 
associated with home-theaters, Hollywood, the CD, computers, automobiles, data 
storage, and the “content” world of movies, television, music, and the internet. Each of 
these descriptive terms was associated with its own range of meanings and practices prior 
to the introduction of DVD. Through exploration of the processes of inscription that new 
products or services experience on their way to becoming a part of a collective social 
knowledge, we can integrate the technological and industrial histories of the preceding 
chapters.  In so doing, this chapter is deeply indebted to the work of Susan Douglas in 
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Inventing American Broadcasting.  Douglas’ exploration of the birth of radio reveals 
dynamic and intersecting enabling conditions in technology, industry, and press 
discourses and provides a useful model for this research (Douglas 1987).  Therefore, this 
study does not suggest that the discourses in the trade press, popular press, and 
advertising played a determinate role in DVD diffusion and adoption.  Rather, these 
discourses combine with the activities of consumers, technological and industrial forces 
discussed in previous chapters, and the regulatory context surrounding DVD. 
This chapter examines some of the primary discourses surrounding meaning 
creation as it relates to the rapid ascent of the DVD.  Discussion begins by identifying the 
cultural context into which DVD was introduced.  The first section argues that existing 
home video and entertainment cultures were uniquely predisposed for a new versatile, 
hybridized home entertainment technology.  With the rising popularity of home video 
purchases, the continuing practice of renting pre-recorded video tapes, more than a 
decade of experiences with digital music on the CD, and new internet experiences, 
cultural conditions were in place for a next-generation home-video disc.  This section 
details the home entertainment culture prior to DVD, describing the practices and 
characteristics of American consumers related to their leisure-time activities.  Analysis 
concludes by suggesting that home entertainment culture, having recently integrated new 
technologies into existing practices, drew upon those experiences to make sense of DVD.   
Section two suggests that the creation of meaning and consumer demand 
surrounding the DVD was also inextricably linked to discourses in the popular and 
technical press.  News coverage of product development, format battles, and DVD 
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performance are analyzed to explore how DVD was introduced to the public and encoded 
with meaning.  These discourses demonstrate how reporters engaged with the existing 
home entertainment culture and its associated semantic networks of language to make 
DVD meaningful.  By utilizing familiar terminology, early representations of DVD 
structured the ways in which audiences understood, interacted with, and helped to 
determine the meanings of the technology.  Furthermore, the degree to which these 
representations suggested the relative advantage of DVD over VHS directly impacted the 
rate of adoption.  Through examination of trade publications and press releases, this 
section illustrates how technology is “encoded” with particular meanings in the 
production process and how those meanings tap into the desires of those consumers most 
likely to be early adopters.175  By demonstrating how the development of the DVD is 
represented in distinct ways, we can begin to account for how meanings are negotiated, 
how demand for the technology was created, and how new technologies are incorporated 
into existing cultural practices. 
Section three shifts to focus on the period surrounding DVD product launch.  
Examination of print advertisements for DVD hardware and software from 1997 and 
1998 reveals the preferred meanings and uses of DVD technology.  Hollywood content 
providers and consumer electronics manufacturers partnered with advertising firms to 
develop campaigns focused on DVD as a home video technology capable of delivering 
                                                
175 Du Gay, Paul, Stuart Hall, et.al. 1997. Doing Cultural Studies:  The Story of the Sony Walkman.  




theater-quality movies.176  In so doing, these firms encouraged potential adopters to 
associate DVD with their prior experiences in home video and theatrical movie-going 
while tapping into their desires for ownership and access to filmed entertainment.  Trade 
and popular press coverage combined with these advertisements and the performance of 
the disc to structure the ways in which consumers experienced DVD and the rate at which 
they purchased players and movies-on-disc.  These factors also aligned with the existing 
home entertainment culture; together these forces begin to account for the unprecedented 
demand for DVD. 
HOME ENTERTAINMENT CULTURES 
Entertainment in the home has always been a ubiquitous aspect of American life.  
Since the invention of mass media, the American domestic space has been awash with 
technologies conveying news and entertainment programming.  From newspapers to 
radio, television, home video, computers, gaming devices, and DVD, media have been at 
the center of American domestic life.  Hollywood films have been a core source of 
content for home consumption since the invention of cinema.  According to Ben Singer, 
films first appeared in the home in 1896.  Targeted towards families, projectors were 
designed to play films rented or purchased from regional stores and mail order 
systems.177  These early experiments failed to develop into a viable home distribution 
industry for Hollywood, but they suggest that the early cinematic entrepreneurs 
recognized the viability of film exhibition in the private space of the home.   
                                                
176 Rather than as a technology for gaming or computer storage and archiving. 
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Improvements were made to projection technologies with the hopes of creating a 
mainstream market.  Home viewing of films increased with improvements in color film 
stock, sound projectors, and standardization of 8mm and 16mm film gauges into the 
1920s and 1930s, but remained a small niche market comprised mostly of wealthy, elite, 
cinephiles.178  Studio titles would be available for rent to this small set of consumers on 
these formats for the next five decades.  Beginning in the late 1930s, Hollywood films 
could also be found on the radio, adapted for millions of listeners by radio programs like 
Lux Radio Theatre.179  By the 1950s, Hollywood films, along with foreign imports, began 
appearing on network and independent television stations.  The studios cut lucrative 
distribution deals with television networks for hundreds of films from their vaults.  
Hollywood films on television filled programming time and returned new revenues to the 
studios.  In the process, home viewing of Hollywood content became firmly entrenched 
as a leisure-time activity for American families.  In 1975, cable television and home 
video technologies were introduced to the American public.  Over the course of the next 
decade, more Hollywood films were available for home viewing than ever before. In the 
process, distinct home entertainment cultures developed around cable television, the 
VCR, the home theater system, the Internet and DVD.180 
These cultures developed around technologies that promised new levels of access 
to content.  Barbara Klinger, in Beyond the Multiplex:  Cinema, New Technologies, and 
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the Home, identifies how taste cultures, gender roles, family dynamics, race, class, social 
identities, history, and notions of authorship and aesthetics are negotiated by groups of 
individuals experiencing Hollywood content in the home.  She finds that groups of early 
adopters negotiate meanings based on their age, race, gender, and education in relation to 
experiences with technologies and Hollywood feature films.  Specific taste cultures 
develop within these groups, as experiences with different home entertainment 
technologies are integrated with discourses on film watching and consumption practices 
in larger cultural spheres.  Klinger identifies groups of individuals that share practices 
and experiences related to a specific technology, suggesting that these cultures impact 
larger “viewing modalities” surrounding Hollywood content in the home.181  Klinger’s 
study provides a valuable starting point in the study of home entertainment cultures 
relative to Hollywood feature films.  Her assertion that explaining Hollywood’s powerful 
social presence must account for home viewing practices and the dynamics of cultural 
meaning-making in domestic spaces is of particular importance. However, her case 
studies in enthusiast home viewing cultures fail to account for mainstream home 
entertainment cultures and the practices of the majority of Americans relative to home 
entertainment.  How audiences developed a core set of practices, meanings, and 
experiences surrounding home entertainment technologies illustrates how demand for 
DVD developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Home Video Rental Culture 
Between 1975 and 1996, the home video industry developed into a massive 
industrial, economic, and cultural phenomenon.  Demand for Hollywood films on tape 
grew rapidly after the studios started distributing their films to the home market in the 
late 1970s.  Between 1985 and 1992, the annual growth rate for the video rental business 
reached double digits each year as a mass home viewing culture grew out of the 
experiences surrounding renting Hollywood feature films from neighborhood video rental 
stores.182  By the early 1990s, the majority of Americans were renting tapes to be viewed 
on their VHS machines.183 At the center of this cultural phenomenon was the American 
family.  Family households rented more tapes more often than households without 
children, and experienced home video in ways that defined home video culture.184  In the 
process, families formed a core set of expectations for home entertainment that would 
influence their widespread adoption of DVD technologies. 
Renting tapes for home viewing was an experience defined by value, control, and 
convenience.  Home video consumers could control when and how they experienced 
content and could be assured that each member of the family could operate the VCR.185  
Much more so than cable television, pay-per-view, and network broadcast of movies, 
home video offered the American family a degree of control over their viewing 
                                                
182 By 1996, the year before the introduction of DVD, consumers were spending $8.7 billion on video 
rentals VSDA annual report, 1997, p. 4. 
183 53% of all adult consumers rented at least one tape in any given month in 1996, according to VSDA 
and VSM researchers; p. 6 VSDA annual report, 1997. 
184 9 out of 10 families, according to Video Business are renters of video content, Ibid, p. 5. 
185 At least for playback of pre-recorded tapes; Ann Gray in Video Playtime, argues that the VCR is in fact 
gendered and certain functions, including programming the machine for taping live television was 
predominantly the purview of males in the household. 
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experience.  This experience began with the renting of the tapes at the retail store.  
According to consumer research commissioned by the Video Software Dealers 
Association and conducted by Yankelovich Partners in 1997, women were the primary 
renters of movies watched by families with children, and could therefore determine how 
many and what type of tapes were suitable for the family.186  Research found that home 
video consumers could be segmented into five categories based on their lifestyles and 
attitudes towards media, technology, and popular culture:  “Voracious Viewers,” “Hi-Fi 
Bachelors,” “SUV Suburbanites,” “Cultured Ladies,” and “Disinterested Gentlemen.” 
“Voracious Viewers” were found to be the most important group of renters; comprising 
only 21% of all video renters, this group was responsible for 32% of all rentals.187  The 
demographic make-up of this group tended to be young (72% were under age 40), urban, 
female (66%) and was likely to have children in the home (74%).188  This group was 
more likely than most other groups to be frequent renters (39% rented once a week or 
more) and rented more tapes per visit to the store (2.6 tapes per visit).  “SUV 
Suburbanites” were also young (mean age of 36.9 years), female (63%), married (89%) 
and had children in the house (96%).189  This group was responsible for 25% of all 
rentals, and represented an equal percentage of the rental population.  Taken together, 
these two constituencies comprised of mostly young married females with children 
accounted for 46% of all renters and 57% of all revenues in the rental market. 
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Another crucial demographic in the home video rental market was young, single 
men, or “Hi-Fi Bachelors,” according to Yankelovich Partners.  This group, whose 
average age was 26, comprised only 19% of the total renting population but accounted 
for 23% of all rentals.190  They were the most likely group to be frequent renters (40% 
rented at least one video per week), and tended to frequent more than one video rental 
store.  More often than not for young men, mothers with children, or anyone else, the trip 
to the video store was a social experience.  According to a study conducted by Chilton 
Research Services in 1996 that surveyed 4,000 rental consumers, nearly two-thirds of all 
trips included someone else.  About half of the time, that other person was a spouse or 
significant other.  Once inside the store, home video rental consumers valued their 
experience.  Chilton’s data suggests that video renters averaged a satisfaction level of 8.4 
on a ten-point scale. 
The nationwide growth of the rental retailer throughout the 1980s and 1990s and 
continued efforts by rental retailers to maintain “copy-depth,” assured that once the renter 
got to the store, they were likely to find what they wanted.191  Overwhelmingly, rental 
consumers valued home video rental for its return on the entertainment dollar.  In a study 
conducted by the Conference Board in 1996, video rentals were ranked the second-best 
value among their ordinary transactions, just behind buying chicken.192  According to a 
1996 poll conducted by Video Business Magazine, consumers valued the availability of 
                                                
190 Ibid. 
191 Women tended to rate their rental experience higher than men in a survey conducted by Video Business 
Magazine; the mean rating for all consumers applied to their most recent rental experience (in 1996) was 
7.5 on a 10 point scale.  VSDA Annual Report, p. 6. 
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titles, as well as the breadth of selection.  Among the 26.5% in this survey who expressed 
dissatisfaction regarding their rental experience, the inability to find the tape they wanted 
was the leading source of their discontent. 
The fact that home video rental culture is so closely aligned with the American 
family is significant.  Besides explaining the performance of family friendly movies in 
home video markets, home video rental culture suggests that Hollywood films on tape 
functioned as a binding mechanism that kept the family together.  Even among single-
person households, home video exerted a socializing influence.  Two-thirds of all non-
family households watched tapes with another adult.193  Home video renting also played a 
key role in the larger culture of leisure surrounding the American family.  By the mid-
1990s, no other leisure activity was experienced more frequently, and with more of the 
household present, than watching movies on rented tapes.  In any given month in the 
mid-1990s, nearly half (47.5%) of all U.S. consumers rented a video at least once.  
Watching rented videos was done more frequently than going to the movie theater or 
buying a CD, and was more than twice as popular as going online or attending a concert 
or sporting event.  A study of 223 VCR households in the Midwest conducted in 1988 
showed that the overwhelming majority of VCR owners reallocated their leisure time 
after purchasing the technology to spend more time at home watching videos with family 
                                                                                                                                            




members or friends.194  The fact that video rental culture was so crucially linked to shared 
experience, social interaction, and the American family suggests that new home video 
technologies would function similarly in the domestic cultures of the home. 
Home Video Sales Culture 
While the majority of people watched Hollywood films on home video via rental 
retailers like Blockbuster by the early 1990s, a significant evolution occurred as the 
studios began releasing blockbuster hits for sale to consumers.  In only three years, from 
1993 to 1996, sales of pre-recorded tapes and practices like collecting and displaying 
libraries in the home became widespread cultural phenomena.  Historically, the home 
video market has been divided between sell-through and rental since its inception.  
Renting tapes was the dominant mode of home video consumption by the majority of 
American consumers throughout the 1980s.  However, classics, or “library titles,” were 
released on videotape for sale as early as 1985.195  Suncoast Video, a division of 
Minneapolis-based Musicland, opened its first sales-only video store in 1986.  The store 
experienced rapid growth, expanding to 107 stores by 1990, stocking more than 6,000 
VHS titles for sale at prices below $29.95.  The major film studios recognized the growth 
of this niche market and began releasing classics in large numbers throughout the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  In 1990 alone, Paramount released more than 100 classics, 
including The Untouchables (De Palma, 1987) and Fatal Attraction (Lyne, 1987) at a 
                                                
194 Lin, Carolyn A. (1988) “Assessing the Impact of the Evolution of Home Video Culture,” Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication 
(71st, Portland, OR, July 2-5, 1988). 
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sell-through price of $14.95. MGM/UA followed suit that same year, releasing another 
100 classics from their vaults.  Stores like Suncoast carried hundreds of titles priced 
below $10, catering to largely cinephiles and collectors.   
Prior to the early 1990s, new releases could be sold directly to consumers, albeit 
at exorbitant prices (upwards of $75 per tape).  “When I sold a copy of Ben-Hur back 
then (1977) to a guy for $70 and he kissed the floor, I knew people liked to buy and own 
films.  I once sold $45,000 worth of cassettes in one weekend,” Art Robbins, owner of 
regional (Northwest) chain Movie Masters, told The Seattle Times in 1990.196  Sales of 
tapes grew steadily throughout the 1980s, from 1 million sell-through transactions in 
1980 to 25.7 million in 1985 to 209.5 million in 1990 (see figure 5.1).197  By 1994, the 
five-store Movies Unlimited Chain based in Philadelphia boasted more than 35,000 VHS 
titles available for sale through its mail-order catalog.198  Reel.com opened for business in 
1997, offering more than 80,000 VHS titles for sale to consumers.  This booming market 
stimulated growth in a variety of businesses selling VHS tapes.  Mass-merchant chains, 
including department stores, discount stores, and wholesale clubs quickly dominated the 
category, claiming more than 50% of all purchases by the early 1990s.  As the price per 
tape dropped and access to titles increased, the practice of buying tapes joined rental as a 
mainstream leisure-time pursuit. 
                                                                                                                                            
195 MPAA Worldwide Market Research, Adams Media Research (2000).  “Sales of Pre-Recorded 
Videocassettes to US Dealers,” p. 28. 
196 “Movie Masters and Suncoast sell but do not rent videotapes,” by John Hartl, The Seattle Times, 17 
June 1990. 
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Figure 5.1:  VHS Sales Spending 1985-1995 
     Units*    Revenue* 
1985     25.69    $773 
1986     46.01    $1,012 
1987     76.49    $1,415 
1988     116.56    $2,098 
1989     172.94    $2,940 
1990     209.5    $3,352 
1991     231.99    $3,619 
1992     264.08    $3,961 
1993     326.91    $4,708 
1994     398.37    $5,497 
1995     483.71    $6,288 
 
 * millions 
Source:  Adams Media Research 
 
By 1996, 60% of all U.S. households were purchasing Hollywood movies on 
video tape.  The American family was at the center of this shift in consumer behavior.  
Households with children were more than twice as likely to purchase two or more tapes 
per month than households without kids.199  The average purchasing household owned 41 
videos in 1996.  In 1996, U.S. consumers spent an additional $7.6 billion to purchase pre-
recorded tapes.200  Home viewing of Hollywood films from a personal collection became 
a commonplace experience.  More than four in ten households reported watching a movie 
from their own library at least once a week.201   
A mass home video sales culture grew out of the experiences and practices 
associated with renting tapes.  Dominated by families with children, home video sales 
culture was defined by the practices of repeat viewing, library building, and socialization.  
                                                




Purchasing tapes from mass merchant stores, rental retailers, and electronics stores 
became a widespread phenomenon because of the previous pleasures and meanings 
experienced by the consumer in home video rental.  Rather being wholly distinct from 
that culture, home video sales culture drew upon the pleasures and practices of renting 
tapes.  Like home video rental cultures, families were most likely to be heavy repeat 
viewers of a given title, often to satisfy children’s notorious appetite for their favorite 
films.  Families who were heavy renters became frequent buyers; households with 
children that routinely rented more than one title a week owned 81 titles on average by 
1996.202  Households without children were two and a half times as likely to be non-
buyers of video tapes.  Families associated value with the purchase of tapes, and began a 
culture of library building.  
Most home video sales on tape prior to DVD consisted of family-friendly titles, 
classics, and blockbuster hits.  Library building meant acquiring a catalog of favorites 
that would please the family and offer repeat pleasures.  Owning tapes meant more 
control over the viewing experience without repeat trips to rental outlets.  This collecting 
culture has long been associated with film buffs, early adopters, and tech-savvy single 
men who collected classics on laserdisc.  Much more so than VHS, the laserdisc 
consumer remained a niche market throughout the period prior to DVD, as a small 
number of collectors cherished a unique set of experiences and pleasures from the disc.  
This small community of mostly young, single, affluent, white males purchased 
                                                                                                                                            
201 Ibid. p. 7. 
202 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Hollywood classics and foreign films for their library, valuing high quality transfers of 
films, supplemental content like “making-of documentaries,” and multiple language 
options.  They displayed their discs on shelves within the home, negotiating their social 
identities through their consumption patterns.  In so doing, they complimented the 
mainstream culture of home video tape sales, demonstrating niche market demand for a 
variety of titles.  Together, these two groups created a collecting culture surrounding 
home video.  Both groups created meaningful practices and experiences in the home.  
While the mainstream consumer used home video collecting to draw the family together, 
the laserdisc consumer negotiated social status through their collections. 
Home video cultures developed over the course of the 1980s and 1990s in relation 
to experiences, practices, and pleasures surrounding Hollywood content in the home.  
Home video became a mass cultural phenomenon because Hollywood content appealed 
to large numbers of the American public.  The development of home video cultures 
combined with theatrical and televisual experiences with Hollywood content to create 
enormous demand for Hollywood movies.  Additionally, the growth of the home video 
sales culture suggested that Americans were eager to build libraries within the home.  
DVDs potential in the marketplace hinged on the growing cultural desire for value, 
control over the viewing experience, and access to content.  DVD tapped into these 




Digital Media Cultures 
Creating consumer demand for DVD meant engaging with existing home video 
cultures and the practices and pleasures of the American family related to media 
consumption.  By the early 1990s, the compact disc had completely replaced tape and 
record technologies in the music industry.  Consumers readily adopted the technology, 
due to the perceived value of the technology, the functionality of the disc, and its delivery 
of high quality digital music.  A culture of consumption developed around the 
technology, as pleasures and practices were negotiated.  For the vast majority of 
consumers, the CD engendered an experience with music that was pleasurable, mobile, 
and reliable.  The quality of digital music on disc far surpassed its analog predecessors 
for the average consumer.  The compact disc simply delivered a better sound.  This is a 
crucial aspect of the developing digital media culture; consumers, by virtue of their 
exposure to digital media technologies prior to DVD, expected high quality, high fidelity 
experiences with digital media. 
The successes of mobile music technologies like Sony’s Walkman and the 
dashboard tape player led to similarly mobile CD technologies.  The CD player was not 
bound to the home stereo like the VHS player was to the television.  Because listeners 
associated the CD with mobility, freedom, and accessibility, they created meaning and 
pleasure in a variety of social, public, and private spaces.  The DVD, which was 
physically identical to the compact disc, would be associated with the range of practices 
and consumer expectations that grew out of their experiences with compact disc.  
Consumers expected a reliable, high quality, mobile experience from digital technologies 
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like the compact disc.  Convincing the public that DVD would do for movies what the 
compact disc did for music began by introducing the concept of DVD as a corollary to 
the compact disc.  Associating the technology with existing home video and digital music 
cultures and technologies proved crucial to creating demand for the technology and 
meeting consumer expectations. 
Early DVD Cultures 
 DVD was introduced to the public in 1997.  Early adopters, largely part of the 
established technophile and laserdisc community, enthusiastically accepted the format 
and began purchasing discs.  Responding to what was thought to be the demands of this 
community, Hollywood designed these early DVDs to perform in ways similar to the 
laserdisc.  Early Warner Bros. titles included supplemental content, such as “making of 
documentaries,” foreign language subtitles, and director commentaries, that were 
standard fare on the laserdisc.  Additionally, discs included widescreen, “letterboxed,” 
versions of films, rather than full-frame versions that were the standard for VHS.  The 
fact that Warner Bros. and their counterparts from the other major filmed entertainment 
studios released catalog titles and classics to this community suggests the degree to which 
they were responding to the established community with its requisite viewing habits and 
demands for a particular kind of viewing experience. 
 However, the question remains as to the influence of existing cultures relative to 
the design and functionality of the new technology.  Were early DVD cultures defined 
through the nature and function of their use with the technology, or with the content 
embedded therein?  Clearly, some degree of give and take between industry and groups 
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of consumers suggested a range of possible expectations for the technology.  As DVD 
moved into the mainstream, in the short interim between 1997 and 2000, industry 
responded to consumption patterns and feedback from retailers in designing discs and 
interfaces.  For instance, when Wal-Mart began returning large numbers of letterboxed 
titles to distribution centers, the studios recognized that a split had occurred in the early 
DVD market.  Enthusiast cultures demanded original aspect ratios and supplemental 
features.  Casual consumers, the vast majority of the mainstream purchasing public, did 
not desire letterboxing or supplemental features.  As a result, the two largest retailers, 
Blockbuster Video and Wal-Mart, stocked full-frame, basic versions of titles while 
specialty stores carried letterboxed versions.  This dynamic continued throughout the 
early stages of DVD release; within three years double-sided discs were appearing that 
carried a full-frame version on one side and a letterboxed version on the other. 
 Early DVD cultures were therefore generally split into two broad categories of 
consumers.  These broad categories contained smaller groups of individuals who shared 
common experiences, pleasures, and meanings associated with the technology.  These 
two broad cultures can be defined as “DVD enthusiasts” and “casual DVD consumers.”  
The first, as we’ve seen, was composed of young, affluent, males who tended to adopt 
new technologies in the early stages of product release.  This group quickly expanded to 
include cinema and home theater enthusiasts, audiophiles, and laserdisc enthusiasts.  On 
the whole, these individuals formed a vocal community that corresponded with industry 
via the internet to express their desires for the new technology.  While the number of 
individuals within this group remained low throughout the early stages diffusion, like 
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their counterparts in existing home video cultures (discussed above), they tended to be 
heavy buyers and accounted for large percentages of the early market.  Additionally, 
DVD enthusiasts are the only group that was not defined solely by the nature of 
interaction with the content on the disc.  To wit:  early DVD enthusiasts quickly took to 
trying out the technology in all of its myriad functional forms.  Whether attempting to 
crack the encryption codes, transferring materials to computers, or unpacking the 
compression algorithms, these consumers were active in their activity and interactivity 
with the technology.  This is not to suggest that their interaction and experiences with 
content were not distinct from more casual viewers; DVD enthusiasts were much more 
likely to explore within the content on the disc, finding hidden features (“Easter Eggs”), 
playing with random access functionality, and the like. 
 More casual DVD consumers, by far the majority of adopters by the year 2000, 
were much more likely to form experiences and pleasures around the content embedded 
within the technology.  This broad category closely aligns with home video sales cultures 
(discussed above), utilizing the technology to socialize and to draw the family together.  
In fact, these adopters communicated their desires for an easy to use disc to the 
Hollywood majors through their purchasing patterns.  By buying full-frame versions of 
titles, these consumers suggested that their pleasures associated with the new technology 
derived from Hollywood movies, not from the bells and whistles on DVD.  Most 
consumers within this category wanted the DVD to perform like the VHS.  Simply put, 
when they put a disc into a machine, they expected to be able to press the “play” button 
on the machine or on the remote and the movie would start.  How Hollywood and the rest 
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of the fledgling DVD industry communicated with these very different groups of adopters 
is the subject of the next section. 
MAKING DVD MEANINGFUL 
The first attempts to fix the meaning of DVD through the popular press used 
familiar language to describe the device, referring to it through analogy to previously 
existing technologies.  Peter M. Nichols, writing for the New York Times in 1994, 
described the technology thusly:  “Some Hollywood executives support the five-inch 
digital video disk, referred to as DVD.  The disk is an advanced form of the video 
compact disk used in CD-ROM programming, and the studios have formed an advisory 
group to help guide and promote its development.”203  Here Nichols uses descriptive 
language to convey what the potential meaning of the new technology will be.  He 
describes the size of the technology, its official acronym, its relationship to Hollywood 
and the content industry, and its connection to existing technology.  However, Nichols’ 
description only means something if the reader is familiar with video compact disk, the 
CD-ROM technology employed on computers, and the terms digital, video, and disk.  
Using analogy and metaphor, Nichols is attempting to contextualize the potential 
technology in terms thought to be familiar to his readers.  Everyone presumably 
understands when Nichols refers to “an advanced form of the video compact disk,” just 
as they would understand if he described the technology as a disk that contained movies 
for playback on television sets like VHS.  But, until the technology had diffused into the 
                                                
203 Nichols, Peter M.  “Home Video.”  New York Times (1857-Current file); Oct. 28, 1994; ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2003) pg. D18. 
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marketplace through a set of core discourses surrounding its design and use, few would 
likely understand if one simply said, “This is a DVD.” 
Returning for a moment to the discursive contexts into which DVD was 
introduced orients the dominant discourses directly employed by the press and advertisers 
to sell DVD and to make it meaningful to the public.  Associative terms utilized by the 
press, including “video,” “digital,” and “high-tech,” suggest that the eventual meanings 
for DVD, like its technological basis, were evolutionary in nature.  The assertion by 
Nichols that DVD was “advanced” suggests to the reader that the technology could be 
associated with a broader discourse surrounding “high-tech” devices.  This particular 
discourse circulating in 1990s culture would have characterized DVD as related to 
cutting-edge technological developments of the internet and computer age.204  The DVD 
would therefore be instantly associated with a long history of meanings pertaining to 
gadgetry, information technology, leisure technologies, and the full range of connotations 
relating technological progress to the periods immediately following cultural, economic, 
industrial, and artistic eras of modernity, urbanization, industrialization, and mass 
production.  DVDs status in this regard also suggests that it may be associated with the 
post-modern, or perhaps more specifically “post-industrial,” as these terms connect the 
technology to a particular way of life.  Based in interactivity, fragmented and 
individualized experience with content, this representation of DVD reflects recurring 
themes in post-modernity. 
                                                
204 This section draws upon the work of Hall, DuGay, et al. 1997.  Doing Cultural Studies:  The Story of 
the Sony Walkman.  London:  The Open University, Sage Publications. 
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Furthermore, the fact that the DVD entered into and helped define a shift in 
technology and culture from “analog” to “digital” is of paramount importance to the 
processes involved in making DVD meaningful.  “Digital” suggests a massive shift in 
culture and industry, away from a particular understanding of technology and technology-
user interface into an age of instant, random access to information and entertainment.  
Digital implies a new way of storing and using data, a computer-based world of binary 
digits and malleable content.  It also portends a revolution in the quality of content; the 
DVD enters into an era of digital imaging and digitalization that shifts electrochemical or 
analog recording into pixels and bits of information to be consumed, digested, and 
reassembled via computer.  Digital suggests a new reproducible text and culture; the 
underpinnings of digital technology afford the unlimited copying of data without quality 
degradation.    Furthermore, digital represents a tide shift for the content industries, a new 
era of distribution technologies and the all pervasive fears of piracy and copyright 
infringement. 
The associative context is further complicated by the “versatility” of the 
technology and its affiliation with a number of culture industries.  The fact that Nichols’ 
description invokes Hollywood’s role in the design and eventual distribution of the disc 
suggests that the technology should be understood through the discourses surrounding 
conglomerate Hollywood in the late 1990s.  Association with Hollywood instantly 
conjures up the century-long dominance in a global market for filmed entertainment, its 
highly effective global marketing and distribution strategies, its hesitance and eventual 
exploitation of new technologies, its production cycles of boom and bust including a 
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preponderance for high-budget, high-concept blockbusters, its influence in cultural norms 
and styles, its increasing concentration of power through conglomeration, and its 
significance to home viewing of pre-recorded video and television content.  It suggests 
DVD has associations with the Big Six corporate powers and their managerial styles and 
division of labor.  The DVD’s “Hollywood-ness” situates it as a product of a particular 
kind of industrial organization, associated with an entire history of cultural significance.  
These associations may reflect historical stereotypes, but they assist in the creation of 
meaning surrounding DVD that is much different from meanings that might be ascribed 
to it if it were the proprietary product of a corporation like Sony.  Furthermore, Nichols’ 
inference that Hollywood’s role in DVD’s technological development would be 
supervisory suggests the involvement of other industries.  The inclusion of the reference 
to CD-ROM immediately signifies both the computer industry and the music industry and 
all of their respective cultural connotations.  The computer industry conjures up a myriad 
of words and images, uses and meanings ranging from gaming to word processing to 
operating systems, the internet, and the information age.  The “CD” part of the equation 
suggests that the cultural meanings connected to digital music, including its interactivity, 
high quality sound, and fidelity, may also be expected from DVD. 
Upon its introduction, DVD was used in certain ways that gave it significance and 
value in late-1990s life.  While there is an entire set of meaningful practices surrounding 
DVD use, including creating libraries of titles that help define individual identity, to 
creating a prominent display of DVD discs in one’s home, to creating home theaters 
around the purchase of a DVD player, to installing DVD players in automobiles and 
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playing titles on headrests while “cruising” city streets, the core set, or “preferred” uses 
of the technology were limited by the infrastructure and safeguards on the disc.  We have 
seen how the DVD was designed from explicit guidelines for intended use patterns; like 
any technology there is a limited range of experiences one could expect to have given its 
design features and limitations.   
Clearly the intended use of the DVD player and disc differ between its home 
video application, its computer/ROM application, differences between hardware and 
software, and its functionality in audio playback.  As a next-generation video technology, 
the range of practices available to the public should be understood relative to VHS and 
laserdisc practice.  By and large, the meaning making practices surrounding DVD-Video 
stem from the standalone player and disc containing pre-recorded feature-film content.  
DVD in home video was made meaningful through the practice of watching movies.  
Many other signifying practices follow, including those listed above and innumerable 
others, but the primary function of DVD relative to home video culture in the first six 
years was to deliver movies via a playback-only machine to the public.  This technology, 
unlike its immediate predecessor VHS, could not record content; there would be no 
“time-shifting” or swapping copies of movies taped off cable on the new platform, by 
design.  Conversely, the range of practices available to the public associated with DVD’s 
application on computers would seem to be much broader.  Because the DVD-ROM 
functioned as both a player for DVD-Video discs and as a mechanism to store and 
retrieve all kinds of digital data, it was made meaningful through a variety of practices 
not only within the home, but in the workplace as well.  DVD-ROM functioned 
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according to its prescribed architecture and limitations, but was fluid, “versatile,” enough 
to stimulate uses and practices ranging from online multimedia content viewing and 
sharing, to multiplayer gaming, to PowerPoint presentations and data backup and storage.  
The aggregate of all the practices connected to DVD use combine with the overarching 
cultural context and the stages of dominant patterns of discourse in the press to create 
cultural meaning. 
DVD Discourses 
Making DVD meaningful to the public began even before a prototype was ready 
for demonstration.  More so than any other technology preceding it, the DVD was the 
subject of intense scrutiny by press members from the Far East to tiny local newspapers 
in the United States years before he official product launch.  My research has found that 
between 1994 and the end of 1999 more than 3000 articles were published around the 
globe on the subject of DVD.  Beginning with somewhat incidental coverage in Japanese 
technology magazines of the first plans for product demonstrations in 1994, DVD soon 
became a hot-topic item for any reporter looking for a riveting story on the future of 
technology, industry, economics, and culture.  Besides making good copy, the story of 
DVD’s early development was characterized in a number of ways that would impact the 
ways in which people came to understand the technology.  Press releases, “leaks” to 
reporters, reports from trade conventions, and interviews focused attention on the 
contentious process of technology development.  Before the marketing machinery of the 
major studios and their counterparts in the computing and consumer electronics industries 
weighed in with advertisements, trade magazines set a framework for DVD discourse in 
 
 231 
their reporting.  These reports referred consistently to DVD as a delivery mechanism for 
Hollywood movies, couching its developmental process analogously to the 
Betamax/VHS format battle of the 1970s and 1980s. 
This early period aligns with the marketing campaigns employed to sell the public 
on the DVD.  Key themes and patterns were evident in the effort to market DVD 
hardware and software.  Drawing upon shared understandings of CD and video culture, 
advertisers targeted the young, affluent, male consumer likely to be an early enthusiast-
adopter.  There are at least four clearly differentiated periods of discourse that dominated 
the cultural sphere surrounding DVDs introduction.  The first phase, beginning in 
December 1994 and continuing through February 1996, is characterized by trade 
reporters’ fascination with the brewing “format war” between Toshiba/Time Warner et al 
and Sony/Philips and is marked by the overwhelming influence of technology 
reporters/reporting.  The second period, ranging from February 1996 through December 
1997, is characterized by two kinds of publicity and discourse:  marketing campaigns 
engaged by members of the consortium to differentiate DVD hardware and software in 
the marketplace; and continuing industry coverage of the number of titles and studios 
supporting the format as it enters the marketplace. This period shifts the discourse 
significantly from the first and is overwhelmingly enthusiastic and positive. 
Phase three, spanning all of 1998 through June of 1999, includes reporting and 
online activism relating to Divx, a DVD rental technology developed by Circuit City in 
partnership with ZoomTV and the Hollywood law firm of Ziffren, Brittenham, Branca & 
Fischer.  The first two phases of discourse surrounding the DVD format war’s escalation 
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and eventual resolution impacted how meaning circulated around Divx and the DVD 
generally.  The press surrounding Divx solidified key themes in the rapidly expanding 
lexicon pertaining to DVD culture and meaning.  Consumer groups and the mass media 
ruthlessly attacked Divx, praising what came to be known as “open source DVD” often 
only as a means of attack on the tertiary format.  This discourse cycle is important for a 
number of reasons, not the least of which is the role played by consumer groups on the 
internet.  Consumer advocacy was first demonstrated through the internet in response to 
the introduction of Divx.  Dozens of anti-Divx internet websites called for the death of 
the technology even before its introduction.  The degree of discontent and disillusionment 
was based partly on the loss of control insinuated by the interactive functionality of Divx 
players and discs.205  The negative consumer response surrounding Divx would prove to 
be unprecedented; it was even credited by some members of the press for the complete 
collapse of support for the technology and its eventual withdrawal from the consumer 
market. 
The fourth period of discourse begins where Divx ends.  On June 16, 1999, less 
than a year after its introduction, Digital Video Express (Divx) shut down operations.  
After the online community’s enthusiastic cheers died down and the press had their field 
day with the estimated $337 million dollar debacle, attention returned to DVD 
technology and its economic, legal, and industrial significance.  By 1999, DVDs cultural 
identity was solidified; the mass diffusion of DVD would soon follow.  Looking to 
                                                
205 The Divx disc controlled viewing patterns by charging for each viewing period (48 hours) of a title and 
reported back to the Divx motherboard via modem to bill the consumer. 
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connect the phenomenon to an inspired individual, to narrativize the history of the 
technology according to a long history of romantic traditions in reporting focused on 
inventor-heroes, stories began to appear in the press about the “Father of DVD,” Warren 
Lieberfarb (Douglas 1987).  Lieberfarb’s role as paternal progenitor was uniquely drawn; 
depicted as a reluctant and misunderstood figurehead-visionary, Lieberfarb was credited 
with the birth of DVD through the complex discourses then circulating in the media and 
cultural spheres.  His role, unlike that of many of history’s fathers of invention, was 
characterized as benevolent mediator, settler of feuds, soother of squabbles and referee in 
the ring between mega-heavyweight industrial pugilists.  However, looming beneath the 
surface of this laudatory praise and paternalism was the growing concern over piracy, 
copyright infringement technologies posted on the internet, and the promise of TV on 
DVD in the near future. 
DVD Discourses:  Format Wars 
Of the three hundred seventy one (371) articles appearing in the popular and trade 
press in 1995 that had DVD as their primary subject, two hundred thirty five (235) of 
them mentioned or featured the words “format war.”  In an article appearing in a January 
edition of the Hollywood Reporter entitled “’95 looks to be digital milestone,” Scott 
Hettrick writes: 
The pervading message at the Winter Consumer Electronics Show was 
clear: 1995 will be a year of digital revolution and of the emergence of 
new technology standards for the entertainment industry. But what was 
just as evident was the uncertainty of how to configure the new 
technologies and the growing tensions between the major hardware and 
software manufacturers as the time grows closer for the release of 
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competitive multimedia platforms, many of which will not survive the 
consumer market share battle.  
Sony and Philips executives are adamant that the entertainment industry 
should adopt a single standard for movies on compact discs. Yet they 
would not consider the notion of embracing a competing format if the 
majority of movie studios favored a technology being developed by 
Toshiba and Time Warner over the Digital Video Disc (DVD) standard 
announced last month by Sony and Philips.206  
This sentiment was typical of the press coverage throughout the United States and 
Asia.  Several things are worth mentioning, however:  Hettrick’s observation that there 
would be a sea-change through technology for the entertainment industries in the near 
future is almost unanimously agreed upon by the trade and popular press; the author calls 
explicit attention to the alliance of Sony and Philips vs. Toshiba and Time Warner and 
the fact that each are developing technologies, a common observation and one that would 
acquire increasing significance; the assertion is made that the market would not support 
multiple competing formats.  Several themes arise that would prove to be pervasive 
throughout this early period of press coverage.  Optimism for the future of the 
entertainment industry is linked, here and elsewhere, to the future of technology and 
technological innovation.  Competing technologies and long standing animosities 
between hardware and software developers could threaten that optimism, leading to 
pessimism and an uncertain future.  Another theme that is evident here that would prove 
influential in the press is the portrayal of Sony and Philips as the stalwarts in the 
competition.  This depiction, here only a hesitancy to accommodate Toshiba and Time 
Warner, would soon snowball into negative press.  Sony quickly became the target for 
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any technology reporter lamenting the possibility of an ugly battle for dominance and a 
split format in the marketplace.  Associating the current format battle over DVD to the 
VHS/Betamax battle, reporters blamed Sony for their rigidity and unwillingness to work 
towards a unified standard.  Shortly after the article appeared in the Hollywood Reporter, 
the Financial Times ran a piece entitled “Sony and Philips on Wrong Side of Divide.”  
The authors report:  
Sony and Philips yesterday appeared to be on the wrong side of the 
technological divide, as leading electronics manufacturers lined up behind 
a rival format for the next generation of video recording discs. Matsushita, 
the world's largest consumer electronics group, has opted for a standard 
for digital video discs (DVDs) being developed by a group of companies 
led by Toshiba and Time Warner and including Hitachi, Pioneer and 
Thomson, the French consumer electronics maker.  
Matsushita's move tips the balance away from the rival Sony and Philips 
DVD format, unveiled a month ago in an effort to establish it as the 
industry standard. The rivalry has raised the prospect of a war similar to 
that between the VHS and Betamax video tape standards in the 1980s. At 
that time Matsushita backed the VHS format, forcing Sony's Betamax to 
retreat.207 
Sony and Philips appear to be given short shrift; the authors present the debut of 
Sony and Philips’ DVD technology, appearing before the rival format, as a power grab 
rather than as demonstration of proof of concept or superior development and design 
efforts.  One key theme that is made explicit here is the analogy between the DVD 
competition for format standardization and the VHS/Betamax battle.  Reactivating the 
animosities engendered therein, the authors seem keen to pit Sony against Matsushita in 
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another battle for market dominance.  This conflict made for good drama, a key element 
in good stories that would help sell newspapers. 
Even a cursory glance at the coverage during this period reveals an anti-Sony 
bias.  Literally hundreds of articles appear with titles like “Major blow to Sony’s hopes 
for format standard,” “Industry support for new digital video disc format spells trouble 
for Philips/Sony alliance,” “Eight back digital video disc standard in opposition to Sony,” 
“Sony stiffens stance in DVD format face-off,” “Sony-Philips point out Toshiba-Time 
Warner DVD problems,” and perhaps most forceful, if only by exclusion, “Has 
Hollywood fallen in love with Time Warner/Toshiba’s DVD?”208  Each article depicts 
Sony and Philips as the source of conflict.  Sony and Philips are presented therein as the 
“bad guy” in the narrative being constructed in the press.  There are many potential 
explanations for the negative coverage in the press, not the least of which is the 
possibility that Sony and Philips treated reporters with disdain and suspicion, or that the 
two companies were acting in a manner consistent with the coverage.  Regardless of the 
motivations behind the trend, technology reporters in the United States and most 
throughout the western and Asian regions of the world jumped at the opportunity to bring 
narrative flare to the processes of technology development.  Pitting industrial giants 
against each other in a battle for survival also increased the stakes for their readers and 
heightened the potential cultural significance of DVD.  More importantly, however, the 
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format-war discourse introduced the public to DVD through the lens of VHS/Betamax.  
Providing a structuring discourse for making meaning of the technology, this discourse 
provided guidelines and limitations to how the public conceptualized the new technology.  
The interested public was encouraged to not only associate the DVD with its home-video 
predecessors, but to imbue it with industrial significance. 
Secondary discourse appearing in the press during this period focused on praising 
DVD demonstrations.  Throughout 1995, accounts of DVD’s impressive technological 
capabilities continued to supplement the hyperbolic fascination with format wars and 
animosity between hardware and software giants.  The trade press closely followed each 
development from the industry, including packaging standards, laser diode developments, 
adaptation of Dolby’s AC-3 Sound system for DVD, the Justice Department’s review of 
DVD patents (more on this forthcoming), and the possibility of a format war over DVD-
Audio specifications. 
Phase one ebbed after the announcement of format standards in August of 1995.  
With the two sides coming to an agreement to work together, the drama of a format battle 
no longer applied.  Rather than shifting focus to detail how and why Sony agreed to 
cooperate with their competitors, trade and popular press accounts focused on the 
product.  This initial period played a crucial role in introducing the public to the concept 
of DVD.  By couching discussion of the technology in hyperbolic terms, the press 
encouraged their readers to conceptualize DVD in a particular way.  By repeatedly 
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focusing on the drama of a format war, the press associated DVD with home video, while 
suggesting that the technology would be influential to the future of media consumption.   
DVD Discourses:  The Product 
Once an agreement had been reached on technical specifications for DVD-Video 
and DVD-ROM, and the press sorted out the details of the agreement, attention turned to 
industry forecasts and glowing optimism for the potential impact of the technology.  
Articles appeared throughout the trade and popular presses with titles like “Digital Gold 
Rush,” “Video Industry puts its money on new DVD format,” “A Video System Shakes 
the Walls,” and “The year that optical disc took the industry by storm.”209  
Complementing this dominant discourse for 1996 was a return of skepticism about 
whether DVD would make it in the market, after Hollywood spoke up to voice its 
concern over copyright protection technologies.  Additionally, a number of articles on the 
brewing competition between industry players to market the DVD to consumers 
appeared.  Mostly appearing in the trade press, commentators shifted focus from the 
potential of the technology and obstacles delaying product launch to analysis of 
marketing strategies and partnerships.  Specifically, technology reporters suggested that 
individual companies would scurry to attain the advantage of brand-name recognition, 
software cross-promotions with hardware devices and economies of scale.210  For the first 
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time, consumers were encouraged to think about the technology as a reality in the 
marketplace. 
By 1997, major newspapers across the country had picked up the story, 
contributing to the production of cultural meaning.  By focusing on the number of titles 
released by particular studios and their hesitancy and eventual support as they came on-
line in late 1997, the press discourse supported the aforementioned affiliation of DVD to 
the Hollywood studios.  In an article appearing in the September 2, 1997 Miami Herald 
entitled “DVD Promises More and Better Entertainment,” the authors proffer an 
optimistic view of the technology while warning potential adopters of the uncertainty 
surrounding the technology.211  Pointing to the fact that Disney, Universal, Fox, and 
Paramount had yet to commit to releasing titles on DVD, the authors initiate a conflicting 
press discourse that is simultaneously glowing in its continuing reviews of the technology 
and pessimistic in regards to the possibility of full support from the studios.  The Seattle 
Times ran a similar article, detailing the titles then available to consumers, DVD’s 
technological capabilities, and discussing the fact that Disney had yet to support the 
format (Disney would eventually commit to DVD in December, planning to release only 
live-action features in the first year).212  The Christian Science Monitor pushed the 
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conversation a bit further, speculating that the studios’ hesitancy to release titles would 
slow the rate of adoption.213 
The second period of discourse ended as DVD entered the marketplace.  With 
early adopters primed for the technology through reports in the press and through 
exposure to product demonstrations, enthusiasm and skepticism in the press discourse 
shifted to product differentiation.  The second period of discourse proved to be an 
important mechanism that would encourage early adopters to associate the technology 
with filmed entertainment and their existing experiences related to home video 
consumption.  Additionally, this period continued to encourage adopters to think about 
DVD as a revolutionary technology.  In so doing, the trade and popular press helped to 
create a small but enthusiastic group of supporters who would not stand idly by as 
competitors entered the marketplace. 
DVD Discourses:  Differentiation   
Three groups of early adopters had materialized around DVD: audiophiles, 
technophiles, and recreation seekers.214  The technophiles, drawn to the technology and 
its potential to dominate the home-video industry, were active in a growing online 
community of DVD supporters.  These communities proved vocal and influential in a 
community-driven anti-Divx campaign that included petitions, boycotts of Circuit City, 
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and passionate correspondence with studios and retailers.215  However, DVD fan cultures 
were not the only negative voices related to Divx.  The video store industry, studio 
executives from Warner Bros. and Columbia, and the media also began a smear 
campaign that would simultaneously herald the superiority of DVD and encourage 
consumers to avoid the rival format.216  While Warner and Columbia’s lack of 
enthusiasm for Divx is understandable given their stakes in the hardware and patent pools 
for DVD (Warner partnering with Toshiba and Columbia being a subsidiary of Sony), the 
media fury is noteworthy.  After several years of meaning making related to DVD and 
widespread, unilateral support for the technology, the popular and trade presses depicted 
the newcomer as superfluous and confusing.  As a $60 million dollar advertising 
campaign began to bring consumers into Circuit City stores across the nation and huge 
cash payouts to studios resulted in titles in the rental format, the online community and 
the media began using words like “chaos” and “confusion” to describe the DVD industry.  
Ultimately, the negative press surrounding Divx combined with an intimidation campaign 
by Warner (they released a memo in December 1998 threatening to withdraw advertising 
support from retailers if they promoted Warner products in conjunction with Divx) and 
then the studios’ scuttling of a deal between Divx and Blockbuster, resulting in the failure 
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of the technology.217  However contentious the discourses surrounding Divx, its arrival in 
the DVD market re-vivified press coverage of DVD while initiating comparisons 
between the formats in the press.  These comparisons, coupled with press coverage of the 
vitriol coming from early adopters, ultimately secured DVD meaning in late 1990s 
culture.  Through the arrival and failure of Divx, DVD’s place as the preeminent next-
generation home video/computer technology was solidified. 
DVD Discourses:  Locating the Birth of DVD 
DVD had conquered its challengers and was clearly defined as a technology, as a 
commodity, and as a cultural phenomenon.  The final period of discourse related to DVD 
culture accounts for the explosive success of DVD following the collapse of Divx.  A 
number of insiders in the DVD universe credited Warren Lieberfarb, the former head of 
Warner Home Video, as the “father” of the DVD.  It was Lieberfarb who, as an executive 
with little technical experience, first partnered Time Warner/Warner Home Video with 
Toshiba in 1992 in a cross-industry collaborative effort to design a technological 
standard.  Johnnie Roberts writes that Lieberfarb “didn't invent the technology. More 
important, he saw its potential to transform the industry. So he cajoled, strong-armed and 
bargained with industry players around the world to set aside their parochial interests and 
sign on to a universal standard for the new format.”218  Jack Valenti, head of the MPAA 
credits Lieberfarb, “Warren is the fellow who had the vision years before anyone 
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else…he laboriously worked to get the other companies to come on board with titles.”219  
Benjamin Feingold, head of Columbia Tri-Star (read Sony) at the time of DVD 
development recalls, "Warren would often go over the heads of the home entertainment 
people because he considered DVD to be that important…if he wasn't getting the right 
answer from someone at Paramount, he'd call [Viacom chairman] Sumner Redstone. If he 
didn't like what [former Fox president] Bill Mechanic had to say, he'd call Rupert 
Murdoch or Peter Chernin."220  
Lieberfarb himself recalled the opposition he faced in the early 1990s:  “The most 
challenging experience I've been through was not convincing the Japanese, Korean, and 
European electronic companies to develop a successor to the VCR. It was not working 
with key players in the technology industry, such as IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and Apple. It 
was working with Hollywood.”221  This last comment is revealing, for it indicates that 
even if we are to ascribe a certain authority to Lieberfarb’s influence in product 
development, the concept of the DVD and its technological base cannot be solely 
affiliated with any one individual or any one company.   
In fact, DVD was a technology that was dependent upon at least three distinct, yet 
closely aligned, industries spanning three continents for its technological “birth” and 
successive periods of discourse in the press and a range of social practices that made the 
DVD meaningful.  It was the confluence of efforts and cooperation between individuals, 
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corporations and indeed between industries that led to the development of DVD 
technology.  It was the enthusiastic technology reviews, product demonstration reports, 
format war hyperbole, advertisements, and online community outrage that led to cultural 
meaning for DVD.  What each of the above quotations suggests is the desire in the press 
to herald the role of one individual in technology development.  What this immediately 
signals is that in studying DVD in this chapter, we have been studying the desires of 
industry, the press, and groups of individuals in society for new technology, and the 
processes through which that technology is made meaningful. 
By the time the first advertisements appeared in 1997 for DVD hardware, 
software, computer manufacturers, and retail outlets, the public had been exposed to 
DVD for more than three years.  Through the trade and popular press, they were 
encouraged to make sense of DVD in particular ways.  Initially, discourse favored a 
technical explication of DVDs capabilities and similarities and differences to its 
technological predecessors.  Shortly thereafter, focus shifted to the brewing “format war,” 
again encouraging potential adopters to make sense of the new technology through 
VHS/Betamax histories, and the roles played by Sony and Philips and Toshiba and Time 
Warner.  The trade and popular press served as a framing device for the new technology, 
telling readers how to think about the new technology, not what to think about it.  
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 As early as January 1996, reports started to appear about advertising strategies 
and expenditures.  The St. Louis Post-Dispatch claimed that the aggregate total of all 
advertising for 1996 would be north of $200 million to introduce DVD by Labor Day.222  
However, due to Hollywood’s concerns over copyright protection and royalty issues and 
the resulting delays in the launch process, it would be another year before the advertising 
blitz kicked into full gear.  The delayed release afforded time to strategize advertising 
plans for software and hardware manufacturers and suppliers.  Warner Home Video 
planned to use its website to supplement print and television campaigns, teaming with 
Toshiba to cross promote titles and hardware in a $30 million dollar campaign; Thomson 
planned to use in-store display units in 300 stores in the seven test markets, featuring 24 
titles from Warner Home Video; Panasonic/Matsushita commissioned Grey Advertising 
for $15 million to produce television and print ads that would champion players and 
highlight the superior quality of audio and video; Philips planned a comprehensive global 
branding campaign with DVD as a key component; Sony planned a large-scale hardware 
campaign featuring in-store demonstrations along with print and television ads featuring 
DVD as the centerpiece of a Sony home theater system.223 
Meaning making in the culture industries, and with DVD specifically, is tied to 
strategies of representation and dominant discourses.  Advertisers tied DVD to the VHS 
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and the CD, heralding its ability to deliver superior video and audio.224  By doing so, 
advertisers engaged with the accumulated meanings stemming from the popular and trade 
presses to sell the technology.  Through a variety of representational strategies advertisers 
identified target demographics and attempted to engage with idealized self-images and 
collective unspoken desires.  Consider the following two-page advertisement for 
Samsung’s new DVD player, appearing in the February 1997 Premiere Magazine: 
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DVD, as I’ve argued, attains meaning by engaging with previously existing 
discourses representing a popular idea of something that is “high-tech” and “interactive.”  
This early advertisement emphasizes DVD’s technical qualities developed by Samsung 
(notice the labels directing attention to the various mechanisms inside the head of the 
model) and its interactive functionality, literally integrating the machinery with human 
biology.  The text on the following page supports this assertion; by representing DVD as 
“Simply Integrated.  Simply DVD.  Simply Samsung” the advertisement suggests that 
DVD should be understood as an idealized and futuristic technology capable of 
perfecting human perception through DVD technology.  Consider too the race and gender 
of the model; the model appears to be a young white female.  However, the difficulty in 
ascertaining this fact suggests that the identification here is youth, rather than a gendered 
or racial identity.  By targeting young people, Samsung appears to be identifying likely 
early adopter enthusiasts while pointing to an idealized vision of home viewing 
technologies. 
 By way of comparison, consider the following two advertisements from 
Sony and Philips appearing in the May 1997 Premiere Magazine and November 17, 1997 








Figure 5.4:  Philips/Magnavox DVD Player Advertisement 
 
The first advertisement stands in stark relief compared to the Samsung 
advertisement.  Sony foregrounds the DVD logo while comparing the product to the CD.  
In so doing, the suggestion is made that the DVD should be understood in light of the 
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CD, and all of the associative meanings therein.  DVD is “the evolution of CD” and is 
sold via a simple, elegant design that suggests, through forthcoming product 
demonstrations, the technology will speak for itself.  Conversely, the Philips ad 
represents DVD as capable of integrating theaters and homes.  By graphically portraying 
this synthesis, Philips is drawing upon the cultural meanings associated with home, 
domesticity, and suburban lifestyles.  Connecting the DVD player with theaters suggests 
that DVD will bring the quality viewing experience into the home.  Like the Sony ad, 
Philips is drawing upon existing cultural meanings relating to technology by comparing 
the DVD to laserdisc through the text appearing below the image.  Furthermore, Philips’ 
slogan, “Let’s make things better,” besides being the cornerstone for their 
aforementioned global branding initiative, further supports the idea that DVD improves 
upon existing technologies.  Neither Sony nor Philips directly represents actual users in 
these ads; we can infer however that by virtue of their placement in particular magazines 
(Premiere and The New Yorker), that the ads are targeting groups of consumers.  The 
Sony ad appears to be targeting movie and technology enthusiasts, historically young 
educated affluent males, encouraging them to participate in product demonstrations in 
retail stores.  Philips seems to be addressing an older affluent educated audience:  
homeowners looking to improve their domestic spaces through new technology. 
The next three advertisements underline the point that DVD has many meanings 
and is represented through a variety of industrial strategies and synergies.  Compare, for 














Figure 5.7:  Toshiba DVD Player Advertisement 
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The Panasonic ad, appearing in the October 1997 Premiere Magazine, makes the 
same associative connection to CD technology mentioned in regards to the Sony 
advertisement above.  However, Panasonic is much more explicit about the affiliation of 
DVD to Hollywood.  Graphically depicting the dynamism of a cavalry charge 
(presumably from a Civil War film), the advertisement suggests that DVD is exciting and 
explosive in its power to deliver Hollywood’s content.  Furthermore, the appearance of 
the hand in the lower third of the image cues the reader to both the size of the disc and its 
metaphorical ability to put the power of theatrical exhibition in the hands of the 
consumer.  This empowerment theme is furthered by the second column of text 
highlighting the convergent potential of DVD.  The inclusion of visual content from 
Hollywood is shifted in the Toshiba/Warner Bros. advertisement, appearing in the same 
magazine.  Besides being representative of a $30 million joint campaign, the largest ever 
by a hardware and software partnership, the ad represents the discourse of “optimism” in 
regards to industrial futures mention above.225  Presented against a heavenly backdrop of 
clouds and blue sky and accompanied by the words, “Here’s how the future is stacking 
up,” the ad excludes everything but the DVD packages and the hardware device.  In so 
doing, connection between hardware and its software component is made explicit while 
product differentiation from VHS is made obvious; consumers can expect to enjoy 
blockbuster hits, and classics not available on VHS, on DVD from Warner Bros. on their 
Toshiba machines. 
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Finally, the Toshiba advertisement appearing in the December 15, 1997 issue of 
Newsweek excludes explicit mention of titles in favor of a stereotypical depiction of 
youth cultures and attitudes.  By representing a young white male in a state of awe at the 
image being reflected in his spectacles and by employing “hip” language in the ad’s 
copy, Toshiba hopes to tap into the cultural moment.  Associating DVD with explosions 
and dynamism was a common strategy to convey DVD’s technical capabilities but the 
degree of excited-ness in the copy points to an effort to connect DVD to “extreme” youth 
culture.  Targeting this specific demographic would seem to suggest a traditional 
targeting of demographics most likely to adopt new technology.  But as we saw with the 
Philips and Toshiba/Warner Bros. advertisements, the story is much more complex.  The 
advertising discourse as a whole includes ads strategically placed to target a wide array of 
potential consumers, from young men and women to home owners in the suburbs.  DVD 
ads employed varying representational strategies to make meaning around DVD, 
although key themes within the different ads suggest that a coherent discourse was 
emerging.  Recurring time and again, ads for hardware, software, and retail outlets 
highlight the “newness” of the technology.  DVD was represented as the “next” (and 
better) CD, VHS, and laserdisc.  Additionally, advertising discourse being created 
through early DVD ads structures DVD to mean Hollywood feature films.  
We have seen in this chapter how cultural contexts contributed to the creation of 
consumer demand for DVD while discourses structured the ways in which the technology 
was understood.  DVD entered into pre-existing cultural contexts in home entertainment.  
The practices of the American family in home video consumption shifted in the early 
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1990s to include buying and cataloguing tapes.  Combined with pleasurable experiences 
with digital music technology, the cultural context was set for a new digital home 
entertainment technology.  DVD has been constructed through a range of meanings and 
practices.  As a new media technology based on a digital platform, DVD intersects with 
and acts upon key themes in late 1990s culture.  It enters into the popular collective 
consciousness through representations in the trade press, popular press, through 
advertisements, and through user-generated activity on the internet.  As a cultural artifact, 
DVD does not mean anything unto itself; DVD is made meaningful through the ways in 
which it is represented in successive stages of discourse and through the activities of 
consumers.  In analyses of these stages of discourse, we saw how representations of the 
technology were connected to various groups of people, cultural desires based on 
interactivity and empowerment, and industrial desires to link the new technology to 
particular practices of viewing pre-recorded feature films in the home.  DVD entered into 
culture through complex and often conflicting discourse, ultimately becoming a cultural 
artifact through the combination of uses, practices, and representations in the press.   
DVD was introduced into a cultural context in a particular historical/cultural 
moment.  It was made meaningful in context by drawing on pre-existing meanings and 
discourses.  These discourses created a favorable cultural context that contributed to the 
successful diffusion of DVD.  As we’ve seen, existing conditions in the content industry, 
consumer electronics industry, and computer industry contributed to DVD’s success.  
Furthermore, chapter six will shift the discussion from the production of culture 
described herein to the regulatory context surrounding DVD, as well as the efforts 
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undertaken by industry to regulate how DVD was used and distributed to the public.  
We’ll see how three industries, comprising dozens of leading corporations from three 
continents, exploited shifts in copyright and antitrust law that ultimately guaranteed the 




Chapter Six:  Regulating DVD 
 The formation of the DVD Forum granted power to a limited set of firms and 
guaranteed control over DVD technological development and specifications.  By virtue of 
the administrative body’s structure, the leading companies in the consumer electronics, 
computer, and filmed entertainment industries cooperated to exploit favorable conditions 
in culture and industry--and in the business and economic climate at large--to optimize 
the prospects of DVD-Video in the marketplace.  Through the administrative body, these 
firms established a hierarchical power structure to control and, in effect, to regulate all 
potential iterations of the technology, including its production processes and the ways in 
which it was marketed to the public.  Once established, the DVD Forum encouraged its 
members to behave in concert, cooperating to establish and maintain the quality of the 
technology and to present barriers to entry for competing technologies or firms.  The 
cooperative nature of the Forum established an industrial culture of production that was 
then adopted by subsidiary industry sectors relating to DVD-Video and DVD-ROM; 
manufacturing, replication, packaging, software providers, and distribution companies 
worked together to pool resources to best exploit the new markets for DVD. 
This cooperative culture surrounding DVD-Video was embraced by consumer 
electronics and computer corporations to ensure the continuing involvement and support 
of Hollywood.  A unified DVD-Video standard and rigid control over all new 
technological and industrial sectors assured the content providers that a stable market 
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could be established.  Revenue sharing agreements and direct sales relationships offered 
the studios a route around the First Sale Doctrine and offered additional incentive to 
support the new home video format.  The support of the studios was integral in 
establishing DVD-Video as the dominant DVD platform.  Hollywood desired a playback-
only disc, and would not support either group attempting to establish a recordable DVD 
standard.  Encouraging compromise over recordable DVD would have been contrary to 
their longstanding desire to maintain control over content; if recordable DVD had 
surpassed DVD-Video in the market, DVD may have become a device primarily used for 
time-shifting and copying films from other discs and off of television.  Keeping DVD-
Video ahead of more flexible recordable formats meant releasing large numbers of titles 
on disc, and assuring that prices of playback-only consoles remained below any new 
recordable devices; once the public conceptualized the technology as one principally 
designed for playback of feature films, it would not readily switch to a technology with 
differing requirements for usability. 
Maintaining control over feature films on DVD was of paramount concern for the 
Hollywood content providers.  DVD offered both an opportunity and a cause for 
trepidation; a new home video technology meant that additional revenues could be 
extracted from the most profitable ancillary market, but digital piracy threatened to 
undercut these potential profits.  Before the studios would fully support DVD, new 
measures were required to regulate consumer access to, and use of, pre-recorded content.  
DVD posed serious challenges to firms making the shift to digital content delivery.  Due 
to the fact that DVD afforded consumers the possibility of making easy, inexpensive, 
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high-quality duplications that they could then distribute via the internet globally, 
protecting content required new technologies and new business strategies.  In a media 
environment that was undergoing a paradigm shift in user-content interaction, with 
consumers exploiting a variety of technologies in consumer electronics, computing, 
satellites and global networks to repurpose and share content, controlling content meant 
regulating the activities of consumers and their level of access to content through new 
technologies, regulations, and enforcement strategies.  The members of the DVD Forum 
recognized that neither technology nor legal measures alone would provide viable and 
secure ways of protecting their valuable assets.  Protecting content required the 
cooperation and compromise of all industry members.  These firms worked to develop 
mechanisms to protect content within devices designed for DVD playback, between 
devices like consoles and computers, and over networks like the internet.226  Reaching a 
cost-effective solution required the collective resources and political capital of the entire 
industry and support from legislators in Washington. 
Securing content on DVD was an imperative first step in attaining the support of 
the content providers and successfully launching the technology.  In order to achieve this 
task, the members of the DVD industry, through the DVD Forum and the DVD Copy 
Control Agency (DVD CCA), employed a three-pronged approach.  The first step 
involved the development of “technical protection measures” (TPMs) that would be made 
available to manufacturers of discs, consoles, and all other hardware capable of playing 
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DVDs.  Often referred to as Digital Rights Management technologies (DRMs), these 
technological safeguards were conceptualized as a means to protect content 
technologically through encryption systems, keys and codes between players and discs, 
and recognition software that limited the playback of discs without officially sanctioned 
technologies.  The second strategy was to enlist lobbyists working on behalf of the 
industry, through the MPAA, DVD CCA, and DVD Forum, to urge legislators to create 
and ratify laws that supported protection technologies and prohibited the circumvention 
of technical protection measure technologies.  The third strategy was to create licenses 
that would be enforced through industrial bodies (the DVD CCA and others), 
guaranteeing oversight and control to participating industrial members.  These three 
strategies were intended to complement the control mechanisms employed by industry 
members discussed in chapter four.  By controlling patents, manufacturing and 
verification standards, distribution networks, licensing bodies, and copy protection 
technologies and legislation legitimizing those technologies, the industry was assured 
unprecedented control.  The development of TPMs and DRMs, along with legislation and 
licensing bodies controlling their implementation and enforcement occurred within a 
broader legislative, regulatory, and technological context.  This era, beginning with the 
Reagan administration’s deregulation policies, is defined by tacit governmental support 
of the oligopolistic activities and organizational structures of the media industries. 
This chapter begins with an examination of the legislative and regulatory context 
leading up to the passage (and validation through the courts) of the Digital Millennium 
                                                                                                                                            
(WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Geneva, December 6, 1999.  
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Copyright Act (DMCA).  This bill was instrumental in sanctioning the use of digital anti-
copying technologies, prohibiting publication of circumvention codes, and assuring 
Hollywood that their movies on DVD would be protected from piracy.  The regulatory 
context surrounding the home video and entertainment industries prior to DVD’s 
introduction also set important precedents in Fair Use and copyright infringement and 
enforcement that would influence Hollywood’s support of DVD. The relationships 
between the entertainment industries and regulatory bodies pertaining to intellectual and 
digital copyright issues, media ownership, patent law, and fair use resulted in an 
increasingly pro-industry regulatory atmosphere.  All of these developments coalesced 
during the mid and late 1990s and combined with favorable contexts in industry, 
technology, economics, and culture to contribute to DVD’s diffusion.  After tracking the 
development and passing of the DMCA in relation to these broader regulatory contexts 
this section explains and examines section 1201, which included the most controversial 
and pertinent language related to “anti-circumvention” provisions, directly impacting the 
commercialization of DVD and broader issues of Fair Use and First Amendment rights.   
Section two examines the various technical protection measures employed by the 
industry to protect content from piracy and illegal use, technologies employed to control 
the global distribution of content, and the structure and function of licensing agencies 
controlling protection technologies.  Various technologies were employed to ensure that 
software would be protected from illegal copying with the intent of “keeping honest 
people honest.”  This section examines the development and implementation of a variety 
of digital and analog technologies designed to prevent unauthorized access by consumers 
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to DVD content.  Technical protection measures proved to be an effective method of 
securing control over the technology, even after the code was cracked and published 
online by a Norwegian teenager in 1999.  Licensing agencies were equally efficient as 
regulatory tools within the industry.  These bodies served as enforcement mechanisms, 
forcing all manufacturers to include the requisite protection technologies on drives, 
consoles, and discs.  By interacting with lobbying organizations like the MPAA (whose 
members were also members of the DVD CCA) to influence legislation, litigate 
copyright infringement cases, and protect the interests of industry members, the licensing 
agencies played an influential role in the process of DVD commercialization. 
Section three examines the enforcement of copyright protections through 
litigation related to the “cracking” of DVD’s protection measures undertaken by the DVD 
CCA and the MPAA against individuals in 1999.  After exploring the circumstances and 
rulings in these cases, this section will speculate on their relative significance to the 
commercialization of DVD.  This discussion will primarily examine how the DMCA was 
enlisted by the DVD Forum through the DVD CCA to discourage widespread diffusion 
of circumvention software, while ensuring the content providers that content would be 
protected through a variety of strategies, including prosecuting individuals thought to be 
in violation of the DMCA.  All of the strategies employed to regulate DVD, both within 
the industry and in relation to user access, illustrate new strategies employed by industry 
to protect digital content.  DVD plays a central role in establishing precedent in federal 
and international copyright law, and is illustrative of a new era of cooperation between 





DVD REGULATORY CONTEXT 
 The regulatory context surrounding the introduction of DVD intersects with larger 
historical, industrial, political, and governmental forces pertaining to media ownership, 
copyright, fair use, and antitrust.  The film industry and the communications industries at 
large have a long history of dealings with governmental agencies seeking to regulate their 
structure or product.   
Regulation and the Entertainment Industries 
Beginning with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, governmental regulations 
sought to increase competition in industry by limiting ownership of similar corporations 
that may be acting as a monopoly.  The regulation, the oldest antitrust law on the books 
in the United States, is enforced by the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice, who shares civil enforcement duties with the Federal Trade 
Commission.  The law is rarely enforced through criminal adjudication; civil proceedings 
under a "rule of reason" standard, which examines the economic benefits and harm of 
allegedly anti-competitive conduct to determine the potential impact on the public, are 
more commonplace. However, the United States Supreme Court has deemed three types 
of conduct so lacking in economic justification as to be per se illegal. The per se 
violations include price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation schemes, and are 
offenses warranting criminal prosecution through the Department of Justice.   
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Concerns over the legality of trusts and per se violations of antitrust law within 
the U.S. coincide with the birth of the motion picture industry.  Edison’s Motion Picture 
Patents Company, the earliest patent pool in the industry, restricted use of film 
machinery, raw film stock, and distribution technologies to companies within the 
collective or those willing to pay licensing fees to the trust.  Edison’s trust was 
infamously enforced by henchmen and bruisers who would intimidate film companies 
working independently in the New York area.  The atmosphere was so restrictive and 
dangerous that several leading film producers and distributors headed west to California, 
founding Hollywood and establishing the modern movie business.  Supreme Court 
decisions in 1912, 1915, and 1917 negated patents on raw stock and all other MPPC 
patents under the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Moving to Hollywood to elude Edison’s cartel 
freed the industry to develop technologies, enact cooperative business practices, and 
develop vertically integrated global business structures.  Thus, a new trust was developed 
in Hollywood in the form of the Hollywood studio system.  In 1938, the United States 
Department of Justice sued the movie studios, claiming they collectively were in 
violation of antitrust regulations.  The case would eventually reach the Supreme Court of 
the United States, under the name United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 US 131 
(1948).  The decision, now commonly referred to as “The Paramount Decree” ordered the 
divestiture of theater chains, eliminating vertical integration in the movie industry and 
quelling collusive activities such as “blind bidding” and “block booking.” 
In the ensuing years prior to the introduction of DVD, particularly during the 
Reagan administration in the 1980s, the Hollywood studios exploited deregulation to re-
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consolidate their power and control over filmed entertainment.  The fact that the studios 
re-integrated their holdings through conglomeration enabled a limited set of firms to 
dictate how and when new technologies would be incorporated into the production, 
distribution, and exhibition businesses.  Crucially, the lobbying efforts of the MPAA 
throughout this period, under the direction of Jack Valenti, established relationships with 
legislators and regulators at the FCC that would benefit industry in their efforts to control 
new technologies.  Through these relationships, lobbyists for the MPAA influenced 
copyright law reform, deregulation of the media industries, and antitrust law that would 
legitimate the industrial structure and practices of the DVD industry. 
Copyright Law 
The relationship between the motion picture industry and the U.S. government is 
not limited to antitrust law.  The industry has a long history of influence in Washington, 
resisting regulation, obtaining favorable trade status, and influencing copyright 
legislation through one of the most powerful lobbies in the United States, the MPAA.  
Because the industry produced creative products that were distributed publicly, United 
States copyright laws, and their enforcement, were of paramount concern.  Since the 
Statute of Anne almost three hundred years ago, U.S. law has been revised to broaden the 
scope of copyright, to change the term of copyright protection, and to address new 
technologies.227 Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the U.S. has 
enacted copyright reform in a thinly veiled pro-industry effort to secure indefinite 
corporate rights to content. The first major revision of U.S. copyright law occurred in 
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1909.  The bill broadened the scope of categories protected to include all works of 
authorship, and extended the term of protection to twenty-eight years with a possible 
renewal of twenty-eight. Congress addressed the difficulty of balancing the public 
interest with proprietor's rights, illustrating the ongoing debate over monopolies in the 
free market and public access through fair use:  
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded 
to music has been to give the composer an adequate return for the value of 
his composition, and it has been a serious and difficult task to combine the 
protection of the composer with the protection of the public… (H.R. Rep. 
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 7 [1909]).  
Copyright law directly impacts Hollywood’s control over content.  Through the 
law, content producers are legally ordained the right to limit use of their product and to 
retain rights to their films for set periods of time.  These periods grew increasingly longer 
through several amendments and supplemental copyright laws passed by Congress.  By 
1976, legislative, technological, and political forces were aligning to shift the relationship 
between the content producers and government once again.  Technological developments 
and their impact on what might be copyrighted, how works might be copied, and what 
constituted an infringement needed to be addressed.  Cable, satellites, and home video 
shifted the nature of content distribution and required new protection measures.  In 1976, 
Gerald Ford attempted to crack down on industrial espionage and illegal copying of 
content in all industries.  In advance of the United States’ decision to become a signatory 
on the Berne Convention of 1886, which provided international standards for copyright 
of creative works, Congress passed a significant copyright revision.  The 1976 act 
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preempted all previous copyright law and extended the term of protection to life of the 
author plus 50 years (works for hire were protected for 75 years). The act covered “the 
scope and subject matter of works covered, exclusive rights, copyright term, copyright 
notice and copyright registration, copyright infringement, fair use and defenses and 
remedies to infringement.”228 The act stipulated that the enforcement of copyright 
infringement was both a governmental and an individual or corporate matter.  The 
copyright holder was to be responsible for civil litigation that would redress monetary 
damages by the infringement; the federal government under the auspices of the 
Intellectual Property Division of the Department of Justice would prosecute offenders 
criminally.  Contained within this revision was language codifying the fair use and first 
sale doctrines, two crucial pieces of copyright law directly impacting the motion picture 
and consumer electronics industries.  These two sections of the act clarified the rights of 
home video hardware producers and set the business model for video rental.  Under this 
act, consumers could not be prosecuted for recording content off of television; pre-
recorded content was free to be rented to home video consumers without recompense to 
the studios after an initial payment by the retailer. 
Deregulation and Antitrust Law 
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-435, 
the HSR Act) was passed by Congress and signed into law by Gerald Ford.  The 
substantive part of this legislation consisted of a set of amendments to current antitrust 
                                                
228 Association of Research Libraries, Copyright & IP Policies Web Site, 
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laws, principally the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.  Essentially, the act stipulated that 
before mergers or acquisitions can close, both parties must file a “Notification and Report 
Form” with the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department 
of Justice.  In so doing, the companies were obliged to notify government of their 
intentions so potential antitrust litigation could be avoided, paying a substantial filing fee 
based on the size and nature of the merger.  The effective result of this legislation was to 
loosen antitrust guidelines prior to a wave of de-regulation during the Reagan 
administration.  The combination of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and the Copyright Act of 
1976 paved the way for a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the entertainment 
industries.   
The HSR Act was the first formal act of Congress that began a radical shift in 
policy that was also reflected in the behaviors of the Federal Communications 
Commission.  Prior to the passage of the HSR Act, the FCC consistently upheld and 
modified laws pertaining to cross-ownership in the media industries, prohibiting media 
consolidation in the television, radio, and cable industries.  After the passage of the Act in 
1976, followed closely by the arrival of Chairman Mark Fowler in 1981 under the 
Reagan administration, the FCC and Congress moved to enact a campaign that sought to 
reduce oversight and greatly shift national broadcasting and media policy (Fowler and 
Brenner 1982; Horowitz 1989; Johnson 1994; Krattenmaker and Powe Jr. 1995; and Le 
Duc 1987).  This shift in policy resulted in specific deregulatory moves by both Congress 
and the FCC throughout the 1980s.  Beginning with an extension of television licenses by 




the FCC in 1981 and continuing through the elimination of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, 
along with deregulation of competition mandates in the television and cable industries, 
the FCC and Congress began a re-conceptualization of the media industry.  Media was 
defined as an industry like other industries operating in a commercial marketplace (Powe 
Jr 1987; Tunstall 1986; Krattenmaker and Powe Jr. 1995). 
The significance of this policy change under the Reagan administration to the 
motion picture industry and their ancillary counterparts cannot be understated.  In less 
than a decade, from 1976 to the mid 1980s, the federal government in the United States 
loosened restrictions on media ownership, virtually encouraging the wave of mergers and 
acquisitions that would transform the film and television industries.  Combined with 
other factors, including new revenue streams from home video, the activities of the FCC 
and the Department of Justice stimulated the mergers of studios and multinational media 
conglomerates that would continue through the period surrounding DVD’s introduction.  
Only a few decades earlier, the motion picture industry was subject to investigations by 
Congress for anticompetitive behaviors.  The divestiture of the Hollywood oligopoly 
occurred during a period of change and uncertainty for the industry.  The House Un-
American Activities Committee, under the direction of Joseph McCarthy, investigated 
Hollywood’s involvement in Communist Party activities shortly after the Paramount 
decree was enacted.  These investigations were at least tangentially related to the 
Paramount case; the collusive practices of the studios and the powerful guilds 
representing virtually all employees in the industry were subject to interrogation by 
government.  The cooperative oligopoly and unions were conflated with anti-
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Americanism; Hollywood took a sizable public relations hit.  Avoiding a similar situation 
in the contemporary environment meant continuing to involve government in the 
activities of the industry.  Working closely with the Department of Justice and Congress 
during the period of industrial formation, Forum members were assured that they would 
not be subject to antitrust violations.  
Meanwhile, the MPAA’s predecessor, the MPPDA (Motion Pictures Producers 
and Distributors of America), and the MPEA (Motion Pictures Export Association) were 
working internationally in the late 1940s and 1950s under the old collusive practices of 
block booking and blind bidding to assure global dominance following World War II.229  
The MPPDA, under the direction William Hays and Joseph Breen prior to the 
appointment of former White House aid Jack Valenti in the 1960s, lobbied Congress on 
behalf of the major studios, seeking favorable international trade conditions for film and 
television content.230  Additionally, the MPAA, as it was called after 1945, was 
responsible for keeping the government from censoring filmed content, establishing a 
system for self-regulation through the Production Code and the ratings system.  The 
1950s and 1960s also saw a greater affinity between the television and motion picture 
industries, as the studios moved into television production to remain profitable following 
the divestiture of their theaters.  Through their lobbying efforts in Washington, the 
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MPAA was able to keep Congress from regulating filmed content while simultaneously 
supporting the industry through favorable antitrust and copyright law.  These lobbying 
efforts would play an important role in the regulation of DVD; by creating a precedent 
with Congress, the MPAA and the DVD CCA could expect favorable treatment from 
legislators. 
Home Video Litigation 
The conglomeration of the media industries in the 1960s and 1970s, under the 
supportive regime at the FCC, did not radically alter the quantity or quality of content 
production and distribution in the United States.  The distribution of motion pictures 
continued, prior to the mid-1970s, according to historically tested patterns, with 
television distribution occurring after the end of all worldwide theatrical runs. With the 
HSR Act and the Copyright Act of 1976 signaling a shift in governmental policy 
regarding the media industries, new technologies threatened to shift the existing business 
model, creating instability and uncertainty.  Home video threatened to destabilize the 
marketplace, giving consumers the ability to freely copy and trade movies and television 
programs.  The Copyright Act of 1976 provided the industry a legal guideline for 
challenging the introduction and functionality of the Betamax.  After reading 
advertisements produced by Sony’s advertising agency Doyle, Dane, and Bernbach 
(DD&B) for the Betamax encouraging consumers to record programs and films in their 
entirety off of television, Universal City Studios, Inc. (MCA/Universal) filed suit in U.S. 
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Federal District Court in Los Angeles on November 11, 1976 (Wasser 2001, pg. 83).  The 
defendants, Sony Corporation of America, DD&B, several retailers selling the Betamax, 
and an individual Betamax customer were accused of violating copyright law.  The 
plaintiffs, Universal and Walt Disney Productions on behalf of the Hollywood majors, 
charged that the violation of copyright was directly connected to the VCR’s ability to 
record live programming and sought to halt the sale of the machines. The studios were 
ostensibly trying to protect film and television producers from the economic 
consequences of unauthorized mass duplication and distribution. However, other 
motivations were likely at play as well.  One possible motivation for Disney’s 
involvement in the case was fear that the new technology would erode their systematic 
reissue and withdrawal of family oriented content targeted at successive generations of 
consumers; MCA/Universal’s motivations were likely related to their market position in 
television production, by far the leading profit earners in that field in 1976 (Wasser 2001, 
pg. 84).  However, Universal might have also wanted to prevent Betamax from capturing 
a significant segment of the fledgling home video market before its parent company, 
MCA, could introduce its DiscoVision laserdisc system, which was scheduled for test 
marketing in the fall of 1977.231   
Handing down its decision in October 1979, the U.S. District Court ruled in favor 
of Sony, citing fair use as grounds supporting consumer activities such as taping off air 
for entertainment or time shifting.  Additionally, the court ruled that copying an entire 
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program also qualified as fair use; that set manufacturers could profit from the sale of 
VCRs; and that the plaintiffs did not prove that any of the above practices constituted 
economic harm to the motion picture industry.232  By the time the decision came down, 
the public had enthusiastically adopted the technology; to curtail their activities would 
have been virtually impossible. The court also upheld the First Sale Doctrine set forth in 
the Copyright Act of 1976.  This decision, eventually upheld by the Supreme Court in 
1984 after an Appeals Court had overturned the ruling, was the legal basis for the home 
video rental boom and the eventual push by the studios to regain control of the home 
video industry through a new technology.  Ironically, the decision favored the studios as 
well as the consumer electronics industry.  The studios realized long before the final 
ruling in the case that home video was returning enormous profits to film studios via the 
rapidly emerging rental market.  By 1986-87, the revenue returned to the studios from the 
home video market surpassed theatrical revenues; Sony, after being beaten in the home 
video market by rival Matsushita’s VHS machine, moved into the content production 
business, exploiting media deregulation initiated by the HSR Act, by purchasing 
Columbia-TriStar in 1989; Matsushita followed suit soon thereafter, acquiring 
MCA/Universal in 1990. 
The regulatory context surrounding the motion picture and home video industries 
impacted the structure and behaviors of the studios and their parent conglomerates in the 
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1990s, just as it had in the 1970s.  The codification of the First Sale Doctrine and the Fair 
Use Doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976 guaranteed that the home video business 
would function in particular ways relative to the motion picture industry.  Through the 
deregulation of the media industries beginning with the HSR Act in 1976, and supported 
by the deregulation of ownership rules throughout the Reagan administration, the motion 
picture companies began to wrest control from their home video counterparts, acquiring 
leading companies and/or forming home video divisions within the corporate structure of 
the media conglomerate.  The delay between the filing of the Sony Betamax Case and the 
final decision by the Supreme Court some eight years later allowed for the home video 
market to be established via the activities of the rental sector and consumers renting, 
purchasing, and recording content.  Thus, by the time the Sony  decision was handed 
down, upholding the First Sale Doctrine and the Fair Use Doctrine, home video/VHS had 
diffused into a majority of homes in the U.S., creating a big business that was returning 
enormous sums to the studios through a two-tiered pricing strategy.233   
Digital Copyright Law 
With the rise of the VCR and home video, copyright law came to be of paramount 
concern for the content industries.  Protecting content meant consistent efforts to lobby 
Congress for favorable regulation would need to be supported through the courts, through 
technological protection measures (where applicable), and through the enforcement 
                                                
233 As was discussed in previous chapters, films were initially priced between $40 and $75 for purchase by 
rental retailers in the first six months of distribution on home video, followed by a significant price 
reduction once demand for the title had fallen.  Reduced pricing targeted consumers through direct sale, 
rather than the home video retailers. 
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activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  In 1988, the United States finally 
became a Berne signatory, radically altering the U.S. copyright system by bringing it in 
line with international copyright law.  Through the efforts of major industry lobbyists, 
including the MPAA and leading computer industry groups, the copyright system 
expanded to provide greater protection for proprietors, formed new international 
copyright relationships, and eliminated the requirement of copyright notice for copyright 
protection.234  Further changes to copyright law came in the early 1990s, prior to the 
widespread diffusion of the internet and DVD technology.  In 1990, Congress amended 
the Copyright Act of 1976 to prohibit commercial lending of computer software, 
modifying the First Sale Doctrine for the first significant time in support of industry 
leader IBM.235  Amending the Act again in 1992, Congress made copyright renewal 
automatic, curtailing the entry into the public domain of works protected by copyright 
prior to 1978.236  By the time President Bill Clinton took office in early 1993, the 
Copyright Act was being amended several times annually, most often in support of 
copyright holders and industry content providers through increased criminal and civil 
penalties and extensions of the terms of copyright. 
A paradigm shift of sorts took place with the election of Clinton in 1992.  Clinton 
recognized the technological and information revolution looming on the horizon.  The 
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235 Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, title VIII of the Judicial Improvements Act of 
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internet and the DVD offered new opportunities for distributing digital media seamlessly 
and without loss of quality in reproduction.  One of his top priorities upon taking office 
was to establish a task force within governmental agencies to develop an agenda related 
to what was deemed the “National Information Infrastructure” (NII).237  The principal 
goal of this task force was to define U.S. priorities and action points for domestic and 
international legal reform.238  The group defined their agenda thusly:  “Carefully crafted 
government action will complement and enhance the efforts of the private sector and 
assure the growth of an information infrastructure available to all Americans at 
reasonable cost. In developing our policy initiatives in this area, the Administration will 
work in close partnership with business, labor, academia, the public, Congress, and state 
and local government.”239  Some of the objectives of the task force were to “promote 
private sector investment, through appropriate tax and regulatory policies…to act as a 
catalyst to promote technological innovation…to help the private sector develop and 
demonstrate technologies needed for the NII…to reform regulations and policies that 
may inadvertently hamper the development of interactive applications…to protect 
intellectual property rights to strengthen domestic copyright laws and international 
                                                
237 THE WHITE HOUSE, Office of the Press Secretary, February 22, 1993 “REMARKS BY THE 
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information policy,” working under the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the 
National Economic Council.  The IITF was chaired by Ron Brown, Secretary of Commerce, with staff 
work done by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the Department of 
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intellectual property treaties [and] to prevent piracy.”240  Through the private sector, the 
argument followed, new technologies and the new electronic infrastructure could 
transform life and work in America.  Protecting the interests of corporate America meant 
protecting the working interests of the American people.  Establishing regulatory policy 
through the NII Task Force, the Clinton administration sought to balance the right to 
protect intellectual property with the right of the public to access information and make 
use of it according to their needs. 
In 1994, the Department of Commerce, working under the NII Task Force, 
published a report calling for public input on the need for expanded regulation of the 
digital environment.  Led by the Commissioner of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
public hearings were held throughout 1994, culminating with a Conference on Fair Use 
(CONFU) to determine changes to Fair Use guidelines as originally stipulated in the 
Copyright Act of 1976.241  While the conference was being held and the Task Force was 
working towards providing recommendations for altering copyright law, President 
Clinton engaged the international copyright community, signing the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (URAA) which implemented the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) including Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs).  This 
piece of legislation removed thousands of works from the public domain and 
retroactively granted them copyrights.  In a legal brief challenging Congress’ power 
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regarding copyright, a group of activists, scholars, and litigators claimed, “These laws 
have greatly harmed plaintiffs’ artistic endeavors, and their ability to perform, teach, and 
disseminate works to the public….the government does not stop there. It even claims that 
this Court has absolutely no authority to review plaintiffs’ challenges because they 
involve ‘policy’ debate reserved exclusively for Congress. In the government’s view, 
Congress has carte blanche authority to enact any copyright law. And it is this Court’s 
‘duty’ to just ‘apply and enforce settled law’ enacted by Congress.” (emphasis in 
quotation).242   
The debate over digital copyright law was heating up.  While CONFU continued 
to hear objections from the public and debate between industry, government, academia, 
and the public carried on, the NII Task Force released the Report of the Working Group 
on Intellectual Property Rights (known as the White Paper) in 1995.  The report claimed 
that existing copyright law was well-suited for most of the potential issues stemming 
from digitalization, but a few alterations would strengthen existing law.  Those 
suggestions included expanding the exclusive rights of copyright owners to include the 
right of transmission, creating new penalties and prohibitions on devices or programs 
designed to circumvent mechanisms protecting the rights of copyright owners, and 
protecting content through legal recourse for infringement of copyright management 
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information.243  These recommendations, adopted in slightly revised form in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, were the basis for sustained outrage and debate over the 
constriction of Fair Use policy applied through technical protection measures on the 
DVD.  Before the bill became law, however, another round of international networking 
shifted the debate once again. 
Because Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton altered U.S. policy regarding 
international copyright treaties, first by signing the Berne Convention and then engaging 
with international standards through GATT and TRIPS, a veritable Pandora’s Box was 
opened that led to sustained lobbying efforts by the MPAA and the other domestic 
content industries (see figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1:  Copyright Law Timeline 
   
These lobbyists recognized that through Congress’ interaction with the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) U.S. copyright terms and standards for enforcement could 
be improved to align with international standards.  Beginning as early as 1993, lobbyists 
for the content industries pushed for extension of copyright protection to life plus 70 
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years (95 for work for hire).244  Ongoing debate at the CONFU hearings resulted in a 
quagmire of competing ideas and interests, with no unanimous recommendations in sight.  
At the conclusion of the year, an international conference under the auspices of the WIPO 
considered the recommendations of the White Paper in an attempt to develop 
international consensus on copyright for the digital environment.  Lobbyists for industry 
and the public worked overtime to convince the diplomats to side with their respective 
organizations.  Delegates from 160 World Intellectual Property Organization member 
countries adopted a statement ensuring the "application of fair use in the digital 
environment." The treaty language emphasized "the need to maintain a balance between 
the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, research and 
access to information."  Ultimately, however, the conference sided with industry, 
agreeing to the recommendations set forth in the White Paper as a model to amend the 
Berne Convention (WIPO Treaty).245   
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
In turn, this international agreement influenced the activities of the United States 
Congress which, as DVD was entering the marketplace in 1997, considered proposals to 
prohibit circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs) through legislation 
complying with the WIPO and Phonograms Treaties.  While legitimizing and protecting 
TPMs was a principal concern of the industries engaged in the commercialization of 
DVD, the move to align U.S. policy concerning digital copyright should be seen within a 





broader context of protecting intellectual property online.  The digitization of information 
and commerce online required legal standards for both protecting intellectual property 
and limiting liability of service providers connecting the public to content.  The House 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Copyrights worked throughout 1997 with input from industry 
and academia to establish legal guidelines to be applied in an all-digital environment.   
By 1998, CONFU hearings were continuing, with content owners (represented by 
the MPAA) refusing to budge from their stance regarding TPMs not being a violation of 
Fair Use laws.  "Fair use" is a crucial element in American copyright law--the principle 
that the public is entitled, without having to ask permission, to use copyrighted works in 
ways that do not unduly interfere with the copyright owner's market for a work. Fair use 
covers personal, noncommercial uses, such as employing a VCR to record a television 
program for later viewing. Fair use also includes activities undertaken for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research.   Jack Valenti 
testified before Congress more than half a dozen times during the course of 1998, 
stressing the concern of the motion picture industry over the potential damage to be 
incurred by free access to digital content through unrestricted Fair Use and the trafficking 
of circumvention software.  According to the MPAA, DVD (and the internet) represented 
a completely different technology from anything then in the marketplace and required 
protection through legal, regulatory, and technological protection measures.  Fritz E. 
Attaway, general council for the MPAA, explains the ongoing debates: 
 Generally the position that we expressed throughout this process with 
regard to fair use was that copyright owners or property owners in general 
have never been prevented from locking up their property preventing 
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access, and that the Fair Use Doctrine has never been interpreted to permit 
someone to throw a brick through a Blockbuster window in order to gain 
access to a motion picture in order to exercise fair use…the issue is access, 
and the Fair Use Doctrine has never been interpreted to allow 
unauthorized access… the [Section] 1201(a)(1) prevents unauthorized 
access, just as the Communications Act has prevented unauthorized access 
to cable programming and satellite programming for many years.  The Fair 
Use Doctrine was not an issue there and we believe that it's not an issue in 
the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions.246 
Mr. Attaway’s assertion that anti-circumvention provisions did not constitute 
infringement of Fair Use guidelines illustrates the official position of the entertainment 
industry.  Consumer advocacy groups disagreed.  Technological protection measures 
virtually eliminated the possibility of fair use activities on DVD.  Artists, teachers, and 
others wishing to access content for repurposing would not be able to do so with 
technological and legal measures in place prohibiting them from doing so.  The official 
position of the MPAA, explicitly expressed through the deposition, incurred the wrath of 
the Digital Future Coalition, who balked at the claim that fair use of copyrighted 
materials would not be restrained by the combination of measures being employed by 
industry.  They argued that the legal measures set forth in the DMCA completely 
obliterated the Fair Use Doctrine set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976 and upheld in the 
Sony Betamax Case.  It is clear that the MPAA was seizing the opportunity afforded by 
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new digital delivery technologies to circumvent the Sony Betamax Case ruling; the 
lobbyists for the MPAA, including Jack Valenti, were drawing on legislative precedent, 
including the Telecommunications Act of 1996, to establish new legal and regulatory 
guidelines to ensure that their content would not be subject to open copying and trading 
as in the VHS/Betamax era. 
While this debate continued, Senator Warren Hatch, chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, renamed the WIPO Treaty Implementing Legislation the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  Before the bill became law, another round of 
debate in Congress occurred, with political gamesmanship impacting the final contents of 
the DMCA.  While copyright jurisdiction traditionally belongs exclusively to the House 
and Senate Judiciary Committees, the potential impact on industry resulted in joint 
referral of the DMCA to the House Commerce Committee.247  The committee, which had 
long-standing relationships with the MPAA, the computer industry content lobbyists 
(ITI), and the consumer electronics lobbyists (through the CEA), urged direct 
negotiations between these groups and the representatives of library and educational 
groups.  Ultimately, compromise was negotiated through the Digital Future Coalition; the 
final guidelines of the DMCA regarding anti-circumvention and technological protection 
measures included limited exemptions for libraries and universities, and required review 
of the law every three years.   
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The DMCA passed through Congress in the closing days of the 105th Session of 
Congress, 1998.  Congress had secured, through an unprecedented pro-industry piece of 
legislation, the rights of the content providers to completely restrict Fair Use.  This 
singular act, perhaps the most important piece of legislation for all intellectual property 
owners regarding copyright in the twentieth century, was indicative of Congress’ position 
regarding copyright.  To wit:  during that same congressional session, the House and 
Senate passed S. 505, the “Sonny Bono” Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) which 
once again sided with the content industries, extending protection from life of the author 
plus fifty years to life of the author plus seventy years.  In 1999, the 106th Session of 
Congress approved a significant hike in the minimum statutory damages for various types 
of copyright infringement in the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages 
Improvement Act.248  Literally dozens of similar examples of the federal government’s 
willingness to alter existing copyright law in the 1990s to protect industry in the digital 
era reflect the atmosphere pervading the Copyright Office, the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees.   
While the DMCA empowered the Copyright office to grant limited exemptions, it 
has repeatedly refused any such requests by consumers.  Movie fans, film scholars, movie 
critics, and public interest groups have all repeatedly asked the Copyright Office to grant 
DMCA exemptions to allow the decryption of DVDs in order to enable non-infringing 
uses and have been denied. For example, exemptions were sought to allow movie critics 
                                                
248 The law increased the minimum statutory damages for infringements from $500 to $750 and increased 
the maximum from $20,000 to $30,000. The maximum for willful infringement increased from $100,000 to 
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to post movie clips, DVD owners to skip "un-skippable" previews and commercials, and 
legitimate purchasers to bypass "region coding" restrictions on their DVD players.249  
None of these requests were approved.  Even if an exemption were granted, however, the 
Copyright Office is powerless to grant an exemption to the DMCA's "tools" ban, which 
means that fair users would be left without the tools necessary to exercise any exemption 
that might be granted.  Direct requests from such groups to the members of the MPAA, 
according to Attaway, have not been made.250 This pro-industry atmosphere initiated by 
Congress and upheld through the activities of the Copyright Office was supported, as we 
will see, by the judiciary.251 
ESTABLISHING CONTROL, PROTECTING DVD:  ANTI-PIRACY TECHNOLOGIES AND 
LICENSING STRATEGIES 
Prior to the regulatory bodies and the judiciary acting in favor of the studios and 
the burgeoning DVD industry, Hollywood recognized that their content would be at 
considerable risk in an open market where piracy of perfect digital copies would devalue 
their product.  They required some form of copy protection for their movies if they were 
                                                                                                                                            
$150,000. 
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to support DVD as a new digital delivery mechanism.  Working with the newly formed 
DVD Forum, and its core constituency of consumer electronics manufacturers and 
computer companies, the studios asked for the development and implementation of 
technological protections to limit copying from the format.  They required that the system 
be “voluntary” and “cost effective,” with the goal of “keeping honest people honest.”252  
A voluntary system would divide consoles and computer drives and their manufacturers 
into compliant and non-compliant categories.  Since all discs from the content providers 
would be compliant, any non-compliant device would be unable to play the discs.  
Therefore, the protection plan encouraged manufacturers to be compliant and to license 
the necessary technology for decryption from the licensing bodies (discussed below).  
This scenario effectively made a “voluntary” protection system mandatory while 
circumventing any possible antitrust infringement.  Additionally, the “cost-effective” part 
of the equation limited the efficacy of the protection technologies.  The studios realized 
very early in the development process that any protection technology that was cost 
effective would be vulnerable to determined hackers.  The goal was to provide a barrier 
to content duplication for the average consumer; determined hackers could be prosecuted 
for circumventing the protection scheme in the courts.  As long as any “hack” did not 
become so ubiquitous and easily integrated into consumer products (as with “Napster”) 
that the entire system was in jeopardy, the content was considered reasonably protected.   
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Of course, in a perfect world the studios could rely on impenetrable copy 
protection technologies, but the realities of the open-source and hacker movements online 
forced the content providers to reconcile degrees of protection and loss to piracy.  
However, by developing a slew of technological protection measures, the industry could 
virtually guarantee that decryption and hacking software and hardware would not reach 
the masses.  The resulting specifications for copy protection were so numerous as to 
overwhelm both the casual consumer and the casual researcher.  Protecting content on 
DVD meant using any and all means necessary, including antiquated analog 
technologies, new digital encryption methods, watermarking, region controls, and new 
techniques and technologies to control the transfer of digital data between devices.  All of 
these strategies were developed and implemented for the express purpose of controlling 
access to, and use of, Hollywood’s content.  Piracy was a concern, but at least as 
important was assuaging Hollywood’s concern that unrestricted access would undercut 
the tiered distribution system that had proved so profitable over the previous decades.  
Controlling the markets into which DVD would be released, maintaining the primacy of 
theatrical exhibition as a distribution window, and continuing the efficient tiered global 
distribution strategy for home video could be assured through the various copy control 
technologies developed for use on DVD. 
Thus the three industries worked to develop an inexpensive system that would: 
   ensure the quality of the digital content 
   be effective against unauthorized consumer uses 
   be robust and tamper-resistant 
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   be revised if a breach occurred in the system 
   be applicable to all forms of distribution 
   be suitable for implementation on consoles and computers (Taylor 2000, p. 
191).   
This laundry list of requirements from the studios was supplemented by the 
consumer electronics manufacturers which asked for a low cost, voluntary, tamper 
resistant system that would not affect the normal use of the device and that would not 
require extensive resource requirements from the device.  Working towards these goals, 
Working Group 9 of the DVD Forum in partnership with a newly formed entity (as of 
1996), the Copy Protection Technical Working Group (CPTWG), spent millions of 
dollars and hundreds of thousands of man-hours to create a mutually agreeable protection 
system that would make digital and analog copying from DVD difficult.  Initially, the 
DVD Forum intended to include copy protection as part of the original specification for 
DVD (discussed earlier), but after a series of delays and combative disagreements 
between interested parties, they separated the work, assigning the CPTWG and WG-9 to 
the task.   
The CPTWG solicited proposals for copy protection technologies from interested 
companies, handing them off to WG-9 for submission and approval from the DVD 
Forum’s steering committee (Taylor 2000, p. 192).  A coalition of groups within the 
Forum developed a framework for security and access control called the Content 
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Protection System Architecture (CPSA).253  This system was designed to be employed on 
all DVD and future digital delivery technologies, defining the content protection 
requirements of hardware devices.  Because DVD content protection was designed to be 
complex, including a variety of different mechanisms for protection, it required a formal 
architecture to coordinate all of its various components.254  CPSA includes two types of 
content-protection mechanisms:  watermarking and encryption.  While watermarking, a 
technical system to identify the status of the content through embedded information, 
offered a more secured form of protection that dictated how content could be accessed, 
played, or copied, its development and implementation on DVD-Video was difficult to 
develop and implement; DVD-Video would rely initially on encryption technologies, like 
CSS, to protect usage and control access. 
Digital and Analog Protection Technologies 
Encryption technologies scramble content until it is decrypted by a device that has 
the requisite descrambling technology.  The Content Scramble System (CSS) (discussed 
earlier) was developed as the primary mechanism to safeguard pre-recorded DVD-Video 
content.  CSS employs an authentication and encryption system whereby the data on the 
disc is encoded, only to be decoded by keys embedded within compliant players.255  The 
                                                
253 At the behest of the 4C Entity (Intel, IBM, Matsushita, and Toshiba; all of whom would eventually be 
steering committee members), the CPTWG, 4C, and the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), worked 
on this aspect of copy protection. 
254 CPSA is made up of eleven rules that define standard ways to implement access and recording controls 
intended to prevent redundancies and incompatibilities.   
255 One of the keys is unique to the disc, while another is located within the MPEG file (the compressed 
movie data) to be descrambled.  Unauthorized copying is prevented through the system by requiring that a 
player interacting with a recording device authenticate that both devices are licensed to use the system.  
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average consumer’s console or drive on her personal computer decrypts data from the 
disc in sections through keys and locks on the discs and devices.  CSS was developed by 
Matsushita and Toshiba in 1996 to comply with Hollywood’s demands and U.S. export 
restrictions.  Hollywood’s concern over perfect digital copies was assuaged by CSS; 
perfect copies of an MPEG stream could be made, but would not be playable since the 
copy would not include the keys for decryption.   
Complying with U.S. export restrictions, however, proved to be the Pandora’s 
Box to illegal copying and the litigation discussed in section three.  Because the 
restrictions limited CSS to 40-bit encryption technologies, with only 25 of those bits 
being actively employed through the algorithms, hackers like Jon Johansen could easily 
crack the code through reverse engineering or brute-force techniques within minutes.256  
Additionally, U.S. Patent Law, and the availability of public patent records, enabled any 
curious hacker access to information the industry consistently argued was protected as 
trade secrets, disseminated only to companies willing to pay exorbitant licensing fees.  
Recognizing the potential vulnerability of the system led developers to additional 
protection measures and a complicated decryption procedure within CSS that utilized 
multiple levels of keys.257  CSS was, and continues to be, the primary protection 
mechanism on all DVD-Video discs and players.  It is, however, just one of many 
technological protection measures curtailing free use, enabling complete market control 
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through restricted access to content, and limiting piracy through copying by non-hacker 
consumers. 
Home video technologies have long been a source of discomfort and concern for 
content providers.  Because VHS and Betamax technologies were based on analog 
technologies, whose use in copying content fell under the Fair Use guidelines of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, protecting content was virtually impossible.  While DVD offered 
the content providers a means to an end of limitless copying and trading of content 
through digital encryption methods, once the digital stream was decrypted it was possible 
to copy directly from the DVD player to a VCR.  The Analog Protection System (APS), 
also known as Analog Content Protection (ACP), was developed by Macrovision (whose 
technology was the primary protection mechanism for VHS) for use on DVD players in 
1996.258  The system was designed to prevent the average consumer from transferring 
DVDs to VHS by scrambling the signal between devices.259  Like all of the copy-
protection technologies devised for public distribution, APS was quickly hacked, this 
time by enterprising consumer electronics manufacturers working outside of the DVD 
Forum.  Seeking an entrée into the market, Asian firms marketed VHS machines that 
                                                                                                                                            
257 These keys included title keys, disc keys, and player keys, all controlled through licensing authorities 
set up under the DVD-Copy Control Agency (DVD-CCA).  Once the disc is inserted in a device, the player 
key decrypts the disc key, the disc key decrypts the title key, and the title key decrypts the stored content.   
258 The system modifies the NTSC/PAL video signals coming from the DVD player such that they can be 
displayed on televisions but cannot be recorded on VCRs.  The system confuses the automatic gain control 
on VCRs through either Pseudo-Sync Pulses (PSPs) or through modulated color-burst signals such that the 
recording from DVDs is severely degraded.  APS was integrated into the CPSA as a functional counterpart 
to CSS and other technological protection measures.   
259 Its interaction with the architecture and functionality of the entire system is based on its designed 
interface with the NTSC/PAL encoder within the player.  This encoder, another control mechanism that 
distinguishes between television output signals in the United States (NTSC) and Europe and a majority of 
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could circumvent the scrambled code and record from DVD machines.  In fact, these 
devices have become so popular around the world that Macrovision subsequently 
developed a VCR that could circumvent its own technology and applied for a patent for 
the process.260 
Yet another technology for controlling use and access to content was developed 
by Macrovision for use on DVDs (see figure 6.2 for more on copy protection 
technologies and their effectiveness).  The Copy Generation Management System 
(CGMS) was designed as a mechanism to direct the recorder to allow or prevent 
copying.261  The system was designed to function according to two formats (analog and 
digital) and three functional states in the recording process (copy enable, copy one 
generation, or copy never).262  While the studios were quick to adopt the CGMS system, 
predictably encoding all discs with “copy never” bits, Macrovision failed to enforce or 
police implementation on consoles or drives.  Consequently, the flag that effectively 
limits the number of copies that can be made from a single disc is often not included in 
the vast majority of drives and consoles.263  Why Macrovision never patented the 
technology is a mystery; one possible explanation may be that the system was not 
                                                                                                                                            
the Eastern world (PAL), interacts with the MPEG stream header and then applies the encryption through 
the output ports on the device.  http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1697,1231647,00.asp 
260 Ibid. 
261 The bits are encoded in the authoring process on the disc itself and on the DVD player and DVD 
recorder.  The DVD player adds the CGMS data to the video output stream before the recorder recognizes 
the setting and allows for copying.   
262 “Preserving an Effective DVD-Copying System,” Macrovision Corp., copyright 2003; accessed via 
http://www.macrovision.com/pdfs/Preserving-an-effective-DVD-Copying-System_0303.pdf 
263 Recent tests of over 100 models of the DVD players in the market have shown that approximately 60% 
either did not implement CGMS-A, or the implementations were incorrect, resulting in CGMS not being 
preserved on the video output during playback.  Ibid. 
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endorsed by the DVD-CCA, which was not willing to license the technology through one 
of the many licensing bodies under their umbrella (see licensing discussion below).  
Without the support of the major licensing body, whose members were the same as the 
controlling body of the DVD Forum, Macrovision was in the precarious position of 
encouraging the retrofitting of DVD players with CGMS--not a logistically feasible 
solution.  Additionally, because Macrovision was profiting from the widespread inclusion 
of analog copy protection measures, licensed by the company independently from the 
DVD-CCA or its subsidiaries, resources may not have been available to enforce the 
implementation and licensing of CGMS. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: DVD-Video Copy Protection Technologies and Performance 
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Source:  Macrovision Testing, March 2003, Macrovision Corporation 
 
Keeping Up with the Hackers:  Supplemental Protections 
APS and CSS were the two principal technologies protecting DVD-Video in the 
open marketplace.  When new DVD formats emerged, new protection measures were 
designed and implemented to better protect content.  The Content Protection for 
Prerecorded Media (CPPM) system was designed to replace CSS for use with DVD-
Audio.264  The technology performs similarly to CSS, utilizing an authentication 
mechanism between disc and player.  While DVD-Audio has failed to achieve the 
widespread success of its video-based sibling, DVD-Audio encryption through CPPM 
represents the continuing efforts undertaken by DVD the industry to improve and 
integrate new protection schemes (Taylor 2000, p. 194).265  These technologies are 
                                                
264 The system was designed by the 4C alliance (IBM, Intel, Matsushita, and Toshiba) 
265 The principal difference between CPPM and CSS is the level of sophistication in the encryption 
sequence and the robustness of the protection provided by the technology.  CPPM replaces the disc key 
utilized by CSS with an album identifier that provides a key that cannot be duplicated on recordable media. 
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distributed and controlled by the DVD Forum’s licensing bodies.  These licensing 
organizations supply device manufacturers with the device keys, and can revoke a key in 
circulation if it is hacked that will make all future discs with new media key blocks 
unplayable.  After 1999, with the potential for recordable and re-writable discs and DVD 
recording drives on the market, the 4C group improved CPPM to compensate.   
The Content Protection for Recordable Media (CPRM) system binds a recording 
to the medium on which it is recorded.  The system allows discs to be recorded and 
played back on drives, but does not allow copying of content from the drive to another 
disc or other media.266  CPRM, like many of the protection technologies discussed herein, 
was designed for beta-testing on DVD hardware and software.  Once the systems were 
found to be robust and sufficiently functional, they could then be applied to other digital 
technologies and platforms.  When CPRM was announced in 1999, the online and 
hardware-enthusiast communities balked at the potential application of the technology to 
computer software systems, PC hard drives, and future digital technologies, calling for 
boycotts and organizing through the Electronic Frontier Foundation.267  Through 2001, 
consumer advocacy groups rallied support, citing fair use constriction and collusion.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
Each drive or console player has a set of 16 device keys that decrypt information on the media key block 
(MKB).   
266 Utilizing a series of keys and media IDs on discs, the system encrypts content as it is copied onto the 
storage drive.  Once the content is encrypted with the individual ID from the disc, it cannot be copied onto 
another disc with a different ID. 
267 “Protecting Digital Assets,” Digital Content Protection, Part II, CPRM:  The Full Story, Ziff Davis 
Publishing Holdings Inc., 2001:  http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1697,1231646,00.asp 
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4C entity finally issued an official policy statement declaring that CPRM was not to be 
licensed for hard drives.268 
Yet another group of technical protection measures was developed for use on 
supplemental DVD formats, with the intention of eventual inclusion on DVD-Video.  
Watermarking employs a digital signature that appears on the video or audio track and 
can be recognized by the recording or playback equipment.269  Watermarking has yet to 
be included on DVD-Video, but the various industry organizations, including the 4C and 
5C groups are determined to enlist it to limit piracy.   
The transmission of digital content afforded by DVD, and the potential for 
limitless perfect copies from digital masters, continues to be a matter of paramount 
interest and investment to protect content.  While DVD provides pristine digital content 
regardless of the particular specification (DVD-Video or DVD-Audio), digital 
interconnect standards have limited the free and unconverted flow of digital content from 
devices to receivers.  Most DVD players convert the digital content to analog for output 
before the receiver reconverts the content back to digital for display.  Once the standards 
for digital transmission have been resolved, digital content will flow unimpeded between 
device and display, providing potential pirates another opportunity to hijack content.  The 
                                                
268 Ibid. 
269 The functionality of watermarking was designed to link content to the signature through conversion 
from digital to analog or vice versa.  Watermarking is then connected to encryption technologies like CSS 
or CPPM; in order for manufacturers to get the required decryption keys that afford access to the content, 
they must sign a license requiring that watermarking detection be implemented.  Watermarking was 
deployed through DVD-Audio players; developed by Verance and utilizing CGMS to limit the number of 
copies that can be made by any one player.  DVD-Audio recorders include encoders that can change the 
watermark embedded on the disc from a “copy-once” to “copy no more,” thus limiting copies to one.  
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5C alliance (Intel, Sony, Hitachi, Matsushita, and Toshiba) developed the Digital 
Transmission Content Protection (DTCP) system to establish secure channels between 
DVD players and digital receivers (like HDTVs).  This secure pathway prevents 
unauthenticated devices from stealing the signal en route.  Another similar protection 
technology was developed in 1999 to create a universal interface standard between 
computers and displays.270  In this way, the protection can be updated continuously 
through consumer’s usage of the system, thus protecting high definition video content on 
computers.  Without this protection technology, Hollywood’s support for the next-next 
generation high definition disc on computers could not be expected. 
Controlled Distribution:  Region Controls 
The final aspect of copy and access protection employed by Digital Video Discs 
is a technology known as region (or territorial) control. While the content protection 
technologies discussed above would seem to cover all potential copyright infringement 
techniques, none of these restrict access based on geographic location.  Region control 
technology divides the world into a number of regions (6 for DVD), allowing discs sold 
in a certain region to be played only on players manufactured in a given region (see 
Figure 5.3).  The reason this technology exists is because movie studios typically sign 
complicated cross-licensing deals for international distribution and desired to maintain 
the tiered distribution strategy to maximize profits in each distribution window; region 
                                                                                                                                            
Through this structure, DVD-Audio discs were protected, while a concession was made to the fair use 
community.   
270 The High-Definition Output Protection (HDCP) scheme, also known as the Digital Visual Interface 
(DVI), utilizes a variety of keys and selection vectors to verify that the receiving device is authorized to 
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control allows studios to cooperate in regions around the world and to stagger marketing 
and distribution.  Region control was intended to maintain the primacy of the theatrical 
window; if DVD versions of films were released in one part of the world while the film 
was still in theaters elsewhere, pirated copies of DVDs could undercut box office sales.  
In addition to employing technology to discourage copying, CSS-encrypted DVD-Video 
discs may “optionally” contain region management information to allow the studios to 
control the distribution of their products throughout the world.271  To prevent discs 
intended for sale in one part of the world from being distributed and used elsewhere, all 
devices automatically check discs for region codes and only play titles for which they are 
authorized.  For computer DVD-ROM drives and recorders this task is accomplished 
through Regional Playback Control (RPC).  There have been two phases employed by the 
DVD industry: Phase I implementations were used prior to the end of 1999 and function 
through the computer’s video playing software, decoding system or operating system to 
manage region control. In this case, the region code could be set only once; for some 
decoders, sometimes the region was even preset at the factory. Phase II implementations 
have been in use since 2000 and hand-off responsibility for region management 
exclusively to the drives and recorders implementing the necessary functions in their 
firmware. Under this system, the user could change the region code up to five times, with 
                                                                                                                                            
display or record video.  The player maintains a list of active keys and vectors, and is updated by system 
renewability messages (SRMs) that come from the discs.   
271 All devices that are equipped with CSS technology (mandated through a “voluntary” system whereby 
any non-CSS device will not play ANY disc from the studios) must contain regional playback controls 
under the terms of the CSS license.   
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the manufacturer having the additional ability to then service the unit and reset this 
counter (up to four times).   
Regional Playback Control (RPC) was one of the most controversial of the 
technical protection technologies employed on DVDs.  Controlling access to content 
through this scheme bordered on illegal restraint of trade, according to the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission.272  International regulatory bodies balked, but 
were relatively ineffectual in combating the use of RPC.  Because RPC is not strictly a 
copy-protection technology, circumventing the system is not illegal in the United States 
and around the world.  Consequently, “universal” and “code-free” players are widely 
available and patches that modify Windows and Mac operating systems to disable RPC II 
in DVD-ROM drives are easily found online.  The studios responded by developing the 
Regional Coding Enhancement (RCE) system to prevent Region I discs from working in 
code-free players.273  Predictably, the hacker community quickly found ways to 
circumvent this new protection measure, creating piracy software and making it widely 
available online. 
                                                
272 http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1697,1231651,00.asp 
273 Essentially, the discs are embedded with codes that can detect if the player has been altered to allow 
playback across regions, preventing playback once the player has been identified as being non-compliant 




Figure 6.3:  DVD Regions 
 
 
Controlled Compliance:  Licensing Bodies 
While there is as yet no hack-proof technology or protection system that can stop 
piracy by the determined hacker, mechanisms for control over access to content continue 
to be relatively effective in preventing most mainstream consumers from casually 
copying or importing regional coded discs.  Additionally, the systems and technologies 
deployed to prevent illegal copying were supplemented by an industrial control 
mechanism that forced device and disc manufacturers to be compliant with the various 
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protection technologies.  A licensing system was set up by the CPTWG and the DVD 
Forum’s various members for each of the copy protection technologies.  Through 
licenses, the collective power of the DVD Forum, and the DVD Copy Control 
Administration, could be wielded to assure compliance in all global markets.  Because 
each of the licenses was under the purview of members of the DVD Forum and was 
developed through either the CPTWG, the 4C alliance, the 5C alliance, or Working 
Group 9 of the DVD Forum, final specifications and the licenses dictating their form and 
function were agreed to by the most powerful industry members.274  By virtue of the 
collective standing of these member organizations, who were also steering committee 
members, and the desire of the studios to protect content from digital piracy, all discs 
were encrypted with the CSS technology.  Therefore, any device manufacturer wishing to 
produce a player or drive capable of playing encrypted discs must obtain a license.  The 
license gives the manufacturer the right to use the technology and provides them with the 
necessary technical locks and keys provided by the licensing body (initially Matsushita 
licensed the technology on an interim basis).  Because the three industries agreed to 
implement the technology jointly, they set the terms and obligations imposed by the 
license stipulating how content would be treated once it was decrypted.   
The license was offered royalty-free, with an administrative fee paid to the 
licensing organization.  This licensing organization was developed for each of the TPM 
technologies as a governing body consisting of member organizations from the content, 
                                                
274 For instance, the CSS system was developed by Matsushita and Toshiba as a proprietary technology 
that was ascribed particular intellectual property rights.   
 
 306 
computer, and consumer electronics industries.  The licensing body, initially Matsushita 
before the formation of the DVD CCA, held the direct rights and responsibilities for 
enforcing the license and the related specification requirements.  Additionally, the studios 
were afforded special enforcement rights as “third party beneficiaries” to bring injunctive 
and “equitable relief” litigation against non-compliant licensees.275  The licensing 
structure for the various protection technologies is divided over several legal bodies, with 
License Management Incorporated (LMI) being the central management body for current 
protection technologies and the 4C Entity taking over future technologies (see appendix 
6.1).276  While tracking the licensing structure for copy protection technologies seems to 
be an impossible task, given the convoluted structure and relationships between entities, 
the power structure is much simpler than it at first appears.  All of the licensing agencies 
are managed by the same executive director, John Hoy, and share the same physical 
address.277  In fact, the DVD CCA, 4C Entity, LMI and the DTLA are actually the same 
organization split up into a multiple organizational structure to avoid antitrust 
litigation.278  We’ll see in section three how these various entities behave to enforce 
licenses and to bring litigation against computer and code hackers, working with the 
MPAA, whose members overlap those of the DVD CCA, LMI, and 4C entities. 
                                                
275 “Copy Protection Measures:  The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses,” by Dean 
S. Marks and Bruce H. Turnbull; Workshop on Implementation Issues of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Geneva, December 6, 1999.  
 
276 For example, the next generation of CSS will be licensed by 4C Entity, not by the DVD CCA which 
licensed CSS.   




The passage of the DMCA and subsequent pieces of legislation supporting or 
extending copyright protection were important steps in securing the confidence of the 
MPAA member companies and guaranteeing their continuing support of DVD 
technologies.  The legislative environment, including the behaviors of the Copyright 
Office and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, supported the patent pooling and 
licensing strategies employed by the DVD Forum and consistently upheld the rights of 
the content producers to restrict Fair Use and protect their content from unauthorized 
access.  The DMCA outlined and legitimized the legal and technological protection 
measures hoped for by the MPAA member companies working in conjunction with the 
consumer electronics and computer industries.  However, it was not until the state and 
federal courts assessed the legislation that the DMCA would prove its worth to the 
industry.  In October of 1999, not even a year after the passage of the DMCA, Jon 
Johansen, a fifteen year old Norwegian computer enthusiast published DeCSS on LiVID 
project, an open source software development site working to build a DVD player for the 
Linux operating system.  DeCSS was a software program that “cracked” the protection 
algorithm employed through the Content Scramble System (CSS) on DVDs (see 
appendix 5.2 for a complete description of the process leading to the release of 
DeCSS).279 
                                                                                                                                            
278 Specifically, DVD CCA is the licensing body for CSS, 4C Entity is behind the CPRM hard-disk 
encryption and several watermarking technologies, DTLA licenses DTCP, and LMI is, of course, the 




The First DVD Hacker:  Jon Johansen vs. DVD CCA 
In January of 2000, attorneys for the DVD-Copy Control Agency, a licensing 
body composed of members from the MPAA and the DVD Forum, in conjunction with 
the MPAA’s international counterpart, the MPA, filed a complaint against Jon Johansen 
with the Norwegian Economic Crime Unite (OKOKRIM) asking for the prosecution of 
the teenager for publishing DeCSS.  Shortly thereafter, the Norwegian authorities raided 
the home of Johansen, seeking evidence in support of a criminal case.  It was not until 
two years later, however, in January of 2002, that Johansen was indicted.280  The 
prosecution began in earnest in December, with legal briefs filed in Oslo City Court 
against the defendant for “building his own DVD playing software.”281  In January of 
2003, the Norwegian court ruled that Johansen was innocent, citing evidence that he had 
made no illegal copies of movies.  An appeal was immediately filed.  The second trial of 
Johansen began before a seven-judge panel in appellate court in December, 2003.  A brief 
trial resulted in affirmation of the lower court’s ruling; Johansen was exonerated.  The 
MPA and DVD-CCA lawyers chose not to appeal the ruling the Norwegian Supreme 
Court, instead turning their attention to the ongoing cases in the United States.   
The significance of this court battle resides not in its ultimate outcome, but in its 
relevance in establishing precedent for controlling DVD content, upholding the 
international copyright laws through the WIPO treaties, and maintaining the support of 
the MPAA member companies releasing content on DVD.  While the case ultimately 
                                                
280 The indictment claimed Johansen was in violation of Norwegian Criminal Code Section 145.2, a data 




resulted in acquittal of the defendant, failing to demonstrate the efficacy of international 
copyright law, the very fact that the DVD-CCA and the MPA brought charges illustrates 
the lengths these industrial bodies were willing to go to protect content. Potential 
copyright violators could expect to face legal ramifications, at considerable 
inconvenience and personal expense; the studios could be comfortable knowing that their 
lobbying and legal representatives in the MPA, MPAA, and DVD-CCA were willing to 
go outside the United States to protect digital content on DVD. 
Meanwhile, in the United States, three cases were filed in December, 1999 against 
alleged violators of section 1201 of the DMCA.   While all three of these cases were 
issued concurrently, they were separate cases, arguing different legal statutes and grounds 
for prosecuting defendants.  The first case tested the jurisdiction of the California courts 
in prosecuting tort offenders who were potentially damaging California industries 
through the internet; the second tested the legality and constitutionality of the First 
Amendment relating to computer code (DeCSS) as free speech; the third was the first 
example of a case pertaining to the DMCA’s legality. 
Trade Secrets:  Pavlovich vs. DVD CCA   
The first case was filed by the DVD-CCA in California State Court against 
Matthew Pavlovich under a trade secret misappropriation claim.  Pavlovich was a Purdue 
University computer science student who maintained the website for the LiVID project 
where Johansen originally posted DeCSS.  The DVD-CCA filed suit against Pavlovich 
and literally hundreds of other anonymous re-publishers of DeCSS code, claiming that 
CSS was a trade secret and that the publishing of DeCSS was in violation of state law 
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pertaining to publishing “highly confidential” trade secrets.  In its complaint, DVD-CCA 
alleged that Pavlovich misappropriated its trade secrets by posting the DeCSS program 
on the LiVid Web site because the “DeCSS program . . . embodies, uses, and/or is a 
substantial derivation of confidential proprietary information which DVD CCA 
licenses.”282  In response, Pavlovich filed a motion to dismiss the charges, contending that 
California lacked jurisdiction over his person.  DVD-CCA opposed, contending that 
jurisdiction was proper because Pavlovich “misappropriated DVD CCA’s trade secrets 
knowing that such actions would adversely impact an array of substantial California 
business enterprises—including the motion picture industry, the consumer electronics 
industry, and the computer industry.”283 In a brief order, the trial court denied 
Pavlovich’s motion, citing California case law, and issued an injunction forcing Pavlovich 
to remove the DeCSS code from the website.  By September of 2000, Pavlovich was 
appealing this ruling to California’s appellate court and California’s Supreme Court, 
challenging the assertion of jurisdiction over him since he was then a resident of the state 
of Texas, with no connection to the state of California.  In December, the California 
Supreme Court granted Pavlovich’s petition and ordered the appellate court to dismiss 
the case or show why jurisdiction should be granted over a non-resident.  After nearly 
eight months of deliberations and arguments from both sides in the California Court of 
Appeals for the 6th District, a ruling was made that validated the DVD-CCA case for 
                                                
282 Pavlovich v. Superior Court, Review Granted XXX 91 Cal.App.4th 409, Opinion No. S100809 
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jurisdiction over the defendant for publications made to the LiVID mailing list.284  
Pavlovich filed another appeal to the California Supreme Court challenging the appellate 
court’s decision.  The California Supreme Court, ruling in November, 2002, sided with the 
defendant (see appendix 5.3 for the ruling).285 
While the ruling of the California Supreme Court ultimately sided with the 
defendant, the case was significant to the DVD industry in a number ways.  Because the 
case against Pavlovich was centered around the infringement of California laws 
pertaining to trade secrets, the case was subject to the standards and evaluative 
mechanisms of the state rather than the federal government or federal judiciary.  This 
distinction is important because the case ultimately establishing that in order for the 
DVD-CCA to successfully prosecute DeCSS cases, they would need to base future cases 
on federal laws, including the DMCA.  Additionally, the case in the state of California 
tested the jurisdiction of the California courts, ultimately revealing that the federal courts 
held jurisdiction in matters impacting industry across state lines.  The final noteworthy 
outcome of the Pavlovich case is revealed through depositions and summary judgment in 
the case; the notion that DeCSS violated trade secrets, even after it was posted by 
hundreds of websites, was dismissed by the courts on grounds that enforcing trade secret 
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infringement after the publishing of that secret online was tantamount to “putting the 
genie back in the bottle” and not the responsibility of the courts.286 
The First Amendment:  Bunner vs. DVD CCA 
 The second case was filed in December, 1999 by the DVD-CCA against Andrew 
Bunner, McLaughlin, et al., in California State Court under a similar trade secret 
misappropriation claim.  The case tested the First Amendment’s protection for technically 
oriented speech; if trade secret claims were upheld, then censoring online information 
after it was available worldwide would have been under the purview of the courts.  
Unlike Pavlovich, Bunner was a California resident who had re-published the DeCSS 
code online on a site called Slashdot.  In December, the California Superior Court denied 
a request from the DVD-CCA to enjoin all online publishers of DeCSS.  Shortly 
thereafter, in January, the court reversed its earlier ruling and issued an injunction against 
Bunner and all other online DeCSS publishers.  By May, 2000, Bunner and his co-
defendants appealed the injunction to California’s Court of Appeals for the 6th District, 
claiming that the ruling was an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of speech.  The 
following November, the California Appellate Court overturned the injunction based on 
the First Amendment rights of Web publishers who republish information obtained in the 
public domain.  The DVD-CCA appealed the decision immediately to the California 
Supreme Court.  On August 25, 2003, the California Supreme Court upheld the free 
speech claims, but sent the case back to the appellate court for reconsideration.  Perhaps 
recognizing their position, the DVD-CCA filed a motion to dismiss the case against 




Brunner in January, 2004, only to have the court deny the request.  Finally, on February 
27, 2004 California’s 6th Appellate Court ruled that the original injunction was an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of expression rights.  The court again cited 
that the computer program could not be restrained from publication because the program 
was not a trade secret at the time it was published.287 
One of the side-effects of the Bunner Case was to identify two constituencies in 
the ongoing battle over content protection, fair use, and First Amendment issues.  A 
number of Amici Curiae and Amicus Briefs were filed after the preliminary injunction 
was handed down by the Superior Court.288  Bunner’s support was largely based on the 
role of the case in shaping future laws regarding trade secrets; the Amici Curiae reads as 
follows:  “Both individually and as a group, they are concerned with the proper evolution 
of trade secrecy law, the consistency of this law with federal constitutional interests, and 
with preservation of legal rules that permit reverse engineering in order to promote 
innovation and competition in high technology and other industries.”289  Conversely, the 
supporters of the DVD-CCA case stated, “Amici are alarmed that if the lower court’s 
decision is upheld, its consequences will extend well beyond the unlawful publication of 
                                                
287 Case description culled from summary briefs and motions posted through the website for the defense, 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF):  http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/DVDCCA_case/#bunner-main 
288 Siding with the DVD-CCA were the Attorney General of California, Microsoft, Ford Motor Company, 
The Boeing Company, Sears, Roebuck & Co., The Proctor & Gamble Company, AOL Time-Warner, 
Bellsouth, Coca-Cola, and the Intellectual Property Owners Association and the National Association of 
Manufacturers.  Siding with Bunner and his co-defendants were the Computer Professionals for Social 
Responsibility, the ACLU, Intellectual Property Law Professors, the Computer and Communications 
Industry Association, and the United States Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing 
Machinery.   
289 “Brief of Amici Curiae,” by Jennifer M. Urban (Bar No. 209845), Samuelson Law, Technology and 
Public Policy Clinic, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), 396 Simon Hall 
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trade secrets in this case to include a much broader array of situations in which the 
intellectual property of American business is embedded in trade secrets.  If the decision is 
affirmed, businesses will no longer be able to rely on California courts to preserve a wide 
range of trade secrets, from customer lists to blueprints to industrial know-how – even 
the secret formula for Coca-Cola. The loss to California will be that valuable trade secrets 
will not be protected against unlawful misappropriation and disclosure, and the State 
could become a haven for intellectual property thieves.”290 
Clearly, the case was generating interest from industry and consumer advocacy 
groups, for different reasons.  Industry groups were concerned that the case would 
legitimize, if not encourage, hacking and publishing trade secrets.  If the courts sanctioned 
such behavior, major industries with intellectual property and trade secrets could lose 
their competitive advantage in the marketplace.  Conversely, advocacy groups fought to 
assure that protections remained in place that protected inventors and innovators who 
might improve existing technologies through reverse engineering.  What the final decision 
of the courts established were guidelines for web-publishing relative to the First 
Amendment.  Additionally, the case demonstrated, once again, that the state of 
California’s courts were not likely to side with industry against individuals who were 
challenging the legitimacy of CSS and the DMCA. 
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The DMCA Case:  2600 Magazine vs. MPAA 
The third part of the legal battle over the publishing of DeCSS was filed by the 
MPAA (the DVD-CCA’s sister organization) vs. 2600 Magazine, a publication targeted 
towards the increasingly organized “hacker” community, in New York Federal Court 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  The case, which came to be alternately 
known as Universal City Studios, Inc v. Reimerdes (for the principal studio and one of 
three defendants responsible for the article posting the DeCSS code), or simply “The 
DMCA Case,” hinged on the studios’ claim that 2600 Magazine provided a technology 
for circumvention access and copy controls on copyrighted works by posting and linking 
to DeCSS and was therefore in violation of Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.  The courts would ultimately agree with the studios, ruling for the 
plaintiffs by identifying that DeCSS was an unlawful circumvention device.  The case was 
the first to directly test the scope and constitutionality of the DMCA’s anti-
circumvention provisions and was crucial to the fight for fair use being waged by 
consumer advocacy groups.   
The studios, through the MPAA, maintained their right to control the manner in 
which movies are played, and challenged the defense’s assertion that the code itself 
constituted free speech under protection of the First Amendment to the Constitution.  
The case began as early as October, 1999, when the MPAA, aware of the online 
availability of DeCSS, began sending cease-and-desist letters to web site operators 
posting the software.  By January, 2000, the studios had identified a target for 
prosecution:  Eric Corley, Emmanuel Goldstein, and Shawn Reimerdes, publishers of 
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2600:  The Hacker Quarterly Magazine.  After a preliminary hearing, the Court ruled for 
the plaintiffs, granting a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from posting 
DeCSS.  Following the injunction, the defendants removed the code from the website, but 
defiantly posted links to other websites offering the software for download.  
Additionally, the website posted this banner:  “We have to face the possibility that we 
could be forced into submission.  For that reason it’s especially important that as many 
of you as possible, all throughout the world, take a stand and mirror these files.”291  Judge 
Lewis A. Kaplan issued a ruling after a three-day trial, upholding the constitutionality of 
the DMCA and enacted a permanent injunction barring the site from posting DeCSS code 
and from linking to any site known to post the code: 
In the final analysis, the dispute between these parties is simply put if not 
necessarily simply resolved. Plaintiffs have invested huge sums over the 
years in producing motion pictures in reliance upon a legal framework 
that, through the law of copyright, has ensured that they will have the 
exclusive right to copy and distribute those motion pictures for economic 
gain. They contend that the advent of new technology should not alter this 
long established structure. Defendants, on the other hand, are adherents of 
a movement that believes that information should be available without 
charge to anyone clever enough to break into the computer systems or data 
storage media in which it is located. Less radically, they have raised a 
legitimate concern about the possible impact on traditional fair use of 
access control measures in the digital era…. In our society, however, 
clashes of competing interests like this are resolved by Congress. For now, 
at least, Congress has resolved this clash in the DMCA and in plaintiffs' 
favor. Given the peculiar characteristics of computer programs for 
circumventing encryption and other access control measures, the DMCA 
as applied to posting and linking here does not contravene the First 
Amendment.292 
                                                
291 www.2600.com 
292 “Opinion,” Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT 
OF NEW YORK, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC, et al., Plaintiffs, -against- SHAWN C. 
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On January 19, 2001, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, serving as defense 
council, filed for appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  Shortly thereafter, on 
January 26, 2001, Amicus Curiae briefs were filed in support of the defendants.  Amongst 
those supporting the appeal were the ACLU, the Digital Future Coalition, the American 
Library Association, the American Research Libraries, the Music Library Association, 
seventeen leading computer scientists, well-regarded and activist-oriented law professors 
Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler (amongst forty-five other law professors from the 
United States and around the world), eight cryptographers, and a coalition of journalists 
and publishers.293 Filing in support of the studios on February 27, 2001, was a collection 
of entertainment industry organizations, major sports leagues, and major industries 
involved in intellectual property production and protection.294  The constituencies 
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293 The coalition included the Online News Association, the Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, the Newspaper Association of America, the Student Law Center, Wired Magazine, the Pew Center 
on the States, the Silha Center for Media Ethics and Law, the College of Communication at California State 
University-Fullerton, a collection of Fair Use Interests, and the ACM Law Committee.   
294 Amongst those filing on behalf of the DVD CCA: the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA), the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada (AFM), the American 
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA), the American Film Marketing Association (AFMA), 
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP),  Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), the 
American Society of Media Photographers (ASMP), the Association of American Publishers (AAP), the 
Business Software Alliance (BSA), the Directors Guild of America, Inc. (DGA), the Graphic Artists Guild, 
the Interactive Digital Software Association (IDSA), the National Association of Theater Owners (NATO), 
the National Cable Television Association, Inc. (NCTA), the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA), the National Football League and National Football League Properties, Inc. (NFL), the National 
Hockey League (NHL), the National Music Publishers' Association (NMPA), the office of the 
Commissioner of Baseball, the Producers Guild of America (PGA), the Professional Photographers of 
America (PPA), Reed Elsevier, Inc., the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association (SBCA), 
the Screen Actors Guild, Inc. (SAG), the Software & Information Industry Association (SIAA), and the 
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. (WGA). The DVD-CCA, filed for the studios on March 13, 2001, 
along with four law professors, Rodney A. Smolla, Erwin Chemerinsky, Kenneth L. Karst, and Marcy 




identified on this list suggests that there existed a discernible divide between industry and 
civil liberties groups; the battle over fair use and the legality of the DMCA would make 
obvious the differing positions and irreconcilable agendas of industry and fair use 
activists.  Any industrial organization concerned with maintaining the future commercial 
viability of their respective businesses supported the MPAA.  The fact that the MPAA 
was supported by all of the major entertainment unions is, in itself, unprecedented in the 
history of the industry.  These organizations, representing the labor forces within the 
industry, supported the MPAA’s case because they recognized the financial stakes and 
the potential repercussions to their employees should the DMCA fail to gain the support 
of the courts.  Conversely, the associations supporting the defendants understood the 
importance of the case in setting a legal precedent regarding free speech issues, industrial 
control over technologies and fair use, and the impact of the decision on the open-source 
online community.  This community of amateur and professional technologists sought to 
improve upon existing software by sharing codes online.  Regulating the activities of this 
community would constrain invention, improvement, and innovation in the technology 
field.  Furthermore, those supporting the defendants recognized that the courts were the 
last bastion of hope to combat the pro-industry regulatory trends.  While the California 
Courts were deciding the legality and jurisdiction of the studios in regards to DeCSS 
postings and prosecutions, the Federal Courts ultimately held the power to overturn the 
states, uphold the DMCA’s constitutionality, and set legal precedent that would impact 
all future decisions regarding online intellectual property, “hacking” technological 
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protection measures, and the classification of software and circumvention techniques as 
First Amendment rights.   
Oral arguments were heard on May 1, 2001 before Circuit Court Judges Newman 
and Cabranes and District Court Judge Thompson.  On November 28, 2001, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Kaplan’s decision that 2600 Magazine violated the 
DMCA by posting the DeCSS code.  The opinion of the court stated that the restriction of 
fair use claimed by the appellants to be in violation of the Copyright Clause of the First 
Amendment was rejected for three primary reasons.  The court ruled that Supreme Court 
“has never held that fair use is constitutionally required…[and] such matters are beyond 
the scope of this lawsuit… [because] the Appellants do not claim to be making fair use of 
copyrighted materials, and nothing in the injunction prohibits them from making such fair 
use.”295  Secondly, the Circuit Court agreed with the District Court’s ruling that there was 
dearth of evidence supporting the claim that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions 
prevented fair use.  Finally, the Court ruled that the constitution provided no support for 
copying the original work in its original format.   
The Appellate Court ruled in favor of the studios across the board, upholding the 
District Court ruling that the DMCA should not be read “narrowly” to avoid 
constitutional doubt.  The court opinion stated that the DMCA targets the circumvention 
of digital walls guarding copyrighted materials and trafficking in circumvention tools and 
                                                




does not apply to the use of those materials after circumvention has occurred.296  The 
ruling stated flatly that the DMCA “is not read to prohibit ‘fair use’ of information just 
because that information was obtained in a manner made illegal by the DMCA.”297  
Furthermore, the ruling agreed with the lower court’s assertion that individuals 
purchasing a DVD do not have the authority of a copyright owner, citing a lack of 
evidence that the studios ever authorized DVD buyers to circumvent encryption 
technology to support use on multiple platforms.  The court did rule that computer code 
and computer programs constructed from code can merit First Amendment protection, 
but that protection was limited by its “non-speech” elements.  The argument outlined the 
differences between computer code and more traditional written communications, 
identifying restrictions on computer code protection as free speech.  Because DeCSS 
instructs the computer, rather than an individual human being, to circumvent the CSS 
code on DVDs it is classified legally as “non-speech” and is not protected by the First 
Amendment.  According to the court, computer code requires substantially less human 
action for activity and impact than blueprints or recipes; “the functionality of computer 
code properly affects the scope of First Amendment protection.”298  Outlining the limits 
of protection for computer code, specifically DeCSS, the court claimed “Differences in 
the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards 
applied to them.”299  The court distinguished between types of content and the 







functionality of the computer code in determining the constitutional standards.  If the 
content was beneficial or “content-neutral,” it would be protected by the First 
Amendment.  If not, as was determined to be the case with DeCSS, the First Amendment 
would not protect the content.   These differences ultimately resulted in the Circuit 
Court’s upholding the lower court’s injunction barring the defendants from posting 
DeCSS as well as the permanent injunction barring them from linking to DeCSS sites. 
Implications and Impacts:  Fair Use and Movies on DVD 
The decisions of the District and Circuit Courts upholding the constitutionality of 
the DMCA were crucial wins for the DVD industry and the MPAA.  While failing to 
receive the prosecutorial support of the state courts in California may have created unease 
amongst content providers, the federal courts assured the major studios that the new 
guidelines and restrictions contained within the DMCA would be upheld and employed 
as legal grounds to prosecute copyright infringement.  Combining with additional 
technological protection measures, digital rights management software, and tightly 
controlled licensing bodies, the DMCA would serve the industrial objective of protecting 
content in digital forms.  Concerns over restrictions on fair use clearly were not a 
principal concern of the industry or of the courts.  As Fritz Attaway noted, the MPAA did 
not consider fair use to be at issue in the passage or implementation of the DMCA’s 
section on anti-circumvention.  Fair use activists disagreed; univocal cries for revisions 
were unsupported through the Copyright Office’s three-year review of the law.  While 
activists claimed that the DMCA would unilaterally eliminate fair use through 
legitimizing technical protection measures designed to control access to and use of 
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copyrighted works, limiting future innovation and fair use expression, thus forever 
altering copyright law, the studios continued to cite piracy as a legitimate rationale for the 
TPMs.  The passage of the DMCA, and its eventual legitimization through the courts, 
along with subsequent copyright term extensions, provided the studios with one of the 
three necessary approaches to protecting their content in digital form.  Technical 
protection measures and tightly controlled licensing bodies assured that content could be 
legally and technically protected on DVD. 
By prosecuting copyright violators, the studios, through the MPAA and the DVD-
CCA, were setting an important precedent not only legally, but socially as well.  Through 
these well-publicized cases, the studios displayed their position relative to digital 
copyright and digital intellectual property protection to all potential violators.  The fact 
that DeCSS had been disseminated via the internet to countless thousands of would-be-
violators of the DMCA was somewhat irrelevant; the vast majority of consumers were 
willing to pay for content and the studios tracked and prosecuted the most egregious 
violators or the innovators of new circumvention software or hardware.  The MPAA and 
the DVD-CCA continued their prosecutions in open court, bringing a federal case against 
321 Studios Inc. for violating the DMCA through the distribution and sale of a product 
called “X Copy.”  The courts ordered the product removed from stores.  Targeting 
companies trafficking in circumvention software included bringing a case against Tritton 
Technologies for manufacturing and distributing “DVD CopyWare,” and three website 
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distributors of similar software; the courts ordered the companies to cease manufacturing 
and distributing the software.300   
The ramifications of the DMCA and the court’s decisions relating to DVD 
technical protection circumvention also had far-reaching effects on technological 
innovation and e-commerce.  When a company called “Streambox” developed and 
commercialized a technology capable of time-shifting streamed Internet media, 
RealNetworks, suppliers of RealAudio webcasts, invoked the DMCA and the precedents 
set forth in the cases cited above to obtain an injunction against the product.301  The 
“open-source” community, responsible for the original cracking of CSS, also has been 
directly impacted by the DMCA; a group of developers was threatened with DMCA 
violation and prosecution after distributing a software application known as 
“Streamripper,” capable of recording MP3 audio streams.302  Assessing the impact of the 
“DMCA Case,” Yochai Benkler, a law professor and Internet expert at New York 
University who submitted a friend-of-the-court brief in support of Corley, said in an 
interview with the New York Times that the DeCSS case is "immensely important…this 
case is a well-focused presentation of the question of whether or not the DMCA created a 
new right to control access to a work if the work is encoded and encrypted in digital 






media…no one has made the argument so audaciously as the movie studios have done 
here, that the DMCA has created that new right."303 
DVD was regulated through technological protection measures, the passage of the 
DMCA, its ratification in federal courts, and through the activities of licensing bodies.  
Controlling consumer access to DVD content was accomplished by a variety of digital 
and analog technologies designed to stop illegal copying.  Additional technologies 
restricted access in global markets, maintaining a tiered distribution and access system 
for Hollywood content.  Restricting piracy and protecting intellectual content meant 
assuring that all industry members producing discs, consoles, or computer drives were 
compliant with industry standards for copyright technologies.  Licensing bodies working 
in concert with the DVD Forum assured that each manufacturer produced technologies 
that would protect the content on the disc.  The passage of the DMCA, at the behest of 
the Forum’s lobbying partners the DVD CCA and the MPAA, legitimized the TPMs 
already in use by the DVD industry.  The DMCA sanctioned the protection of content 
through these technological barriers, setting a precedent that was then tested in the courts.  
After failing to successfully prosecute DVD hackers in state and international courts, the 
DVD CCA found success on the federal level.  “The DMCA Case” upheld the 
constitutionality of the law; the DVD Forum and its members were assured that their 
technologies were protected and hackers could be prosecuted. 
                                                
303 “DVD Case Will Test Reach of Digital Copyright Law,” by Carl S. Kaplan, July 14, 2000, Copyright:  




The development of viable technological protection measures was a crucial first 
step in assuring Hollywood would support the technology by releasing movies on DVD.  
Once these technologies were in place in 1997, Hollywood began to release a small 
number of films on disc.  However, their full support did not come until it was clear, after 
the passage of the DMCA on October 8, 1998, that Congress would provide a mechanism 
for prosecuting digital copyright violators.  By the time the court cases were settled in 
2002, consumers had made it clear that DVD had arrived as the dominant home video, 
gaming, and computer storage technology.  Revenues from the technology were 
staggering, with DVD-Video dominating.  The DVD Forum had regulated both consumer 
and industrial access to the technology and its software.  In so doing, they convinced 





Chapter Seven:  Conclusion 
 From 1994 to 2002, DVD became the most successful consumer electronics 
product in history.  Early in its developmental period, as competing firms worked 
independently to corner the market with proprietary technologies, doubts existed as to the 
viability of competing DVD platforms in the marketplace.  Conceptualized as a 
technological commodity by the consumer electronics industry, DVD promised to be the 
“next-generation” optical media storage device capable of delivering high quality 
audio/visual data to televisions and computer screens.  As a replacement technology for 
both the CD-ROM and the VHS, DVD promised new revenue streams to industry and a 
markedly different experience to potential consumers. At the behest of the computer 
industry, led by IBM, and with input from the Big Six media conglomerates, the two 
competing camps agreed to a single standard, thus launching the dynamic process of 
DVD technological development and diffusion.  As an innovation, DVD held a 
significant relative advantage in both the home video and computer markets.  DVD was 
introduced to these markets and their respective publics through product demonstrations 
and through targeted advertising hailing DVDs superior performance, reliability, and 
flexibility compared to VHS and CD-ROM.  DVD was made meaningful by virtue of 
these campaigns and successive periods of discourse in the trade and popular presses 
which oriented the new technology along a continuum of home video, computer, and 
digital music experiences.  The industries involved in commercializing the technology 
realized the importance of integrating the new technology into the previous experiences, 
 
 327 
values, and needs of potential adopters.  Through the advertising campaigns detailed in 
chapter five, we have seen how DVD targeted early adopters:  young, affluent, male 
demographics.  The early and late majority of consumers joined these early adopters by 
2000.  DVD was sold to early adopters with rhetoric hailing the technology as a marked 
improvement over existing technologies that was capable of creating a more complete 
theatrical experience.  The degree to which DVD fit into existing practices and pleasures 
related to existing home video and computing cultures and the value associated with the 
technology assured that the majority of consumers would quickly adopt DVD.  Because 
technological development and early marketing efforts involved multiple industry 
members (for instance joint campaigns for hardware consoles and software titles from 
Toshiba and Warner Bros. respectively), DVD was sold as a package product of 
hardware tools and software as information bases for the tool.   
This element in the process of making DVD meaningful through advertising and 
marketing campaigns simplified the potential range of uses and meanings available for 
the convergent technology.  Potential adopters were encouraged to understand the 
technology as a playback mechanism for pre-recorded Hollywood feature content.  
DVD’s potential complexity was simplified by these campaigns and via the functionality 
of the console devices entering the market.  Additionally, DVD consoles were offered to 
the public on a trial basis through video rental chains, thus affording consumers the 
opportunity to test the technology before investing in their own consoles.    DVD, as a 
technology and as a cultural artifact, performed similarly to pre-existing CD 
technologies; consoles operated very much akin to CD players, with consumers placing a 
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disc on a tray that moved on a horizontal plane, pushing it into the console and 
interacting with content through remote controls or via the buttons on the machine itself.  
Once the machine was properly connected to a television set, the performance of the 
shiny little disc left no doubt as to its superior performance.  Because the developmental 
process for the technology involved such rigorous cross-industrial input and testing, very 
few fatal errors or flaws in the technology were reported.  Because DVD offered a clear 
relative advantage to its technological predecessors, was compatible with existing 
experiences in home video and compact disc cultures, was relatively easy to understand 
and use, was available on a trial basis, and because the innovation was supported by the 
content providers, its diffusion into society achieved unprecedented success. 
The various perceived advantages and their communication via multiple media 
and interpersonal networks contributing to DVD’s diffusion intersected with favorable 
contexts and conditions in culture, technology, industry, economics, and the regulatory 
environment.  Throughout this project, I have argued that these favorable contexts 
aligned with the collective behaviors and desires of the media industries, the computer 
industries, and the consumer electronics industry to replace existing technologies and 
business practices.  We have seen how the technological context was primed for the 
development of DVD technology via improvements in compression, bonding, laser, and 
manufacturing processes and/or technologies originating in compact disc or laser disc.  
The cultural context was uniquely well-suited for DVD’s introduction, as consumers 
were able to reference existing semantic networks of meaning to orient their experiences 
with the new product.  DVD was made meaningful via its association with video culture, 
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digital technologies, and digital audio disc functionality.  Because cultural practices 
pertaining to the shift from VHS to DVD could be compared with the shift from audio 
tape/records to compact disc, consumers were able to situate this shift as similarly 
beneficial to their experience with high quality digital media.  Furthermore, because an 
effective marketing campaign encouraged potential adopters to conceptualize the 
technology as a “revolutionary” and “futuristic” platform that would make VHS obsolete, 
cultural practice in adopting the technology was tied to discourses of change.  The 
cultural context was articulated by the trade and popular presses, whose hyperbolic 
language stimulated early adopters and synchronized with the industrial rhetoric in 
advertising campaigns.  These discourses introduced the technology in specific and 
targeted ways to home theater, computer, gaming, and digital technology enthusiasts.  By 
tracking the format battle between Toshiba/Time Warner and Sony/Philips, et al., the 
press created a semantic context that titillated their various publics while building desire 
for the potential technology capable of creating a war between industrial giants.  When 
DVD was in development by competing developers at Toshiba/Time Warner and Sony, 
the widespread success it would attain in global markets was but a goal.  This goal was 
reached through the efficient organization, cooperative behavior, and exploitation of 
contexts by the filmed entertainment, consumer electronics, and computer industries, 
along with the enthusiastic adoption of the technology by consumers. 
The industrial contexts into which DVD was introduced and diffused also were 
uniquely favorable to its rapid diffusion.  As I explain in chapter three, the film industry 
in the early to mid 1990s was undergoing a series of mergers and acquisitions.  These 
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shifts in ownership and control resulted in tightly integrated media conglomerates whose 
business model was tied to the efficient exploitation of cultural products in all outlets and 
global markets.  In order to capitalize on cross-media ownership, the media 
conglomerates sought a shift in the existing business model for their most lucrative 
market, home video.  Seeking a way around the First Sale Doctrine and the powerful 
rental retailers that would allow for more control over filmed entertainment, the media 
conglomerates desired a “playback-only” replacement technology for VHS.  DVD would 
allow the content providers to circumvent the existing rental business model through a 
sell-through business model.  Newly formed home video divisions within the 
conglomerate structure could then deal directly with mass retailers, and new business 
models could be developed for use with rental retailers.  The consumer electronics 
industrial context also was primed for a new home video technology.  Because Sony’s 
Betamax had lost the first home video battle to Matsushita’s VHS, Sony desired a new 
proprietary technology that would allow them increased market share in the home video 
business.  Additionally, industrial factors such as the dissolution of a viable domestic 
consumer electronics industry stemming from the collapse and sale of RCA, the 
cooperative research and technology initiatives of the Japanese consumer electronics 
firms, the passive reliance on Japanese firms for innovation and commercialization of 
new technologies by both domestic (U.S.) and European consumer electronics 
companies, and the increasingly hybridized computer and consumer electronics industry 
in Japan and Taiwan led to a favorable industrial environment in Japan for DVD 
development.  Additionally, the consumer electronics industry in the Asian markets was 
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in a period of sustained downturn prior to the commercial success of DVD.  VHS 
products had saturated global markets by the early 1990s and failed to return significant 
profits to manufacturers.  New technologies like the Sony Walkman temporarily 
stimulated the market, but failed to be significant profit generators for any company other 
than Sony.  CD technologies continued to drive the market through the early 1990s, but 
profit margins continued to decrease as per-unit retail costs dropped.  Therefore, the 
consumer electronics industry, dominated by Japanese corporations who had attained 
global market control from the success of VHS and CD technologies, was uniquely 
positioned for an industry-wide development and diffusion effort with a new optical 
storage technology.  The fact that the entire consumer electronics industry recognized the 
viability of DVD and worked together to develop and commercialize it, at times acting 
against their corporate cultures to share proprietary technologies, is unprecedented in the 
history of that industry. 
Meanwhile, the global computer industry also was uniquely predisposed for a new 
and improved optical storage technology.  Prior to the introduction of the World Wide 
Web and the resulting upturn in the personal computing business, IBM had begun to lose 
ground as the global market leader in computing.  After a period of sustained success in 
all markets in supercomputing and industrial mainframes, IBM had begun to lose market 
share to domestic and global competitors due to their decision to release an open-source 
personal computing technology that relied on supplier networks for peripheral 
technologies.  In so doing, IBM had ceded market control and power to Intel and 
Microsoft, who quickly dominated the market via their processor and software elements 
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respectively.  IBM, unable to innovate new technologies independent of their supplier 
networks in Asia, desired a new drive technology to stimulate the stagnant CD-ROM 
market.  The Japanese computer industry, whose members were working in close concert 
with consumer electronics manufacturers, took up the slack and developed the DVD as 
both a consumer electronics product and as an upgrade-drive for personal computers.  
DVD’s significance to the personal computing industry cannot be understated.  The 
arrival of DVD-ROM and supplemental technologies affording high-quality digital 
audio-visual playback on personal computers simultaneously gave rise to numerous 
personal computing companies in the United States, including Dell, Gateway, and the 
newly merged HP.  It also resuscitated IBM in the global market, stimulated the growth 
of Microsoft and Intel (along with AMD and others), and spurned the rapid growth of the 
World Wide Web.  DVD-ROM brought content from the Hollywood content providers to 
the personal computer, at once mobilizing the reception environment for watching filmed 
entertainment, and bringing together the interests of the IT industry and Hollywood.  The 
fact that three industries, once separate and distinct, synchronized their technological 
development and commercialization efforts for DVD is noteworthy for several reasons.  
While the filmed entertainment and consumer electronics industries had had a brief 
history of interaction prior to the early 1990s, with Sony entering the media content 
industry via their acquisition of Columbia-TriStar and Matsushita following suit with 
their purchase of MCA, never before in the history of these industries had all three 
aligned their resources and desires to develop, innovate, and commercialize a new 
technology.  Additionally, the fact that each industrial context was individually aligned in 
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such a way that member firms would agree to work together both intra-industrially and 
inter-industrially on a singular technology is unprecedented in history. 
The fact that the filmed entertainment, consumer electronics, and computer 
industries came together to create and commercialize a new technology in the process 
forming a wholly new ancillary industry, related to but distinct in its organization, 
performance, and behavior from the respective core industries, make the story of DVD of 
value to contemporary industry studies.  The formation of mechanisms and industrial 
administrative bodies for controlling the technology represent a limit case in the study of 
contemporary industrial power and control.  Through the structure of the DVD Forum, 
the leading members of the three constituent industries guaranteed their dominance in the 
DVD industry.  Through patent pooling, licensing bodies, technological protection 
measure development, maintenance, enforcement, and new technological platform 
development, the DVD industry relied on cooperative behavior and centralized power 
hierarchies to assure the successful exploitation of the contexts detailed above.  Through 
the DVD Forum, the leading members of the computer industry, the consumer electronics 
industry, and the film industry were encouraged to behave cooperatively for the benefit of 
all, often in direct conflict with long-standing competition and animosities between 
industrial members.  Together, these firms could develop not only unified technologies 
and patent pools, but unified barriers to entry for outside firms with competing 
technologies, litigators seeking antitrust rulings in state and federal courts, regulators 
working towards new copyright legislation, distribution networks around the globe, and 
potential pirates who might develop and distribute means and mechanisms to illegally 
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copy content from the discs.  By establishing and legitimizing the administrative body of 
the DVD Forum, the ten founding member firms, with additional support from market 
leaders in each constituent industry, formed an ancillary industrial context that assured 
their initial, and continuing, control over the technology in all markets.  Through the 
hierarchal structure established by virtue of the various committees and subcommittees 
reporting to the steering committee, the founding members at once opened membership 
to all interested corporations, in the process avoiding antitrust litigation, and closed 
access to the seats of power by channeling decision making authority and membership 
decisions directly through the steering committee.   
In the process, relationships and partnerships were formed between steering 
committee members on an unprecedented scale.  Once completely independent firms 
from the consumer electronics and media industries partnered together to market, 
strategize, and commercialize the technology.  Cooperation within and between industries 
led to lasting relationships between firms and numerous synergies in marketing, 
distribution, and production of goods leading to the exploitation of global markets.  The 
managerial philosophies and corporate strategies stimulating widespread conglomeration 
across industrial lines had finally been efficiently realized through the activities of the 
DVD Forum.  What Sony had hoped to achieve in hardware/software synergies through 
the acquisition of Columbia-TriStar was now de-rigueur corporate behavior by multiple 
firms relating to DVD industrial practices.  Time Warner partnered with Toshiba to 
market DVD titles and DVD hardware consoles.  Pooling resources and associating 
hardware consoles with high profile Hollywood content proved to be mutually beneficial 
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for each firm.  What DVD industrial formation and the resulting structuring, conduct, and 
performance of member firms suggests is that synergies between industries are fully 
realized only through tightly regulated mechanisms for control.  These mechanisms 
assure both the continued industrial relevance and efficacy of leading firms and 
discourage dissent and cessation.  If a member company refuses to cooperate with the 
collective behaviors of the Forum, the collective remaining resources can be brought to 
bear.  Principally, the structure of the DVD Forum established mechanisms for control 
over both the technology and member firms.  Through the collective power of member 
firms, the processes of technological development, maintenance, licensing, marketing, 
distribution, etc., could be tightly regulated while outside innovation and competition 
could be discouraged.  Barriers to entry in the industry were established on a heretofore 
unprecedented level; any attempt to work outside of the Forum meant challenging the 
hegemony of the largest media conglomerates, global leaders in the consumer electronics 
industry, and the largest and most powerful computing companies in the world.   
The myriad ways in which the members of the DVD Forum exploited favorable 
existing contexts in culture, technology, industry, and economics, including their 
cooperation in innovation and technological standardization, was supplemented by their 
efficient exploitation of the regulatory environment discussed in chapter five.  The 
regulatory context had undergone marked shifts prior to DVD’s introduction and 
diffusion.  Changes in media ownership regulations, including significant and successive 
acts by Congress and the FCC, removed barriers limiting cross-ownership of media 
companies, thus stimulating waves of mergers and acquisitions that brought consumer 
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electronics companies into the content production and distribution businesses.  The 
Department of Justice sanctioned cooperation between firms and repeatedly ruled in 
favor of media and technology companies.  Meanwhile, the regulatory context pertaining 
to copyright law and enforcement was undergoing significant shifts that affected the 
introduction and technological form and function of DVD.  Throughout the decade prior 
to DVD’s introduction, copyright law in the United States was being reshaped to more 
closely align with international standards.  The fact that copyright law was repeatedly 
altered throughout this period to extend intellectual property and copyright terms for 
creative works assured the content providers in Hollywood that their shift to digital 
platforms would be protected by virtually limitless copyright terms.  Additionally, digital 
technologies, including the internet and DVD spurned another wave of copyright 
revisions in the United States Congress.  DVD was at the center of debates leading to 
new laws sanctioning the implementation of technical protection measures and digital 
rights management technologies.  These technologies would restrict the ability of 
consumers to copy content between devices while constricting any creative sampling of 
content from digital delivery technologies.  In the process, digital copyright law not only 
granted additional control mechanisms to the producers of content and technology, it 
limited potential fair uses of digital content.  The passage of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, a watershed decision in the history of copyright law, assured the various 
industries involved in developing digital technologies like the DVD that technical 
protection measures embedded within their technologies were not only legal, but the 
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circumvention and distribution of any software or hardware designed to circumvent them 
was illegal. 
In order to guarantee the support of the content providers in Hollywood, DVD 
needed these technological protection measures to guarantee the security of content 
embedded within the discs, thus assuring its functionality as a playback-only technology.  
While the technical specifications for anti-piracy technologies with DVD were not 
“robust” enough to discourage the determined expert hacker, they did assure content 
providers that their films and eventually their television programs would be protected 
from piracy with the average consumer.  The regulatory context sanctioning the increased 
control mechanisms proffered by the industrial members pertaining to DVD was 
solidified through the series of cases brought against individuals and companies involved 
in the inevitable cracking of the protection technologies.  Once the protection 
mechanisms had been broken, it was imperative that the content providers and their 
hardware partners in the consumer electronics and computer industries not only prosecute 
those responsible for circumventing the technology, but to win in federal court.  While 
the various lobbying and administrative bodies controlling the interests of industry 
players (including the MPAA, the MPA, and the DVD-CCA) found little prosecutorial 
success in state and international courts relating to the “DeCSS” cases, their efforts 
served as catalysts to the continued diffusion of DVD throughout the late 1990s.   
The very fact that the collective resources of industry were brought to bear against 
individuals for cracking, publishing, or distributing circumvention codes served two 
crucial functions:  the protracted nature of the cases encouraged content providers to 
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continue distributing films on DVD while the cases went through the system; and 
coverage in the international trade and popular presses functioned as a public relations 
coup.  A clear message was sent around the world through these ultimately unsuccessful 
early cases:  any attempt to hack protection measures on digital delivery technologies 
would be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.  As we’ve seen, “the law” relating to 
digital copyright was decidedly pro-industry, with Congress, the FBI, and the Department 
of Justice firmly on the side of those companies involved in the manufacturing and 
distribution of digital content and delivery technologies.  Eventually, the federal courts 
would uphold the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, thus securing legal precedent in 
digital copyright enforcement relating to DVD and all future digital technologies.  In so 
doing, the courts aligned themselves with their counterparts in the other two branches of 
government, siding with industry, limiting the ability of consumers to engage with digital 
technologies in any creative way that would traditionally have been sanctioned under the 
Fair Use clause in copyright law.  Additionally, the fact that the federal courts barred 
individuals and companies from publishing or distributing circumvention mechanisms 
encouraged industry members to continue to support the distribution of content on DVD, 
meeting consumer demand for titles and guaranteeing the continued viability of the 
platform for the foreseeable future. 
LESSONS LEARNED:  THE DVD STORY 
What this story of DVD provides are several lessons in technological diffusion 
that are of value to industry and researchers alike.  In explaining the unprecedented 
success of DVD, this project has detailed the dynamic synchronicity of multiple 
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favorable contexts in culture, technology, industry, economics, and the regulatory 
environment.  DVD became the most successful consumer electronics product of all time 
through the combination of these forces and their efficient exploitation by key industry 
players in the consumer electronics, filmed entertainment, and computer industries.  
Without any one of these conditions, DVD would have faced a much different process of 
introduction, commercialization, and diffusion.  Each of the contexts detailed in this tome 
alone do not account for the success of the technology or its eventual impacts on the 
cultural, industrial, and economic spheres.  Only through their combination can we begin 
to draw lessons that are applicable to future technological introductions.  Additionally, 
through examination of these multiple influences we can begin to assess the significance 
of the mid-to-late 1990s for the historical record.  Never before in the history of the 
media industries did factors as diverse as consumer demand, regulatory shifts, cross-
industrial cooperation, technological developments, and economies of scale combine to 
assist a singular technology in its process of diffusion into global markets. 
Comprehension of these development accounts for the uniqueness of this historical 
moment, comparing its various components to past, present, or future conditions 
surrounding technological introduction.  Taking the long-range view of this story, we can 
begin to see how each of the contexts discussed herein developed over time to eventually 
align at this unique point in history.  The fact that film culture had undergone a series of 
shifts over time with the distribution of content into homes via television beginning in the 
1950s, to home viewing of tapes and discs with home video and laserdisc in the 1970s, to 
cable and satellite, begins to explain the cultural context into which DVD was introduced.  
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But home viewing of pre-recorded content should also be understood relative to other 
cultural shifts over time leading to DVD.  Disc culture, beginning with laserdisc, primed 
cultural consumers for high quality content and supplemental features beyond the film 
itself, including director’s commentary, “making of” documentaries, and deleted scenes.  
Disc culture expanded upon the introduction and diffusion of the compact disc, setting 
the stage for a similarly sized home video disc more than a decade later.  The long view 
of the cultural context affords insight into the events and technologies impacting 
meaningful interaction with digital content on discs leading to the introduction and 
adoption of DVD by consumers.  Additionally, if we are to understand the cultural 
context related to DVD as a temporal historical process, shaping and being shaped by 
technologies and uses and gratifications stemming from those technologies, we must also 
begin to explore how DVD afforded consumers with, at the very least, the appearance of 
significant improvements in their interaction with content control.  DVD, by virtue of it 
technological functionality, offered consumers random access to content; through 
supplemental materials included on the discs, consumers were presented with “access” to 
the process of filmmaking and to the personalities engaged in the production of content.  
In so doing, DVD tapped into a cultural zeitgeist defined by increasing access to 
information and control over that information.  The combination of these two factors 
aligns with the historical trajectory of digital and home viewing cultures. 
Taking this approach to each of the contexts impacting DVD’s diffusion affords 
similar perspective on the singular uniqueness of the historical moment.  Each of the 
three invested industrial contexts aligned to afford cross-investment, partnerships, and 
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cooperation in the process of technological commercialization.  As we’ve seen, the 
consumer electronics industries in Europe and the United States were decimated by the 
rise of the Japanese and South Asian companies.  Their demise, related to 
mismanagement associated with outsourcing, resource management, and mergers and 
acquisitions, opened the door for their counterparts in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea to fill 
the void.  The filmed entertainment industry, seeking an alternative to the existing 
business model for home video dictated by the First Sale Doctrine, was undergoing a 
series of mergers and acquisitions of their own that brought the studios under the 
corporate umbrella of tightly integrated media conglomerates.  As discussed above, the 
computing industry also was engaged in dynamic shifts over time relating to the rise and 
fall of market leaders through strategic moves relating to technology.  Taking the broad 
historical view of the industrial context sets the stage and offers perspective on the 
processes involved in cross-industrial cooperation.  The fact that each of the three 
industries involved in the technological development and commercialization of DVD 
desired, by virtue of their specific industrial context, a new digital disc technology is unto 
itself noteworthy; the fact that the three industries desired a similar technology at the 
same historical moment is staggering in its historical importance.  Furthermore, the fact 
that multiple industries cooperated to meet and develop demand from consumers engaged 
in a favorable cultural context should be viewed as a piece of this complicated synergistic 
process that is, unto itself, an example of miraculous good fortune.  Due to the 
synchronicity of these two contexts, combined with the favorable contexts detailed above 
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in the regulatory environments, technology and economics, the efficient exploitation of 
all of these contexts the newly formed DVD industry could be realized. 
Above all else, the lessons learned from the processes of DVD’s development, 
introduction, commercialization, and diffusion suggest that a variety of contexts influence 
the introduction of new technologies.  Take, by way of example, the story of DVD’s 
potential successor, high definition disc technology.  While the technological context 
provided for the mechanisms and underpinnings for the next generation disc technology, 
and the regulatory context continued to support industrial efforts to control digital 
content, several contexts proved to be out of alignment.  The industrial context into which 
high-definition discs were developed and introduced had shifted significantly after the 
success of DVD.  As was discussed in chapter four, Sony and Philips had broken ranks 
from the DVD Forum, developing competing technologies for DVD recordable discs.  
Attempting to challenge the hegemony of the Forum, these companies also began 
developing a proprietary high definition disc technology, BluRay, that would compete 
with the consortium’s HD-DVD.  Because the computer industry was not invested in high 
definition drive technologies, as they were with a replacement for CD-ROM technology, 
there existed no impetus for them to encourage concessions between competing camps.  
The Big Six media companies asked the competing camps for technical protection 
measures, backward compatibility, and reliable functional operability for the new 
technology, but refused to support one camp exclusively over the competitor.   
Of course, this hedging of support between formats was directly related to the 
industrial context; Sony controlled their library of titles through Columbia-TriStar, the 
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MGM library (purchased in 2004) and all new content coming from their studio.  They 
were primed to finally realize their hardware/software synergies by releasing content on 
BluRay exclusively.  Meanwhile, Time Warner’s longstanding leadership role within the 
DVD Forum, and their partnership with Toshiba and Matsushita in the development of 
HD-DVD, virtually guaranteed an adversarial debut for high-definition discs.  
Additionally, the cultural context, and the related level of consumer demand for high-
definition disc technologies, was not primed to the extent present with DVD 
technological introduction.  Because HD-TV had not achieved significant penetration of 
the television market upon the eventual introduction of competing disc formats, there was 
little demand from the masses for a unified disc technology.  Without an enormous 
installed base of high definition television sets, there would not be enormous demand for 
new hardware consoles capable of delivering high definition pre-recorded content.  
Furthermore, high definition discs were not discernibly different from their standard 
definition counterparts.  The new discs were the same size, shape, color, and contained 
the same labels as DVDs.  Unlike the shift from VHS to DVD, the shift from DVD to 
high definition discs did not tap into semantic networks of meaning like “futuristic,” 
“digital” (from analog), and “revolutionary” as detailed in chapter two.  The new discs 
offered a higher quality image from their predecessors, but without high definition 
television sets in tens of millions of homes across the United States, there was little hope 
of effectively demonstrating the difference. 
What the introduction of competing high definition discs suggests is that the 
various industries involved in developing the next-generation technology for home video 
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failed to learn the lessons offered by DVD.  What they are missing is the alignment and 
synchronicity of all contexts, including culture, industry, technology, economics, and the 
regulatory environment.  Instead, they have attempted to push a new technology into a 
limited market in the hopes of establishing a winner prior to the widespread diffusion of 
the necessary television technology.  While this strategy is noteworthy to the extent that it 
offers a lesson in technological commercialization and diffusion in a limited context, it 
will ultimately fail to resonate historically due to the disengagement with lessons of the 
immediate past.  DVD offered these companies, and all other industries, a model for the 
efficient exploitation of contexts to virtually guarantee that a new technology would 
diffuse rapidly into the marketplace.  In order for that lesson to be applied, however, 
industry must carefully analyze the contexts detailed in this study.  Additionally, new 
technologies must align with both consumer demand and supporting technological 
products.  If, for instance, high definition televisions were in 99% of all households in the 
United States, as was the case with standard definition television sets upon DVD’s 
introduction, and high definition discs offered consumers a markedly different experience 
in both the tangible interaction with the artifact and with its embedded digital content, 
rapid diffusion might be expected.  For this rate of diffusion to occur, of course, a single 
technological platform would need to be introduced with the full support of all content 
providers and computing software companies. 
The future of the DVD market appears convoluted at best.  While DVD continues 
to dominate global markets and will be the primary delivery mechanism for digital 
content for at least the next decade, new technologies threaten to unseat the current 
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champion.  If we look, for instance, to a related lesson learned in the recent past 
stemming from high definition format battles, we might begin to see the future of digital 
content distribution.  After the CD had conquered the music industry and given life to 
digital music delivery, competing camps went to market with a next generation high 
definition compact disc.  While this format battle was directly related to the development 
of the DVD, with one of the next-generation CD formats developed through the DVD-
Forum as DVD-Audio, the rush to market failed to account for cultural shifts in listening 
to and playing back music.  After a long history of dominance for the album, the music 
industry was promoting single songs to enthusiastic consumers as the next phase of 
content delivery.  When competing high-definition discs entered the market, as DVD-
Audio and SACD, without clear guidelines for optimum playback and problems with new 
console devices, consumers shifted to online music downloads of singles through file-
sharing networks.  Individual songs could be downloaded for free, illegally of course, and 
played on a computer or burned to a recordable CD.  In turn, CD sales slumped and a 
new industry was born online; MP3 players were introduced to make single songs 
portable, and the iPod quickly dominated the market by virtue of its flexibility and a 
savvy marketing campaign targeting young people.  According to RIAA (Recording 
Industry Association of America) in 2003 only 0.4 million DVD-Audio disks were sold, 
1.3 million SACD were sold through to consumers, 1.5 million LP, and 745.9 million 
CD. CD sales reached the peak level in 2000 and have experienced a sharp decline since 
the widespread adoption of online digital distribution.  If, as is expected, broadband 
technologies continue to develop at the current rate, and the high definition format battle 
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between HD-DVD and BluRay continues into the future without a clear winner, online 
distribution of high definition movies and television programs could displace the DVD as 
the primary delivery mechanism for content. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has laid significant groundwork for the study of DVD and digital 
technologies.  By examining a variety of influences on the diffusion process, it has been 
my goal to expand traditional approaches to diffusion and technology studies by taking a 
contextual, modal approach to the subject. This study has highlighted the contingent 
nature of various contexts impacting the dynamic processes of DVD commercialization.  
What we have seen throughout this work is that these contexts worked in concert to 
enable the most successful diffusion of any technology in history.  However, work 
remains to more fully examine additional contexts that may have impacted the process.  
While my discussion has privileged certain contexts in an effort to identify their eventual 
exploitation by industry, I have not fully addressed the favorable contexts within the 
mode of feature film production.  Future analysis of this subject needs to account for the 
favorable (for industry) labor contexts within the filmed entertainment industry leading to 
the introduction of DVD.  Contractual agreements between the Screen Actor’s Guild and 
the studios limited the amount of monies to be recouped for actors from the sale of 
DVDs.  While SAG has repeatedly balked at the current deal, they have yet to force any 
significant action in renegotiating with the studios.  Similarly, the Writer’s Guild (WGA), 
the Director’s Guild (DGA) and the Producer’s Guild have been unable to break the 
stranglehold established by the studios during the VHS-home video era.  A study of the 
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history of these agreements would undoubtedly reveal how the labor context was 
favorably suited for DVD; the studios refused to renegotiate contracts with the 
introduction of DVD because they had established a royalty structure and residual 
payment plan through home video that existed within the context of other negotiations 
related to health benefits, salaries, and retirement packages.  The guilds did not want 
jeopardize their contractual benefits in these areas for a larger slice of the DVD pie. 
Additional research on the subject could also begin to explore shifts in industrial 
practices relating to the waves of cooperation and industrial cultural formation related to 
the DVD industry.  This study has outlined grounds for further inquiry on this subject by 
detailing the structural logic of the DVD Forum; additional analyses could further 
examine the behaviors and cultural practices occurring within the Forum compared to 
periods prior to its formation in each of the three invested industries.  Much work has 
been done on the corporate cultures within the Sony Corporation; additional studies could 
explore shifts within that culture instigated by Sony’s involvement within the DVD 
Forum and their eventual secession—not to mention the culture of production 
surrounding Blu-Ray development and commercialization.  Additionally, scholars could 
begin a comparative analysis between corporate cultures at Sony and their chief rival, 
Matsushita that could afford insight into the shifting nature of intra-corporate and inter-
corporate cultures.  What this study has suggested is that through administrative and 
industrial bodies such as the DVD Forum, the DVD-CCA, and the MPAA, corporate 
cultures expand into industrial cultures wherein discrete corporate cultures combine into 
an often contradictory, complex, and dynamic cultural logic that exists tenuously 
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alongside pre-existing corporate cultures of production. Industrial cultures could also be 
the subject of studies examining technological research initiatives conducted throughout 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan as discussed in chapter three. 
This study has focused on the contexts surrounding DVD commercialization.  
There exists a fertile ground for additional research into DVD technology.  A growing 
body of research has begun to explore DVD impacts on fan cultures (Johnson 2005; 
Kendrick 2005; Cubbison 2005), aesthetics and authority (Carroll 2005), and 
supplemental content histories and subgenres (Hight 2005), much more work remains to 
be done on the aesthetics of digital transfers and compression technologies employed by 
DVD, interaction and interface theory with DVD menus and accessibility, and DVD and 
pedagogy.  DVD also offers researchers the opportunity to examine the creation and 
maintenance of a completely new production culture.  DVD divisions within the Big Six 
have established hierarchies and divisions of labor related to, but distinct from, the 
existing modes of production employed by the feature film and television industries.  
Additionally, future analysis can analyze these new divisions relative to shifts in 
corporate power structures.  Besides marketing, production, and distribution divisions 
within these “home entertainment” divisions, there exists an entire realm of unexplored 
cultures of production within disc replication plants, the retail market, and distribution 
companies.  There exists an entire field of laborers working exclusively on DVD 
production, themselves engaged in cultures of production forged by virtue of their 
positions as compression engineers, graphic designers, DVD producers, editors, after 
effects technicians and the like.  Additional work needs to seriously engage with the 
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culture of production on feature film sets; the dynamic creation of meaning and conflict 
between crew and between cast and crew could be examined relative to the place of the 
DVD supplemental production team.  These crews, in my own experience as a DVD 
Producer, are normally excluded from the primary culture on-set, viewed with a certain 
disdain by principal crew members. 
Future analyses of technological diffusion and the formation of digital industries 
could apply the contextual, modal approach suggested herein.  Revisiting successful and 
unsuccessful technologies, artifacts, and goods and services through contextual analysis 
of a variety of contributing factors could shed light on, and provide a model for, diffusion 
dynamics.  If we were to revisit the introduction of the television, for instance, through 
the approach utilized in this study, would we find a favorable regulatory environment 
supplementing the efforts of industry?  Would we find the synchronicity of contexts 
identified herein?  Much can be gained from an approach that puts aside deterministic 
effects and impacts and focuses on the explanatory processes through which 
technologies, business models, goods or services gained a foothold in society.  Additional 
work pertaining to DVD employing this approach should begin to explore the various 
contexts outside of the United States, principally the variety of different cultural contexts 
around the world into which DVD achieved successes. As researchers, we must begin to 
examine the contemporary media industries through not only their product, but through 
their process.  It is through the dynamic interaction of forces in society that these 
industries produce meaningful and commercially viable products for consumption.  In 
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Appendix 3.1:  Computer Industry Statistics, early 1990s 
 
Market share by Machine Size  
Source: Dataquest, WSJ, 1/4/94, (from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
  1992 
  Revenue  Market Revenue  Market 
Segment  $ (millions) Share(%)  $(millions) Share(%) 
Supercomputer   2,062.10   1.8   2,198.30   1.8 
Mainframe  23,376.40  20.6  21,151.10  17.5 
Midrange   21,809.80   19.2  21,000.50  17.4 
Workstation   9,327.90   8.2  10,127.50   8.4 
PCs   57,045.20  50.2  66,265.00  54.9 
Total  113,621.40 100.0 120,742.40 100.0 
 
 
Large Scale Systems, Revenue in $millions  
Source: Datamation, (from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
 1992 1991   1990  Change Market 
Company Rev. Rev.   Revenue 91-92 Share (%) 
IBM 8,190.0 9,100.0   10,623.0 -10.0% 29.1% 
Fujitsu 4,431.3 4,446.1    2,843.1  -0.3% 15.7% 
Hitachi 4,043.5 3,501.9    3,414.2  15.5% 14.4% 
NEC 3,079.0 3,063.5    2,593.6   0.5% 10.9% 
Unisys 1,966.0   850.0    1,016.0 131.3%  7.0% 
Amdahl 1,489.6   987.2    1,360.0  50.9%  5.3% 
Nihon 1,029.3   965.4      951.0   6.6%  3.7% 
Siemens   962.2   964.4    1,018.5  -0.2%  3.4% 
Gr.Bull   857.3   830.2      825.4   3.3%  3.0% 
Cray   550.5   582.0      590.2  -5.4%  2.0% 
 
 
Personal Computers, Revenue in $millions  
Source: Datamation, (from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
  1992  1991 1990 91-92 Market 
Company  Revenue Revenue Revenue Change Share (%) 
IBM  7,654.5 8,505.0 9,644.0 -10.0% 17.2% 
Apple  5,412.0 4,900.0 3,845.8  10.4% 12.2% 
Compaq  4,100.0 3,271.4 3,598.0  25.3%   9.2% 
NEC  3,986.8 4,135.8 3,211.1  -3.6%  9.0% 
Fujitsu  2,618.5 2,319.7 1,419.6  12.9%  5.9% 
Toshiba  1,949.4 2,093.5 1,953.7  -6.9%  4.4% 
Dell  1,812.5   667.4   n/a 171.6%  4.1% 
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Olivetti 1,348.7 1,586.1 1,791.7 -15.0%  3.0% 
AST  1,140.5   800.7   n/a  42.4%  2.6% 
Gateway  1,107.1   627.0   n/a  76.6%  2.5% 
 
 
Personal Computers  
Source: Dataquest, (from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
 1992 1992 1993 1993 
 Revenue Market Revenue Market 
Company $mil Share  $mil Share(%) 
IBM  7,448  13.1%  9,015  13.6 
Apple  6,048  10.6%  7,267  11.0 
Compaq  3,478    6.1%  6,603  10.0 
NEC  2,824   5.0%  3,795   5.7 
Dell  1,769   3.1%  2,532   3.8 
Others 35,478  62.1% 37,053  55.9 
Total 57,045 100.0% 66,265 100.0 
 
 
WorkStations, Revenue in $millions  
Source: Datamation, (from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
 1992 1991 1990 91-92 Market 
Company Revenue Revenue Revenue Change Share (%) 
Sun 2,394.0 2,455.3 1,934.0  -2.5% 17.4% 
IBM 1,890.0 1,400.0 1,000.0  35.0% 13.7% 
HP 1,530.0 1,055.0   920.0  45.0% 11.1% 
Fujitsu 1,510.7 1,353.2   865.3  11.6% 11.0% 
Digital 1,120.0 1,250.0 1,250.0 -10.4%  8.1% 
Matsush 1,112.4 1,013.8   848.1   9.7%  8.1% 
SGI   730.0   550.0   414.6  32.7%  5.3% 
Unisys   650.4   100.0   n/a 550.4%  4.7% 
Intergr   615.5   616.0   344.7  -0.1%  4.5% 




Source: Dataquest, WSJ 1/6/94 (from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
 1992 1992 1993   1993 
 Revenue Market Revenue   Market 
Company $mil Share% $mil   Share(%) 
Sun 2,991.3  32.1  3,220.6  31.8 
HP 1,753.7  18.8  2,289.6  22.6 
IBM 1,516.7  16.3  1,470.3  14.5 
Digital   982.4  10.5    970.8   9.6 
SGI   675.1  7.2    936.3   9.2 
Others 1,408.7  15.1  1,240.0  12.3 






(from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
 1992  1991  1990 91-92 Market 
Company Revenue  Revenue  Revenue Change Share (%) 
IBM 11,365.9 10,524.0 9,952.0   8.0% 31.9% 
Fujitsu  3,524.9  2,513.0 1,607.0  40.3%  9.9% 
Micrsft  2,960.2  2,045.9 1,323.0  44.7%  8.3% 
NEC  1,840.3  1,761.5 1,358.5   4.5%  5.2% 
Comp As  1,770.8  1,437.8 1,310.7  23.2%  5.0% 
Siemens  1,058.4    964.4   925.9   9.7%  3.0% 
Novell    988.6    632.6   n/a  56.3%  2.8% 
Hitachi    982.5    959.1   798.1   2.4%  2.8% 
Lotus    810.1    828.9   642.2  -2.3%  2.3% 
Digital    800.0    796.0   810.0   0.5%  2.2% 




(from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
 1992  1991  91-92 Market 
Company Revenue  Revenue Change Share (%) 
IBM 7,948.6 10,278.0 -22.7% 12.6% 
HP 4,590.0  4,370.0   5.0%  7.3% 
Canon 3,892.8  3,139.0  24.0%  6.2% 
Hitachi 3,401.0  3,092.9  10.0%  5.4% 
Fujitsu 3,122.0  2,996.3   4.2%  4.9% 
Seagate 3,079.4  2,668.7  15.4%  4.9% 
Digital 3,000.0  2,900.0   3.4%  4.8% 
Xerox 2,708.0  1,200.0 125.7%  4.3% 
AT&T 2,283.2  2,100.0   8.7%  3.6% 
Conner 2,240.0  1,590.0  40.9%  3.6% 
 
 
Data Communications  
(from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
 1992 1991 1990 91-92 Market 
Company Revenue Revenue Revenue Change Share (%)  
AT&T 3,315.0 1,790.0 1,465.0 85.2% 19.5% 
N. Tele 2,300.0 1,460.0 1,220.0 57.5% 13.5% 
IBM 2,200.0 2,000.0 2,950.0 10.0% 12.9% 
NTT 1,871.7 1,495.4 1,230.3 25.2% 11.0% 
Matsush 1,262.3 1,267.2 1,060.1 -0.4%  7.4% 
Ricoh   956.1   892.2   837.4  7.2%  5.6% 
Motorol   745   n/a   n/a  n/a  4.4% 
Racal   690.7   679.0   625.2  1.7%  4.1% 
Mitsubi   647.3   550.9   492.0 17.5%  3.8% 
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(from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
 1992 1991 1990 91-92 Market 
Company Revenue Revenue Revenue Change Share (%)  
IBM 6,410.0 2,018.0 1,500.0 217.6% 13.3% 
EDS 4,272.6 3,666.1 2,870.0  16.5%  8.9% 
CSC 2,474.4 1,944.7 1,679.3  27.2%  5.1% 
Anderso 2,445.0 2,083.0 1,670.2  17.4%  5.1% 
ADP 2,075.0 1,810.0 1,736.0  14.6%  4.3% 
Fujitsu 1,913.5 1,546.5   988.9  23.7%  4.0% 
Cap Gem 1,892.5 1,462.1 1,465.9  29.4%  3.9% 
TRW 1,800.0 1,839.0 1,739.0  -2.1%  3.7% 
Digital 1,570.3 1,570.3 1,162.3   0.0%  3.3% 
Unisys 1,336.0   600.0   n/a 122.7%  2.8% 
NTT 1,247.8   996.9   883.7  25.2%  2.6% 
 
 
Projected quantities of Personal Digital Assistants  
(from Marvin Sirbu, CMU)  
Number of units 
    sales installed base 
1993:    65,000    65,000 
1994:   150,000   215,000 
1995:   330,000   545,000 
1996:   750,000 1,300,000 
1997: 1,400,000 2,400,000 























Appendix 3.2:  Consumer Electronics Timeline (with hyperlinks) 
• 1877: Edison Cylinder Phonograph 
• 1878: Thomas Edison Demonstrates the Cylinder Phonograph 
• 1881: Earliest Identified Flat Disc Record 
• 1885: Tainter Graphophone 
• 1887: Berliner Gramophone 
• 1900: Gramophone Disc Record vs. The Edison Cylinder 
• 1906: De Forest Audion Vacuum Tube 
• 1916: Thomas Edison Holding an Edison Disc Record 
• 1922: RCA Superheterodyne Radiola 
• 1926: Baird Mechanical Television 
• 1926: Image from Baird's Mechanical Television 
• 1927: Baird Phonovision VideoDisc Apparatus 
• 1928: Baird Televisor 
• 1929: Zworykin Kinescope 
• 1939: RCA Transparent TRK-12 Television at the World's Fair 
• 1941: Atanasoff-Berry Electronic Digital Computer 
• 1941: VideoDisc Jukebox 
• 1946: The Eniac Computer is Unveiled 
• 1946: RCA's First Postwar Designed Television 
• 1946: Williams Tube CRT Memory Storage Unit 
• 1947: RCA's First Rear Projection Television 
 
 356 
• 1947: Invention of the Transistor 
• 1950: Simon Electromechanical Personal Computer 
• 1951: Whirlwind Computer - The First to Display Real Time Video 
• 1952: UNIVAC Computer Used to Predict the 1952 Election 
• 1952: IBM 701 - The Company's First Fully Electronic Computer 
• 1953: Winky Dink Interactive Television Show 
• 1953: IBM 650 Magnetic Drum Calculator 
• 1954: RCA's First Commercial Color TV 
• 1955: RCA Black & White Television Converted to Color 
• 1955: TRADIC - The First Fully Transistorized Computer 
• 1956: Ampex VRX-1000 - The First Commercial Videotape Recorder 
• 1956: RCA Bizmac Computer 
• 1956: IBM 305 RAMAC Computer with Disk Drive 
• 1956: RCA "Hear See" Videoplayer Presented to David Sarnoff 
• 1958: The Integrated Circuit is Invented by Jack Kilby 
• 1959: Philco Predicta Princess Swivel Television 
• 1960: DEC PDP-1 Precursor to the Minicomputer 
• 1962: Telstar - First Satellite to Transmit Live Transoceanic Television 
• 1963: First Consumer-only Video Tape Recorder 
• 1964: IBM Introduces the System/360 Family of Business Mainframe Computers 
• 1964: Control Data Corporation CDC 6600, the First Supercomputer 
• 1965: NASA Project Gemini Computer - The First in Space 
• 1965: DEC PDP-8 Desktop-sized Minicomputer is Introduced 
• 1966: The Acoustic Modem is Improved for General Use 
• 1967: Ampex Instant Replay Disk Recorder 
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• 1968: The First Computer Mouse is Demonstrated 
• 1969: CBS EVR or Electronic Video Recording System Prototype 
• 1969: RCA SelectaVision HoloTape Player Prototype 
• 1970: Telefunken Teldec VideoDisc Player Prototype 
• 1971: First CED Patent Applications by RCA 
• 1971: Intel 4004 - The First Microprocessor on the Market 
• 1971: Computer Space - The First Arcade Video Game 
• 1972: Magnavox Odyssey - The First Home Video Game System 
• 1972: Cartrivision - The First VCR with Prerecorded Tapes 
• 1972: The First Successful RCA SelectaVision VideoDisc 
• 1972: First Public Demonstration of the MCA Disco-Vision System 
• 1973: RCA "February" Prototype CED Player 
• 1973: Xero Alto Computer 
• 1973: RCA SelectaVision MagTape Prototype VCR 
• 1975: Telefunken Teldec Production VideoDisc Player 
• 1975: RCA EM-2 CED VideoDisc Player Prototype 
• 1975: Altair 680 and VideoDisc Articles in Popular Electronics 
• 1975: IBM 5100 - The First IBM PC - Is Released 
• 1975: Sony Betamax Combination TV/VCR Released in the U.S. 
• 1976: First Stand-alone Sony Betamax VCR Released in the U.S. 
• 1976: Apple Computer Co. Comes Into Existence 
• 1976: Fairchild Channel F - First ROM Cartridge Video Game System 
• 1976: RCA Studio II Home TV Programmer 
• 1977: VideoDisc Players - Here At Last ? 
• 1977: Consumer Computers at the West Coast Computer Faire 
 
 358 
• 1977: Loose CED Media Contrasted To Final Product 
• 1977: Cross Section of the Metallized RCA VideoDisc 
• 1977: The First Conductive VideoDiscs Are Molded 
• 1977: The First VHS VCR is Introduced in the U.S. 
• 1977: Atari Video Computer System 
• 1978: Heathkit H8 Unassembled Kit Computer 
• 1978: RCA SDT200 CED Player - The First to Accept Discs in Caddies 
• 1979: The VideoDisc Is Here! 
• 1979: RadioShack TRS-80 Model II with Integral 8-inch Floppy Drive 
• 1979: Prototype of the SFT100 VideoDisc Player 
• 1979: The APF Imagination Machine 
• 1979: JVC VHD/AHD Video/Audio Disc System Prototype 
• 1979: HP85 Instrumentation Computer with IEEE488 
• 1980: Thomson-CSF Transmissive VideoDisc System 
• 1980: Apple III Business Computer 
• 1980: The First CED Title to be Inventoried 
• 1981: Commodore VIC 20 Personal Computer 
• 1981: The SFT100W CED Player Hits the Market 
• 1981: Xerox Star - The GUI is Marketed 
• 1981: Osborne Portable Computer 
• 1981: TI99/4A Computer - An Updated Version of the TI99/4 
• 1981: The IBM Personal Computer is Introduced 
• 1981: RCA Prototype Random Access Player at Vidcom 
• 1982: JVC's VHD VideoDisc System at the Consumer Electronics Show 
• 1982: DEC Rainbow Triple Boot Computer 
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• 1982: Capacitance Electronic Disc System Goes Stereo 
• 1982: Vectrex Graphic Computer System 
• 1982: Timex Sinclair Computer for $99.95 is Introduced 
• 1982: Sony CDP-101 - the Compact Disc is Introduced 
• 1982: Compaq Portable - The First IBM Compatible 
• 1983: Apple Lisa with Graphical User Interface and Mouse 
• 1983: Commodore SX-64 Executive - The First Color Portable Computer 
• 1983: RadioShack Model 100 - The First Truly Usable Notebook Computer 
• 1983: JVC VHD VideoDisc System Hits the Market in Japan 
• 1983: RCA Introduces Their J-Line of CED VideoDisc Players 
• 1983: Coleco Adam Computer with Daisy Wheel Printer 
• 1983: Unified Digital Command Center for the SJT400 Interactive CED Player 
• 1983: The CED System is Marketed in Great Britain 
• 1983: AT&T Sceptre - WebTV in 1983 ? 
• 1983: IBM Introduces the PCjr Home Computer 
• 1984: Macintosh Hits the Market 
• 1984: Dimensia - The Next Dimension in Sight and Sound 
• 1985: The Commodore Amiga Is Introduced 
• 1987: IBM Introduces the PS/2 Family of Personal Computers 
• 1988: The Cube-shaped NeXT Computer Becomes Available 
• 1993: Macintosh Color Classic - The Last Classic Mac 
• 1993: The Graphical WWW is Born with the Release of NCSA Mosaic 
• 1994: The RCA Digital Satellite System (DSS) Begins Broadcasting 
• 1996: WebTV Using a Television to Access the Internet is Launched 
• 1997: DVD Achieves a Nationwide Market 
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• 1998: DIVX the Pay-Per-View DVD System is Launched 
• 1999: Personal Video Recorders from ReplayTV and TiVo are Introduced 














Appendix 3.3:  U.S. Consumer Electronics Spending 
 
US consumer electronics sales data 
Patterns of consumer electronics sales in the United States. Sales are shown in millions of 
dollars. 
Type of 
device 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
        
Cordless 
telephones  
842  1,141  1,672  1,745  1,808  1,307  1,358 
        
Corded 
telephones  
638  557  515  489  471  393  294 
        
Cellular 
telephones 
1,133  2,574  5,940  6,000  6,066  8,995  8,651 
        
Home 
computers 
4,187  12,600  15,950  16,640  16,390  16,400  12,960 
        
Computer 
printers  
(NA)  2,430  3,900  4,188  4,500  5,116  5,245 
        
Computer 
software 
971  2,500  3,450  3,930  4,480  5,062  5,771 
        
Home fax 
machines 
920  919  1,137  647  455  387  349 
        




        
Standard 
color TV 
6,197 6,798 6,023  6,122  6,199  6,140  5,130 
        
TV/VCR 
combos 
178  723  684  832  1,014  969  790 
        
VCR decks  2,439  2,767  2,618  2,409  2,333  1,861  1,058 
        
Home 
satellites 
421  1,265  726  733  957  1,102  921 
        
DVD players (NA)  (NA)  171  421  1,099  1,713  2,697 
        
Video game 
hardware 
975  1,500  1,650  1,980  2,250  2,700  3,250 
        
Video game 
software 
2,400  3,000  3,900  4,480  5,100  5,850  6,725 
        
Blank audio 
cassettes 
376  334  281  248  208  162  106 
        
Blank 
videotapes 
948  708  695  647  590  567  604 
        







Appendix 4.1:  DVD Forum Member Companies (as of 3/07) 
1K Studios   4M Systems SA http://www.4m-inc.ch  
A & R Cambridge Limited http://www.arcam.co.uk http://www.arcam.co.uk/news/index.cfm 
Accuphase Laboratory, Inc.    
Action Asia Limited    
Action Electronics Co., Ltd.    
Adobe system    
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. http://ati.amd.com/  
Aisin AW Co., Ltd. http://www.aisin-aw.co.jp/  
Alco Electronics Limited http://www.alco.com.hk  
Almedio Inc. http://www.almedio.co.jp  
Alpine Corporation    
Analog Devices K.K. http://www.analog.com/  
Aplix Corporation http://www.aplix.co.jp/  
Apple Computer Inc.    
ArcSoft, Inc. 
Arima Devices Corporation    
Asahi Kasei Microsystems Co., Ltd.    
ASUSTeK Computer Inc.    
ASV Corp.    
Atmel Corporation    
AudioDev AB http://www.audiodev.com  
B.D. FOX & FRIENDS, INC. 
B&W Group / Classe Audio Inc. http://www.classeaudio.com/  http://www.rotel.com/  
B1 Media    
Bayer MaterialScience AG http://www.bayer-ag.de  
Bcom Electronics Inc.    
BOSE Kabushiki Kaisha    
Broadcom Corporation http://www.broadcom.com/  
Cheertek Inc. http://www.cheertek.com.tw  
China Electronics Technology Group Corporation No.3 Research Institute    
Cinram Inc. http://www.cinram.com  
Citron Electronic    
Clarion Co.,Ltd.    
CMC Magnetics Corporation http://cmc.taiwanet.com  
Coding Technologies http://www.codingtechnologies.com  
Columbia Digital Media, Inc. http://www.columbia-dm.co.jp/  
Columbia Music Entertainment, Inc. http://columbia.jp/ http://www.columbia-dm.co.jp/  
Crest National http://www.crestnational.com  
Custom Flix http://customflix.com  
Cryptography Research http://www.cryptography.com/  
CyberLink Corp. http://www.gocyberlink.com/  
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D&M Holdings, Inc. 
DAEWOO Electronics Corp.    
Daikin Industries, Ltd.    
Data Storage Institute, Singapore    
DaTARIUS Technologies GmbH http://www.datarius.com/  
Daxon Technology Inc. http://www.daxontech.com/  
DCA Inc. http://www.dcainc.com  
Delphi Technology, Inc. 
Deluxe Digital Studios, Inc. http://www.bydeluxe.com  
Denca Industrial Limited    
Dolby Laboratories Inc.    
DPHI, INC http://www.dataplay.com  
DTS, Inc. http://www.dtstech.com  
Eclipse Data Technologies http://www.eclipsedata.com  
ECOM Inc.    
EIZO NANAO Corporation http://FORIS.TV/ http://www.eizo.co.jp/  
Emfasys Corporation    
ESS Technology, Inc.    
Expert Magnetics Corp. http://www.expertmg.co.jp/  
Flexplay Technologies, Inc. http://www.flexplay.com/  
Foster Electric Company, Limited http://www.fostex.co.jp/http://www.fostex.co.jp/  
Fraunhofer IIS-A http://www.iis.fraunhofer.de/amm/  
FUJIFILM Corporation    
Fujitsu Ten Limited    
Funai Electric Co., Ltd.    
GEAR Software, Inc. http://www.gearsoftware.com  
Gigastorage Corporation    
Gork Enterprises, Inc.    
Harman International    
Hioki E.E. Corporation    
Hewlett-Packard Company    
Hitachi, Ltd. http://dvd.hitachi.co.jp  
Homenema Disk Incorporation http://www.homenema.com  
Horizon Semiconductors Ltd. http://www.horizonsemi.com  
Hyundai Autonet Co.,Ltd. http://www.hyundaiautonet.com  
IBM Corporation    
Imagica Corp.    
Imation Corporation    
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)    
Infodisc Technology Co., Ltd. http://www.infodisc.com  
INFOMEDIA INC. 
Info Source Multi Media Korea Ltd.    
Intel Corporation    
Intersil Corporation http://www.intersil.com/cda/home/  
InterVideo, Inc. http://www.intervideo.com/  
Kenwood Corporation    
 
 365 
KONICA MINOLTA OPTO, INC. http://konicaminolta.jp/  
Laser Pacific Media Corporation    
Lead Data Inc.    
Leader Electronics Corp. http://www.leader.co.jp  
Lenovo Group Ltd. http://www.lenovo.com  
LG Electronics Inc. http://www.lge.com  http://www.lge.com/product/product.html  
Linn Products Ltd. http://www.linn.co.uk  
Lite-On It Corp.    
LSI Logic Corporation    
M2 Engineering AB    
Macrovision Corporation http://www.macrovision.com  
Magnum Semiconductor, Inc.    
Manufacturing Advanced Media Europe    
Marvell Semiconductor http://www.marvell.com/  
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. http://www.panasonic.co.jp/dvd/  
MediaTek Inc. http://www.mtk.com.tw  
Megan Media Holdings Bhd http://www.meganmedia.com.my  
Memory-Tech Corporation    
Meridian Audio Limited http://www.meridian-audio.com   
Mico Technology (Shenzhen) Limited    
Microsoft Corporation    
MIPS Technologies http://www.mips.com  
Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation    
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation http://www.mitsubishielectric.co.jp/dvd/index.html  
Mitsui Chemicals, Inc. http://www.mitsui-chem.co.jp/cdr/  
Mitsumi Electric Co.,Ltd.    
Moser Baer India Limited http://www.moserbaer.net  
Movielink, LLC. http://movielink.com/  
MPO International http://www.mpo.fr  
MUST Tech. Co. Ltd. http://www.musttech.com.tw  
Nagase & Co., Ltd. http://www.nagase.co.jp  
NBC Universal, Inc.    
NEC Corporation    
Nero AG http://www.nero.com http://www.nerodigital.com  
NHK Technical Services, Inc. http://www.nhk-ts.co.jp/  
Nichia Corporation http://www.nichia.co.jp  
NTT Electronics Corporation    
NuCORE Technology Inc. http://www.nucoretech.com/  
NVIDIA Corporation    
OC Oerlikon Balzers AG http://www.oerlikon.com/datastorage  
Odeon Cineplex S.A.    
Onkyo Corporation http://www.onkyo.co.jp/DVD_compo/index.htm  
ONO Sokki Co., Ltd.    
OPT Corporation    
Optical Disc Corporation http://www.odc-nimbus.com  
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Optical Memory National Engineering Research Center, China 
Optodisc Technology Corporation 
Orion Electric Co., Ltd. http://www.orion-electric.co.jp  
Pegasys Inc. 
Pinnacle Systems GmbH http://www.pinnaclesys.com  
Pioneer Corporation    
Pixela Corporation http://www.pixela.co.jp/  
Plannet Associate Co., Ltd.    
Pony Canyon Enterprise Inc.    
Postech Corp.    
Princo Corp.    
Prodisc Technology Inc.    
Pulstec Industrial Co., Ltd.    
Quanta Storage Inc.    
Realtek Semiconductor Corp. http://www.realtek.com.tw/  
Ricoh Company, Ltd. http://www.ricoh.com/  
Ritek Corporation http://www.ritek.com.tw  
Rohm GmbH & Co. KG    
Royal Philips Electronics http://www.philips.com  http://www.licensing.philips.com  
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.    
Sanken Media Product Co.,Ltd.    
Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd.    
Scientific Atlanta Inc. http://www.scientificatlanta.com  
Sensio Technologies Inc.    
Sharp Corporation http://sharp-world.com/  
Shibasoku Co.,Ltd.    
Shinano Kenshi Co.,Ltd.    
ShinShin Co., Ltd. http://www.ssnet.co.jp/  
Shinwa Co., LTD http://www.shinwa.co.jp/  
Sigma Designs, Inc. http://www.sigmadesigns.com  
Silicon Image http://www.siimage.com  
Singulus Technologies AG http://www.singulus.de/  
SM Summit Holdings Ltd. http://www.smsummit.com.sg/  
Sonic Solutions http://www.sonic.com  
SONY BMG Music Entertainment    
Sony Corporation http://www.sony.com  
Spb Software House GmbH    
Starlight Video Limited    
STMicroelectronics K.K.    
Sun Cheer Technology Ltd.    
Sunext Technology Co., Ltd. http://www.sunext.com  
Taiyo Yuden Co., Ltd http://www.ty-top.com  
Target Technology Company LLC http://www.targettechnology.com  
Tatung Co. http://www.tatung.com.tw  
TDK Corporation http://www.tdk.co.jp/  
TEAC Corporation    
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Techking Technology CO., LTD    
Teijin Chemicals Ltd.    
Texas Instruments Japan Limited    
The Cannery http://www.cannery.com/  
Thomson http://www.thomson.net  
THX LTD    
TNE JAPAN    
Toppan Printing Co., Ltd.    
TOPTICA Photonics AG http://www.toptica.com  
Toshiba Corporation http://www.toshiba.co.jp/index.htm  
TOYO Recording Co., LTD.    
TRAILER PARK    
Trendy Corporation http://www.trendy.co.jp/  
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation    
U-Tech Media Corporation http://www.utechmedia.com.tw  
Ulead Systems, Inc. http://www.ulead.com  
UmeDisc Ltd. http://www.umedisc.com  
Universal Music Group http://www.universalstudios.com  http://www.umusic.com  
Verance    
VESTEL Group of Companies http://www.vestel.com http://www.vestelinvestorrelations.com  
VIA Optical Solutions, Inc.    
Victor Company of Japan, Limited http://www.jvc-victor.co.jp/ http://www.jvc.com/  
Videon Central Inc.    
Visionare Corporation    
Walt Disney Pictures and Television    
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. http://www.warnervideo.com  
Warner Music Group http://www.wmg.com/  
Wipro Limited http://www.wipro.com  
YA BANG Industrial Co., Ltd. 
Yamaha Corporation http://www.global.yamaha.com/ http://www.global.yamaha.com/products/av/ 
http://www.global.yamaha.com/news/  
Yaskawa Information Systems Corporation 
Yokogawa Electric Corporation http://www.yokogawa.com/tm/ 
http://www.yokogawa.co.jp/Measurement/  
Zhenjiang Jiangkui Group Co., Ltd.    
ZOOtech Ltd. http://www.zoodigitalgroup.com http://www.zoo-tech.com  




Appendix 4.2:  Early DVD Titles, Warner Home Video 
 
Titles released by WHV in 1997: "10", 2 Days in the Valley (HBO),A Christmas Story 
(MGM/UA), A Little Princess, A Time to Kill, Absolute Power, Ace Ventura, Ace Ventura 
2, Adam's Rib (MGM/UA), Addicted to Love, Adventures of Pinocchio (NL), All the 
President's Men, Amadeus, Arthur, Assassins, Austin Powers (NL), Balanchine's 
Nutcracker, Batman, Batman & Robin, Batman Forever, Batman Returns, Beetlejuice, 
Best Years of Our Lives (HBO), Birdcage, The (MGM/UA), Bishop's Wife, The (HBO), 
Black Stallion (MGM/UA), Blade Runner (DC), Blazing Saddles, Blown Away 
(MGM/UA), Body Heat, Bodyguard, The, Bonnie and Clyde, Bridges of Madison County, 
Brigadoon (MGM/UA), Bullitt, Caddyshack, Camelot (30th), Candidate, The, Cat on a 
Hot Tin Roof (MGM/UA), Chariots of Fire, Client, The, Color Purple, The, Conspiracy 
Theory, Contact, Cool Hand Luke, Cyborg (MGM/UA), Dangerous Liaisons, Dark 
Victory (MGM/UA), Demolition Man, Dirty Harry, Disclosure, Dog Day Afternoon, Dr. 
No (MGM/UA), Driving Miss Daisy, Dumb and Dumber (NL), Elvis: That's the Way It Is 
(MGM/UA), Eraser, Executive Decision, Exorcist, The, Fathers' Day, Fire Down Below, 
Forbidden Planet (MGM/UA), Forever Young, Free Willy, From Russia with Love 
(MGM/UA), Fugitive, The, Get Shorty (MGM/UA), Getaway, The (1972), Glimmer Man, 
GoldenEye (MGM/UA), Goldfinger (MGM/UA), GoodFellas, Green Berets, Gremlins, 
Grinch/Horton (MGM/UA), Grumpier Old Men, Grumpy Old Men, Hang 'em High 
(MGM/UA), Hunchback of Notre Dame (RKO), Interview With the Vampire, Island of 
Doctor Moreau (NL), J.F.K. (DC), Jailhouse Rock (MGM/UA), Jeremiah Johnson, 
Jezebel, Ladyhawke, Last Man Standing (NL), Lawnmower Man, The (NL), Lethal 
Weapon, Lethal Weapon 2, Lethal Weapon 3, Little Shop of Horrors, Long Kiss 
Goodnight (NL), Mad Max: Beyond Thunderdome, Man Who Would Be King, The, Mars 
Attacks!, Mask, The (NL), Maverick, Menace II Society (NL), Michael, Michael Collins, 
Midnight Cowboy (MGM/UA), Mortal Kombat (NL), Murder at 1600, My Fellow 
Americans, National Velvet (MGM/UA), Nat'l Lampoon's Christmas Vacation, Nat'l 
Lampoon's Vacation, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, Outbreak, Outland, Pale Rider, 
Pelican Brief, Philadelphia Story, The (MGM/UA), Player, The (NL), Policy Academy, 
Poltergeist (MGM/UA), Postman Always Rings Twice, The, Presumed Innocent, Private 
Benjamin, Purple Rain, Raging Bull (MGM/UA), Rain Man (MGM/UA), Red River 
(MGM/UA), Right Stuff, The, Risky Business, Road Warrior, The, Rob Roy (MGM/UA), 
Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves, Rocky (MGM/UA), Rocky II (MGM/UA), Rocky IV 
(MGM/UA), Rosewood, Rumble in the Bronx (NL), Searchers, The, Secret Garden, The, 
Selena, Seven (NL), Shine (NL), Show Boat (1951) (MGM/UA), Singin' in the Rain 
(MGM/UA), Sleepers, Space Jam, Spawn (NL), Spawn Animated (HBO), Species 
(MGM/UA), Stagecoach, Strangers on a Train, Streetcar Named Desire (DC), Tango and 
Cash, Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles (NL), Tequila Sunrise, The, Thelma & Louise 
(MGM/UA), Tin Cup, Tom Jones (HBO), True Romance (DC), Turbulence (HBO), 
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Twister, Under Siege, Under Siege 2: Dark Territory, Unforgiven, Vegas Vacation, Viva 
Las Vegas! (MGM/UA), What Ever Happened to Baby Jane?, Who's Afraid of Virginia 
Woolf?, Wild America, Wild Bunch, The, Willy Wonka and The Chocolate Factory, 
Witches of Eastwick, The, Wizard of Oz, The (MGM/UA), Woman of the Year 
(MGM/UA), Woodstock -- 3 Days of Peace and Music, Wuthering Heights (HBO), Year 




Appendix 4.3:  Revenue Sharing Contract, MGM and Hollywood Video 
(2001) 
 
REVENUE SHARING TERM SHEET 
HOLLYWOOD ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION 
 
The following (this "Agreement") sets forth the principal terms of the 
revenue sharing agreement between MGM Home Entertainment ("MGM") and 
Hollywood 
Entertainment Corporation ("Retailer") concerning certain motion 
picture titles 
made available to the public by MGM. 
 
TITLES:   All motion pictures and programs released by MGM 
during 
the Term as Rental-Priced (defined below) new release 
VHS and day-and-date DVD (in the English and Spanish 
language) (hereafter collectively referred to as 
"Units"), intended for non-commercial, private in-home 
viewing, on an output basis, to the extent that MGM owns 
or controls the necessary revenue-sharing rights in each 
such motion picture or program (individually a "Title"). 
 For purposes of this Agreement, "day-and-date DVD" 
shall include DVD new releases where the DVD release 
date is within * of the VHS Street Date.  In addition, 
Retailer shall have the option to *.  Other video 
products, and all other media, shall not be included 
within this Agreement.  Retailer agrees to lease all 
Titles offered by MGM during the Term. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, Retailer shall be under no obligation to 
lease from MGM more than * Titles per year that have a 
Gross Box Office (defined below) of * and that MGM has 
not participated in such Title's production (e.g., as 
evidenced in the credit block) ("Class C Pictures").  If 
MGM releases more than *  Class C Pictures in any given 
year, Retailer and MGM shall mutually select the * to be 
included hereunder and any additional Class C Pictures 
shall only be leased by Retailer in Retailer's sole 
discretion.  "Gross Box Office" shall mean the box 
office gross receipts earned by a title in the United 
States and Canada measured from the Title's initial 
theatrical release in the Territory until the date 
ordered by Retailer, as reported by the Hollywood 
Reporter.  "Rental-Priced" shall mean new release VHS 
format Titles not priced for sell-through (as the term 
is commonly understood in the United States video 
industry). 
 
Retailer agrees that Units of Titles will only be 
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obtained on a revenue sharing basis in accordance with 
this Agreement.  For the avoidance of doubt, this 
Agreement is on an output (versus a Title-by-Title) 
basis, excluding * and excluding certain Class C 
Pictures as outlined above. 
 
*Confidential material omitted and separately filed with the Commission 
under 
an application for confidential treatment. 
 
TERM: The term of this Agreement (the "Term") shall commence upon the 
date this Agreement is fully executed, and shall 
continue thereafter for a period of three (3) years; 
provided, however, that MGM or Retailer may terminate 
this Agreement at any time after December 15, 2002, upon 
ninety (90) days' written notice (which notice may be 
given before or after December 15, 2002). 
 
TERRITORY: United States, its territories and possessions. 
 
TRANSACTION: Lease, with rights to purchase Units at end of the 
Revenue Sharing Period. 
 
ORDER DATE: With respect to ordering each and every Title pursuant to 
this 
Agreement, Retailer shall provide to MGM (or its 
designee) order quantities determined by Retailer for 
such Title not later than six (6) weeks prior to such 
Title's Street Date (the "Order Date"). The orders shall 
specify the number of Units (VHS and DVD) for each 
Title. 
 
SHIPPING: MGM shall ship (at MGM's sole cost and expense) the 
Units 
leased by Retailer to not more than two (2) distribution 
centers designated by Retailer.  MGM shall ship such 
Units to such designated locations for arrival at such 
locations not less than fifteen (15) days prior to 




COMMITMENT: Retailer and MGM shall mutually agree on the number of 
Units 
for each respective title that Retailer shall lease from 
MGM.  In the event the parties cannot agree on the 
number of Units on or before forty five (45) days prior 
to the Street Date of any Title, the number of Units 
shall be determined by reference to the matrix attached 
hereto as Exhibit A ("MGM Matrix").  Retailer agrees to 
provide MGM with written notice of the inability of the 
parties to agree on or before the expiration of said 






In the event * is used to determine the number of Units 
acquired by Retailer, Retailer agrees to pay * 
 
* Confidential material omitted and separately filed with the 
Commission under 
an application for confidential treatment. 
 
The allocation between VHS and DVD within the number of 
Units leased shall be determined by Retailer in 
Retailer's sole discretion; provided, however, that in 
the event Retailer elects to increase the percentage of 
DVD acquired in excess of * percent (*%) of the 
Retailer's * at the time of the allocation, the 
allocation in excess of such * percent (*%) increase 
shall be subject to MGM's prior written consent, which 
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.  For 
purposes of illustration, if at the time of the 
allocation * 
 
Matrix Adjustment:  The parties agree that the MGM 
Matrix * shall be adjusted semi-annually during the term 
of this Agreement.  The first such adjustment shall be 
made effective December 15, 2001, with later adjustments 
being made on June 15, 2002, December 15, 2002, June 15, 
2003, and December 15, 2003 ("Adjustment Date(s)").  The 
adjustment in the * for the next period shall be a pro 
rata increase or decrease in the Unit ranges based upon 
the percentage year-over-year increase or decrease in 
Store Revenue for Retailer's stores for the six (6)- 
month period ending the month prior to the month of the 
Adjustment Date ("Adjustment Period"); provided, 
however, that unless the adjustment is greater than * 
percent (*%), there shall be no adjustment made in the 
*. Year-over-year increases or decreases shall be 
effective as of the Adjustment Date and shall be 
determined by comparison of Store Revenue for the prior 
Adjustment Period to Store Revenue for the same six (6)- 
month period of the prior year.  The Store Revenue 
percentage increase or decrease shall determine the 
percentage increase or decrease in the Unit ranges in 
the *.  For purposes of this Agreement, Store Revenue 
for Retailer's stores is defined as average store 
revenue determined from all Comp-stores owned by 
Retailer and all franchises or licensed stores for which 
Retailer is responsible for new release acquisitions. 
 The * for any period shall apply to Titles that have a 
Street Date within such period.  For purposes of this 
Agreement, "Comp-stores" are defined as stores over one 
(1) year old compared to the same store for the same 





SHARE: For purposes of this Agreement, Revenue Share includes 
*, excluding any sales taxes, use taxes, and any other 
government-levied transaction fees collected from the 
customer. 
 
* Confidential material omitted and separately filed with the 
Commission under 
an application for confidential treatment. 
 
Rental Revenue:  Retailer shall pay to MGM an amount 
equal to * percent (*%) of all Rental Revenue (defined 
below) with respect to each and every Unit leased by 
Retailer pursuant to this Agreement ("MGM's Rental 
Share") during the period commencing upon the respective 
Street Date for such Title and continuing for * 
thereafter ("Revenue Sharing Period"). "Rental Revenue" 
is defined as all monies actually tendered by consumers, 
including rental fees and extended viewing fees (less 
amounts refunded * and excluding any sales taxes, use 
taxes, and any other government-levied transaction fees 
collected from the customer.  For purposes of the 
foregoing, Promotional or Operation Credit or Discount 
shall mean * 
 
DVD PVT:  * 
 
VHS PVT:  * 
 
MINIMUM PER 
TRANSACTION: With respect to each Title, Retailer shall pay to MGM 
the 
greater of:  (i) * per Rental Transaction (defined 
below) averaged over the aggregate number of rental 
transactions for all Units of such Title during the 
Revenue Sharing Period, or (ii)  * amount for such 
Title.  For purposes of this Agreement, "Rental 
Transaction" is defined as a single-night or multiple- 
night Rental Transaction involving a Unit, whether or 
not paid for. 
 
MGM acknowledges that one of Retailer's operation 
programs is the free rental of new releases to 
Retailer's store employees prior to Street Date.  The 
purpose of the program is to educate Retailer's 
employees so they may better serve customers.  MGM 
acknowledges that such program transactions are excluded 
from Rental Revenue and Rental Transactions.  Retailer 
acknowledges that such program shall be applied to MGM 
in a manner consistent with its application to other 




AD ALLOWANCE: * shall be made available by MGM to Retailer for 
advertising purposes; provided, however, that amounts, 
if any, in excess of such minimum shall be determined by 
MGM at MGM's sole discretion.  The allowance may be 
deducted monthly by Retailer from MGM's Revenue Share 
otherwise payable by Retailer. 
 
 
* Confidential material omitted and separately filed with the 
Commission under 
an application for confidential treatment. 
 
END-OF-TERM 
BUYOUT FEE: VHS Units: With respect to VHS Units of each Title 
leased by 
Retailer, Retailer shall, on the date which is * after 
such Title's Street Date, * 
In the event MGM elects to have Retailer return Units, 
MGM shall provide the destination address for its 
distribution center for return of the Units and Retailer 
shall deliver the Units to such location.  Retailer may 
reasonably retain and consolidate return shipments to 
fully utilize truck capacities, provided returns shall 
not be delayed by such for more than * 
 
DVD Units:  With respect to DVD Units of each Title 
leased by Retailer which have not been sold during the 
Revenue Sharing Period for such Title, Retailer shall, 
on the date which is * after such Title's Street Date, 
* 
 
In the event MGM elects to have Retailer return Units, 
MGM shall provide the destination address for its 
distribution center for return of the Units and Retailer 
shall deliver the Units to such location.  Retailer may 
reasonably retain and consolidate return shipments to 
fully utilize truck capacities, provided returns shall 
not be delayed by such for more than *. 
PVT 
CONSUMER 
SALES: Only Units that have previously been rented to consumers 
(PVT) may be sold pursuant to this Agreement during the 
Revenue Sharing Period.  There shall be no PVT sales 
prior to the date which is * after each Title's 
respective Street Date for VHS and * after each Title's 
respective Street Date for DVD (the "Permitted Sale 
Date").  Thereafter, Retailer may sell Units for each 
Title leased by Retailer pursuant hereto.  *. 
 
PAYMENT 
TERMS: MGM's Rental Share and * revenue shall be paid by 
Retailer to MGM not later than * days after the end of 
the month during which each respective transaction 
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occurred.  With respect to the * any * shall be payable 
within * days after the expiration of the applicable 
Revenue Sharing Period for the Title. 
 
MGM's * shall be paid by Retailer to MGM not later than 
* days after the date such amount is due to MGM in 
accordance with * provision set forth above. 
 
*Confidential material omitted and separately filed with the Commission 
under 
an application for confidential treatment. 
 
DATA 
REPORTING: With respect to each and every Title pursuant to this 
Agreement, Retailer shall provide to MGM (or its 
designee), on a weekly basis, all transactional data, 
excluding Retailer's customer data, for all amounts 
payable by Retailer to MGM pursuant to this Agreement in 
the manner set forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto. 
MGM acknowledges that Retailer's current electronic 
reporting capabilities are satisfactory to MGM. 
Retailer agrees that it will maintain its system to 
continue to provide such data.  Retailer agrees to 
consider reasonable data format changes requested by 
MGM, provided that such changes do not require 
significant expenditures or otherwise present processing 
problems. 
 
DEFECTIVES: VHS:  MGM shall allow Retailer a credit, as the sole remedy 
for 
damaged or defective VHS Units, in an amount equal to * 
of Revenue Share for VHS Units. 
 
DVD:  MGM shall allow Retailer a credit, as the sole 
remedy for damaged or defective DVD Units, in an amount 
equal to * of Revenue Share for DVD Units. 
 
The credits may be deducted monthly by Retailer from 
MGM's Revenue Share otherwise payable by Retailer. 
 
PRODUCT 
ALLOCATION: In the event Retailer closes one (1) or more stores during 
the 
term of this Agreement, Retailer shall have the right to 




PLACEMENT: Retailer shall stock all DVD and VHS Units of all Titles 
leased 
in Retailer's stores.  Retailer shall have the right to 
transfer Units between its stores.  Retailer agrees that 
Retailer shall stock and transfer Units consistent with 
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Retailer's handling of similar product of other major 
motion picture studios. 
 
* Confidential material omitted and separately filed with the 
Commission under 
an application for confidential treatment. 
 
AUDIT RIGHTS: With respect to each and every Title pursuant to this 
Agreement, MGM shall hold all audit and inspection 
rights in connection with all Units pursuant to this 
Agreement (including, but not limited to, the right to 
audit the Matrix Adjustment determinations); provided, 
however, that MGM shall not audit Retailer more than 
once per quarter.  Such audits shall not continue for 
more than twenty (20) business days so long as Retailer 
provides requested audit documentation to MGM in a 
timely manner.  In no event shall MGM have the right to 
examine records relating to Retailer's business 
generally or with respect to projects or areas not 
directly relating to Revenue Share with MGM.  The 
foregoing sentence shall not limit MGM's right to audit 
and inspect the Matrix Adjustment determinations and the 
transactional data provided to MGM set forth above. 
 
NO ASSIGNMENT: This Agreement may not be assigned by Retailer without 
MGM's prior written consent.  The sale or exchange of 
Retailer's stock in a public offering and the subsequent 
sale of Retailer's stock on a nationally recognized 
exchange or in NASDAQ, a change in ownership of Retailer 
as a result of a merger, consolidation, reorganization, 
joint venture, the exchange of stock between Retailer's 
parent company and a subsidiary or between subsidiaries, 
or the sale of all or substantially all of Retailer's 
stock, or the sale of all or substantially all of 
Retailer's assets shall not be considered an Assignment. 
 Retailer shall not be required to obtain MGM's consent 
and MGM shall have no right to delay, alter, or impede 
any of the foregoing transactions or combinations 
thereof.  Only the event of change in ownership or 
control of Retailer as a result of such a transaction 
shall the successor entity have the right to assume 
Retailer's rights and obligations under this Agreement; 
provided, however, no such assignment shall operate to 




* Confidential material omitted and separately filed with the 
Commission under 
an application for confidential treatment. 
 




(other than its respective employees, in their capacity 
as such) any information with respect to the terms and 
provisions of this Agreement except: (a) to the extent 
necessary to comply with law, administrative order, or 
rule or the valid order or decree of a court of 
competent jurisdiction, in which event the party making 
such disclosure shall so notify the other and shall seek 
confidential treatment of such information, (b) as part 
of its normal reporting or review procedure to its 
partners, its divisions, its corporate affiliates, its 
financiers, its financial advisers, auditors, and its 
attorneys, and its profit participants (to the extent 
deemed necessary by the disclosing party), (c) for 
reasonable conduct of its business, to Retailer's 
employees, agents, and business advisors or consultants 
authorized by Retailer who have a reasonable need to 
know such information; provided, however, that any and 
all such parties are advised of the confidential nature 
of the information and agree in writing to be bound by 
the confidentiality requirements of this Agreement. 
 
INDEMNIFICATION: MGM hereby indemnifies and holds harmless Retailer, 
its 
successors and assigns, including any customers, from 
any loss, liability, claim, or damage (including, but 
not limited to, reasonable outside attorney fees) 
arising out of or in relation to the content of any Unit 
of a Title leased by Retailer pursuant to this 
Agreement; provided, however, that such Unit(s) has not 
been altered or modified by Retailer. 
 
 
* Confidential material omitted and separately filed with the 
Commission under 
an application for confidential treatment. 
 
MGM and Retailer contemplate that a more formal agreement shall be 
entered into 
by MGM and Retailer with respect to the foregoing matters and standard 
terms 
and conditions to be negotiated 
 
in good faith.  Pending the preparation and execution of such more 
formal 
documentation, this Agreement shall be binding upon MGM and Retailer. 
 
 
MGM HOME ENTERTAINMENT INC.  HOLLYWOOD ENTERTAINMENT 




By: /s/ David Bishop  By: /s/ F. Bruce Giesbrecht 
 
 378 
 David Bishop    F. Bruce Giesbrecht 
Its: President   Its: Executive Vice President 
      Business Development 
 








Appendix 4.4:  Master List of DVD Distributors 
 (Source:  DVDFILE.com) 
 
Alphaville Pictures 
A small theatrical production company, they currently use Universal as their distributor.  
Amblin Entertainment 
See The Spielberg Connection special report for more information.  
Anchor Bay Entertainment 
An independent distributor that solely licenses titles from production companies. Anchor 
Bay does not comment on titles currently in negotiation, and currently has no exclusive 
DVD distribution agreements with any production companies. Lately, Anchor Bay has 
specialized in horror titles, but has recently started to license other genres as well. 
Interestingly, they have just licensed some titles from Walt Disney. 
Artisan 
Was formerly named LIVE Entertainment, and was/is mainly responsible for smaller "B" 
titles. They also currently distribute films produced by a three now-defunct companies, 
Republic Pictures, Vestron Pictures and Carolco, as well as distributing DVD titles in a 
joint venture with Hallmark Hall Of Fame.  
AVCO Embassy Pictures 
Independent that produced a large of number of well-regarded cult films in the 70's 
(including some John Carpenter films), they have long since gone bankrupt. Most of their 
films were acquired by Nelson Entertainment for home video release, who has since been 
acquired by Polygram. For all intents and purposes, Polygram now has distribution rights 
for AVCO films on DVD. 
Buena Vista Home Entertainment 
They exclusively distribute titles from Miramax Films, Dimension Films, Hollywood 
Pictures, Touchstone Pictures and Walt Disney Pictures. 
Cannon 
This big B-Movie indie of the 80's (think Invasion U.S.A., Missing In Action flicks, etc.) 
has long gone out of busness. However, their entire film library was picked up by MGM 




A production company that produced many big-budget spectacles in the 80's and 90's, up 
until their recent filing of Chapter 11 bankruptcy. All their titles are distributed 
exclusively by Artisan. 
Castle Rock Entertainment* 
There has been much confusion surrounding Castle Rock releases on all formats. 
Originally, Castle Rock's films (Shawshank Redemption, Dolores Claiborne, etc.) were 
distributed theatrically by Columbia Tri-Star Pictures. However, Castle Rock became a 
subsidiary of Time-Warner, who then controlled all DVD distribution rights to their titles. 
However, in a legal situation still undisclosed, DVD rights to Castle Rock titles have 
been held up, and have become split on a title-by-title basis between Polygram and 
Warner. In any case, Columbia DOES NOT control DVD rights to any Castle Rock 
titles anymore. 
CIBY 2000* 
A small "art house" producer, they currently co-produce many of their films and use a 
wide variety of distributors. Unfortunately, they have no one exclusive distributor to 
make it easier... 
Columbia Tri-Star Pictures 
Aside from their own extensive film library, they also currently distribute titles for 
Mandalay Entertainment, Sony Pictures, Sony Pictures Classics and Tri-Star Pictures. 
Please note that they do not distribute Sony Wonder or Sony Music...those companies 
handle their own DVD distribution. Also, they used to distribute Castle Rock 
Entertainment titles theatrically, but do not handle DVD distribution chores for those 
titles (see Warner and Polygram). 
Criterion Collection 
An independent distributor that solely licenses titles from production companies. 
Although they have produced extensive special editions on laserdisc, many of those titles 
are currently owned by others for DVD. Criterion does not comment on titles currently in 
negotiation, and currently has no exclusive DVD distribution agreements with any 
production companies. 
DaViD Entertainment 
A distributor of adult films only.  
Dimension Films 
The "B" movie/horror film division of Miramax Films. Now distributed by Miramax 




Paramount distributes DVD titles. 
Elite Entertainment 
An independent distributor that solely licenses titles from production companies. Elite 
does not comment on titles currently in negotiation, and currently has no exclusive DVD 
distribution agreements with any production companies. Elite specialized in horror 
releases on laserdisc, but has seen most of those titles picked up by other companies for 
DVD. It is unsure how aggressive Elite will be with future DVD releases. 
Facets Multimedia 
A rather small but prestigious independent distributor of small indie and foreign films on 
home video. Unfortunately, they are currently not supporting DVD. 
Fine Line Features 
The "art film" division of New Line Cinema. All titles exclusively distributed on DVD by 
New Line. 
Full Moon Pictures 
A "B" movie/horror film production company. Currently self-distributes their own titles 
on DVD. 
Gramercy Films* 
Initially, Gramercy used various distributors for their theatrical product, but has since 
become a complete subsidiary of Polygram Entertainment.  
Hallmark Entertainment 
The acclaimed home of many award-winning Hallmark Hall Of Fame television 
miniseries and movies. Recently acquired by Artisan, who solely distributes their 
product on DVD. 
HBO Home Video 
Most obviously well-known for their cable television films, HBO does produce some 
theatrical films as well, and acts as their own distributor for DVD. 
Hollywood Pictures 
Another live-action division of Walt Disney Pictures, they have since ceased operations 
and been folded into Touchstone Pictures. All their catalog titles exclusively distributed 




The largest supplier of laserdiscs in North America, Image was hit a bit hard by the fast 
acceptance of DVD. They enjoyed large distribution contracts with the majors for 
laserdisc, but most of those studios are taking charge of their DVD output themselves. 
Image is now negotiating for the same limited number of catalog titles with the likes of 
Elite, Anchor Bay and Criterion. Image does not comment on titles currently in 
negotiation, and currently has no exclusive DVD distribution agreements with any 
production companies. 
King's Road 
A small independent film production company, they recently licensed many titles to 
Trimark for DVD release. 
Lightstorm Entertainment* 
Currently, Lightstorm exclusively uses 20th Century Fox as their distributor, although a 
few of their productions (Titanic, Terminator 2) have been distributed or co-distributed 
by other studios. But, for all intents and purposes, 20th Century Fox is the main 
distributor of Lightstorm productions. 
Lucasfilm* 
Uses 20th Century Fox as their distributor, both theatrically and on home video. 
However, some older Lucasfilm productions (most notably the Indiana Jones films) have 
gone through Paramount. 
Magic Lantern 
A recent partnership between two known VHS and laserdisc distributors, VCI and The 
Roan Group, Magic Lantern licenses all their titles, and specializes in cult, horror and 
exploitation films, presenting them in high-quality special editions. 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) 
MGM Home Entertainment acts as a known DVD distributor for its own theatrical films, 
as well as Turner Entertainment, United Artists and Eon Productions. Also, MGM 
recently bought Orion Pictures, which has been folded completely into MGM. Orion's 
library contained over 1,000 films. However, Orion had signed DVD licensing 
arrangements with other companies before the buyout, and those contracts are being 
honored by MGM. Once those licensing agreements expire (in around two to three 
years), MGM will retain full distribution rights over Orion titles. 
Miramax Films 
Although they are physically distributed by Buena Vista Home Entertainment, and used 
to license many of their titles to The Criterion Collection on laserdisc, they have recently 




A smaller production and licensing company, who recently sold a large number of their 
catalog titles to Polygram for distribution. 
New Line Cinema 
They current distribute their own New Line Cinema and Fine Line Features titles on 
DVD 
October Films* 
Initially, October used various distributors for their theatrical product, but has since 
become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Universal Pictures. Any future October 
productions will be distributed on DVD by Universal. 
Orion Pictures* 
A pretty big independent up until their recent Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. They have 
since been bought by MGM. However, many Orion titles (Dances With Wolves, 
Robocop, etc.) were previously licensed on DVD to Image and Criterion. MGM is 
honoring those contracts, but as soon as they are up (in 2-5 years depending on title), all 
rights will revert back to MGM exclusively, who can them re-release them on DVD or 
license them again. 
Paramount Pictures 
Another big major. They self-distribute their own films, and have recently begun to co-
produce some films with the likes of DreamWorks SKG, Touchstone Pictures and 20th 
Century Fox.  
Phoenix Pictures 
A small independent production house, it uses Columbia Tri-Star for home video 
distribution exclusively. 
Pioneer Home Video 
Pioneer Home Video is a subsidiary of Pioneer Electronics (the major source of 
LaserDisc players and Laser-Karaoke), and handles (obviously) all home video releases. 
Pioneer licensed (through 2001) many titles for LaserDisc from the majors, and produces 
many special editions. However, Pioneer does not release DVD titles (aside from 
Karaoke and music titles), so many of their great laserdisc special editions remain 
unavailable on DVD. Some studios have started to buy or license the supplements 
produced by Pioneer to release them on DVD (such as Artisan with Sophie's Choice and 
the upcoming Basic Instinct SE). However, some companies have simply released movie 
only-editions of titles that are available as Pioneer Special Editions on laserdisc (like 




Although having been around for decades, Polygram has only r recently begun to attempt 
to move aggressively into the major's theatrical territory. They currently distribute their 
own Polygram Filmed Entertainment titles on DVD, and recently acquired the complete 
Nelson Entertainment catalog of films, which included many early AVCO Embassy 
films. Also, they entered into a distribution agreement with Castle Rock and Manga 
Entertainment for select title releases only. 
Republic Pictures 
A subsidiary of Spelling Films, Republic was closed down, with their catalog of titles 
licensed to Artisan for DVD release. 
Simitar 
Currently self-distributes their own titles. 
Sony Music / Sony Wonder 
Although a subsidiary of Sony Entertainment, Sony Wonder and Sony Music act as their 
own DVD distributors, and DO NOT go through Columbia Tri-Star Home Video. 
Sony Pictures 
The "parent" company that owns Columbia Tri-Star, amongst others. Uses Columbia 
exclusively for DVD distribution. 
Sony Pictures Classics 
The "art film" division of Sony Pictures. Uses Columbia exclusively for DVD 
distribution. 
Touchstone Pictures 
Essentially the live-action division of Walt Disney pictures. Exclusively distributed by 
Buena Vista Home Entertainment.  
20th Century Fox 
20th Century Fox holds a large catalog of self-produced titles. Fox also has exclusive 
distribution rights with such major producers as Lucasfilm Ltd. and James Cameron's 
Lightstorm Entertainment. 
Trimark 
Best known for their adventurous streak in film production, Trimark mainly deals in 





Is exclusively distributed by MGM. 
Universal Pictures 
A long-standing major studio. Universal Home Entertainment currently acts as a known 
distributor for the following production companies: Amblin Entertainment (see above), 
Gramercy Pictures, Alphaville Pictures, and, of course, Universal Pictures itself (formerly 
known as MCA/Universal).  
Vestron Pictures 
A big "B" movie supplier in the 70's and 80's, they have since gone bankrupt. Most of 
their titles are now owned and distributed exclusively by Artisan. 
Walt Disney Pictures 
Exclusively distributed by Buena Vista Home Entertainment (Disney's home video 
division). Please note that Disney does occasionally license some titles on DVD to 
independents, most recently Anchor Bay. 
Warner Bros. 
Castle Rock Entertainment and Rhino Records (select titles only), New Regency Pictures 
and Icon Entertainment. Also, they distribute Warner Music Group, MGM (through Feb. 
2000) and New Line DVD titles domestically, but are not directly responsible for title 
selection (see the appropriate Warner Music, MGM and New Line sections for that). 
Warner Music Group 
Although a subsidiary of Time Warner, Warner Music handles their own DVD music 
video releases under their Special Projects group. They currently act only as a distributor 







Appendix 6.1:  Conference on Fair Use Participants 
 
CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE PARTICIPANTS 
ALLIANCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOFTWARE INNOVATION (APSI) 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE (AAAS) 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY COLLEGES (AACC) 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES (AALL) 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS (AAM) 
AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY (ACS) 
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES (ACLS) 
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION (ACE) 
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION (ALA) 
AMERICAN MUSICOLOGICAL SOCIETY (AMS) 
AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY (APS) 
AMERICAN PRINTING HOUSE FOR THE BLIND (APHB) 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS (ASCAP) 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF JOURNALISTS AND AUTHORS (ASJA) 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MEDIA PHOTOGRAPHERS (ASMP) 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PICTURE PROFESSIONALS (ASPP) 
ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION MEDIA AND EQUIPMENT (AIME) 
ASSOCIATION FOR INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY (AIT) 
ASSOCIATION OF ACADEMIC HEALTH SCIENCES LIBRARIES (AAHSL) 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (AACU) 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES (AAMC) 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS (AAP) 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES (AAU) 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITY PRESSES (AAUP) 
ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (AAMD) 
ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES (ACRL) 
ASSOCIATION OF RECORDED SOUND COLLECTIONS (ARSC) 
ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES (ARL) 
ASSOCIATION OF TEST PUBLISHERS (ATP) 
ART LIBRARIES SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA (ARLIS/NA) 
AUTHORS GUILD, INC./AUTHORS REGISTRY, INC. (AG/AR) 
BROADCAST MUSIC INCORPORATED (BMI) 
BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (BSA) 
CENTER FOR COMPUTER-ASSISTED RESEARCH IN HUMANITIES (CCARH) 
CHURCH MUSIC PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION (CMPA) 
COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION (CAA) 
COLLEGE MUSIC SOCIETY (CMS) 
COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (CCIA) 
CONSORTIUM OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY MEDIA CENTERS (CCUMC) 
COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER (CCC) 
COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT SERVICES (CMS) 
COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (CS) 
COUNCIL OF LITERARY MAGAZINES AND PRESSES (CLMP) 
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CREATIVE INCENTIVE COALITION (CIC) 
EDUCOM/COALITION FOR NETWORKED INFORMATION (EDUCOM/CNI) 
FIRST CHURCH OF CHRIST SCIENTIST (FCCS) 
GRAPHIC ARTISTS GUILD (GAG) 
INDIANA PARTNERSHIP FOR STATEWIDE EDUCATION (IPSE) 
INFORMATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (IIA) 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY COUNCIL (ITIC) 
INSTITUTE FOR LEARNING TECHNOLOGIES (ILT) 
INSTRUCTIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL (ITC) 
INTERACTIVE MULTIMEDIA ASSOCIATION (IMA) 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL & MEDICAL PUBLISHERS 
(IASTMP) 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE (IIPA) 
J. PAUL GETTY TRUST 
MAGAZINE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION (MPA) 
MAJOR ORCHESTRA LIBRARIANS ASSOCIATION (MOLA) 
MEDICAL LIBRARY ASSOCIATION (MLA) 
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (MPAA) 
MUSIC EDUCATORS NATIONAL CONFERENCE (MENC) 
MUSIC LIBRARY ASSOCIATION (MLA) 
MUSIC PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION (MPA) 
MUSIC TEACHERS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (MTNA) 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS (NAB) 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOLS OF MUSIC (NASM) 
NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE PROMOTION OF HISTORY (NCCPH) 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS OF MATHEMATICS (NCTM) 
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (NEA) 
NATIONAL MUSIC PUBLISHERS ASSOCCIATION (NMPA) 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (NPR) 
NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION (NSBA) 
NATIONAL SCIENCE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (NSTA) 
NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (NAM) 
OHIOLINK 
PICTURE AGENCY COUNCIL OF AMERICA (PACA) 
PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM (PBS) 
RECORDING FOR THE BLIND & DYSLEXIC (RFB&D) 
RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (RIAA) 
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 
SOCIETY OF MUSIC THEORISTS (SMT) 
SOFTWARE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION (SPA) 
SONNECK SOCIETY FOR AMERICAN MUSIC (SSAM) 
SPECIAL LIBRARIES ASSOCIATION (SLA) 
THE COPYRIGHT GROUP 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS/NATIONAL DIGITAL LIBRARY PROGRAM 
U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LIBRARIES AND INFORMATION SCIENCE (NCLIS) 
U.S. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS (NEA) 
U.S. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES (NEH) 
U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE (NLM) 
U.S. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF) 





WRITTEN STATEMENTS SUBMITTED TO CONFU 
[The following submitted written statements at the CONFU meeting on September 21, 1994.] 
ALLIANCE TO PROMOTE SOFTWARE INNOVATION 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY COLLEGES 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES 
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES 
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION 
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION 
ASSOCIATION OF ACADEMIC HEALTH SCIENCES LIBRARIES 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITY PRESSES 
ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES 
ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES 
BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE 
COLLEGE ART ASSOCIATION 
CONSORTIUM OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY MEDIA CENTERS 
COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER 
CREATIVE INCENTIVE COALITION 
DAVID NIMMER 
EDUCOM 
INFORMATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS 
MEDICAL LIBRARY ASSOCIATION 
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE UNIVERSITIES AND LAND GRANT COLLEGES 
NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE PROMOTION OF HISTORY 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS OF MATHEMATICS 
OHIOLINK 
RECORDING FOR THE BLIND & DYSLEXIC 
RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 
SOFTWARE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION 
THE COPYRIGHT GROUP 
U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 





Appendix 6.2:  DMCA Timeline  




The following table illustrates the major actions undertaken to pass the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.   The left column follows the passage of the DMCA 
while the right column tracks legislation that either competed with or became part 
of the final version of the DMCA.   
 
 
    
July 1997   
 
7/29/97 -- H.R. 2281 "WIPO Copyright 
Treaties Implementation Act" 
Introduced -- referred to House 
Committee on the Judiciary  
 
 
August 1997  
 
 8/7/97 -- H.R. 2281 referred to House 
Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property  
 
 
 September 1997   
 
9/16/97 -- H.R. 2281 Subcommittee 
Hearings held  
 




        
 July 1997   
 
 7/17/97 -- H.R. 2180  "On-Line 
Copyright Limitation Act" Introduced -- 




 7/21/97 -- H.R. 2180 referred to 
House Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property  
 
  
 August 1997   
 
 September 1997   
 
 9/3/97 -- S. 1146 "Digital Copyright 
Clarification and Technology Education 
Act of 1997" Introduced -- referred to 
Senate Committee on Judiciary  
 
 
 9/4/97 -- S. 1146 Committee on 




 9/16/97 -- H.R. 2180 Subcommittee 
Hearings held  
 
 
 October 1997   
 
 10/9/97 -- H.R. 2652 "Collections of 
Information Antipiracy Act"  Introduced -




 10/17/97 -- H.R. 2652 referred to 




Intellectual Property  
 
10/23/97 -- H.R. 2652 Subcommittee 
Hearings held  
 
 
 November 1997   
 
 11/13/97 -- H.R. 3048 "Digital Era 
Copyright Enhancement Act" 
Introduced -- referred to House 
COmmittee on the Judiciary  
 
 
 11/24/97 -- H.R. 3048 referred to 
Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property  
 
 
 December 1997 - January 1998   
 
 No official action   
 
 February  1998   
 
 2/12/98 -- H.R. 2180 reintroduced as  
H.R. 3209, referral to Judiciary  
 
 
 March  1998   
 
 3/18/98 -- H.R. 2652 subcommittee 
mark-up  
 
 3/24/98 -- H.R. 2652 full committee 
mark-up  
 
 April  1998   
 
 4/1/98 -- H.R. 3209 merged with H.R. 
2281 during mark-up of House 
Committee on the Judiciary -- no 





 May  1998   
 
 5/6/98 -- S. 2037 "Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998" Introduced -- 
Placed on the calendar in the Senate  
 
 5/11/98 -- S. 2037 Report filed by Sen. 
Hatch -- S. Rept. 105-190  
 
 5/12/98 -- H.R. 2652 reported to House 
and placed on the Union Calendar  
 
 5/14/98 -- S. 2037 put before Senate 
and passes on a voice vote  
 
 5/19/98 -- H.R. 2652 called up in the 
House under a suspension of the rules 
and passes by a voice vote.  
 




 June  1998   
 
 July  1998   
 
 7/10/98 -- S. 2291 "Collections of 
Infromation Antipiracy Act" Introduced -- 






 August  1998   
 
 September  1998   
 
 9/17/98 -- S. 2037 discarded -- 
amended language substitued for 
language in H.R. 2281  
 
 
 9/18/98 -- Message on Senate action 
sent to House  
 
 
 October  1998   
 
 10/13/98 -- S. 2291 reffered to Senate 
Subcommittee on Technology, 







Appendix 6.3:  Partial Media Regulations Timeline (from Bill Moyer’s 
NOW) 
 
1941 Local Radio Ownership Rule, National TV Ownership Rule enacted. A 
broadcaster cannot own television stations that reach more than 35% of 
the nation's homes. 
1946 Dual Television Network Rule enacted, prohibiting a major network from buying another major network. 
1964 Local TV Multiple Ownership Rule enacted, prohibiting a broadcaster 
from owning more than one television station in the same market, unless 
there are at least eight stations in the market. 
1970 Radio/TV Cross-Ownership Restriction enacted, prohibiting a 
broadcaster from owning a radio station and a television station in the 
same market. 
1975 Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Prohibition enacted. Bans 
ownership of both a newspaper and a television station in the same 
market.  
1981 Reagan Administration deregulation under the leadership of FCC 
Chairman Mark Fowler. Deregulatory moves, some made by Congress, 
others by the FCC included extending television licenses to five years 
from three in 1981. The number of television stations any single entity 
could own grew from seven in 1981 to 12 in 1985. (Museum of 
Television and Radio) 
1985 Guidelines for minimal amounts of non-entertainment programming are 
abolished. FCC guidelines on how much advertising can be carried per 
hour are eliminated. 
1987 "Fairness Doctrine" eliminated. At its founding the FCC viewed the 
stations to which it granted licenses as "public trustee" — and required 
that they made every reasonable attempt to cover contrasting points of 
views. The Commission also required that stations perform public 
service in reporting on crucial issues in their communities. Soon after he 
became FCC Chairman under President Reagan, Michael Fowler stated 
his desire to do away with the Fairness Doctrine. His position was 
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backed by a 1987 D.C. Circuit Court decision, Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 
which ruled that the doctrine was not mandated by Congress and the 
FCC no longer had to enforce it. (Full history of the Fairness Doctrine)  
February 8, 
1996 
President Clinton signs the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It is 
generally regarded as the most important legislation regulating media 
ownership in over a decade. The radio industry experiences 
unprecedented consolidation after the 40-station ownership cap is lifted. 
Clear Channel Communications owns 1200 stations, in all 50 states, 
reaching, according to their Web site, more than 110 million listeners 
every week. Viacom's Infinity radio network holds more than 180 radio 
stations in 41 markets. Its holdings are concentrated in the 50 largest 
radio markets in the United States. In 1999 Infinity owned and operated 
six of the nation’s Top 10 radio stations.  
July 17, 2001 Senate Commerce Committee hears panelists speak about media 
ownership. Senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC) expresses concerns about 
media consolidation. Mel Karmazin (President and COO, Viacom), Alan 
Frank (CEO, Post-Newsweek Stations, Inc.), Jack Fuller (President, 
Tribune Publishing Company), William Baker (President, WNET, New 
York City), Gene Kimmelman (Co-Director, Consumer's Union), and 
Professor Eli M. Noam (Columbia Business School) in attendance.  
October 29, 
2001 
FCC conducts a roundtable on media ownership policies. Government 




A train carrying hazardous materials derails at 1:30 a.m. in Minot, North 
Dakota, spilling 210,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia in an incident 
federal regulators call "catastrophic". Clear Channel Communications 
owns six out the seven commercial stations in Minot. Minot authorities 
say when they called with the warning about the toxic cloud, there was 
no one on the air who could've made the announcement. Clear Channel 
says someone was there who could have activated an emergency 
broadcast. But Minot police say nobody answered the phones. (The 
Associated Press, January 14, 2003 - "A year after derailment, the land 
has healed, mostly, but what of the people who live in Minot?" by Blake 
Nicholson). (At the Senate Commerce Committee hearing on January 
14, 2003, Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) cites Minot as an example of 
how consolidated media can negatively affect a local community. THE 
NEW YORK TIMES reported on the Minot radio station market again 
on March 29, 2003 in "On Minot, N.D., Radio, a Single Corporate 
Voice") 
September 7, THE NEW YORK TIMES reports that the FCC will conduct a review of 
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2002 media ownership rules, as mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 
1996. The FCC commissions several studies of the media marketplace to 
review the rules on an empirical basis. They start the review in 
September, 2002.  
September 9, 
2002 
According to our survey, ABC's WORLD NEWS THIS MORNING is 
the only network show to acknowledge the FCC's announcement - at 
4:40 in the morning. The report, in its entirety: Liz Cho, ABC News: 
"Government regulators reportedly are likely to allow the country's 
media giants to get even bigger. THE NEW YORK TIMES says the 
Federal Communications Commission is reviewing media ownership 
rules this week. Among other things, current rules prevent a newspaper 
from owning a TV station in the same city or a network from owning 
stations that serve more than 35 percent of the national market."  
October 1, 
2002 
FCC releases 12 studies on the media marketplace. The studies comment 
on how Americans get their news, the state of television, newspaper, and 
radio industries, and a variety of other media issues.  
January 2, 
2003 
Comments on media ownership due to the FCC. Viacom (owner of CBS 
and UPN), General Electric (owner of NBC), and News Corporation's 
Fox Entertainment Group, among others, file a request with the FCC that 
all media ownership rules be eliminated. They argue that the rules are 
outdated in the internet age, when average Americans have access to 
media through countless forms and outlets. (WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, January 3, 2003 - "Media Companies Seek End to All 
Ownership Rules," by Yochi J. Dreazen) (Read the comments filed.) 
January 14, 
2003 
Senate Commerce Committee hearing - Chairman Powell and 
Commissioners Abernathy, Adelstein, Copps, and Martin in attendance. 
Senators Ernest Hollings (D-SC), John McCain (R-AZ), Byron Dorgan 
(D-ND) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) are among the participants. Powell 
declares there won't be radical changes to the current media ownership 
rules in response to Senators' concerns. Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) 
cites Minot as an example of how consolidated media can negatively 
affect a local community. 
January 16, 
2003 
Columbia Law School holds forum on media ownership. Chairman 
Powell and the four other FCC Commissioners attend. Discussions on 
news and civic discourse, entertainment, localism, and the business of 
media. Panelists include television executives (including Martin Franks 
from CBS Television), journalists, academics, union representatives, 






Chairman Powell writes an op-ed in USA TODAY "The time has come 
to honestly and fairly examine the facts of the modern marketplace and 
build rules that reflect the digital world we live in today, not the bygone 
era of black-and-white television."  
"Joe Friday knew that only the facts would help him unravel a case. It is 
the same with this critically important FCC policy review. Only the facts 
will enable us to craft broadcast-ownership restrictions that ensure a 
diverse and vibrant media marketplace for the 21st century."  
January 30, 
2003 
Senate Commerce Committee hearing on media ownership - L. Lowry 
Mays (Clear Channel), Edward Fritts (National Association of 
Broadcasters), Don Henley (Recording Artists Coalition), Robert Short 




Thirty Congressmen sign a letter to Chairman Powell criticizing the FCC 
for not adequately publicizing the media ownership debate and rushing 
the rules-changing process to favor major media outlets.  
February 17, 
2003 
The Project for Excellence in Journalism releases a five-year study of 
local television news, "Does Ownership Matter in Local Television 
News?" They found that TV stations owned by smaller media firms 
generally produce better newscasts; are better at local reporting; produce 
longer stories ; and do fewer softball celebrity features. The study 
concludes that ... "Changes that encourage heavy concentration of 
ownership ... In local television ... By a few large corporations ... Will 
erode the quality of news Americans receive."LA Times, February 17, 
2003 - "Smaller Stations Fare Better in Local TV News," by Edmund 
Sanders, )  
February 27, 
2003 
FCC holds its only official public hearing on media ownership rules in 
Richmond, VA. Chairman Powell and the other four commissioners 
make statements, panels discuss diversity, competition, and localism. 
Panelists include television and radio executives, journalists, academics, 
union representatives, media advocacy groups, and economists. (Press 
release, program, and presentations)  
March 19, 
2003 
Senator Wayne Allard (R-CO), Senator Susan Collins (R-ME), and 
Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME) write a letter to Chairman Powell 
calling for a broader public debate in the FCC's media ownership review. 
("Senators Want Input on Media Rules," Mediaweek.com)  
April 1, 2003 A group of lawmakers write to FCC Chairman Powell urging him to 
keep to his proposed schedule to present the ownership rules decision by 
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June 2, 2003. (Read the full letter, signed by Rep. Billy Tauzin, R-La., 
Sen. John Breaux, Reps. Roy Blunt, R-Mo., John Shimkus, R-Ill., Vito 
Fossella, R-N.Y., Mary Bono, R-Calif., George Radanovich, D-Calif., 
and Pete Sessions, R-Texas, and Sens. Gordon Smith, R-Ore., John 
Ensign, R-Nev., and George Allen, R-Va.)  
June 2, 2003 The FCC revised its limits for broadcast ownership (read Media 
Ownership Rule Changes) but multiple parties appealed this decision. 
The cases were consolidated and assigned to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit, which stayed the effective date of the new rules. 
July 23, 2003 The House voted 400-21 to approve a spending bill that included a 
provision to block the FCC decision to allow major television networks 
to own up to 45% of the country's viewers. The Bush administration has 
voiced opposition to the attempt to rescind the FCC ruling.  
September 3, 
2003 
A federal appeals court in Philadelphia issued an order blocking the rule 
changes from taking effect. (Read the ruling.)  
September 4, 
2003 
The Senate Appropriations Committee passed a spending bill that 




Congress introduced a "resolution of disapproval" to nullify the new 
FCC rules which passed in the Senate 55-40 (with overwhelming 
bipartisan support); however, Republicans in the House have vowed not 
to pass the legislation. Read the resolution. 
October 8, 
2003 
NBC said it would purchase the entertainment arm of Vivendi Universal 
for $3.8 billion. See what the "Big Six" own now.  
November 5, 
2003 
A letter signed by 208 members of Congress is sent to House Speaker 
Dennis Hastert requesting the full House be allowed to consider the 
resolution of disapproval passed in the Senate on September 16, 2003. 
Read the letter.  
November 24, 
2003 
In a last minute deal Senate Republican leaders and the White House 
compromised on the TV station ownership cap. It was increased just 
enough to allow Viacom and News Corporation to keep all their stations 
(39% limit).  
December 8, 
2003 - January 
22, 2004 
Omnibus spending bill incorporating the ownership cap adjustment 
passed first by the House on December 8, 2003, and by the Senate on 
January 22, 2004.  
January 6, 
2004 
At the Smith Barney Citigroup Global Entertainment, Media and 
Telecommunications Conference, Sumner Redstone, Chairman and CEO 
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of Viacom remarks that "2004 will be a breakout year for Viacom." 
Media reporters speculate that 2004 will be a year of mergers. 
January 28, 
2004 
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") released its tenth 
annual report on competition in the market for the delivery of video 
programming. The report examines the status of competition, discusses 
changes that have occurred in the competitive environment over the last 
year, and describes barriers to competition that continue to exist. The 
FCC released the report at an open meeting in San Antonio, Texas.  
January 29, 
2004 
The Consumer's Union released its new national survey of where people 
turn for local news. The survey found "newspapers are more than twice 
as important a source than the Federal Communications Commission 
determined when it relaxed its media ownership rules."  
February 11, 
2004 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has scheduled a hearing for this date 
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